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Abstract 
The issue of safety in the workplace may be described as an area of both chronic and 
acute significance to workers, organisations, families and communities. The aim of 
my research was to develop and test a work-level model of safety climate by 
incorporating coworker commitment to safety with existing safety climate measures 
of manager and supervisor commitment to safety. Climate for social exchange, 
involving management, supervisor and coworker social exchange dynamics, was 
further proposed as a foundation climate supporting the development of facet-
specific safety climate.  The application of a levels-of-analysis approach to scale 
development recognises the hierarchical nature of organisations.  Using explicit 
organisation referents for both the social exchange and safety climate domains and 
was intended to clarify construct definition, distinction and interrelatedness issues.  
Self-report surveys completed by 342 front-line workers (excluding supervisors and 
managers) representing 120 functional work teams in 80 departments, across nine 
organisations (including contractor affiliates) formed the main cross-sectional 
sample. Organisations providing less than ten valid front-line worker responses were 
excluded when describing organisational safety climate profiles (N=6) and work 
groups with less than two valid responses were excluded form group level analysis 
(N=77).   Factor structures and predictive models of climate variables were examined 
using individual and group-level data, allowing the direct comparison of results 
obtained using different aggregation methodologies.  Results indicated that 
supportive climates for social exchange provide a foundation for the development of 
positive safety climates at aligned work-levels.  The emergent factor structures of 
organisation and group-level safety climate, reflecting management and supervisor’s 
commitment to safety, differed when analysed using individual and group-level 
analyses.  A strong relationship was found between global safety climate and the 
safety behaviours of workers; however the hypothesised safety climate safety 
behaviour  injuries/ incidents mediation model was supported when using group-
level analyses.  Larger predictive effects were observed for self-reported near miss 
incidents than for minor injuries, supporting the potential utility of this index in 
future research. The more proximal influences of coworker and supervisor safety 
climate subscales were found to mediate the more distal influence of management 
safety climate on workers’ safety behaviours. The three work-level safety climate 
xv 
 
 
dimensions (i.e. management, supervisor and coworker commitment to safety) fully 
mediated the effects of social exchange climate on individual safety performance, 
supporting a hierarchical psycho-social model of workplace safety.  It was concluded 
that incorporating the normative influence of coworkers and climate for social 
exchange in models of workplace safety, enhances our understanding of how the 
social context impacts workers’ safety perceptions and performance.  The application 
of a level-of-analysis approach to construct operationalisation and data treatment 
generates practical, theoretical and methodological challenges for future safety 
research.  
xvi 
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1. Introduction and Overview 
1.1. Introduction 
The issue of safety in the workplace may be described as an area of both chronic 
concern to employers and governments and of acute significance to employees, 
families and communities.  Australian safety statistics indicated that in the 2009-10 
financial year, 640 700 people or 5.3% of the working population experienced at 
least one injury in work-related incidents in the past 12 months (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011).  Of these workers 56 % required some time off work to recuperate. 
Even though the major consequences of workplace incidents are generally only 
minor injuries, workplace fatalities are still too frequent an occurrence.  Excluding 
fatalities due to work-related traffic accidents on public roads, Safe Work Australia 
reported 111 deaths in 2009-2010, down from 151 in 2008-09 and 134 in 2007-08 
(Safe Work Australia, 2010). 
 
Even though work-related injury and fatality rates in Australia appear to be on the 
decline the total economic cost of work-related illness and injuries has been 
estimated at $57.5 billion dollars or 5.9 % of GDP for the 2008-09 financial year 
(Safe Work Australia, 2010).  Safe Work Australia reported 134 835 serious 
compensation claims being made in 2007-08 at an average claim payment of $6 900.  
While estimates of the direct financial costs of workplace accidents to industry and 
the community can be extrapolated from lost work hours, medical costs and 
insurance claims, such figures may under estimate the real financial costs involved, 
as a significant proportion (36%) of workers who experience injuries choose not to 
pursue compensation claims (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). Yet beyond the 
immediate economic costs, it is far more difficult to capture the full extent of 
personal suffering experienced by accident victims and their families, as the effects 
may well impact on individuals’ short and long term physical, psychological, social 
and financial wellbeing. 
 
It is often not until media attention is focused on specific cases of personal tragedy or 
major accidents that the significance of safety in the workplace is raised to a more 
global level and our communities begin to question “how could this have happened?”  
One such example was the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and fire in April 2010 
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in which 11 people lost their lives and 17 others were injured.  However beyond the 
personal injury toll experienced at Deepwater Horizon, the environmental, social and 
economic ramifications of this event continue to impact affected communities. 
Despite the drama and tragedy of such large scale incidents briefly capturing local 
and worldwide media attention, the consequences of day-to-day workplace accidents 
are more often endured by the families of victims, workmates, corporations involved 
and local communities with little acknowledgement.  Whether large or small scales, 
root causes of accidents are inevitably sought by industry investigators and the legal 
responsibility of accident causation examined by governing authorities, however just 
as the overarching personal, social and economic costs of accidents are hard to 
ascertain so too are the underlying causes of accidents.  
 
Investigating why accidents occur and finding ways to improve workplace safety 
practices are areas that have long been of interest to organisational psychologists 
(e.g.,  Heinrich, 1931).  Importantly, in recent years, research into the behavioural 
aspects of occupational safety has shifted emphasis away from describing lagging 
indicators, such as accidents and injuries rates, to focus on more complex models of 
leading indicators, including individual and organisational factors that support or 
prohibit safe behaviours by employees (Flin, 2003; Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 
1998). Within this context, the safety climate of an organisation has been proposed as 
a key indicator of  safety performance (Zohar, 1980). While safety climate 
instruments have continued to gain support from academics and practitioners, 
explanatory models examining the process through which safety climate influences 
the safety performance of individuals have been limited in number and scope (Flin, 
2007).  In addition the typical treatment of safety climate as an individual- level 
construct rather than a group-level construct has been criticised (Zohar, 2003, 2010).   
 
The overall aim of this research is therefore to expand our understanding of the link 
between organisational climate and safety outcomes by developing and evaluating a 
psycho-social model of safety climate in an Australian sample using a levels-of-
analysis approach as recently recommended by Zohar (2010). This approach 
recognises that in organisational settings any investigations should acknowledge and 
respect the extant hierarchies or functional work-levels operating in that specific 
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context. For example safety constructs should be operationalised at the relevant 
work-level and data collected from, aggregated to and evaluated at the corresponding 
levels. To address the need for stronger theoretical grounding in safety climate 
research my explanatory model will be developed within the context of social 
exchange theory.  This approach fits well within the framework for organisational 
research recommended by Bennett, Cook and Pelletier (2003). A summary of how 
aspects of Bennett et al.’s conceptual framework have been used to guide the 
development of my research is discussed in the next section.   
 
1.2. Conceptual framework 
In an attempt to promote more theoretically and methodologically rigorous research 
in the field of Organisation Health, Bennett et al.’s (2003) framework highlights the 
importance of understanding organisations in terms of both the external and internal 
contexts in which they operate.  Whereas Bennett et al.’s seven core themes 
originally focused on organisational health; when adapted to a safety context (see 
Table 1.1) they provided a meaningful framework for the development of this thesis.  
 
Table 1.1 Conceptual Framework of Research into Organisational Safety  
 
Theme Postulates of Organisation Safety 
1 Multidimensional Recognition of multiple dimensions of safety. 
2 Multilevel Multiple levels of analysis and cross-level 
interrelationships should be taken into 
considered. 
3 Self-assessment adaptability Consideration given to ongoing monitoring of 
safety levels and adaptive responses associated 
with the multidimensional and multilevel 
components of safety. 
4 Effort in safety promotion Implementation of multilevel, proactive safety 
programs and policies 
5 Fitness/Congruence Consideration given to safety congruence both 
between organisation and external environment 
and within organisation components. 
(table continues) 
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Table 1.1 (continued)  
Theme Postulates of Organisation Safety 
6 Core tensions Awareness of core tensions involved in 
maintaining optimal safety 
7 Regression/ Development Awareness of the cycles of growth, regression 
and deterioration of organisation vitality which 
may affect safety efforts 
Note.  Adapted from (Bennett et al., 2003) 
 
The first theme, multidimensionality, postulates that a safe organisation considers 
multiple dimensions of employees’ safety including subjective and objective data.  
Implications of this theme in the development of my research include the need to 
critically appraise the utility and validity of current safety climate measures and the 
various indicators of safety outcomes including dimensions of individual and 
organisational safety performance, including accidents, injuries and near miss 
incidents.  Figure 1.1 illustrates an overarching conceptualisation of a multilevel 
model of safety climate which has been based largely on Reason’s (1997) Swiss 
cheese model of organisational safety and the seminal work of Zohar (2003, 2010). 
The graphic identifies near misses, accidents and injuries as separate but related 
outcomes of active and latent failures in safety systems and culture. 
National (Political, 
Social, Economic)
Industry (Regulators)
Organisation 
(Managers)
Work team 
(Superviors & Co-Workers)
Individual
Adapted from Reason (1997)
Active & latent 
Failures 
Ecological Model of Embedded Cultures and Multilevel Organisational Safety Climate
 
Figure 1.1. Ecological model of embedded cultures and multilevel organisational 
safety climate. 
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The second theme focuses on the nested or multilevel nature of organisations.  In my 
study, a work-level approach is used in the development of all climate measures and 
analytical techniques employed.  Particular attention is paid to the use of appropriate 
referent points (self, work group, supervisor and top management) in the generation 
of survey items. Model specification also delineates the level of aggregation applied 
for statistical analysis.  Figure 1.2 illustrates the specific work-levels of interest in 
my thesis, being organisational level safety behaviours of managers and group level 
behaviours of front-line supervisors and workers. In accordance with Zohar’s (2010) 
level-of-analysis approach this graphic illustrates how data collection can be 
conducted at the different levels supporting multi- and cross-level analysis.  In the 
data collection phase of my research three versions of the survey were developed and 
coded to facilitate data matching across work-levels. Responses from managers, 
supervisors and front-line workers were obtained however only front-line worker 
responses are examined in this thesis.   
 
 
Figure 1.2. Work-level conceptualisation of organisational safety climate. 
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The third theme identified in Bennett et al.’s (2003) framework is concerned with 
self-assessment adaptability.  In terms of my adaptation this focuses on both the 
researcher’s and organisations’ commitment to ongoing monitoring of safety levels 
and adaptive responses to safety feedback. A priority of my study is to provide 
participant organisations with baseline appraisals of their safety standing, while 
championing the need for and benefits of ongoing (longitudinal) assessments. 
Questionnaires incorporate coding systems and confidential identifiers to allow data 
matching across time in future evaluations. 
 
Theme four, effort in safety promotion, highlights the importance of organisations 
acting on research feedback by implementing safety programs and improving 
policies.  Even though provision of an intervention/training workshop was not a part 
of my research, all participant organisations were provided with comprehensive 
feedback identifying areas for potential policy change and training needs. 
 
Theme five focuses on safety in terms of organisational fit - both external and 
internal.  Conducting inter and intra organisational research offers opportunities to 
identify similarities and differences in safety-related antecedents and outcome 
variables across and within industries. To facilitate external fit analysis, I recruited 
organisations from different industry groups including the mining, resource (oil and 
gas), transport, construction and manufacturing sectors. Internal fit is linked to 
multilevel analysis as mentioned above and includes the assessment of diversity and 
consensus amongst individuals and work-groups on safety indicators, such as climate 
strength and variability. 
 
Bennett et al.’s (2003) sixth theme relates to researchers having an awareness of the 
core tensions involved in maintaining optimal safety within an organisation.  This 
theme considers the degree of organisational alignment of “adaptive tensions” in 
terms of three main dimensions: stability versus chaos; coherence versus diversity 
and a slack versus tight fit.  Again the conceptual and statistical treatment of data in 
this study provides a measure of the coherence and fit of the group-level climate 
constructs operating within and between different organisations. While longitudinal 
data would provide an indication of the stability of the climate constructs over time 
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this important component was not assessed however provision was made for follow 
up data collection in the questionnaire design. 
 
Bennett’s et al.’s (2003) last theme recognises the process of both regression and 
development of an organisation’s experience.  Applied to a safety context this 
involves having an awareness of the cycles of growth and deterioration an 
organisation may go through and how these may affect safety efforts. From a top 
down perspective, this highlights the importance of understanding the broader 
political, social and economic context organisations operate within. This contextual 
component of the framework was critical in the initial sourcing and negotiations with 
participant organisations as data collection occurred within a period of economic 
volatility and labour market instability.  References to contextual factors are briefly 
described in the methodology chapter and are also taken into consideration in the 
final interpretation and discussion of results.  
 
This approach also allows us the opportunity to foster a greater appreciation of the 
impact safety incidents can have on organisational vitality and employees’ 
perceptions of the pervading culture of the organisation. This specifically relates to 
the retrospective design characteristics of my study.  Recently, the utilisation of both 
retrospective injury and accident statistics in safety research has been raised as a 
concern (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & Arthur, 2010).  Beus, Payne, et al. argue that 
studies choosing this type of data source should theoretically frame explanatory 
models in terms of injuries predicting safety climate rather than safety climate 
influencing injury rates. Despite this concern, retrospective designs in which safety 
climate is framed as a lead indicator of incidents and accidents have been and 
continue to be the most common study design reported in the extant safety literature, 
largely due to the methodological issues, such as attrition, and logistical difficulties 
associated with obtaining prospective injury data (whether subjective or objective) 
from organisations using longitudinal research.      
 
Bennett et al.’s (2003) framework provided a useful point of reference for the 
development of my research approach, however the main ideas and rationale for my 
thesis chiefly emerged from reviewing the seminal works of Zohar (Zohar, 1980, 
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2000, 2002a, 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005) and Hofmann and colleagues (Hofmann & 
Morgeson, 1999, 2004; Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003; Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1996). Subsequent commentaries on safety climate by Zohar (Zohar, 2008, 2010; 
Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008) and key meta-analyses in the domain (Beus, Payne, et 
al., 2010; Christian, Wallace, Bradley, & Burke, 2009; S. Clarke, 2006; Nahrgang, 
Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011) provide added support for the approach taken and my 
research objectives as discussed in the review of safety  literature outlined in the 
following section.   
 
Three of the four meta-analyses referred to in my study (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; S. 
Clarke & Ward, 2006; Nahrgang et al., 2011) utilised the  meta-analytic approach 
recommended by Hunter and Schmidt (2004), indicating a relatively consistent 
approach across reviews. With regard to the choice of using fixed or random effects 
modelling only Christian, et al., (2009) specified the use of random effects in their 
meta-analysis.  Both Clarke and Christian, et al., included only published articles in 
their meta-analysis, whereas Beus, Payne, et al. and Nahrgang also included 
unpublished studies and dissertations that complied with their inclusion criteria in 
their studies.  Given the different publication time frames covered in each of the four 
meta-analyses it was noted that the majority of overlapping studies in the four meta-
analysis represented all the key publications in the research domain over the past 
twenty years.  The inclusion criteria and handling of multiple reported effects with in 
the same research were all comprehensively described and relatively consistent 
across the studies.   
  
1.3. Thesis Overview 
The overarching aim of my study is to develop a model of safety climate and social 
exchange that examines climate indicators at multiple work-levels across the 
organisations.  A further aim is to examine potential differences in construct 
structures and relationships for the proposed model when analysed at both the 
individual and group-level.  Chapter 2 of my thesis focuses on the theoretical 
foundations and empirical findings relating to safety climate.  This review begins 
with a brief overview of issues in general climate research before moving on to more 
specific aspects of safety climate operationalisation, measurement options and 
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application in explanatory models.  My critique is intended to provide an 
understanding of relevant developments in the domain with a specific focus on 
current strengths and weakness in safety climate research. In particular I seek to 
justify the addition of coworkers (or mates in the Australian vernacular) as a focus of 
interest when operationalising safety climate measures.   
 
In Chapter 3, I examine various indicators of safety outcomes beginning with a 
description of two key measures of individual safety performance: compliance and 
participative behaviours.  Empirical evidence supporting the differential relationships 
between these behavioural outcomes and safety climate are presented.  I then move 
on to evaluate the variety of accident and injury-related outcome measures that have 
been used in the safety literature.  Often these have been linked to industry standards 
and have included statistics such as fatalities and lost-time injuries and more recently 
micro accidents and near miss incidents.  This review is intended to provide 
justification of the selection of outcome measures in my research. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a review of the leadership and group dynamics literature with a 
focus on the influences exerted by management and supervisor; and the more 
informal influences that coworkers have in establishing safety norms.  Social-
exchange theory is proposed as a theoretical basis for understanding the lateral and 
vertical workplace interactions operating within organisations.  Evidence supporting 
the operationalisation of social exchange as a foundation climate construct 
supporting the development of safety climate is also examined. The cross-sectional 
design of my study precludes the definitive testing of causal relations between study 
constructs, however evidence from both the safety and leadership literature is 
provided to support the temporal ordering of climate for social exchange as an 
antecedent of safety climate and performance.   
 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the rationale and methodology for my thesis are presented.  
Chapter 5 provides a summary of research objectives and rationale for the 
development of research hypotheses.  Chapter 6 presents the methodology applied in 
my study, including a description of organisation characteristics.  Chapter 6 also 
10 
Work-level Safety Model 
 
includes an account of measurement development and a summary of injury and 
incident statistics.   
 
The validation of the measures used in the study is the focus of Chapter 7.  I begin 
this chapter with a summary of procedures pertaining to assumption testing and 
missing data treatment.  The focus then shifts to the assessment of individual- level 
factor structures and psychometric properties of the individual safety behaviour, 
psychological safety climate and social exchange scales.  Exploratory factor analytic 
procedures and both item and scale-level confirmatory factor analyses are 
undertaken.  Examples of participant organisations’ safety climate profiles are also 
provided.  The chapter concludes with validation results for the group-level data and 
a brief discussion of results and their implications for the research domain. 
 
In Chapter 8, the predictive validity of a global model of safety climate and safety 
outcomes is examined.  Three methodological approaches for model testing are 
reported. To ground my results within existing empirical findings the first approach 
investigates the relationship between global safety climate, individual safety 
behaviours and safety outcomes using individual- level analysis.  In the second 
approach, constructs are aggregated to the group-level based on individual- level 
factor structures (ILSA approach) as described by Peterson and Castro (2006).  The 
final approach uses the Create Aggregate-level Scales (CSA)  method of data 
aggregation in which the assessment of factor structures is conducted at the intended 
level of aggregation.  Results for the three analytic approaches are interpreted and 
compared with past findings. 
 
Chapter 9 provides results of the analyses testing a stratified work-level model of 
safety climate incorporating social exchange as an antecedent of safety climate to 
investigate how the quality of social exchanges influences perceived safety climate 
and workers’ safety behaviours.  The three modelling approaches used in Chapter 8 
are repeated to support a direct comparison of individual and group-level results.  
 
In Chapter 10, I present an overarching discussion of the key findings and 
contribution of my research to the field.  I evaluate the methodological limitations 
11 
  Overview 
 
 
 
and strengths of my research, present the theoretical implications for researchers and 
the practical implications for safety practitioners and organisational leaders.  Ideas 
for future research are also presented.  My thesis concludes with comments on the 
benefits to be gained from applying a level-of-analysis approach to organisational 
safety, the significance of including coworkers in models of safety climate and the 
importance of understanding work-place social exchanges as foundations for the 
establishment of compliance and proactive safety norms.
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2. Safety Climate 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will review the theoretical foundations and empirical findings 
relating to safety climate with a specific focus on current strengths and weakness in 
the methodology of safety climate research.  Topics covered include: the distinction 
between psychological and organisational climate, the link between foundation and 
facet-specific climates, and specific use of referents in climate research. Zohar’s 
(2008, 2010) recommendations regarding the adoption of a level-of-analysis 
approach to safety climate research are examined and I consider the implications of 
ignoring the nested nature of data within organisations.  Where possible, meta-
analyses are used to identify important trends and differences in results for studies 
applying different construct treatments and statistical methodologies.  In the later 
sections of this chapter, attention is paid to the specific measurement of existing 
components of safety climate including climate level, strength and variability.  
 
2.2. Psychological and Organisational Climate 
Within any organisational setting, managers and employees are faced with a variety 
of goals and subsequently develop policies, procedures and practices to achieve these 
multiple objectives (Reichers & Schneider, 1990).  An individual’s perception or 
cognitive appraisal of the organisational environment results in the emergence of 
what has been termed a worker’s  psychological climate (R. J. James & Jones, 1974).  
Building on Locke’s  (1976) work on job-related values,  James and colleagues 
developed a hierarchical model of psychological climate (PC) to explain how 
individuals ascribe meaning and assess their relative wellbeing within their work 
setting (L. A. James & James, 1989; Jones & James, 1979).  Their PC model focused 
on workers’ perceptions of four key workplace attributes: leader support and 
facilitation; role stress and harmony; job challenge and autonomy; and workgroup 
cooperation, warmth and friendliness. 
 
In contrast, one of the key definitional aspects of climate research in organisations is 
the notion that the perceptions of relevant workplace conditions can be shared 
amongst employees.  Instead of the focus on individual perceptions in the PC 
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construct, organisational climate (OC) is said to represent the shared perceptions of 
workplace environments.  Organisational climate is measured by aggregating 
individual workers’ perceptions (PC) to provide an index of the “typical or average 
way people in an organisation ascribe meaning to that organisation” (R. J. James et 
al., 2008, p. 15).  Aggregation in multilevel research may be conducted at different 
work-levels to potentially derive a hierarchy of group or organisational climates. 
Payne has argued that for employee clusters to have “conceptual utility in helping to 
understand the functioning of organisations...[they] have to have some sensible 
socio-psychological identity...rooted in some formal or informal structured 
collectives such as work teams, work sites or departments” (R. Payne, 1990, p. 78).  
Furthermore, in multilevel research the questions researchers ask and utility of the 
climate indices they derive are linked to the compositional model they apply (Chan, 
1998).  
 
2.2.1. Composition Models 
To assist researchers apply the appropriate forms of aggregation in climate research 
Chan (1998) has provided a typology of composition models. He identified protocols 
based on the focus of research questions, the use of criteria for aggregation, and 
referents applied in the survey items.  The establishment of criteria to support data 
aggregation is considered important in research using consensus composition models 
(Bliese, 2000; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Zohar, 2003).  In the various consensus 
models within-group agreement on climate scores has been proposed as grounds for 
the aggregation of individual- level constructs (e.g., PC) to form the higher level 
construct (e.g., OC).  Consensus models are most commonly applied in 
organisational climate research as they generally align with the researchers’ overall 
objectives to examine antecedents and outcomes of climate level.  However, Chan 
has also described how indices of within group variance or climate strength may be 
used as a focal construct representing a group-level characteristic in multilevel 
dispersion models.  
 
Chan (1998) also makes the distinction between composition climate models with a 
focus on individual perceptions (e.g., PC and OC) and climates with a referent shift 
to the collective, in which the focus of item content shifts to the perceptions of others 
(e.g., Collective PC and OC). The use of the term collective climate for Chan’s 
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purposes refers to the application of a group rather than a self- referent and should 
not be confused with the statistical usage of the term in which collective climates are 
said to be formed through the statistical clustering of respondents on the basis of 
patterns of perceptual agreement on target scales (Jackofsky & Slocum, 1988; Joyce 
& Slocum, 1984). 
 
The utilisation of multilevel analysis in which the aggregation of data is applied to 
the group, department or organisation-level acknowledges that in organisations the 
shared experiences of group members cause dependence of observations and should 
therefore not be considered statistically independent (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998).  
Following on from his early climate research in the safety domain (Zohar, 2003, 
2008; Zohar & Luria, 2005), Zohar (2010) has more recently proposed that a level-
of-analysis approach to climate research in organisations should be adopted to help 
address the nonindependence issue.  In this stratified approach to construct 
development, clearly defined referents are used to improve the alignment of item 
work-level specific content within organisations. That is, constructs examining 
coworker or supervisor practices are examined at the group-level using a collective 
group referent (e.g., our supervisor communicates effectively with team members), 
while top level management practices, affecting a broader range of workers, may be 
aggregated and analysed at a higher level such as the department or organisation-
level. 
 
As the application of appropriate levels of analysis in climate research has not always 
been optimal, clarification of the link between theoretical definitions used, referents 
applied and levels of analysis undertaken have been raised as methodological issues 
warranting greater attention (R. J. James et al., 2008; Zohar, 2010).   More 
specifically in the safety domain, relatively few studies have used multilevel 
modelling with an application of composition models and collective referents to 
explore the shared nature of the construct as theoretically recommended (for 
exceptions see Hofmann et al., 2003; Simard & Marchand, 1995, 1997; Zohar, 2000, 
2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  
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2.3. Foundation and Facet-specific Climates 
In seeking to understand how workers make sense of their complex working 
environments, climate researchers  have also distinguished between foundation and 
facet-specific climates (Schneider & Bowen, 1993).  According to Schneider and 
Bowen, foundation climates represent the general climate in which employees 
operate. An example of a foundation climate index used in safety research is Neal, 
Griffin and Hart’s (2000) General Organisational Climate which outlined seven work 
environment factors (appraisal and recognition, goal congruence, role clarity, 
supportive leadership, participative decision making, professional growth, and 
professional interaction).  Two further examples of foundation climates recently 
investigated in relation to occupational safety include the climates for organisational 
support and management-employee relations (Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 2006).  
These two general constructs fit well within the leadership facilitation and support 
dimension originally identified in James and James’s (1989) model of psychological 
climate.  
 
In contrast, facet-specific climates pertain to a more restricted aspect of 
organisational operations such as safety, production or service orientation.  Zohar 
defined safety climate as the “shared perceptions among members of an 
organisation… of the safety policies, procedures and practices… that reflect the true 
priority of safety” in the workplace (Zohar, 2003, p.125).  Facet-specific climates 
may operate concurrently (e.g., work-ownership climate and safety climate; Zohar, 
2008) and often compete for priority, such as in the case of climate for safety versus 
productivity (Zohar, 2000, 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Importantly, when safety 
climate is considered as a social construct (Rochlin, 1999), attention is focused on 
the employees’ consensual interpretation of the enforced policies and enacted 
practices, rather than on the espoused set of formal policies or procedures in and of 
themselves (Zohar, 2003).  
 
Zohar (2008, 2010) recently proposed that understanding the pattern of relationships 
between general and facet-specific climates and workers’ perceptions of relative 
priorities and competing demands across the organisational hierarchy should be a 
central focus for future safety research.  This approach fits with the proposal “that the 
more general organisational climate provides a context in which specific evaluations 
16 
Work-level Safety Model 
 
of the importance of [facet-specific priorities] are made” (Neal et al., 2000, p. 100). 
Neal et al. proposed that general organisational climate would not only predict facet-
specific climates but that the facet-specific climate would mediate the influence of 
foundation climates on outcomes relevant to the domain of enquiry.  However, 
research in the safety domain that has investigated the relationship between 
foundation climates, facet-specific climate and outcomes has been relatively sparse 
(DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004; see Larsson, Pousette, & 
Törner, 2008; Neal et al., 2000; Silva, Lima, & Baptista, 2004; Wallace et al., 2006).  
 
In their seminal work, Neal et al. (2000) found a strong, positive relationship (r= 
0.52) between general organisational climate and safety climate in a hospital setting.  
They showed that the relationship between general organisational climate and 
individual safety behaviour was fully mediated by safety climate.  However, in this 
instance, Neal et al.’s treatment of study variables as individual-level data more 
closely equates to general psychological climate as defined by James et al. (2008) 
than organisational climate per say, highlighting the problem and confusion that can 
occur due the interchangeable and inconsistent use of terminology applied in climate 
research. That is, the term organisation climate can be used to reflect the theoretical 
focus of the item content of a scale on the broad aspects of organisational behaviour 
(as applied in Neal et al.’s study), to indicate the use of aggregated climate data 
rather than individual- level psychological climate perceptions as previously 
described in section 2.2, or as an indicator of the higher organisational, work-level 
focus of facet-specific climate scales (e.g., Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
 
The strong, positive relationship found between general climate and safety climate in 
Neal et al.’s (2000) study has been supported by both Wallace et al. (2006) and Silva 
et al.’s (2004) results.  In an investigation of the interrelationship between general 
foundation climate and facet-specific safety climate, Silva and colleagues (2004) 
operationalised both of their climate inventories using four work context dimensions: 
support, innovation, rules and goals. Their intention was to provide a restricted and 
consistent domain of reference for items across the two climate indexes.  In their 
sample of 15 industrial organisations they found that general organisational climate 
explained 52% of the variance in safety climate, with both climate measures 
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independently predicting accident rates. However, Silva et al. did not test the 
mediation model of foundation climatesafety climate safety outcome 
relationships. 
 
In a further study, conducted at the group-level of analysis, Wallace et al. (2006) also 
found that safety climate mediated the relationship between two foundation climates 
and occupational accidents.  When controlling for common method effects, Wallace 
et al. identified strong predictive relationships between safety climate and both the 
climate for Management-employee relations (r=.32) and Organisational support 
(r=.41).  Finally, Larsson et al. (2008) found that general psychological climate has 
both direct and indirect effects on workers’ safety behaviours, however their study 
did not look at the effects of safety climate in their predictive model. 
 
Further research conducted in the retail industry examined whether safety climate 
mediated the relationship between general organisational climate and employees’ 
perceived safety at work (DeJoy et al., 2004).  DeJoy et al.’s analysis was again 
conducted on individual-level data.  They found organisational support, coworker 
support, and communication to be significant predictors of safety climate (R
2
= .55) 
after controlling for demographic, environmental conditions (hazards), and safety-
specific policies and programs.  DeJoy et al.’s results supported a partial mediation 
model with environment, policies and practices, and organisational support all 
retaining their significance (albeit with reduced values) after the inclusion of safety 
climate in the model.  DeJoy et al. (2004) concluded that “a positive safety climate is 
more likely to exist in an environment that generally supports and values its 
employees and where there is open and effective communication” (2004, p.88).  
However, a potential issue to consider in DeJoy et al.’s study was the inclusion of 
environmental conditions and policies and programs as separate predictor variables 
when they are more often operationalised as dimensions of safety climate. 
   
In sum it appears that current empirical findings support the proposal that general 
organisational climates provide the context in which more more facet-specific 
climates, such as safety climate emerge.  While the foundation climates so far 
examined in the safety literature have represented a variety of contextual workplace 
dimensions, scope remains to further investigate the relationship between general and 
18 
Work-level Safety Model 
 
facet-specific safety climate at the same hierarchical level of the organisation using a 
level-of-analysis approach (Zohar, 2010). However, as will be described in the 
following section, the operationalisation of safety climate has not been a clear-cut 
process. 
 
2.4. Issues in the Operationalisation of Safety Climate  
Since Zohar (1980) first introduced the term safety climate, problems associated with 
poor construct definition, indefinite factor structure and inappropriate 
methodological treatment of the construct have plagued research (see Cox & Flin, 
1998; Guldenmund, 2000, 2007; Seo, Torabi, Blair, & Ellis, 2004; Zohar, 2003). To 
provide justification of the choices I have made when conceptualising safety climate 
in my study, in the following sections I will examine several of these problematic 
issues including: the distinction between climate and culture, the use of explicit 
referents, issues of dimensionality, and treatment of safety climate as a global or 
work-level construct. 
 
2.4.1. Climate, Culture and Referent Shifts 
One major issue in the safety literature has been the imprecise use of the terms safety 
culture and climate.  While these terms have often been used interchangeably, some 
commentators have argued that they have different theoretical roots, definitional 
nuances and levels of abstraction (R. J. James et al., 2008; Reichers & Schneider, 
1990).  James et al. have argued that the typology of composition models provided 
by Chan (1998) offers a framework to distinguish between the individual referent 
focus of climate constructs (applying a direct consensus model) and the collective 
focus of culture-based constructs (requiring the application of a referent-shift 
consensus model). However, Chan did not make this climate/culture distinction, 
differentiating only between psychological climate (PC), as an individual- level 
construct using self-referents in his direct consensus model, and psychological 
collective climate (PCC), using others as the core referent in the referent-shift 
consensus model. 
 
In their work on foundation and specific climates, Wallace et al. (2006) chose to 
apply two types of composition models (direct and referent-shift consensus models) 
when constructing their climate measures. They contended that the collective referent 
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(e.g., the work group) was a more appropriate focus for their safety climate construct 
as their intention was to measure perceptions at the group-level of abstraction rather 
than at the individual- level. As Chan (1998) has explained, in referent-shift 
consensus models: 
Rather than an individual’s own climate perceptions (i.e.,, psychological 
climate) or the aggregation of individuals’ perceptions (i.e.,, organisational 
climate), the researcher now is interested in how an individual believes others 
in the organisation perceive the climate [requiring a shift in referent from self 
to others] and whether there is within groups consensus in such belief (p. 
238). 
 
To illustrate how the referent shift may be applied in safety climate research, I have 
adapted the efficacy example used by Chan (1998) to a safety context.  For example, 
an item tapping safety efficacy would change from, I am confident that I can perform 
tasks safely, to I am confident that my team can perform tasks safely, when the group 
referent shift is applied. This item then becomes a more appropriate measure of 
group safety efficacy.  However, to extend this example, it may be possible to further 
modify the item to read; workers in my team are confident that they can perform this 
task safely.  This change facilitates the full shift of focus of the item to reflect the 
individual’s perception of the collective belief or practice operating within the 
specified work unit (e.g., work group, department, site, and organisation). As safety 
climate is generally defined as the shared perceptions of respondents regarding the 
state and priority of safety in the organisation, the collective focus may provide a 
more appropriate referent for operationalising safety climate inventories as this offers 
a reflection of the group norm for the work unit.  As no research has reported a 
comparison of results derived using referents shifts, my intention is to adopt a best 
practice approach based on Chan’s recommendations rather than specifically 
comparing results derived using the various referent shifts.  
 
While acknowledging that the nested nature of individuals within workplace settings 
in analyses more appropriately complies with the theoretical conceptualisation of 
safety climate as a collective construct, the majority of safety climate studies in the 
extant literature have measured psychological safety climate (PSC) using direct 
consensus referents.  In support of this statement two recent safety climate meta-
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analyses have organised their summaries according to the PC/OC orientation used in 
the original studies (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009).  With some 
degree of overlap in the empirical studies included in the two meta-analyses, the ratio 
of  PSC:OSC research appears to be at a rate of between 3:2 (Beus, Payne, et al., 
2010) and 3:1 (Christian et al., 2009).  In Christian et al.’s study, when looking at 
accident/injury data as the criterion, stronger relationships were observed with OSC 
(ρ=-.39, k =13) than with PSC (ρ=-.14, k =27).  This trend was also observed in 
Beus, Payne et al.’s study (OSC; ρ=-.29, k =10 and PSC; ρ=-.16, k =32).  Given the 
different effects sizes reported for PSC and OSC in both meta-analyses, the call for 
greater methodological rigour in distinguishing levels of analysis in safety research 
appears warranted on both theoretical and empirical grounds. 
 
Irrespective of the collective or individual referent used or level of data treatment 
applied, Cox and Flin (1998) concluded that safety climate measures provide a 
snapshot of the prevailing state of safety which may be used as an indication of the 
more enduring and underlying safety culture.  They further argue that questionnaires 
measuring safety culture or safety climate are almost indistinguishable in terms of 
their component factors or dimensions and that across the domain, determining the 
content range and dimensionality of safety climate continues to prove problematic. 
 
2.4.2. Dimensions of Safety Climate 
Determining the generic structure of safety climate has been another central issue in 
the safety literature with commentators offering a variety of ideas about why the 
number and nature of factors vary so dramatically across studies (Guldenmund, 
2000; Shannon & Norman, 2009). While these reasons range from theoretical (broad 
or specific content domain) to methodological (different statistical treatments across 
studies) consensus has yet to be found.  Furthermore, Shannon and Norman recently 
proposed that in failing to acknowledge the nonindependence of data in workplace 
samples, existing derivations of safety climate factor structures are fundamentally 
flawed. They reason that as the focus of the majority of safety climate items is on the 
measurement of work-group or organisational characteristics (such as management 
or supervisor safety practices) rather than on the practices or attitudes of the 
individual respondent, the data generated is fundamentally multilevel in nature.  As 
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such, identifying factor structures should be conducted using multilevel techniques 
rather than individual- level factor analyses.  With respect granted to this critique of 
methodological flaws in the approach to factor identification, the reality remains that 
the vast majority of research to date has not adopted this strategy.  The following 
review of literature and interpretations of results provide are therefore made with this 
limitation in mind.     
 
In their review of safety climate inventories Seo et al. (2004) reported that the 
published factor structures of safety climate scales ranged from two to twenty-eight 
dimensions, consistent with findings in past reviews (see Cox & Flin, 1998; 
Guldenmund, 2000; Zohar, 2003).  Seo et al. identified a core of five main constructs 
including management commitment to safety, supervisor safety support, coworker 
safety support, employee participation in safety decision making and employee 
competence.  However, safety climate has most frequently been operationalised as 
management and supervisor commitment to safety (Brown, Willis, & Prussia, 2000; 
Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
 
In his more recent evaluation of the use of questionnaires in safety research 
Guldenmund  (2007) proposed that safety climate scales should recognise how 
management protocols manifest at different hierarchical levels of the organisation; 
that is at the organisation, group and individual-level.  Guldenmund suggested that 
these management systems should include policies and practices associated with risk 
management, hardware design and layout, maintenance, procedures, manpower 
planning, competence, commitment, communication, monitoring and change. Indeed, 
several of Guldenmund’s sub classifications are represented in the management and 
supervisor dimensions of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) safety climate scales. 
 
In conceptualising their organisation and group safety climate constructs, Zohar and 
Luria (2005) drew on behaviour expectation theory to describe active practices (e.g., 
monitoring, enforcing and controlling behaviours), proactive practices (e.g., 
promoting learning, development, instructing and guiding behaviours) and 
declarative practices (declaring and informing), as distinct but highly related aspects 
of management and supervisors’ commitment to safety.  Zohar and Luria’s scale 
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items were based on benchmark safety management codes (British Standards 
Institute, 2000). 
 
Johnson (2007) conducted one of the few studies to test the factor structure and 
predictive validity of the sixteen item version of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) group-
level safety climate scale assessing supervisor safety commitment. Using both 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis Johnson also identified a highly 
correlated three-factor structure (r =.94, .94 and .93, p < .05), which he labelled 
caring, compliance and coaching.  Johnson argued that the supervisor safety climate 
scale could be further reduced to 11 items without a marked decrement in 
explanatory power.  While Johnson’s findings are largely commensurate with Zohar 
and Luria’s, the trimming of 30% of Johnson’s sample due to multivariate outliers 
warrants mention and may have impacted on his results. 
 
2.4.3. Higher and Lower Order Structures  
Importantly, while the number and nature of safety climate dimensions have been 
subject to ongoing discussion (Dedobbler & Beland, 1998), the treatment of safety 
climate as a single, higher-order construct (collapsing dimensions to form a global 
index of safety climate) has been the norm.  For example, Seo (2005) examined the 
relationship between his five factor operationalisation of safety climate (Seo et al., 
2004), with employees’ perceptions of work pressure, risks, hazard level, barriers to 
safety and self-reported unsafe work behaviour.  While he drew largely on earlier 
studies to support his theoretical model (i.e., Brown et al., 2000; Oliver, Cheyne, 
Tomás, & Cox, 2002; Rundmo, Hestad, & Ulleberg, 1998; Tomás, Melia, & Oliver, 
1999), Seo did not follow Tomás and colleagues’ (1999) lead in modelling the macro 
organisation factors (management actions supporting safety) and the micro factors 
(supervisory and coworker responses to safety and worker attitudes) as separate 
components, preferring to combine them as a global construct. 
 
In Clarke’s (2006) meta-analysis, examining the relationship between safety climate, 
safety performance and accidents/injuries, she reported effects for safety climate as a 
global construct. However more recently, the criteria applied by both Beus, Payne et 
al. (2010) and Christian et al. (2009) to classify and report safety climate effects in 
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their meta-analyses differentiated between the global and dimensional treatment of 
safety climate. Christian et al. categorised safety climate both as a global construct 
and separately as eight first-order factors based largely on Neal and Griffin’s (2004)  
taxonomy.  Christian et al.’s factors included management commitment, human 
resource management practices, safety systems practices, supervisor support, internal 
group processes, boundary management, risk and work pressure. Christian et al. 
identified 48 effects from studies adopting the global psychological safety climate 
approach (i.e., treatment of safety climate as a higher order construct using 
individual- level analysis, N=33 739); 14 effects from studies using the global 
organisational safety climate approach (i.e., treatment of safety climate as a higher 
order measure using group-level of analysis, N=794 groups) and fewer studies 
examining the separate dimensions of safety climate using either individual or group-
level analysis.  According to Christian et al.’s review, when a dimensional-based 
approach was used the most frequent categories investigated have been supervisor 
support (16 individual-level studies and 8 group-level studies) and management 
commitment (9 and 1 studies respectively).  
 
Beus, Payne, et al. (2010) also provided results for both global and dimensional 
specifications of safety climate in their meta-analysis of the safety climate-injury 
relationship. They included subscales for: management commitment to safety, 
management safety attitudes, management safety practices (supervisors), specific 
safety policies, coworker safety, safety communication, safety training, 
housekeeping, safety procedures and safety reporting.  Beus, Payne, et al. identified 
32 effect sizes from studies that adopted a global psychological safety climate 
approach (N=16 011) and 11effects from studies using a global organisational safety 
climate approach (N=448 groups).  When looking at the effects for separate 
dimensions of safety climate, using individual or group-level analysis, management 
commitment to safety (k=26) and management (supervisor) safety practices (k=12) 
constituted the most common subscales used.   
 
Beus, Payne, et al. (2010) also investigated the potential contamination and 
deficiency of the safety climate measures used in their review in terms of the 
identified factor structure in each study’s correspondence to Zohar’s definition of 
safety climate (Zohar, 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Beus, Payne, et al.’s criteria for 
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construct validity focused on a scale’s capacity to assess employees’ perceptions of 
safety-related policies, practices and procedures, specifying that 
 
Safety policies define strategic goals and the means for their achievement 
while safety procedures provide planned courses of action relating to those 
goals.  Safety policies and procedures both exist at the organisational level 
and are maintained by upper management.  Safety practices refers to 
implementation of policies and procedures at the work group-level [and relate 
to supervisory & coworker practices] (p.727). 
 
Beus, Payne, et al. defined construct contamination as the inclusion of irrelevant 
content in a scale and deficiency as the failure to adequately represent the specified 
content domain.  According to their criteria, safety climate dimensions such as 
personal safety attitudes, job safety/risk and supervisor competence were considered 
contaminants, while measures that excluded management commitment to safety or 
supervisor and coworker safety-related practices such as communicating safety 
information would be deemed deficient. 
 
Contrary to their hypothesis, Beus, Payne, et al.’s (2010) determined that construct 
contamination artificially inflated safety climate  injury correlations in two of their 
three test conditions.  However, this result makes sense when recognising that the 
association between the contaminant categories identified (e.g., risk perceptions and 
personal safety attitudes) and injury rates have been well established in the literature 
(Melia, Mearns, Silva, & Lima, 2008).  That is to say, while such constructs may not 
be considered true safety climate dimensions according to Beus, Payne,et al.’s 
criteria, it is not surprising that safety-related constructs not fitting within their 
definition would still be correlated with injury rates. Therefore, such contamination 
would be expected to increase the variance explained in the outcome, being akin to 
adding another recognised predictor in a regression model. However, if the 
contaminants selected where more overt in showing limited predictive validity with 
injuries (e.g., job satisfaction or affective organisational commitment), the hypothesis 
for contamination may well have been supported.   
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Beus, Payne, et al. (2010) also found that scale deficiency generally resulted in 
weaker associations between safety climate and injuries.  Again, in this instance the 
omission of key safety climate dimensions resulted in attenuated associations; a state 
akin to the expected reduction in the coefficient of determination when a recognised 
strong predictor is removed from a regression model.  While Beus, Payne, et al. do 
not claim to have resolved the safety climate dimensionality issue, their use of 
Zohar’s (2003) definition as a broad and sound basis for further construct 
development is well considered.  However, Zohar (2010) himself, has recently 
shared further theoretical and methodological insights regarding the definition of 
safety climate to help clarify and guide future investigations in the field.  Extending 
on his early work, Zohar’s recommendations focus on elucidating how the 
hierarchical nature of organisations can and should be recognised in the 
dimensionality of safety climate and are discussed in the following section. 
 
2.5. Work-level Approach to Safety Climate  
In his commentary on past and future directions for safety climate research Zohar 
(2010) identified a series of key conceptual issues including the recommendation that 
safety climate perceptions be viewed from the levels-of-analysis perspective.  He 
argued that taking into consideration the importance of safety “procedures-as-a 
pattern” (p.1518) of associations and interactions within organisations would 
advance our understanding of the domain.  More specifically Zohar asserted that 
[as] the target of climate perceptions can relate to the organisation or group-
level of analysis (i.e., senior management commitments and policies vs. 
supervisory or coworker practices) it follows that climate measurement 
should be based on level-adjusted subscales offering separate measures for 
climates associated with respective organisational levels...The practice of 
mixing items associated with divergent levels of analysis must be 
discontinued in order to avoid level discrepancy errors in safety climate 
measurement...[and the] development of level specific subscales should be 
encouraged as it is likely to enhance measurement sensitivity and conceptual 
rigor. (p.1521)  
 
Adopting a levels-of-analysis approach in which safety climate is separated into 
more discrete work-level dimensions offers the opportunity to expand our 
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understanding of how safety climate differs across work-levels and to investigate 
how the shared perceptions amongst workers relevant to each dimension are formed.  
While attempts to gauge the different safety attitudes and behaviours of 
organisational agents (i.e., individuals, coworkers, supervisors and managers) has 
long been considered in the development of safety climate questionnaires (for an 
example see Safety Research Unit, 1993), to-date few studies have either specifically 
separated safety climate scales into work-level domains or attempted to tease out the 
relationships between the differing climate dimensions (for exceptions see Melia et 
al., 2008; Simard & Marchand, 1995, 1997; Tomás et al., 1999; Zohar & Luria, 
2005).  Tomás and colleagues encouraged the separation of the climate dimensions 
“in order to understand their complex relations with other criteria, and to obtain an 
analytic measure of them for diagnostic purposes” (1999, p.53).  This multilevel 
approach was also observed in the empirical findings of  Simard and Marchand 
(1997) who recognised that both macro and micro organisational factors 
differentially contribute to safety outcomes, and is finding renewed support in more 
recent theoretical discussions (Neal & Griffin, 2004; Zohar, 2003, 2010).   
 
Zohar has been one of the strongest advocates of multilevel climate research in terms 
of both investigating work-level dimensionality and applying multilevel analysis 
(Zohar, 2000, 2003, 2008, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Zohar has described safety 
climate as “an emergent property, characterising groups of individuals [that can be] 
operationally assessed by aggregating individual perceptions to the required unit of 
analysis (organisation, department, work group) and using the mean to represent the 
climate for that entity” (Zohar, 2003. p.124).  Zohar’s multilevel models of safety 
climate (see Zohar, 2003, 2010) provide the most comprehensive representations of 
the possible links between safety climate dimensions, antecedent factors and safety 
outcomes produced to date.  Zohar and Luria (2005) empirically tested aspects of 
Zohar’s (2003) model by developing measures of safety climate at the organisational 
level (operationalised as top level management commitment to safety) and group-
level (supervisors commitment to safety).   
 
However, Kozlowski and Klein (2000) indicate that  in organisations, emergent 
phenomena, such as safety climate are generally shaped by a combination of formal 
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structures and by informal social-interaction processes. Chiaburu and Harrison also 
concluded in their meta-analysis investigating peer influences in the workplace, that  
“coworker actions predict perceptual, attitudinal, and behavioural outcomes of their 
colleagues even when the influence of the direct leaders (on the same focal 
colleagues) is accounted for” (2008, p. 1094).  As such, while Zohar has not 
previously included coworker safety practices as part of his group-level safety 
climate construct, it is my intention to argue that the informal normative influence of 
coworkers’ commitment to safety be considered as a relevant aspect of the content 
domain. 
 
2.6. Coworker Commitment to Safety  
To add support for the inclusion of coworker commitment to safety in future studies 
and the operationalisation of safety climate in this thesis, evidence from studies that 
have included coworker practices and group processes in their explanatory safety 
models are provided in this section.  As an indication of the limited scope of safety 
research that has included coworker safety practices, Beus, Payne, et al. (2010) 
identified only seven effect sizes for coworkers in their review. Interestingly, they 
found the association between coworker safety and retrospective injury rates (ρ=-.22, 
k =7) to be stronger than that observed for either management /supervisor safety 
practices (ρ=-.16, k =6) or management commitment to safety (ρ=-.12, k =10) at the 
individual- level of analysis.  As such they argued for the continued inclusion of 
coworker practices in safety climate measurement instruments.  
 
In their meta-analysis, Christian et al. (2009) based their classifications on Neal and 
Griffin’s (2004) integrated model of workplace safety which included internal group 
processes as a first-order factor of safety climate.  This factor incorporated workers 
“perceptions of communication and support for safety within work-groups or the 
extent to which employees perceive that their coworkers provide them with safety-
related cooperation and encouragement” (Christian et al., p.1107). Exemplars of this 
factor from ten empirical studies that were included in their meta-analysis involved 
coworkers’ safety backup, workers’ safety communication, peer safety orientation 
and trust in peers. Christian et al. found support for the role of internal group 
processes predicting individual workers’ safety performance (ρ=.40, k =9) and 
accidents/injuries (ρ=-.19, k =8). In definitional and scale content terms, Christian et 
28 
Work-level Safety Model 
 
al.’s internal group process category equates with the coworker social support 
dimension identified in Nahrgang et al. (2011) more recent meta-analysis.   
 
The significance of coworker support and commitment to safety was also highlighted 
in a qualitative study of safety in Self Directed Work Teams (SDWT; Roy, 2003).  
Roy found that, while management commitment to safety and production-based 
incentive systems had an influence on safety behaviour, the influence of legitimate 
and illegitimate peer pressure appeared to be the main driver of safety outcomes in 
their study. Roy also found evidence to support the negative side effects of group 
norms on safety in situations in which the group standard leaned towards a tolerance 
for risk. 
 
Roy’s (2003) conclusions are supported by the earlier empirical studies of Simard 
and Marchand (1994, 1995, 1997) who found workgroup characteristics (i.e., 
coworker cooperative relations and group cohesion) to be important predictors of 
both workgroup compliance behaviour and propensity to engage in safety initiatives.  
These studies highlight the issue of whether any dimension of coworker safety 
climate should represent coworker commitment to safety in terms of specific safety 
practices, or more general coworker relations and internal group process as has been 
the case.  This concern reflects back to the previously described distinctions drawn 
between foundation and facet-specific climates and will be explored further in 
Chapter 4 looking at leadership and group process as potential antecedents of safety 
climate. 
 
In one of the few studies to adopt a stratified dimensional approach in safety 
research,  Melia et al. (2008) proposed that safety climate would provide a more 
effective diagnostic tool if the conceptualisation and analysis of the construct focused 
on the distinct safety responses of all the key organisational agents involved in the 
psycho-social chain of safety influence (i.e., managers supervisorscoworkers 
workers ). In their analysis of four construction industry samples from culturally 
distinct populations (English, Spanish (2) and Chinese), Melia et al. reported 
differential patterns of association between workers’ risk perceptions and 
management, supervisor, coworker and worker dimensions of their safety climate 
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scale.  When individual workers’ risk perceptions where regressed on all safety 
climate subscales Melia et al.’s predictive model was significant in all but the 
Chinese sample.   
 
Furthermore, when workers’ safety behaviours were regressed on the management, 
supervisor and coworker subscales the influence of coworkers remained significant 
when controlling for supervisor and management influence, highlighting the 
important role coworkers play in establishing normative safety behaviours (Melia et 
al., 2008).  This trend was most obvious in the Chinese sample, compared to the 
English and Spanish samples.  While Melia et al.’s results support the utility of 
separating safety climate into hierarchically-based subscales their use of a series of 
individual-level regression analyses did not support the full testing of mediation 
effects leaving scope for future research to adopt the psycho-social chain of safety 
climate approach to explanatory models with alternate safety outcomes such as 
accidents and injuries using more rigorous statistical methods. 
 
Two further studies have examined coworker safety practices as indicators of 
subjective safety norms and the key role these norms play in directing  workers’ 
safety performance (Fogarty & Shaw, 2010; Jiang, Yu, Li, & Li, 2010).  Fogarty and 
Shaw used the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) to explain the interplay 
between safety climate, group safety norms, individual safety attitudes, work 
pressure and workers intentions to violate safety procedures.  The Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB) explains behaviour as being a function of an individual’s 
behavioural intentions and the perceived behavioural control they have over 
performing the task.  In turn, an individual’s intention to engage in a particular 
behaviour is said to be shaped by their attitude towards the behaviour and their 
perception of the normative practices of significant others. Fogarty and Shaw also 
included management attitudes (safety climate) as an antecedent of the TPB 
constructs in their model and determined that both management attitudes to safety 
and group safety norms play a vital role in shaping workers’ intentions to violate and 
safety behaviour. 
Fogarty and Shaw (2010) found that both management attitudes and group safety 
norms proved strong predictors of workers’ intentions to violate safety procedures 
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and self-reported violation behaviours, contributing largely to the TPB model’s 
accounting for nearly 50% of the variance in violations.  Importantly Fogarty and 
Shaw showed that group safety norms mediated the influence of management 
attitudes on violations and showed stronger relationships with workers’ reported 
intentions to violate than is generally found in TPB studies.  This may possibly be 
due to the more explicit priority placed on safety in many organisations compared to 
other normative domains generally investigated in TPB research. 
 
In a sample of Chinese petroleum and chemical workers, Jiang and colleagues (2010) 
also investigated the impact of workers’ perceptions of management safety practices 
(aggregated to group-level safety climate) and coworkers’ safety knowledge and 
behaviour (PCSK/B) on safety performance and self-reported injuries and near 
misses. The safety climate scale in Jiang et al.’s study used a generic management 
referent, resulting in a degree of ambiguity relating to whether supervisor or top level 
management safety practices and responsibilities were being targeted.  The issue of 
ambiguity in management referents in organisational research has been raised by Flin 
(2003) and potentially poses problems for both scale validation and interpretation of 
results.  However as Jiang et al. treat their management safety climate as a 
unidimensional scale and interpreted their results accordingly any limitations relate 
to a potential lack of fidelity rather than to a lack of construct validity.    
 
Jiang et al. (2010) developed the PCSK/B scale as a measure of descriptive safety 
norms.  Their 6-item scale focuses on coworkers’ familiarity with safety equipment, 
safety skills, concern for safety in the workplace, compliance with safety procedures, 
safety-related habits and communication. Using Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(HLM), Jiang et al. found a positive relationship between coworker behaviour, 
individual safety behaviours and reduced injury rates, with individual behaviours 
mediating the influence of PCSK/B on injuries.  They also identified significant 
cross-level interactions indicating that for individuals operating in work-groups in 
which perceptions of management commitment to safety is high (stronger safety 
climate), the stronger the positive influences of coworker normative safety behaviour 
is on individual behaviour.   
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While the use of HLM is a key strength of Jiang et al.’s (2010) study, they 
recognised that the analysis of only 23 groups could impact on the generalisability of 
their results.  Also, given the differential patterns of association found across cultural 
samples in Melia et al.’s (2008) study and the recognised importance placed on 
group cohesion and influence in collectivist cultures (Hofstede, 1997), the 
generalisability of Jiang et al.’s results to different cultural samples may be 
questioned.  However, the correlations between coworker PCSK/B and both 
individual worker safety compliance (r=.23) and participation (r=.25) in Jiang et al.’s 
study did not mirror the inflated worker coworker associations found in Melia et 
al.’s  Chinese organisational sample, indicating that Melia et al.’s results may be an 
artefact of the particular sample used rather than a cultural idiosyncrasy.  
 
In sum, while Jiang et al.(2010) did not specifically conceptualise coworker safety 
knowledge and behaviour as a dimension of safety climate, the relationship observed 
with management safety climate, safety performance and injury rates add support for 
the inclusion of coworker practices in safety climate scales. In addition, the content 
of both Jiang et al.’s (2010) PSK/B scale and Melia et al.’s (2008) Coworker Safety 
Response (CSR) scale focus on safety-specific practices rather than on general group 
processes and cohesion which promotes greater face and construct validity in safety 
climate scales.  Items from these coworker scales are also broadly aligned with the 
content covered in Zohar and Luria’s (2005) management and supervisor safety 
climate scales in covering aspects of active, proactive and declarative safety practices 
such as communicating safety-related information; hazard awareness and response; 
and modelling and monitoring safety behaviours.  While the issue of what content 
should be in safety climate scales remains problematic it is apparent that the 
inclusion of coworker safety practices has gained empirical support in more recent 
times.   
 
In terms of the theoretical framework of this thesis and broader literature, the 
inclusion of safety-specific content in scales, organised around the safety practices of 
agents traversing the organisational hierarchy, acknowledges both the 
multidimensional and multilevel nature of safety climate.  The utilisation of domain- 
aligned safety content (e.g., communication, rule compliance, monitoring and 
training), with more clearly defined referents, potentially offers opportunities for 
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researchers and safety practitioners to track areas of strength and weakness in the 
chain of safety activity, identify incongruent practices across work-levels, and 
identify core tensions in safety priorities between organisational agents.  Finally, by 
adopting a work-level approach to climate research it is possible to describe safety 
climate not only in  terms of the orientation (level) of safety climate, as has been 
done in the majority of safety studies, but also in terms of the within and between-
group  patterns of variability (Dragoni, 2005) which have attracted far less attention 
from researchers. The following section therefore describes the three currently 
applied indices of safety climate: level, strength and variability. 
 
2.7. Safety Climate Indices 
Climate level refers to the direction or orientation of aggregate scores of a specified 
work unit, with a high score indicating positive perceptions.   In contrast climate 
strength represents the homogeneity of individuals’ climate perceptions within work 
units and climate variability indicates the pattern of between-group variance at some 
higher level of aggregation (Chan, 1998; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 
2005).  Depending on the researcher’s specific focus, units of interest may be work-
groups, departments, work sites, organisations or even across an industry as a whole.  
However, across departments or divisions within an organisation the variability of 
work unit climate is not necessarily uniform, therefore when investigating any facet-
specific climate, such as safety, identifying the within-group homogeneity (climate 
strength) of work units is complemented by assessing the degree of between-group 
variability to determine if an organisation has a uniformly strong or weak climate. 
 
2.7.1. Climate Strength and Variability 
To date advancements in the measurement of safety climate to capture organisation 
and group cohesion by Zohar (2000) have included the operationalisation of within 
work-group homogeneity (safety climate strength) and between work-group 
differences (safety climate variability). Several statistical options to capture the 
concept of sharedness implicit in climate strength identified in the safety climate 
literature include: standard deviation scores (Beus, Bergman, & Payne, 2010; Zohar 
& Luria, 2005), within group correlation (L. R. James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993; 
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Luria, 2008) and intraclass correlation coefficients (Glick, 1985; L. R. James, 1982; 
Pousette, Larsson, & Törner, 2008).  
 
While a fairly limited proportion of  safety climate research has applied multilevel 
techniques using the consensus approach to aggregation (Hofmann & Morgeson, 
1999; Hofmann et al., 2003; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000; Zohar & Luria, 
2004, 2005) even fewer studies have applied the dispersion model approach (or a 
combination of both approaches) to look at climate strength as an entity in its own 
right for descriptive or analytic purposes (see Beus, Bergman, et al., 2010; Luria, 
2008; Oliver, Tomás, & Cheyne, 2006; Pousette et al., 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2004; 
Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008).  As my focus in this thesis is not on modelling 
predictors and outcomes of climate strength, a review of this literature is not 
provided.  However by combining measures of climate level and strength for the 
different dimensions of safety climate, it is possible to provide a more meaningful 
picture of the overarching status of safety in an organisation; creating an organisation 
safety climate profile.   
 
As shown in Table 2.1, having an understanding of both climate strength and level 
provides a more comprehensive descriptive metric for interpreting potential work 
unit climate profiles. For example, in work environments with weak safety climates, 
a higher level of situational role ambiguity is said to exist as employees differ in their 
interpretations of events and understanding of role expectations (Gonzalez-Roma, et 
al., 2002; Luria, 2008; Schneider et al. 2002).  We would anticipate therefore that 
weaker climate strength and greater variability would be associated with more 
moderate climate levels.  However, having a weak climate does not preclude the 
climate level from being relatively high overall; in this instance it would simply 
indicate a larger degree of polarisation, with the potential for pockets of workers 
holding extreme negative or positive views about the state of safety in the 
organisation.   
 
In contrast, for organisations or work-groups with uniformly strong climates, 
individuals’ perceptions are more consistent and normative behaviour aligned within 
and across work units.  As such the potential for situational role ambiguity and need 
for clarification of facet-specific role expectations is reduced.  The optimal safety 
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environment would therefore be described as a strong, positive safety climate in 
which employees uniformly perceived safety as a priority that guides workers’ 
behaviours across the organisation. The least advantageous safety climate profile 
would conversely be a strong, negative safety climate in which employees 
universally perceive safety as a low priority and act accordingly. 
 
Table 2.1 Work Unit Profiles for Safety Climate Level and Strength Indices 
 
 Climate Strength 
 
Climate Level 
 
Strong 
Homogeneous 
(Low within group variance) 
Weak- Transitional 
Heterogeneous 
(High within group 
variance) 
Positive 
(High Mean) 
Extreme positive safety norms 
High level of consensus 
Minimal subcultures 
Low role ambiguity 
Optimal safety climate 
 
Positive safety norms 
Low level of consensus 
Potential for polarisation 
Role ambiguity 
Resurgent safety climate 
 
Negative 
(Low Mean) 
Extreme negative safety norms 
High level of consensus 
Minimal subcultures 
Low role ambiguity 
Toxic safety climate 
 
Negative safety norms 
Low level of consensus 
Potential for polarisation 
Role ambiguity 
Chronic safety climate 
 
 
2.8. Summary 
In summary, this chapter reviewed the theoretical foundations and empirical findings 
relating to safety climate with a specific focus on current strengths and weaknesses in 
the conceptualisation and methodology applied in safety climate research.  My 
review examined the theoretical differences between general foundation climates and 
facet-specific safety climate.  While the foundation climates so far examined in the 
safety climate literature have represented a variety of contextual workplace 
dimensions, a lack of empirical studies on this topic was identified.  In particular, 
relatively few studies within the safety domain have used multilevel approaches to 
explore the nested nature of organisational data as theoretically recommended.  My 
examination of the literature then moved on to explore more specific aspects of the 
operationalisation and measurement of safety climate.  Topics covered included the 
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dimensionality of the construct, treatment as either a higher order global construct or 
set of lower order constructs, and level of analysis applied.   
 
With regard to the operationalisation of safety climate, Zohar’s (2010) 
recommendations regarding the adoption of a level-of-analysis approach to safety 
climate research were considered and the incorporation of coworkers as a key 
component of a stratified work-level model of safety climate proposed.  As a key 
element of my thesis, measurement options associated with the analysis of safety 
climate at the individual or group-level were also described and the implications of 
ignoring the nested nature of data within organisations when testing explanatory 
models considered.  Where possible, meta-analyses were used to identify important 
trends and differences in results for studies applying different construct treatments 
and statistical methodologies.  Finally, different indices of safety climate including 
climate level, strength and variability were briefly described. 
 
Having therefore examined the broad conceptualisation of safety climate as an 
emergent, multidimensional measure of overall organisational safety, in the 
following two chapters I move on examine the link between safety climate and safety 
outcomes and the psycho-social antecedents of safety climate.
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3. Safety Performance and Outcomes 
3.1. Introduction 
A variety of approaches for measuring workers’ safety performance and 
organisational safety outcomes have been described in the safety climate literature.  
Indeed, as an alternative to traditional indicators such as accident and injury rates, 
safety climate itself has been proposed as a lead indicator of organisation safety 
performance (Zohar, 2010).  However, a recent issues raised in the safety domain 
concerns the potential reverse causality of this interplay (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; S. 
C. Payne, Bergman, Beus, Rodríguez, & Henning, 2009).  That is, should safety 
climate be treated as a lag or lead indicator of accident and injury outcomes?  To 
begin teasing out the relationship between safety climate, individual safety 
performance, accidents, incidents and injuries my review begins by examining the 
links between safety climate and safety outcomes.  
 
In the first section of this chapter I briefly evaluate the variety of accident-related 
outcome measures available including fatalities, lost time injuries (LTIs), micro 
accidents and near miss incidents.  In particular I will consider the benefits and 
limitations of using objective and subjective sources of outcome data.  I then move 
on to discuss two key measures of individual safety performance: compliance and 
participative behaviours.  Empirical evidence supporting the differential relationships 
between these two individual-level safety performance measures and safety climate 
is then provided.  To conclude the chapter I briefly touch on the issue of discriminant 
validity between dimensions of safety climate, as a group-level entity, and workers’ 
safety behaviours as an individual- level construct (Glick, 1985; Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000; Zohar, 2003).  
 
3.2. Safety Outcomes 
Accident-related outcome measures have been used in the safety literature with 
varying levels of success. Often these have been linked to industry standards and 
have included relatively low frequency statistics such as fatalities and LTIs 
(Zacharatos, Barling, & Iverson, 2005; Zohar, 2000).  While fatalities and LTIs are 
two of the main Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) reporting 
criteria, for empirical purposes their relatively low incidence rates mean these gross 
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outcomes may be statistically insensitive to subtle changes in safety conditions 
within organisations.  Further concerns regarding the use of low base rate fatalities 
and LTI data are potential power issues and restrictions to effect sizes in studies 
utilising these outcome measures (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  In addition to LTIs, 
researchers have also used company infirmary records of basic first aid treatment for 
minor injuries or micro accidents including burns, cuts, bruises, sprains, and eye 
injuries (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2000, 
2002a).   
 
While company injury records are considered one of the most valid and objective 
measures of safety performance, concerns regarding systematic organisational 
underreporting of injuries and accidents to regulatory bodies have been raised.  
Probst and colleagues (Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008; Probst & Estada, 2009) 
found that the annual injury rates recorded in company OSHA logs were not an 
accurate representation of the actual injury occurrence; with the rate of unreported 
accidents to reported accidents being 5:2 (Probst & Estada, 2009). Furthermore, 
Probst et al. (2008) determined that the rate of underreporting injuries in 
organisations with poor safety climates (81% of injuries not reported) was higher 
than that found in organisations with positive safety climates compared ( 47%). 
Therefore, while organisational injury statistics provide a seemingly objective 
measure of organisational safety outcomes they are not unproblematic.  
Consequently, researchers have often turned to subjective measures of injury 
occurrence as more easily ascertainable indicators of individual safety outcomes.   
 
One subjective approach to obtaining injury data is the use of self-report measures to 
assess the frequency, type and severity of injuries experienced by employees over a 
set period of time (Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & 
Francis, 2006; Zacharatos et al., 2005). While the time frame applied for 
retrospective recall of injuries has ranged from months to years, Veazie and 
colleagues have recommended six months as the maximum time period that accurate 
recall can be sustained (Veazie, Landen, Bender, & Amandus, 1994).   
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In addition to injuries, a less common, but potentially useful self-report measure of 
work-place safety is the frequency and type of near miss incidents (Mearns, Flin, 
Gordon, & Fleming, 2001; Oliver et al., 2002; Zacharatos et al., 2005).  Near miss 
incidents provide a measure of how frequently workers experience an event in which 
they almost or could have sustained an injury. Near misses can be measured by 
likert-style frequency scales, as used by Zacharatos et al.(2005) or a recall count 
(Goldenhar, Williams, & Swanson, 2003; Jiang et al., 2010).  If placed within 
Heinrich’s (1959) classic safety triangle depicting the ratio of unsafe acts to minor 
and major injuries, the inclusion of near miss incidents would fit underneath minor 
injuries, and therefore represents a broader probability base for measurement 
purposes.  As Christian et al. (2009) contended, the inclusion of near miss incidents 
as an outcome measure in safety research provides greater flexibility for profiling 
incident occurrence and greater statistical sensitivity, opening new doors for future 
research in to the relationship between safety climate, incidents and injuries. 
 
Three recent meta-analyses (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009; S. 
Clarke, 2006) have investigated the association between safety climate and 
injury/accident rates. Clarke examined the relationship between safety climate, safety 
behaviours and accidents/injuries. In particular she compared results of studies 
obtained using retrospective and prospective injury data. Clarke identified the use of 
individual or group data for safety climate and source of accident indicators in her 
summary of each study; however she did not include this information as mediating 
factors in her analysis.  In contrast, Christian et al. classified their studies according 
to data sources and further distinguished between studies applying individual- and 
group-level analysis.  Beus, Payne, et al. distinguished between studies adopting 
individual- and group-level data treatments while also looking at differences found 
when using retrospective and prospective accident data. However, no study has 
examined the interplay of data source (subjective-objective), temporal ordering 
(retrospective-prospective) and data treatment (individual-group) concurrently.  
 
In her meta-analysis of 28 safety climate studies, Clarke (2006) reported that an 
increase in safety climate scores corresponds to a decrease in accident/injury rates (ρ 
= -.22). (Note. The signage of Clarke’s reported correlations have been reversed to 
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be consistent with conventions applied in the other meta-analyses and this thesis).  
Clarke concluded that the strength of this relationship is even stronger for studies 
using prospective injury data in which safety climate is treated as a leading indicator 
of safety outcomes (k = 6; ρ = -.35) compared to retrospective studies (k = 25; ρ = -
.22).  However, it is difficult to determine if these stronger effects are actually 
attributable to the source of data or level of analysis applied rather than their 
prospective nature, as the effects reported are largely obtained from studies using 
company medical records at the group-level of analysis (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 
2003; Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 2000, 2002a; Zohar & Luria, 2004).  
 
Beus, Payne, et al.’s (2010) results were generally consistent with Clarke’s (2006) 
findings however, when classifying studies according to level of analysis, the 
inclusion of more studies under the group-level, prospective injury design 
classification resulted in Beus, Payne et al.’s estimate being slightly weaker (k = 6; ρ 
= .24).  In addition Beus, Payne et al. did not identify any studies that used 
individual- level data for the measurement of safety climate and prospective injury 
data.  For retrospective injury data Beus, Payne, et al. found stronger association in 
studies using group-level data (OSC k =10; ρ= -.29,) than individual data (PSC k 
=32; ρ= -.16). While it appears from this result that regardless of the use of 
retrospective or prospective data, stronger associations are found using group-level 
analysis, the source of data may still be a potential confound in the relationship. 
 
As objective medical and OSHA data has been used in both prospective (Zohar, 
2000, 2002a; Zohar & Luria, 2004) and retrospective designs (Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1996), when considered in combination with level of analysis issues, the source of 
data may have implications for the different correlations found for the relationships 
between safety climate and injury statistics in both Clarke (2006)  and Beus, Payne, 
et al.’s (2010) studies.  As stated in section 2.4.1, Christian and colleagues (2009) 
identified stronger relationships between safety climate and outcomes when using 
group-level data.  Despite the smaller number of studies included in the OSC self- 
report injuries (k =2; ρ= -.21) category of the meta- analysis compared to those using 
objective data (OSC injury records, k =11; ρ= -.42), a trend toward weaker effects 
is observable. Whereas this trend was found to be  consistent in studies using 
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individual- level data the overall magnitude of correlations between safety climate 
and outcomes was weaker (PSC Injury records, k =4; ρ= -.20; PSCself-report 
injuries,  k =24; ρ= -.13).   
 
In summary therefore, it appears that stronger relationships are observed for the 
relationship between safety climate and injuries when the nonindependence of data is 
addressed using group-level analysis.  Furthermore, safety climate and injury 
correlations are also enhanced when objective data such as OSHA and infirmary 
records are used compared to self-reported injury experiences.  While it also appears 
that studies using retrospective injury data produce weaker associations than studies 
using prospective data, the overlap between data source, level of analysis and design 
confound the issue. 
 
As such, despite the apparent drawbacks in reduced effects sizes that can realistically 
be expected when using retrospective, self-report accident and injury data, the utility 
of this information source should not be dismissed but rather considered as an 
underestimate of the real state of affairs.  If longitudinal, objective injury statistics 
are not accessible (which is often the case in organisational research) and cross-
sectional, self-report data is the only data source available as is the case in my thesis) 
consideration should be given to conducting the analysis at the group-level to 
optimise potential construct relations. However, beyond accident and injury data, an 
alternate safety outcome often used in safety climate research is the safety 
performance of individual workers or work-groups.  In the following section I 
examine this alternative outcome in greater depth. 
 
3.3. Safety Performance 
As safety climate instruments have continued to gain support from academics and 
practitioners, several frameworks conceptualising the link between safety climate 
and safety behaviours have been developed  (Brown et al., 2000; Christian et al., 
2009; DeJoy et al., 2004; Fogarty & Shaw, 2010; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Neal & 
Griffin, 2004; Seo, 2005; Silva et al., 2004; Tomás et al., 1999; Zohar, 2003). The 
measurement of safety behaviours has been undertaken using both objective and 
subjective data sources such as self-reports, supervisor ratings (Simard & Marchand, 
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1997), safety audits (Zohar & Luria, 2005) and behavioural observations (Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004; Glendon & Litherland, 2001; Neal et al., 2000). While safety audits 
and behavioural observations are considered superior methods of safety assessment, 
they are both cost and labour intensive; requiring the collaboration of independent, 
trained assessors to observe workers over extended periods of time.  In contrast, self-
report and supervisor ratings that assess individual employees’ behaviours on 
specific tasks or group-level safety behaviours (Simard & Marchand, 1995, 1997), 
are more easily attained and cost effective data collection methods.  As such the 
majority of safety performance research has been conducted using subjective self-
report measures. 
 
Historically, researchers examining individual workers’ safety performance using 
self-report measures have conceptualised safety behaviour as a unidimensional 
construct focused on rule compliance or its opposite – violations and unsafe 
practices. However, in the late seventies Andriessen (1978) recognised the value to 
be gained from distinguishing between dimensions of safety behaviours associated 
with workers following rules or carefulness (i.e., active practices) and using their 
initiative (proactive practices).   
 
3.3.1. Active and Proactive Safety Behaviours. 
Simard and Marchand (1994, 1995) provide several important insights into the nature 
of safety in workplaces; being some of the first authors to develop a noncompliance- 
based safety scale.  However, their initial 3-item measure of workgroup safety 
initiative provides limited coverage of the construct domain (see Little, 
Lindenberger, & Nesselroade, 1999 for a commentary on multivariate indicators).  In 
a later validation study, Simard and colleagues concluded that workers’ safety 
behaviours should be conceptualised as a bidimensional construct, including both 
compliance and proactive safety practices.  They argued that safety behaviours such 
as reporting hazards, engaging in safety meetings, communicating safety 
information, and offering ideas about safety issues constituted a more participative 
type of safety practice which they termed safety initiative (Marchand, Simard, 
Carpentier-Roy, & Ouellet, 1998). 
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In their investigations of the macro and micro organisational factors that affect safety 
outcomes, Simard and Marchand (1994) also initiated the use of multilevel analytical 
techniques in the safety arena.  While safety researchers have conventionally stressed 
the importance of employees’ compliance behaviours, Simard and Marchand’s 
(1994) results indicated that the propensity for work-groups to take safety initiatives 
is a stronger predictor of effectiveness in occupational safety than the level of care 
taken by workers.  Simard and Marchand also highlighted the significant role that 
leadership styles and the nature of social relationships between workers, coworkers 
and supervisors have in influencing safety outcomes (Simard & Marchand, 1994, 
1995, 1997), a domain of interest further pursued by other key researchers in the 
safety field (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999, 2004; Hofmann et al., 2003; Hofmann & 
Stetzer, 1996; Zohar, 2002a; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008). As such Simard and 
Marchand (1994, 1997) heralded the four key trends in current organisational safety 
literature. They are; utilising methodological techniques to analyse group-level data; 
separating the safety climate construct into key macro and micro dimensions (Zohar 
& Luria, 2005); exploring the role that formal and informal social exchanges 
(Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann et al., 2003) and leadership styles have on 
safety outcomes (Hofmann & Morgeson, 2004; Neal et al., 2000; Zohar, 2002a); and 
investigating proactive safety behaviours in addition to compliance behaviours 
(Hofmann et al., 2003; O'Toole, 2002). 
 
Griffin and Neal (2000) also operationalised safety compliance and participation 
using short 3-item scales. They identified a degree of independence between the two 
safety performance scales in two samples (Study 1, r = .38; Study 2, r= .30).  This 
was also reflected in the stronger associations found between safety climate and 
participative safety behaviours observed when safety climate was modelled as a 
predictor of both constructs.  In a more recent study, Pousette et al. (2008) 
distinguished between personal safety behaviours (i.e., compliance activities) and 
two further scales established by Cheyne et al. (1998) representing structural safety 
behaviours (i.e., participation in organised safety activities) and interactional safety 
behaviour (i.e., safety activities associated with communicating safety information 
and ideas with coworkers and managers), however these later two scales have been 
combined under the participation or safety citizenship banner. 
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In a study examining the important role leadership style plays in organisational 
safety,  Hofmann et al. (2003) expanded the conceptualisation of participative safety 
to develop a measure of safety citizenship behaviours.  Hofmann et al.’s scale 
included six key types of proactive safety behaviour: helping, voice, stewardship, 
whistle blowing, civic virtue (keeping informed) and initiating safety-related change.  
These dimensions were derived from existing organisational citizenship measures 
(see Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 1990; 
Van Dyne, Graham, & Dienesch, 1994), with the resultant 27-item scale providing a 
more comprehensive measure of proactive or safety citizenship behaviour.  
 
The rationale behind using organisational citizenship behaviours is that such actions 
may be considered more discretionary than procedural-based behaviours, thereby 
requiring employees to go beyond what is expected in formal work role definitions 
(Hofmann et al., 2003).  In support of this argument, Hofmann and his colleagues 
found that employees could discriminate between safety citizenship role definitions 
and core safety role definitions (i.e., mandated job requirements such as following 
procedures). Of additional interest in Hoffman et al.’s study was the importance of 
the quality of social exchanges between leaders and subordinates in promoting safety 
citizenship behaviours.  Hofmann integrated role theory, social exchange and safety 
climate research to propose “that employees will reciprocate implied obligations of 
leadership-based social exchange (e.g., Leader-member exchange [LMX]) by 
expanding their role and behaving in ways consistent with contextual behavioural 
expectations (e.g., work-group climate)”(Hofmann et al., 2003, p.170).  That is, in 
work-groups where safety is valued, employees who have high quality LMX 
relationships pay back their leaders by being more proactive in their safety activities. 
However, as yet, relatively few studies have utilised the bidimensional model of 
safety performance to examine the interplay between the two performance 
dimensions their distal and more proximal antecedents (e.g., leadership and safety 
climate respectively ), and their outcomes (accidents and injuries). 
 
3.3.2. Safety Performance in Predictive Models. 
In their recent meta-analysis, Nahrgang et al. (2011) reported construct associations 
between both workers’ compliance practices and engagement in safety and a variety 
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of safety-related constructs.  They used the term engagement to describe workers’ 
participative safety behaviours however I have relabelled it here as proactive safety 
behaviours for greater interpretive consistency.  Nahrgang et al. found slightly 
weaker correlations between proactive behaviours and accidents/injuries (rc=.08) and 
adverse events (rc=.32) than for compliance (.20 and .49 respectively). In contrast 
they found slightly higher correlations between safety climate (i.e., management 
commitment to safety) and workers’ proactive behaviours (rc =80.) than compliance 
behaviours (rc =.71).  Nahrgang et al. concluded that the different patterns of 
associations between proactive safety and compliance, safety climate and safety 
outcomes added support to the construct distinction between these two aspects of 
workers’ safety performance. 
 
In relation to the explanatory models used to describe the relationship between safety 
climate, workers’ safety performance and outcomes, Griffin and Neal (2000) 
identified knowledge and motivational drivers as mediating factors between safety 
climate and safety behaviours.  In contrast, Zohar (2000, 2003) has drawn on 
behaviour-expectation theory to explain workers’ safety-related actions.  Zohar and 
Luria (2005) further established that the relationship between manager commitment 
to safety and workers’ performance is mediated by group-level supervisor 
commitment. Flin (2007) synthesised elements of both these models to expand her 
conceptualisation of the safety climate–injury relationship to include the impact of 
human error.  Like Zohar before, while Flin acknowledged the key role supervisors, 
managers and (to a lesser degree peers), play in establishing performance 
expectations, she refrained from including coworker influences in her model.   
 
In their recent study Jiang et al. (2010) investigated the role coworker safety 
knowledge and behaviours plays in mediating safety climate’s impact on both 
compliance and participative safety behaviour.  Jiang et al. found a strong association 
between safety compliance and participation (r= .63); a weak but significant 
relationship between safety climate and participation (r=.13) and no significant 
association between safety climate and compliance (r=.03).  They also identified 
different associations between performance and safety outcomes, with significant 
zero order correlations being observed between participation and injuries (r= -.11); 
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and safety compliance and near miss incidents (r=.13).  While the direction of this 
latter relationship is counter to that anticipated, the positive association may reflect a 
greater awareness of potential incidents or willingness of report near miss 
occurrences in those workers who see themselves as highly compliant.  
 
In one of the few studies to use longitudinal analysis to examine the lagged and 
leading relationship between safety climate, worker safety performance and safety 
outcomes, Neal and Griffin (2006) examined both employee safety behaviours and 
group accidents rates over a five-year period.  Using multilevel analysis they found 
that for hospital work-groups in which individuals engaged in compliance and 
participative safety behaviours, accident rates for lost time injuries were significantly 
reduced over time.  Pousette et al. (2008) also found safety climate predicted self-
reported safety behaviours obtained 7 and 14 months after the initial data collection.  
The temporal ordering of the safety climate-safety behaviour relationship was further 
supported in Pousette et al.’s study, as the relationship remained significant when 
prior (Time 1) safety behaviours were controlled. 
 
Two further meta-analyses have examined the relationship between safety climate 
and performance (Christian et al., 2009; S. Clarke, 2006). While both identified that 
a growing number of studies are incorporating safety participation in their predictive 
models, the body of empirical evidence is still relatively sparse.  Clarke’s (2006) 
meta-analysis demonstrated the importance of differentiating between workers’ 
compliance and participative safety behaviours.  Clarke identified strong association 
between compliance and participation (k=5: p=.47) in the small number of studies 
that included both measures. Clarke found that while safety climate predicted both 
compliance and participation practices the strength of the relationship between safety 
climate and individual workers’ participative safety behaviours was slightly stronger 
(k = 8; ρ = .50) than with compliance behaviours (k = 12; ρ = .43).  
 
Clarke (2006) also reported a relatively weak relationships between accident/injury 
outcomes and both safety compliance (k=9; p=.09) and participation (k=3; p=.14), 
however the latter effect was observed in a very small sample (N=411) in meta-
analytic terms.  In this instance, due to recoding of accident data used in her study, 
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the positive correlation indicates that greater compliance and levels of participation 
are associated with a decrease in accident/injury rates.  Despite being based on only a 
small number of studies, Clarke’s findings add support to the value of including both 
explicit, role-determined compliance practices and more implicit, proactive safety 
citizenship behaviours (Hofmann, et al, 2003). Clarke’s review also identified the 
general lack of research linking safety behaviours to safety outcomes such as injury 
rates. 
 
In a subsequent study, Christian et al. (2009) also used safety performance and 
accidents /injuries as criterion measures in their meta-analysis of the personal and 
situational factors influencing safety outcomes.  With some overlap in the studies 
included in their reviews, it was not surprising that Christian’s results were consistent 
with Clarke’s (2006); however the separation of effects for safety climate according 
to dimensionality and level of analysis provides an opportunity to examine 
associations more closely in Christian et al.’s work.  For the five effects observed 
between participation safety and compliance behaviours Christian calculated a mean 
corrected correlation of .46, consistent with Clarke’s result.  Of significance to note 
were the relatively stronger overall effects observed for both performance and 
accidents when group-level analysis were applied compared to results obtained using 
individual- level analysis.  Also of interest were the stronger relationships found 
between climate, performance and outcomes when objective data, such as archival 
records, safety audits and OHS medical data, are used in predictive models rather 
than highly subjective self-report data.  However as mentioned previously, obtaining 
such information is invariably more difficult. 
 
One issue in regarding the construct relationships between safety behaviours and 
both antecedents and outcomes concerns the practice of embedding items targeting 
employee participation in safety activities and rule compliance within safety climate 
scales (e.g., Seo et al., 2004).  The inclusion of individual-level data in safety climate 
scales has been criticised on the basis that such information is not an emergent 
property of the group or organisation as the definition of climate implies (Glick, 
1985; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Zohar, 2003).  In line with the approach taken by 
Beus, Payne, et al. (2009), the inclusion of items assessing workers’ safety 
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behaviours using an individual worker referent, constitutes construct contamination. 
Depending on the actual measure of individual performance or attitude used and the 
explanatory model conceived, the inclusion of individual-level constructs in safety 
climate scales may artificially inflate or attenuate the relationship between 
antecedent, predictor and criterion.  However, if the referent is shifted to assess 
coworker safety performance within the workgroup or organisation the emergent 
property of climate constructs is respected and the potential for confounding with 
individual- level antecedent or outcome measures reduced.  
 
3.4. Summary 
In the above review I have described how current and past research has tended to 
focus on one safety outcome measure alone in predictive models which restricts the 
opportunity for direct comparisons to be made between and within studies.  
Furthermore, I have discussed how alternate safety outcome measures such as micro 
accidents or minor injuries and near miss incident data, which potentially offer scope 
for greater response variability amongst workers, have been underutilised in the 
literature. I have also described how research has largely examined the relationship 
between the global operationalisation of psychological safety climate, as an 
antecedent of compliance and to a far lesser extent participative safety behaviours, 
and touched on the issue of construct contamination between safety climate and 
safety performance in the literature.  My review also showed that the link between 
safety climate and safety outcomes has typically been investigated using 
retrospective self-report accident/injury data analysed at the individual- level.  
Whereas results of the meta-analysis described above go some way towards 
determining if the magnitude of effects found in the literature are linked to 
methodological and design issues (i.e., the use of retrospective and prospective injury 
data), data sources (i.e., the use of objective or subjective performance and injury 
data) or level of analysis issues (i.e., conducting individual or group-level analysis), 
scope remains to investigate these issues further.   
 
My review of the extant literature was intended to provide a justification for the 
selection of outcome measures used in my thesis and the approach taken to data 
modelling.  Again, meta-analyses were referred to as overarching indications of the 
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strength of construct relationships in the literature.  With regard to my research 
framework my review recognised the multilevel, multidimensional nature of safety 
performance and safety outcomes in organisations by examining the diverse range of 
measurement options available and in particular the dependence of empirical studies 
on subjective rather than objective outcome data.  I also took into consideration 
measurement issues relating to the collection and analysis of data at the individual, 
group and organisational levels.  Furthermore, the temporal ordering of safety 
climate-behaviour-outcome issue ties in with the regression/development postulate of 
my framework in recognising the dynamic nature of organisations and the profound 
impact safety incidents can have on workers’ perceptions and broader organisational 
function. Having briefly reviewed the literature relating to the outcomes of having a 
positive safety climate, in the next chapter I focus on potential antecedents of safety 
climate and performance.  
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4. Leadership, Support and Social Exchange 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I present a review of the leadership, social support and social 
exchange research conducted within the safety domain.  In particular I focus on 
investigating the influences exerted by management and supervisors and expand the 
examination to include the informal influences that coworkers have in establishing 
safety norms. 
 
4.2. Leadership in Safety Research 
When recently describing his integrated model of safety climate and outcomes, 
Zohar (2010) included the process of sense-making as an underlying foundation for a 
modified version of the safety pyramid.  In this multilevel model the social and 
cognitive exchanges between leaders and workers plays a crucial role in the 
formation of climate perceptions.  In a review of the role of leadership in safety, 
Hofmann and Morgenson (2004) highlighted the importance of leaders’ commitment 
to safety in the workplace as a key dimension of safety climate, however they noted a 
relative paucity of studies that directly examine how different leadership styles 
influence workers’ perceptions of climate or safety behaviours.  Hofmann and 
Morgenson identified 12 studies that either focused directly on safety-specific leader 
behaviours (e.g.,  Barling et al., 2002; Tomás et al., 1999; Zohar, 2000, 2002b) or 
examined the relationship between general leadership styles and safety outcomes 
(e.g., Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann et al., 2003; Simard & Marchand, 
1997;  Zohar, 2002a; Zohar & Luria, 2004). 
 
My review of more recent publications indicates that the modelling of relationships 
between leadership, safety climate level and outcomes has continued as the main 
enterprise in the research field (e.g.,  S. Clarke & Ward, 2006; Crichton, 2005; Kath, 
Marks, & Ranney, 2010; Kelloway et al., 2006; Martinez-Córcoles, Gracia, Tomás, 
& Peiró, 2011; Wu, Chen, & Li, 2008; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008).  However, 
understanding the role leadership plays in the formation of group consensus (climate 
strength) has also attracted some limited research attention (Luria, 2008; Zohar & 
Tenne-Gazit, 2008). Christian et al. (2009) included leadership style as a situational 
predictor in their meta-analysis of safety performance and outcomes.  Their results 
indicated that leadership had a moderate positive relationship with safety 
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performance (k=9; ρ=.31) and weak negative association with accidents and injuries 
(k= 7; ρ= -.16). When the leadership effects were separated into compliance and 
participation dimensions slightly stronger associations were found between 
leadership and safety participation (k=3; ρ=.35) than for compliance behaviours (k=3; 
ρ=.24). This result is consistent with the proposal that leadership style is associated 
with worker engagement in participative or organisational citizenship behaviours 
(Podsakoff et al., 1990). However as indicated by the limited sample sizes for these 
categories and the lack of specification of which level of leadership is driving the 
safety performance outcomes, there is a need for further research in this area. 
 
While Christian et al. (2009) did not distinguish between studies using safety-
specific leadership scales or traditional leadership inventories, Zohar and Luria 
(2005) have highlighted the need to establish the discriminant validity of safety 
leadership and generic leadership measures given the integrated nature of the 
constructs.  In the following section I briefly look at empirical findings obtained 
using both safety-specific and generic leadership approaches before focusing on the 
most commonly applied leadership approach: leader-member exchange.    
 
4.2.1. Safety-Specific Leadership 
Kelloway, Mullen and Francis (2006) extended their earlier collaborative work with 
Barling (Barling et al., 2002) to operationalise two safety-specific leadership styles.  
By modifying the wording of items tapping active/transformational and passive 
leadership in the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (Bass & Avolio, 1997) they 
created new facet-specific leadership scales for use in a safety context.  In testing 
their leadership-safety model, Kelloway et al. identified that both of these safety 
leadership styles differentially related to safety consciousness and safety climate 
which subsequently predicted safety events and injuries.  However, a major 
limitation of this study was the use of working, undergraduate students as the sample 
population, as the use of this predominantly white collar/service industry sample 
places in question the generalisability of their results to higher risk settings, typically 
targeted in safety research.  
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Wu, Chen and Li (2008) also investigated the relationship between safety leadership, 
safety climate and safety performance in university laboratories. Their 
operationalisation of safety leadership tapped aspects of caring, coaching and 
controlling which mirrors Johnson’s (2007) renaming of supervisor safety climate 
factors in his validation of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) scale.  A closer inspection of the 
items for both safety leadership and safety climate measures in Wu et al.’s study 
indicated little construct differentiation.  Evidence of poor discriminant validity was 
also seen in Wu et al.’s path analysis that showed a very strong association between 
safety leadership and safety climate.   
 
More recently Martínez-Córcoles et al. (2011) examined the relationship between 
safety culture, safety climate, safety leadership and compliance behaviours.  They 
operationalised safety climate as top level management commitment to safety  
(Zohar & Luria, 2005) and adapted the Empowerment Leadership Questionnaire 
(Arnold, Sharon, Rhoades, & Drasgow, 2000) to reflect the safety focus of 
supervisors in the nuclear industry. They subsequently identified five supervisory 
safety leadership factors which they labelled: leading by example, participative 
decision making, coaching, informing and showing concern, which again align quite 
closely with Zohar and Luria’s (2005) supervisor safety climate scale.   
 
While Martínez-Córcoles et al. (2011) identified a strong bivariate correlation and 
standardised pathway between leadership and safety climate (r=.55; β=.61) the 
ordering of these constructs in their model is somewhat puzzling in that they 
proposed top level management commitment to safety as a mediating factor between  
workers’ perceptions of supervisory safety leadership style and compliance 
behaviours. However in terms of the distal (organisation-level management 
practices) and proximal (group-level supervisory practices ) influences represented 
down the organisational hierarchy, it would seem more logical to model supervisory 
safety practices/style as a mediating influence between top management practices 
and performance, or for organisation-level safety climate to moderate the group 
climate performance relationship.  This apparent management-level incongruence 
in Martínez-Córcoles et al.’s study may be linked to the use of ambiguous referents 
in the particular nuclear context (i.e., supervisors may actually equate to top level 
managers rather than first line supervisors as inferred).   
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When commenting on the lack of empirical evidence relating to how managers 
influence organisational safety, Flin (2003) highlighted the ambiguous application of 
the term management in safety climate research as a problematic issue. She argued 
that clarifying the differential influence of management commitment to safety across 
the organisational hierarchy (from front-line supervisors to managing directors) 
would enhance our understanding of workplace safety.  This stance has since been 
supported by Zohar (2010) in his call for the application of a level-of-analysis 
approach and greater content specification in safety climate research.  While both 
Flin and Zohar were referring to clarification of management safety practices and 
roles listed within safety climate inventories, the same issue and potential solution 
applies when considering the influence of leadership style.  
 
On the basis of such findings it becomes apparent that the distinction between 
leaders’ commitment to safety (as a dimension of safety climate) and leadership style 
may be more easily confounded when safety-specific leadership scales are used.   
Zohar and Luria (2005) contend, that while “leader interactions provide the medium 
in which policies are implemented,… the medium, although influencing the message 
(e.g., greater emphasis on safety under high quality leader-member interactions), 
[should] not be confused with it”  (2005, p.626).  In support of this statement they 
argued that the limited findings to date indicate that individuals discriminate between 
the two constructs, by basing leadership perceptions on relationship referents and 
climate perceptions on commitment referents.  This distinction is however 
confounded when safety-specific leadership scales are used.   
 
In contrast therefore, by focusing on more general leadership behaviours in safety 
research the opportunity exists to tease out the influences of both a leader’s style and 
safety orientation, as independent constructs.  For example, in climate-based 
research, leadership style may be conceptualised as a component of a broader 
organisational foundation climate within which the facet-specific safety climate 
emerges.  Indeed intuitively, the independence of leadership style and safety 
orientation makes sense, in that one cannot automatically assume (only hope) that an 
effective leader must have a strong commitment to safety, especially if organisational 
goals prioritise production over safety outcomes.  
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4.2.2. General Approaches to Leadership  
While the range of approaches to leadership in the organisational literature is 
extensive (for a review see Yammarino, Dionne, Chun, & Dansereau, 2005) the 
leadership models applied most frequently in the safety domain have focused on 
Transformational and Transactional leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1997), leader-
member exchange (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), and leader influence tactics (Yukl & 
Falbe, 1990).  Zohar (2002a) initially found evidence to support the interaction 
between leaders’ safety priority and two dimensions of transactional and 
transformational leadership in the prediction of safety climate and micro accidents. 
Zohar and Luria (2004) later identified that the transformational leadership style of 
supervisors (platoon leaders) in the military were positively correlated to group-level 
safety climate and moderated the relationship between supervisor practices and 
safety climate perceptions. Clarke and Ward (2006) also found that leaders’ 
influence tactics had significant positive  direct and indirect effects when modelled 
on safety climate and safety participation.  In one of the few studies to use 
longitudinal data, Parker, Axtell and Turner (2001) also found evidence that 
supportive supervision predicted safe working 18 months after initial data collection.  
 
Additionally, establishing how the quality of leader-member exchanges (LMX) 
influences safety climate and performance has attracted a considerable degree of 
research interest.  In their 1999 study, Hofmann and Morgeson described how social 
exchange theory provides a conceptual foundation to explore key aspects of 
organisational behaviour, and included two forms of social exchange; perceived 
organisational support (POS) and LMX in their safety model. Similarly, Oliver et al. 
(2002) drew upon social exchange theory when discussing the importance of both 
supervisor support and coworker support in their study of the individual and 
organisational factors that affect occupational accidents.  More recently Kath et al. 
(2010) also examined the relationship between safety climate, LMX, POS and 
upward safety communication.   
 
While Hofmann and Morgeson (2004) rightly identified the relative lack of research 
into leadership and supervisory social exchanges within the safety domain, it is 
possible to extend this concern to argue that even less research has focused on 
investigating how the broader range of social relations and group processes operating 
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within and across the workplace hierarchy can affect safety outcomes.  In the  
following sections I therefore review empirical studies that have examined the 
relationship between organisation support, leadership, group process, safety climate 
and safety outcomes with a specific focus on the application of social exchange 
theory.  
 
4.3. Social Exchange Theory  
Social Exchange Theory (Blau, 1964) describes the nature of exchanges in social 
resources that occur within relationships. When considered in combination with the 
norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), the underlying premise of social exchange 
theory is that an expectation exists between individuals that support provided, 
services rendered or rapport established within relationships will be reciprocated in a 
commensurate form. In an organisational safety context, social exchange theory 
suggests that in the normal progress of daily interactions workers and leaders 
establish exchange-based relationships (leader-member exchanges).  In situations in 
which high quality leader-member exchange relations are formed and safety is 
valued by the leader, a worker would be expected to feel a sense of obligation to 
respond in a manner beneficial to and consistent with the safety goals and objectives 
of their leader.  In low quality exchange situations any obligation to reciprocate in a 
positive manner is weakened.  
 
However, social exchange dynamics are not restricted to supervisor LMX 
relationships, but rather span the organisation to include management- worker and 
worker- coworker interactions, potentially forming a broader climate for social 
exchange. While few studies in the safety literature have attempted to look at the 
complexity of social exchange variables operating down the organisational chain of 
influence (DeJoy et al., 2004; Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999), these exceptions are 
included in the following review.  To reflect the hierarchical nature of social 
exchange relations I begin with the most distal exchange relationship, that between 
higher level managers and workers. 
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4.3.1. Organisation-level Social Exchange (POS) 
In general, social exchange research conducted at the upper management or 
organisational level has been investigated under the banner of perceived 
organisational support.  In developing their POS scale, Eisenberger et al. (1986) 
followed Levinson’s (1965) approach in arguing that employees “view actions of 
agents of the organisation as actions of the organisation itself... [resulting in] the 
personification of the organisation”(Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchinson, & Sowa, 
1986, p. 500). However, from the perspective of workers, agents of the organisation 
operate at all hierarchical levels.  As such, when completing a POS scale, using the 
organisation referent, as generally administered, it may be difficult to ascertain 
whether respondents are actually rating perceived support in terms of the agency 
provided by their immediate supervisor, lower level managers or executive levels of 
management as the content of items is often applicable at different management 
levels. 
 
In this instance the generic use of organisation may exacerbate the potential for 
ambiguity as previously discussed in the nonspecific usage of the term management 
in safety climate research mentioned by Flin (2003).  In line with the level-of-
analysis approach to safety climate recommended by Zohar (2010), I would argue 
that to improve construct validity in variables tapping social exchange interactions at 
various levels of the organisation, the distinction between focal referents should be 
made explicit. 
 
Mearns and Reader (2008) also drew on social exchange theory when developing 
their organisation wide support for health and safety model.  They described how 
“essentially building a climate of care, concern and support for health within the 
work group... [based on] appropriate social exchanges within an organisation, may 
lead to unanticipated benefits in terms of employee safety behaviours that go beyond 
normal compliance...” (p. 388 & 392). This stance is consistent with general 
leadership theory which links high quality, transformational leadership with 
expanded employee engagement in organisational citizenship behaviours (Podsakoff 
et al., 1990). In developing their facet-specific health support scales for supervisors 
and workmates, Mearns and Reader found that the strongest relationships with safety 
citizenship behaviours were observed when supervisors supported employee health (r 
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= .33; β =.23).  Perceived organisational support also showed significant correlations 
with safety citizenship (r = .29; β =.14) and to a lesser degree workmate support of 
health (r = .21; β =.08). 
 
As previously described in Chapter 2, Wallace et al. (2006) found that safety climate 
mediated the relationship between two foundation climates (the climate for 
organisational support and management-employee relations), and occupational 
accidents.  Safety climate was also found to mediate the relationship between general 
organisational climate and employees’ perceived safety at work (DeJoy et al., 2004).  
DeJoy et al. included organisational support, coworker support, involvement with 
others, involvement with supervisors and communication in their conceptualisation 
of organisational climate. They found support for the relationship between 
organisational support, coworker support and safety climate and also concluded that 
organisational support has both direct and indirect effects on safety outcomes.  In 
these two studies POS was conceptualised as one dimension of the broader 
organisational or foundation climate however only Wallace et al. treated POS as a 
group-level construct.  Indeed, as in the general leadership literature where levels-of-
analysis issues have been raised as a concern (Yammarino et al., 2005), safety-
related social exchange studies have generally analysed individual- level data derived 
from the dyadic relationship between supervisors and individual workers, with few 
studies correctly aligning theory, data and measurement techniques.    
 
For example, Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) regressed both POS and LMX on 
group leader’s safety communication, safety commitment and injuries.  In a sample 
of 49 supervisor and group leader dyads in the manufacturing industry, Hofmann and 
Morgeson distinguished between nonunion supervisors and unionised group leaders.  
However the unionised group leaders may be considered first line supervisors in their 
own right depending on the sample population. Of importance here is the issue of 
clarifying not only the level of analysis applied (Yammarino et al., 2005) but also the 
status of the focal leader and relationship to the respondent. Hofmann and 
Morgeson’s results indicated that both social exchange variables had significant 
associations with safety communication (POS: SC r = .54) but that only LMX 
showed significant associations with all three criterion variables (LMX: SC r = .47, 
 57 
 Leadership and Social Exchange  
 
 
Commitment  r = .29, Accidents r = -.32).  These results indicate that the more 
proximal exchange relationships between workers and their direct supervisors is 
more critical in fostering better safety communication, commitment to safety and 
fewer injuries in group leaders than more distal organisational support. However in 
their review of the application of multilevel analysis in leadership research, 
Yammarino indicated that while the appropriate levels of analysis were implied in 
Hofmann and Morgeson’s theory and hypothesis development, they believed that the 
theory, concepts, data and measurement levels were misaligned and required more 
explicit clarification as was subsequently undertaken in Hofmann et al.’s (2003) later 
research on LMX.  
 
In sum the results of these studies add support to the proposal that a network of 
social exchanges at different levels of the organisation may be influencing employee 
behaviours and safety outcomes.  Importantly the literature indicates that employees 
are influenced not only by their relationships with their supervisor, but also by their 
perceptions of the degree to which upper management values and is committed to 
them as individuals; and the nature of social interactions within work teams. 
 
4.3.2. Group-level Social Exchange (LMX) 
As a key link in the psycho-social chain of influence, research has to date largely 
focused on the social exchanges between first line supervisors and their team 
members.  In her discussion of the emergence of state goal orientations in work-
groups Dragoni (2005) argued that through a process of social learning (Bandura, 
1986), consistent patterns of leader behaviours are observed and interpreted by 
workers as the leader’s achievement priority.  Through ongoing interactions, this 
priority forms the basis for the specific goal orientation or normative behavioural 
expectations for the individual and group; that is psychological or group climate.  
Dragoni further described how some group leaders with a “particularly compelling 
presence” (p. 1091) have the capacity to galvanise climate perceptions within their 
work-groups.   
 
Hofmann et al. also proposed that “employees will reciprocate implied obligations of 
leadership-based social exchanges (e.g., leader-member exchange) by expanding 
their role and behaving in ways consistent with contextual behavioural expectations 
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(e.g., work-group climate)” (2003, p. 170).  Consolidating these two lines of 
thinking, it appears that leaders play an important role in both helping to form group-
level safety climate perceptions and encouraging workers to operate within or even 
surpass the normative behavioural expectations. In support of these statements, 
Hofmann et al. (2003) found that perceived safety climate moderated the relationship 
between leader-member exchanges and workers’ safety-related role definitions and 
safety citizenship behaviours. That is, in work-groups in which safety was valued 
and the quality of leader-member exchanges was high, workers were more likely to 
engage in beyond-role safety citizenship behaviours.   
 
Michael and colleagues (Michael, Guo, Wiedenbeck, & Ray, 2006), also examined 
the relative importance of supervisor LMX and safety communication in predicting 
subjective and objective safety outcomes for blue collar workers in the wood 
manufacturing industry.  Michael et al.’s results indicated that when viewed from a 
subordinate’s perspective, the quality of LMX is a stronger predictor of their 
subjective recall of safety events over a 12 month period than safety communication.  
Using hierarchical regression to control for age, gender and job satisfaction, they 
found that LMX accounted for a small but significant amount of variance in safety 
events (2.3%) but only .3% of safety communication. Even though self-reported 
accident data and company OSHA records in Michael et al.’s study were 
significantly correlated, neither LMX nor safety communication emerged as 
significant predictors of the objective safety records. While the overall size of the 
effects observed were considered small, Michael et al. concluded that the importance 
of front-line supervisors’ actions and relations with workers should not be 
overlooked when promoting safety in the workplace.  
 
Furthermore, just as supervisors have been identified as an important cog in the 
wheel driving organisational safety, so too are a worker’s fellow team members, as 
they represent the most proximal point of contact within the organisational social 
system (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Turner & Parker, 2004). As described previously, 
while the need to clearly distinguish between leadership style and leaders’ 
commitment to safety has garnered support (Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005), 
even less attention has been paid to the apparent lack of construct distinction found 
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in the labelling and measurement of coworker social support and cohesion as aspects 
of internal group processes in the safety literature, compared to coworker 
commitment to safety as a dimension of safety climate. 
 
4.3.3. Group Member Social Exchange 
In the safety literature to date there has been a lack of distinction made between the 
general quality of group interaction occurring (workgroup context) and safety-
specific group practices (safety climate related norms).  For example in Christian et 
al.’s (2009) meta-analysis, they adopt Neal and Griffin’s (2004) taxonomy to label 
internal group processes as a category within psychological safety climate.  As their 
definition focused on the “perceptions of communication and support for safety 
within work-groups or the extent to which employees perceive that their coworkers 
provide them with safety-related cooperation and encouragement” (p.1107), the 
content domain appears to reflect emergent group safety practices and therefore its 
inclusion as a dimension of safety climate is appropriate. However when I examined 
the item content in a number of the studies included under this category in Christian 
et al.’s (2009) meta-analysis, their focus was on generic group characteristics rather 
than safety-specific interactions.  For example, DeJoy et al. (2004) investigated 
coworker support, Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) work-group processes, and  Hse , 
Lee, Wu and Takano (2008) teamwork.  In each of these scales there was no mention 
of safety in any of the items.   
 
In contrast, Watson and colleagues examined the safety norms of coworkers, with 
items focusing on coworkers wearing protective clothing and taking corrective safety 
actions (Watson, Scott, Bishop, & Turnbeaugh, 2005).  In this instance the scale is 
correctly included under the safety climate subcategory but does not really reflect 
internal group process as the label implies.  With the intention of promoting the value 
to be gained by establishing greater construct distinction, in the following review I 
focus on studies that have investigated the relationship between generic group 
process and safety outcomes rather than those that have adopted the hybrid group 
process/safety climate approach. 
 
While no studies in the safety domain have investigated group member social 
exchange specifically, the important role that coworker support  and group cohesion 
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plays in reducing role ambiguity, organisational citizenship behaviours and task 
performance is well established in the organisational literature (Chiaburu & Harrison, 
2008; Kidwell & Mossholder, 1997).  For example, when examining the relationship 
between group cohesion and organisational citizenship behaviours, Kidwell and 
Mossholder (1997) used social exchange theory to explain one of the mechanisms 
through which cohesiveness encourages worker participation.  They argued that 
“cohesive groups would display more positive and frequent social exchanges than 
noncohesive groups…[thereby] encouraging trust in the long run that social 
exchanges will be reciprocated [in the form of organisational citizenship 
behaviours]” (1997, p.778).  While Kidwell and Mossholder did not attempt to 
measure the quality of social exchanges as a separate construct from group cohesion, 
a later study by Love and Forret (2008) found strong correlations between team-
member exchange and supervisors’ ratings of workers on four of the five dimensions 
of organisational citizenship behaviours. 
 
Within the safety literature, Simard and Marchand (1995) included supervisors’ 
perceptions of work-group cohesiveness in their multilevel analysis and found that 
cohesion was related to workers’ propensity to engage in safety initiatives at the 
individual (r=.21, p<.01) and group-level of analysis (r=.41, p<.01).  When modelled 
with other macro and micro organisational factors (including supervisor participative 
management of safety), group cohesion remained a significant predictor of safety 
initiatives. Furthermore, Luria (2008) found that group cohesion in military units was 
a positive predictor of safety climate strength.  When modelled with the leadership 
style of their platoon leader, significant interaction effects indicated that the strongest 
levels of group consensus regarding safety climate perceptions were found in groups 
that were more cohesive and also rated their platoon leader highly on the 
transformational leadership scale.  Conversely in groups that had a leader who 
engaged in a passive leadership style, high cohesiveness in the platoon was found to 
mitigate the lack of direction from the leader in establishing a relatively stronger 
safety climate than found in groups with lower social cohesion.  
 
In a further study, Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) investigated the impact of group-
level safety climate, group members’ willingness to approach workers engaging in 
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unsafe acts (approach intentions), and group processes on unsafe behaviours and 
group-level accidents.  They operationalised coworker support as a separate, generic 
construct using a 7-item scale from the Survey of Organisations (Taylor & Bowers, 
1972).  Using  group-level analysis to investigate the construct relationship for 222 
workers nested in  21 teams, Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) reported moderate to 
strong correlations between group process and safety climate at both the individual 
and group-level (individual r=.34; group r=.49).  Correlations observed between 
group process and unsafe behaviours (individual r=-.17; group r= -.49) were also 
significant and stronger at the group-level, but for the group process  accident 
relationship the effect was not significant (group r=-.31, p<.10). Considering the 
small sample size at the group-level, insufficient power may have contributed to this 
finding.  Subsequently Hofmann and Stetzer claimed marginal support for their 
group process accident hypothesis. 
 
In a further study examining employee perceptions of job demands and safety 
climate in a sample of injured construction workers, Gillen and colleagues (Gillen, 
Baltz, Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002) found that workers who perceived that their 
working environment was safer, as indexed by more positive safety climate ratings, 
also rated supervisor (r=.55) and coworker support (r=.31) higher on the Job Content 
Questionnaire  (JCQ).  
 
Of importance to note in these studies is the consistent magnitude of the relationships 
observed between the variety of group process indices (whether they measure 
coworker support or group cohesion) and both safety climate and safety outcomes.  
In addition, the trend for associations observed at the group-level of analysis to 
exceed those found using individual-level data warrants comment.  When scale items 
focus on the individual workers’ or supervisors’ perceptions of the general social 
interactions between coworkers in their team, this referent shift is consistent with the 
criteria for climate constructs in that the focus is directed on the emergent qualities of 
the group.  If aggregation of this data is subsequently conducted, the shared nature of 
climate perceptions is reflected at the target level of analysis.  Subsequently if group 
process variables, leadership and measures of organisational support are examined in 
combination it may be possible to operationalise a modified version of the 
overarching environment for support recently described by Nahrgang et al. (2011).   
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In their comprehensive meta-analysis of the extant safety literature, Nahrgang et.al 
(2011) used the Job Demands-Resource Model  (Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, & 
Schaufeli, 2001) as a framework to investigate how job demands and job resources 
impact on employee burnout, engagement and safety outcomes. Within the job 
resources domain, they included social support, leadership and safety climate as 
dimensions of a supportive environment. One of Nahrgang et al.’s key findings was 
that a supportive environment was a major factor in promoting workers’ compliance 
and engagement in safety practices and safety outcomes across industry settings. 
Nahrang et al. (2011) concluded that the consistently strong correlations found 
between the three supportive environment variables, safety engagement and 
compliance, add weight to the hypothesis that support environments may act as 
antecedents to both safety climate and safety performance.        
 
Nahrgang et al.’s (2011) review also highlights that, while there are fewer studies 
examining the role coworker social support plays in safety models, both population 
estimates and the relative importance statistics derived add credence to the 
importance of coworker activities in predicting workers’ safety performance and 
safety outcomes.  In all bar one relationship with criterion variables (i.e., unsafe 
behaviours) correlations for coworker social support exceeded the values of the more 
intensely researched leadership variables.  Coworker social support was also found to 
account for more variance in both accidents and adverse events than safety climate 
(accidents 65.5% of .32: adverse events 31.6% of .22).  That being said, the criteria 
used when formulating the job resource -supportive environment variables show a 
degree of construct confusion both within and between categories. To quote directly 
from Nahrgang et al.’s methodology: 
 
Social support includes involvement and support from coworkers, team-work, 
and coworker support for safety.  Leadership includes styles of leadership 
(i.e., transformational), relationships between leaders and workers (i.e., 
leader-member exchange), trust, and supervisor support for safety... Safety 
climate includes the overall perceptions of the safety climate, the perceptions 
of management’s involvement in safety, and proactive management of safety 
(2011, p. 76). 
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While the use of such broad brush strokes across construct domains allowed greater 
flexibility in the meta-analysis it may have been at the cost of construct validity. As I 
have previously discussed in my review of the literature, the failure to distinguish 
between general and facet-specific concepts in the social support and leadership 
categories is problematic in a manner akin to not distinguishing between the message 
and the medium through which it is delivered (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  Furthermore, 
items measuring coworker and supervisor support for, or commitment to safety are 
often included in global safety climate measures along with management 
commitment to safety.  This potential mixing of domain content again may lead to 
construct validity issues, potential problems with multicollinearity and artificially 
inflated estimates with safety performance and outcomes.     
 
Despite these concerns Nahrgang et al.’s (2011) organisation of the job resources 
variables distinguishes between individual (knowledge and autonomy), group 
(coworker support and leadership) and organisational level (safety climate) 
information, reflecting Zohar’s (2010) recommendations to approach safety climate 
research from a levels-of-analysis perspective.  If further construct refinement was 
undertaken in empirical studies to clearly distinguish between safety climate and 
social support dimension, such as focusing on workers’ perceptions of the lateral and 
horizontal social exchange interactions engaged in by organisational agents, the 
operationalisation of a foundation climate for social exchange could be formulated to 
hierarchically align with levels of group (coworker and supervisor) and 
organisational (management) safety climate.  Such an undertaking would potentially 
advance our knowledge of the psycho-social chain of influence in safety research, as 
is the intent of my research.  
 
4.4. Summary 
I began this chapter with a brief description of leadership styles investigated in the 
safety literature. My review highlighted the need for researchers to make two clear 
points of differentiation in their studies.  The first involved the use of generic or 
safety-specific leadership and the need to improve construct discriminant validity 
between the two.  The second, focused on the need to clearly distinguish between 
levels of management to minimise focal target ambiguity in safety research.  
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Drawing upon the general leadership literature, I then provided evidence to support 
the utility of social-exchange theory as a common theoretical basis for understanding 
lateral and horizontal workplace interactions operating within organisations.  In line 
with arguments previously presented regarding the importance of including coworker 
influences in safety models, empirical findings examining the role of coworker 
support and group dynamics were also described.  
 65 
 Rationale 
 
 
5. Rationale 
5.1. Research Aims and Objectives 
As I have described in the preceding chapters, research indicates that an important 
link exists between the safety climate of an organisation, employee compliance and 
participative safety behaviours, and safety outcomes such as accidents and injuries 
(Christian et al., 2009; S. Clarke, 2006; Nahrgang et al., 2011).  Furthermore, the 
quality of leadership and informal relationships in workplace settings has been found 
to influence employee safety behaviours (Hofmann et al., 2003; Nahrgang et al., 
2011).  However, few studies to date have investigated these factors concurrently or 
examined the direct impact of applying different levels of analysis and aggregation 
methodologies on construct associations.  My overall aim in this research is therefore 
to examine the relationships between key organisational predictors of employee 
safety outcomes by developing and testing a work-level model of safety climate and 
social exchange using group-level analysis to directly compare the results derived.  
More specifically a series of objectives are proposed, namely: 
 
1. To develop a measure of safety climate, using a level-of-analysis approach 
that incorporates the active and proactive safety practices of organisational 
agents. 
2. To show how climate level, strength and variability can be used to examine 
organisational differences in safety climate profiles.  
3. To investigate how the relationship between employee perceptions of 
management, supervisor and work-group commitment to safety (i.e., levels of 
safety climate) influence individual employees’ safety performance and 
safety outcomes (e.g., injuries, near miss incidents). 
4. To investigate the relationship between the climate for social exchange, 
including the quality of more formal (management and supervisory) and 
informal (coworker) social exchanges, perceived safety climate level and 
workers’ safety performance.  
5. To examine potential differences in the hypothesised construct structures and 
relationships for the work-level model of safety climate when different 
aggregation techniques are used to conduct group-level analysis.  
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The following rationale is separated into two sections. In the first section I focus on 
hypotheses relating to the development and validation of the constructs to be used in 
the work-level safety climate model.  In the second section I present the rationale for 
testing two explanatory models.  The first of these models examines the relationship 
between global safety climate, safety behaviours and safety outcomes.  The second 
proposes a stratified work-level model of climate for social exchange, safety climate 
and safety behaviour.  Within each of these sections a justification of the 
methodological and theoretical choices made in my research is offered and specific 
hypotheses presented. 
 
5.2. Operationalising Study Constructs 
In response to the call for safety research to shift its focus to investigating functional 
processes and explanatory models (Flin, 2007; Zohar, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005; 
Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008), my research explores the mechanisms of how climate 
for social exchange and safety climate combine to influence safety behaviours and 
outcomes.  To achieve this goal, a critical first step is the operationalisation of a 
work-level safety climate construct that expands upon Zohar’s Organisational Safety 
Climate Scale (Zohar, 2003) to include coworker commitment to safety at the group-
level and also the operationalisation of climate for social exchange indicators.  A 
preliminary objective of my thesis is therefore the validation of both existing and 
new safety behaviour, safety climate and social exchange scales.  
 
5.2.1. Work-level Organisational Safety Climate Scale. 
5.2.1.1. Coworker Dimension 
Reviews examining the dimensionality of safety climate have identified a range of 
possible components (see Cox & Flin, 1998; Guldenmund, 2000; Seo et al., 2004; 
Zohar, 2003) with leader actions having emerged as the principal component and key 
focus of research in recent years (Flin, 2007, Zohar,2003). However, in accepting the 
definition of safety climate as the shared perceptions of safety conditions (including 
the policies, procedures and practices) within an organisation, should our 
operationalisation not reflect the practices of employees at all work-levels, not just 
those of managers and supervisors?  In line with social interaction perspectives 
(Schneider, 1975) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), including 
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coworker actions in group-level safety climate acknowledges the influences work 
mates have on the formation of subjective safety norms.   
As discussed in section 2.6, in using the TPB as a framework to examine the 
relationship between safety climate (operationalised as management attitudes to 
safety), group safety norms and unsafe behaviours (violations) Fogarty and Shaw 
(2010) highlighted the key role coworkers play as models for normative behaviour.  
Chiaburu and Harrison (2008, p.1097) have also argued that “coworkers matter [by] 
making the place for a broad range of employee outcomes.”   While the influence of 
coworkers is not a new addition to the safety domain, previous research has typically 
focused on coworker support (Roy, 2003) or influence (Findley et al., 2007) rather 
than specifically on coworkers’ commitment to safety.  As indicated in Nahrgang et 
al.’s (2011) recent meta-analysis, coworker social support and support for safety 
have been found to be highly correlated with safety climate measures and strong 
predictors of safety performance and outcomes. 
 
While the reasons for including management and supervisor safety practices in 
generic safety climate scales seems self-evident, the inclusion of workers’ self-
ratings of their safety practices (such as participation, compliance, knowledge or 
competence) is problematic, as it confuses perceptions of safety climate with 
individual safety performance.  Depending on the explanatory model developed, self-
reported worker safety performance is often used as a criterion measure.  If workers’ 
safety practices also form a part of a global safety climate index inflated correlations 
between predictor and criterion would be expected.  Furthermore, such information is 
not considered an emergent property of the group or organisation as the definition of 
climate implies (Glick, 1985; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Zohar, 2003). To reduce the 
potential for confounding between predictor and outcome, including workers’ 
perceptions of coworker safety practices as an index of group safety norms addresses 
the theoretical issue of emergence properties required in climate constructs.  
Furthermore using a rating of coworker safety practices in safety climate scales frees 
workers’ ratings of their individual safety behaviour for use as individual-level or 
aggregated group-level outcome measures.   
 
However, in seeking to develop a comprehensive measure of coworker safety climate 
a logical and pragmatic solution is apparent; to adapt an existing worker safety 
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performance measure to a coworker referent. Furthermore, in developing such an 
instrument I wished to tap complementary content domains to Zohar and Luria’s 
(2005) active and proactive management and supervisor safety climate scales.  In 
reviewing the safety performance literature, Hofmann et al.’s (2003) 
operationalisation of front-line worker compliance and proactive behaviours emerged 
as the prime contender from which to create a group-level coworker climate scale.   
When examined at the item level a strong theoretical overlap was observed between 
the three content themes used by Zohar and Luria (2005) and the two dimensions of 
safety practices identified by Hofmann and colleagues. To maintain greater 
continuity in the thesis, the terms active and proactive safety practices will be used 
for both individual safety behaviour subscales and group-level coworker safety 
climate subscales to represent compliance and participative practices respectively. 
(See section 6.4 for a description of the derived scales)    
 
Therefore, having conceptualised coworker commitment to safety as a derivative of 
worker safety behaviour, three important issues need to be assessed.  First, that the 
proposed two-factor structure for both the individual and group climate scales is 
consistent across referents; second, that participants can clearly differentiate between 
the coworker and individual behaviour scales; and finally that the shared nature of 
perceptions implicit in the definition of climate scales is observed in the coworker 
scale.   
 
When investigating the level of agreement amongst workers, Zohar (2005) used 
standard deviation scores as a measure of Climate Strength.  Pousette et al. (2008) 
found that the level of agreement (sharedness) observed for safety climate factors 
was stronger than that observed for measures of individual attitudes towards safety.  
However, consideration of the premises of controllability, stability and locus of 
causality described in attribution theory (see DeJoy, 1994) would arguably direct 
observers to expect less variability in aggregated self-response variables than in 
measures using other organisational agents as the referent (whether it be the 
coworkers, supervisors or managers). 
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To expand, self- directed biases  may result in workers attributing  their own good 
safety performance to controllable, stable, internal causal factors (e.g., their own 
effort, knowledge and ability) and any negative performance elements to less stable, 
uncontrollable, external factors (e.g., tiredness due to shifts, changing work pressure 
or poor procedures).  In contrast, the fundamental attribution error would predict that 
workers would be more likely to attribute observations of both positive and negative 
safety performance of their coworkers or managers to dispositional characteristics of 
those individuals than to situational factors (Ross, 1977).  Acknowledging the reality 
that in functional groups, workers and coworkers come with a diverse range of skills 
and knowledge, yet are arguably exposed to the same or very similar workplace 
environmental factors, a process of biased attributions would in theory result in two 
outcomes.  First, it would contribute to workers operating within generally positive 
safety climates maintaining high self-ratings across the response domain as safety 
deviance or violations are more likely to be dismissed as aberrant events rather than 
normal patterns of behaviour.  Second, it would support greater response variability 
in workers’ ratings of coworkers than when an individual referent is applied.   
 
To support the utility of both the individual safety behaviour scale and the coworker 
safety climate scale, I would expect that mean scores for self- ratings will be higher 
than ratings of coworkers and that the level of agreement between workers when 
assessing their own safety behaviours would exceed the level of agreement observed 
between workers when assessing coworkers’ commitment to safety.  Therefore, a 
three-stage strategy will be used to assess the continuity of factor structure, 
differences across response referents and differential level of agreement between 
safety climate and individual behaviour measure as outlined in the following 
hypotheses:  
  
Hypothesis 1: The factor structure of individual safety behaviours will be best 
represented by a correlated two-factor structure representing active and 
proactive safety behaviours when tested against single and uncorrelated two 
factor models.  
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Hypothesis 2: The factor structure of the coworker safety climate scale will 
be best represented by a correlated two-factor structure representing active 
and proactive safety behaviours when tested against single and uncorrelated 
two factor models.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Front-line workers will differentiate between measures of 
coworker safety climate and individual safety behaviours such that ratings of 
coworker commitment to safety will be lower than workers’ self-ratings and 
level of agreement will be weaker for the coworker scale. 
 
 
5.2.1.2. Management and Supervisor Dimensions 
Having expanded the work-level conceptualization of safety climate to included 
coworker activities,  my next aim is to confirm the overall factor structure of the 
safety climate scale and test the model’s predictive validity. This first involves 
validating the factor structure of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) management and 
supervisor safety climate scales in the sample of front-line workers to be used in my 
study. 
 
Zohar and Luria (2005) proposed that each dimension of their safety climate 
construct (i.e., both management and supervisor commitment) would conform to a 
correlated three-factor structure.  Their results indicated a high level of item-cross 
loadings and strong factor correlations, leading them to conclude that each dimension 
would be better represented as a single, higher order structure reflecting the general 
commitment to safety of both supervisors and management. To date only one study 
by Johnson (2007) has attempted to replicate the factor structure of the supervisor 
dimension of safety climate obtained by Zohar and Luria.  As discussed in section 
2.4.2 Johnson identified three highly correlated factors labelled: caring, compliance 
and coaching which he argued closely aligned with Zohar and Luria’s (2005) original 
dimensions.  However, he recognised that both the single and two-factor models also 
provided a good fit to the data. 
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Therefore in seeking to further validate Zohar and Luria’s (2005) safety climate 
scales, exploratory analysis of the factor structure of both the organisational 
(management) and group-level (supervisor) safety climate dimensions will be 
conducted in the front-line worker sample in this study.  Due to the high level of 
factor correlations previously identified in the literature, and in recognition of the 
potential impact of attribution biases when rating distal organisational agents, it is 
proposed that a one-factor structure will emerge as the best fit for the data in each 
safety climate subscale as hypothesised below. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The factor structure of the organisation- level management 
safety climate scale will be best represented by a one factor structure when 
tested against imposed two & three factor models.  
 
Hypothesis 5: The factor structure of the group-level supervisor safety 
climate scale will be best represented by a one factor structure when tested 
against imposed two & three factor models.  
 
5.2.2. Climate for Social Exchange  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the importance of different leadership styles in predicting 
safety climate and promoting employees’ safety performance has been well 
documented in the safety literature (e.g. Barling et al., 2002; Hofmann et al., 2003; 
Kelloway et al., 2006; Nahrgang et al., 2011; Zohar, 2002b).  However, the role of 
group dynamics in the development and maintenance of safety norms has attracted 
less research attention.  An important aim of my study is therefore to investigate how 
the quality of management, supervisor and coworker social exchanges in the work-
place relates to employees’ perceptions of safety climate and their safety behaviours.  
In line with the approach taken by Wallace, et al., (2006), in their investigation of the 
relationship between organisational support, management-employee relations and 
occupational safety, my intention is to operationalise the three social exchange 
measures as foundation climates.  Accordingly, the focus of each scale will be 
directed at interdependent, group-level social exchanges rather than direct, dyadic 
exchanges (Molm, 1994). 
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As my overall aim is to test an explanatory model of safety climate and outcomes 
that includes the influence of social exchange, an important initial step is the 
validation of the climate for social exchange scales.  My intention is to align the 
three social exchange indicators with the stratified dimensions of safety climate in a 
manner consistent with the level-of -analysis approach recommended by Zohar 
(2010). 
 
5.2.2.1. Leader-Member Exchange 
In seeking to find measures of social exchange appropriate for my research, I initially 
focused my attention on one of the most well recognised and documented exchange 
variable: leader-member exchange.  My literature review showed that the leader-
member exchange scale, originally developed by Graen and colleagues (Graen & 
Scandura, 1987; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995), provided a statistically valid measure of 
leadership style in safety contexts (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann et al., 
2003).  More pragmatically, compared to alternative leadership instruments such as 
the Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (Bass & Avolio, 1997) used by Zohar 
(2002a), the 7-item LMX scale has fewer items and allows a scaling of higher to 
lower quality of social exchange, rather than a categorisation of leadership style. The 
LMX also lends itself to both self-report and climate rating formats.  That is, by 
changing the referent, it is possible to compare how employees’ and supervisors’ 
perceptions of the social exchanges that occur between them differ (Liden, Wayne, & 
Stilwell, 1993).  The LMX scale was therefore selected to examine social exchanges 
between workers and their direct supervisor.  
 
5.2.2.2. Manager-Member Exchange 
The operationalisation of social exchange constructs at a management/ organisational 
level has previously been undertaken using measures of Perceived Organisational 
Support (Eisenberger et al., 1986).  However, LMX measures have also been used to 
assess social exchanges between managers at different levels of the organisation 
(Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999). The POS scale used by Hofmann and Morgeson 
(1999) was a modified 9-item version of the original POS scale (Eisenberger et al., 
1986).  Hofmann and Morgeson’s scale statements showed considerable item overlap 
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with the LMX, but with the more ambiguous referent of “the organisation.”  Mearns 
and Reader (2008) used a “support from the operator” scale when investigating the 
relationship between organisational support and safety citizenship behaviours in 
offshore oil and gas facilities.  Mearns and Reader’s operator support scale 
comprised 13-item selected from both Eisenberg et al.’s (1986)  POS scale and Ribisl 
and Reishl’s  (1993) worksite health climate scales.  
 
As existing scales did not appear to capture the specific nature of Management-
Member social exchange as I had envisaged, I propose to use a modified version of 
the LMX scale, retaining four common items of the POS, and shifting the 
“organisation” referent to the more specific top level management referent to form a 
Manager-Member Exchange (MMX) scale (Further scale information is provide in 
Section 6.4). Given the unidimensional structure previously found for the POS and 
LMX scales, I propose that the MMX will retain a one-factor structure. 
 
5.2.2.3. Group-Member Exchange 
When reviewing the literature on group member social exchange, the coworker 
interactions scale used by Simard and Marchard (1995) focused on work-group 
characteristics of group cohesion and cooperation with their supervisor. However, 
this scale was based on supervisor ratings of group behaviour, rather than the quality 
of social exchanges amongst workers from an individual worker perspective. While 
alternative measures of group cohesion are available (see Mudrack, 1989 for a 
review) many of the scales focus on friendships, and group member attraction to and 
identification with the group, rather than targeting work-related social exchanges 
specifically.    
 
One exception is the work by Seers, Petty and Cashman (1995) who developed the 
Team-Member exchange quality scale.  This 10-item scale focuses on both the 
contribution focal individuals make to the team environment as well as the support 
and recognition they receive back from coworkers.  Three of the items are therefore 
replicated in terms of the reciprocity of offering and receiving praise and assistance.  
The remaining items in the TMX overlap with several LMX scale items.  While 
Seers et al.’s original scale applied a frequency of behaviour rating format, other 
researchers have since used modified versions of the scale that apply agree/disagree 
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response formats (Love & Forret, 2008; Tse, Dasborough, & Ashkanasy, 2008).   
When assessing the utility of this instrument for inclusion in my study, I considered 
the within-scale item shift in referent from self to others as potentially problematic.   
  
Hofmann and Stetzer (1996) also measured group process and effective teamwork 
using a 7- item scale from the Survey of Organisations (Taylor & Bowers, 1972).  
Again this measure showed considerable item overlap with the LMX scale, in terms 
of worker confidence in others’ decision making capabilities, knowledge about job 
roles, and willingness to help solve work-related problems.  However, several of the 
common items were combined as double barrelled questions in Taylor and Bower’s 
scale.  To provide a valid means to assess the quality of social exchanges between 
coworkers, distinct from existing group cohesion and social exchange scales, I 
therefore propose to develop a Group-Member Exchange scale (GMX), based on 
items in the LMX instrument, with modifications to the group referent. That is the 
exchange relationship focuses on the respondents’ perceptions of the general quality 
of social exchanges within the group rather than their personal social exchanges with 
other team members.       
 
To validate the climate for social exchange scales, exploratory analysis of the factor 
structure of the organisational (MMX) and group-level (LMX and GMX) safety 
climate dimensions will be conducted in the front-line worker sample.  Given the 
small number of items in each scale and previous unidimensional structures found 
for the LMX it is proposed that a one-factor structure will emerge as the best fit for 
each of the climate for social exchange subscale as hypothesised below. 
 
Hypothesis 6: For each of the three climates for social exchanges variables 
representing the management, supervisor and co-workers social exchanges, a 
one-factor structure will provide the best fitting factor solution when 
compared against imposed two factor emergent structures. 
 
5.2.3. Construct Distinction 
Zohar and Luria (2005) highlighted the need to establish the discriminant validity of 
safety climate and leadership style inventories given the integrated nature of both 
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constructs.  They contended that while “leader interactions provide the medium in 
which policies are implemented… the medium, although influencing the message 
(e.g., greater emphasis on safety under high quality leader-member interactions), 
[should] not be confused with it”  (Zohar & Luria, 2005, p.626).  In support of this 
statement Zohar and Luria argued that individuals discriminate between the two 
constructs, by basing leadership perceptions on relationship referents and climate 
perceptions on commitment referents.   
 
To test this proposal, item and scale-level confirmatory factor analyses will be 
conducted to examine if front-line workers can adequately distinguish between the 
hierarchically aligned dimensions of safety climate and social exchange constructs as 
indicated in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1. Organisational and group-level climate and social exchange 
dimensions. 
 
Furthermore, if Zohar and Luria’s (2005) ideas of separate organisation and group-
level climates are correct, we should find stronger correlations between the two 
group-level climate constructs, measuring supervisor and coworker commitment than 
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between the group and organisation-level factors.  In support of this proposal 
research within the general organisational literature has identified a degree of 
correspondence between hierarchical work-levels and collective climates (Gonzalez-
Roma, Peiro, Lloret, & Zornoza, 1999).  Gonzalez-Roma and colleagues identified 
that top level and sectional management typically form one level of collective 
climate and middle and low level employees a distinct second collective climate 
(Gonzalez-Roma et al., 1999); with management generally responding more 
positively to climate perceptions of support, innovation, goal and rules than lower 
level workers.   
 
Hypothesis 7: Front-line workers will discriminate between safety climate and 
social exchange constructs when tested as both first-order and higher order 
structures such that: 
(a) The factor structure of organisation level management behaviours and will be 
best represented by a correlated two factor structure representing 
management safety climate and management–member social exchange when 
tested against single factor, uncorrelated two & three factor models. 
 
(b) The factor structure of group level supervisor behaviours and will be best 
represented by a correlated two factor structure representing supervisor safety 
climate and leader–member social exchange when tested against single 
factor, uncorrelated two and three factor models. 
 
(c) The factor structure of group level coworker behaviours and will be best 
represented by a correlated three factor structure representing coworker safety 
climate and group–member social exchange when tested against single factor, 
two factor & uncorrelated three factor models. 
 
(d) Correlations between the active and proactive co-worker safety climate 
subscales will be stronger than correlations found between either active and 
proactive co-workers safety climate and group member social exchange. 
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(e) Correlations between safety climate and social exchange constructs within 
hierarchical levels (i.e. organisation and group levels) will be stronger than 
those observed within construct domains (i.e. safety climate and climate for 
social exchange). 
 
To test Hypothesis 7, a series of theoretical models were developed.  As a precursor 
to structural modelling to be undertaken in Chapters 8 and 9, scale-level model 
testing was conducted on the combined workers’ sample.  Social exchange and safety 
climate scales were based on structures identified in the exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis.   
 
The first hypothesised model, illustrated in Figure 5.2, examines the alignment of 
workers’ perceptions within construct domains by proposing a two-factor model of 
global safety climate and social exchange.  This model offers support for the use of 
global safety climate and social exchange measures across organisational levels in 
predictive models.  In contrast, the alternative models (see Figures 5.3 & 5.4) depict 
a stronger alignment of workers’ perceptions within organisational levels than within 
construct domains.   
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Figure 5.2. Two-factor model of global safety climate and social exchange. 
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactice; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange. 
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In line with Zohar and Luria’s (2005) recognition of the importance of supervisor 
behaviours in the development of group-level climate, the alternative model 
represents a two-factor model of organisation and group-level actions in which 
supervisor and coworker safety commitment and social exchange are closely aligned.   
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Figure X. Model 30 Two Factor Model of Organisation Level 
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Figure 5.3. Two-factor model of organisational-level safety climate and social 
exchange. 
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactice; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange. 
 
 
The third model further stratifies the hierarchy of workers’ perceptions to clearly 
distinguish between workers’ perceptions of management, supervisor and coworker 
actions.  A stronger correspondence of workers’ perceptions within hierarchical 
levels of the organisation than within construct domains would provide support for 
the use of first-order work-level models of safety climate and social exchange 
variables in predictive models. 
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Figure X. Model 31 Three Factor Model of Organisation Level 
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Figure 5.4. Three-factor model of organisation-level safety climate and social 
exchange. 
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactice; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange. 
 
5.2.4. Organisation Safety Climate Profiles  
A further objective of my research is to present a format for reporting organisational 
safety climate profiles based on climate level, strength and variability.  As indicated 
in Nahrgang et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis, patterns of associations between safety-
related constructs can vary considerably across industry settings.  With the aim of 
providing a diversified sample which would provide greater scope to investigate the 
capacity of the safety climate measures to discern both organisational and work-level 
differences, the participant organisations in my study were recruited from diverse 
industries.  
 
When evaluating the overall climate levels based on front-line worker responses and 
the separate organisational safety climate profiles, it is proposed that self-other biases 
will manifest more obviously in front-line workers’ ratings of managers’ and 
supervisors’ commitment to safety compared to ratings of coworker commitment.  In 
this instance the fundamental attribution error would indicate that workers would be 
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more likely to attribute negative safety performance of their managers and 
supervisors to more stable, dispositional characteristics of those individuals rather 
than to situational factors.  This process of biased attributions would contribute to 
workers providing relatively higher ratings of coworker climate measures than for 
more distal supervisors and managers.  It is also proposed that less response 
variability will be found when workers complete rating scales within their own work-
level than when they rate the safety behaviours of more distal organisational agents.   
 
Hypothesis 8: Front-line workers will differentiate between measures of 
management, supervisor and coworker safety climate such that: 
(a)  Average scores (climate level) will be highest for ratings at the respondents’ 
work-level and diminish with increased organisational distance.   
(b) Level of agreement will be strongest for scales targeting the respondents’ 
own work-level (climate strength). 
 
Having investigated how the perceptions of front-line employees can be used to form 
valid measures of organisational level safety climate, my next aim is to examine 
group-based perceptions of safety climate. 
 
5.2.5. Group-level Factor Structures  
Shannon and Norman (2009) have indicated that the vast majority of studies 
undertaken to determine the factor structure of global safety climate are 
fundamentally flawed because they fail to acknowledge the nonindependence of data. 
However individual-level exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses remain the 
most widely used and accepted data reduction techniques in organisational research.  
To investigate potential differences in emergent factor structures when using 
multilevel techniques, factor analyses will be conducted on both individual- and 
group-level data, and the results compared.  
 
While multilevel methodologies are becoming more evident in the organisational 
literature, there is still a relative lack of research that applies group-level analysis in 
applied safety settings.  As such the use of both individual and group-level modelling 
in the same study contributes to our understanding of how potential differences in 
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results may occur when applying different methodological techniques in safety 
climate research.  
 
5.2.5.1. Approaches to data aggregation in factor evaluation  
While Shannon and Norman (2009) have highlighted the inadequacy of safety 
climate research to account for the nonindependence of data when deriving factor 
structures, the issue of using correct measurement metrics for scale development at 
aggregate levels of analysis is far from simple.  In their discussion of approaches to 
aggregate measure construction, Peterson and Castro (2006) put forward three 
procedural options: the ILSA approach (create individual-level scales and aggregate), 
the CSA approach (aggregate items and create aggregate-level scales), and the 
combined ILSA/CSA approach (create individual-level scales, aggregate and then 
create aggregate-level configural scales).   
 
In the ILSA approach scale items are evaluated for factor structure and scales created 
at the individual-level of analysis.  The level of within-group agreement is then 
assessed for each scale at the target level (e.g., group or organisation) and 
aggregation of the scales conducted.  The ILSA methodology has to date been the 
general approach adopted by organisational researchers and is considered appropriate 
for the aggregation of individual-level constructs such as personality, attitudes and 
personal relationships (Peterson & Castro, 2006).  With regard to Chan’s typology 
(1998), variables suitable for ILSA aggregation would use direct referents in item 
development.  The ILSA approach is therefore considered the appropriate type of 
aggregation method for individual workers’ safety behaviours when seeking to form 
group-level safety behaviours.  However, whereas the ILSA method of factor 
evaluation has been used in all safety climate studies to date, according to Peterson 
and Castro’s recommendations, it is not considered the appropriate methodology to 
apply when dealing with safety climate scales.    
 
In the CSA approach, aggregation of items to the target level of analysis occurs first, 
followed by the evaluation of factor structure and creation of scales at the higher 
level of analysis.  Peterson and Castro (2006) indicate that the CSA strategy is 
suitable when dealing with constructs that reflect normative behaviour and aligns 
with the multilevel EFA and CFA procedures discussed by Shannon and Norman 
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(2009).  Accordingly, if we again consider Chan’s typology (1998), variables 
suitable for such aggregation would apply referent shifts to the group rather than the 
individual in item development. As group-based referents are used in all the social 
exchange and safety climate scales used in this research, the CSA approach would be 
considered the appropriate aggregation protocol for these scales.  However, in 
practical terms, as the group becomes the unit of analysis for EFA and CFA in the 
CSA approach,  larger samples sizes are required to ensure sufficient item to case 
ratios and statistical power.     
 
Finally the combined ILAS/CSA method uses a combination of both approaches.  
The ILAS/CSA approach is practically the most difficult to manage as it “requires an 
unusually large number of items and aggregate units” to support evaluation of scales 
at both individual and aggregate levels (Peterson & Castro, 2006, p.515).  As such 
the use of this protocol is restricted to extremely large samples typically used in 
cross-cultural research.  Given the anticipated sample size in my research this 
approach was not considered a viable option and therefore not be used.  
 
To comply with Shannon and Norman’s (2009) recommendations regarding the use 
of multilevel factor analysis in safety climate research, all climate scales will be 
analysed at the work-group level using the CSA approach.  Conducting both 
individual-level factor analysis (i.e., the bases for ILSA protocols) and CSA group-
level factor analysis allows the examination of potential differences in emergent 
factor structures when using the two approaches.  
 
As an exploratory examination it is hypothesised that the factor structures identified 
using the CSA approach for the more distal climate constructs (i.e., management and 
supervisor behaviours) will differ from those determined using individual-level data, 
potentially corresponding to the three-factor structure described in their initial 
validation (Zohar & Luria, 2005).  For the coworker scale, I propose that a two-factor 
structure representing active and proactive safety practices will be consistent across 
methodological treatments in line with the theoretical development of the scale.  
Given the relatively small content domain covered in the social exchange scales and 
the stability of the one-factor  structures of the LMX, POS and TMX scales on which 
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they are based I propose that the structures of these scales will not differ across 
treatments.  As the CSA approach is recommended for the assessment of normative 
behaviour, such as inferred in climate scales, (Peterson & Castro, 2006) it is 
proposed that the CSA methodology should be sensitive to group-level nuances and 
therefore provide the most accurate dimensional representation  of the constructs. 
 
Hypothesis 9: When analysed using the CSA approach to group-level 
aggregation the factor structures for the more distal safety climate scales 
representing Management and Supervisor commitment to safety will differ 
from the one factor structures hypothesised at the individual-level of analysis. 
 
By applying the protocols for evaluation of factor structures described above it will 
be possible to compare results for explanatory safety using the following approach: 
 Comparing directly between predictive models assessed at the individual and 
group-level using the ILSA approach to aggregation (i.e., both based on 
individual- level factor structures) and; 
 Comparing directly between predictive models derived using the ILSA and 
CSA approaches to aggregation.    
 
As the main focus of my thesis is on using group level methodologies, the  
explanatory models based on the ILSA and CSA aggregation approaches are reported 
in Chapters Seven and Eight.  Results for individual level models are included for 
reference purposes as an Appendix.   
 
5.3. Explanatory Models 
My next objective is to develop and test explanatory models of social exchange, 
safety climate and safety outcomes. To achieve this goal, two explanatory models 
will be tested at group-level of analysis using scales derived using both the ILSA and 
CSA approaches.   
 
As the work-group safety outcome measures are formed through direct aggregation 
of reported injuries and incidents these indicators are consistent across both the ILSA 
and CSA replications.  Furthermore, the ILSA approach is considered the appropriate 
technique for deriving the work-group safety behaviour scale, therefore this measure 
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will also be consistent across model replications.  In contrast, (as discussed in section 
5.2.5.1 above) the structure of safety climate and social exchange scales may 
potentially vary across replications based on their CSA factor evaluations.   
 
 
5.3.1. Global Psychological Safety Climate Model 
Within the safety domain, Clarke’s (2006) meta-analysis examining the relationship 
between safety climate, safety performance and workplace accidents, incorporated 
studies treating organisational safety climate as a global construct.  While many of 
the safety climate scales included in Clarke’s study differed in their constituent parts, 
overall results supported the validity of composite safety climate measures in 
predicting safety participation and to a lesser degree safety compliance.  More 
recently, the meta-analysis conducted by Christian et al. (2009) reported mean 
corrected correlations for studies using safety climate as both a global construct and 
as separate safety climate dimensions as specified in their conceptual framework. 
  
Results of meta-analyses conducted by Clarke (2006), Christian et al. (2009) and 
Nahrgang et al. (2011) have identified that the relationships between safety climate 
and safety outcomes such as accidents and injuries operate indirectly through 
workers’ safety behaviours.  As indicated in Figure 5.5, initial modelling will 
therefore examine the relationship between safety climate (operationalised as a 
global construct), individual safety performance and self-report safety outcomes, 
including LTI, minor injuries and near miss statistics. To test a mediation hypothesis 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) will be used to compare the fit of the 
mediation, full and direct models.  Assessment of fit statistics and a series of Chi-
square difference tests between nested models will allow the comparison of 
theoretically derived models depicting direct and indirect relationships between 
constructs (Bollen, 1989). To further assess the incremental validity of the group 
level coworker commitment to safety in the global operationalisation of safety series 
of hierarchical regression analysis will be conducted using injuries, near miss 
incidents and both active and proactive workers safety behaviours as outcomes.  
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Hypothesis 10: The influence of global safety climate on safety outcomes will 
be mediated by individual safety behaviours.   
 
Figure 5.5. Mediation, full and direct models for the predictive relationship 
between global safety climate, individual safety behaviours and safety outcomes. 
 
 
5.3.1.1. Difference in Group-level Modelling 
Consistent with theoretical conceptualization of safety climate as a group level 
construct, results of recent meta-analyses (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; Christian et al., 
2009) have indicated that the associations between safety-related constructs are 
strengthened when the nonindependence of data is addressed using group-level 
analysis. It is possible however, that the stronger correlations observed between 
safety climate and accidents/injuries in the literature may also be linked to the source 
of data rather than the treatment of data.  That is, the use of objective data such as 
prospective OSHA and infirmary records, and behavioural safety audits is more 
common in group-level studies included in the meta-analysis, compared to the more 
frequently used self-reported safety behaviour and retrospective injury data  in most 
safety climate studies.  Therefore the direct comparison of results, controlling for 
data source and design, allows for a more effective assessment of the impact of data 
treatment on the strength of construct relations. It is predicted that the mediation 
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model will be supported when using both the ILSA and CSA group-level aggregation 
such that the magnitude of construct relationships will be stronger than that observed 
using individual- level analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 11: The strength of associations observed between global safety 
climate and safety outcomes will be stronger using both ILSA & CSA 
aggregation than using individual-level analysis. 
 
5.3.2. Work-level Safety Model 
My next objective is to use a level-of-analysis approach to examine the relationship 
between climate for social exchange, safety climate and safety performance. When 
conducting their meta-analysis on the importance of coworker influences in the 
workplace, Chiaburu and Harrison (2008) stated that theoretical advances could be 
made by examining influences emanating from coworkers, leaders and the 
organisation simultaneously rather than focussing on any one level of influence in 
isolation or collapsing scales across levels.  While Chiaburu and Harrison’s research 
focuses on general workplace performance, their findings support Zohar (2010) and 
Guldenmund’s (2007) opinions regarding the need for safety researchers to explore 
how the influences exerted by different lateral and vertical social agents in the 
workplace affect individual workers’ attitudes and safety behaviours.  
 
In line with such recommendations, Christian et al. (2009) showed that a greater 
understanding of the processes involved in creating a safe workplace may be 
achieved by modelling the interactions of the safety climate dimensions separately.  
Likewise Nahrgang et al. (2011) identified different patterns of associations between 
safety outcomes and supportive environments that include coworker, supervisor, and 
management safety-related practices.  In proposing a work-level model of safety I 
seek to examine how the proximal and distal influences of first-order dimensions of 
the foundation climate for social exchange and safety-specific climate impact on the 
safety behaviours of workers, a conceptual representation of this relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 5.6. The overall model will be tested using an overarching SEM 
analysis in which direct and indirect effects of the social exchange and safety climate 
constructs on workers safety behaviours can be examined.  A staged approach will be 
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undertaken in the development of specific hypothesis to support the rationale behind 
the mediation model proposed. This process starts with investigating the core 
relationship between safety climate and workers safety behaviours using the 
stratified work-level conceptualisation of safety climate. Climate for social exchange 
is then forwarded as an antecedent of safety climate. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. The conceptual model of foundation and facet-specific safety 
climates.   
 
5.3.2.1. Safety Climate and Safety Behaviours  
To first expand our understanding of how the different dimensions of safety climate 
influence the individual safety behaviours of workers, both the proposed active and 
proactive dimensions of coworker safety climate will be modelled independently.  
To facilitate model testing the direct, indirect and total effects of safety climate 
indicators on workers active and proactive safety performance will be examined.  
The significance of direct effects in the full model imply that an individual’s 
perceptions of safety climate at the organisational and group-levels independently 
affect individual safety performance.   
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However, as Zohar and Luria (2005) found that supervisor commitment to safety 
fully mediates the relationship between manager safety climate and individual safety 
behaviour, an alternative explanation of the link between safety climate dimensions 
and individual behaviours is that the more proximal influences of supervisor and 
coworker commitment will mediate the relationship between more distal 
organisational influences of managers.  In this instance the more distal influence of 
management commitment to safety is proposed to have both a direct and indirect 
influence on the formation of both dimensions of work-group safety climate 
(supervisor and coworker commitment) and only an indirect effect on individual 
safety behaviours.  
 
In support of a mediation model, Chiaburu and Harrison (2008, p.1094) concluded 
that “coworker actions predict perceptual, attitudinal, and behaviour outcomes of 
their colleagues even when the influence of the direct leaders (on the same focal 
colleagues) is accounted for.”  This approach acknowledges the pivotal role 
coworkers, as a reference group, play in the formation of behavioural norms.  In this 
instance coworker safety climate is depicted as a key mediating influence between 
both manager and supervisor safety climate and individual safety behaviours as 
represented in Figure 5.7.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.7. The hypothesised mediation model for the relationship between work-
level safety climate and workers behaviours.   
 
The mediation model proposes that the distal influences of management safety 
climate will impact directly on supervisor safety practices and indirectly on coworker 
 89 
 Rationale 
 
 
practices with supervisor safety climate mediating the management and coworker 
relationship.  As the most proximal predictor, coworker safety climate is 
hypothesised to mediate the influence of more distal safety climate dimensions on 
workers safety behaviours. Furthermore it is proposed that the pattern and magnitude 
of associations between safety climate and the active and proactive safety behaviours 
of individuals will differ. 
 
Hypothesis 12: In a stratified work-level model of safety climate coworker’s 
commitment to safety will mediate the more distal influence of mangement 
and supervisor commitment to safety on workers safety behaviours.  The 
mediation model will provide a better fit to the data when copmared to a 
partial mediation model.  
 
5.3.2.2. Social Exchange and Psychological Safety Climate  
In the work-level safety model, social exchange variables are proposed as 
antecedents of the three dimensions of safety climate.  When reviewing the safety 
literature, it is apparent that attention has been focused mainly on investigating the 
influences of management and supervisor on safety, to the neglect of the informal 
influences exerted by coworkers.  Furthermore, when the impact of leadership styles 
and social exchanges on safety have been investigated, most studies have examined 
separate components of the organisational hierarchy in isolation rather than adopting 
a level-of-analysis approach allowing the examination of potential mediation and 
moderation processes.   
 
The hypothesised mediation model proposes that the perceived quality of social 
exchange between organisational agents and workers directly influences workers’ 
perceptions of safety climate at the aligned hierarchical level of the organisation.  
The effects of quality social exchange between manager, supervisors and coworkers 
on workers’ safety behaviours are therefore mediated through the formation of a 
positive safety climate across organisation-levels.  The hypothesised and alternative 
work-level models of safety  are represented in Figure 5.8 which shows the proposed 
relationship between climate for social exchange and the work-level dimensions of 
safety climate and the flow through effects to individual safety performance. 
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Figure 5.8. Hypothesised models of the predictive relationship between social 
exchange, safety climate and active and proactive safety behaviours.  
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Hypothesis 13: The dimensions of climate for social exchange at distinct 
work-levels are proposed as antecedents of safety climate at the 
corresponding work-level such that: 
(a) High quality management-member social exchange supports front-line 
workers’ positive perceptions of organisation level management safety 
climate. 
(b)  High quality leaders-member social exchange supports front-line 
workers’ positive perceptions of group level supervisor safety climate. 
(c) High quality management-member social exchange supports front-line 
workers’ positive perceptions of group level co-worker active and 
proactive safety climate. 
 
Hypothesis 14: The positive impact of climate for social exchange on 
individual workers’ safety behaviours will be best represented by a fully 
mediated model operating through the establishment of positive safety 
climate when compared to a direct or partially mediated model.  
  
5.3.2.3. Difference in Group-level Modelling 
 
The second set of replications examines the proximal and distal influences of 
aggregated social exchange and first-order safety climate dimensions on the group-
level safety behaviours.  In these model the ILSA derived worker safety behaviours 
scale forms the group-level outcome variable for both group-level analyses. However  
as proposed in hypothesis nine both the safety climate subscales for management and 
supervisors are expected to produce an expanded factor structure when data is 
analysed using the CSA approach. Figure 5.9 provides a representation of a possible 
two factor solution of both subscales.   The hypothesised mediation model shows the 
antecedent effects of climate for social exchange on safety climate and the flow 
through effects of management and supervisor commitment to safety on group safety 
performance.  The aggregated social exchange variables represent a group-level 
foundation climate while the safety climate dimensions constitute a group-level 
facet-specific climate.  
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Figure 5.9. Hypothesised model of the predictive relationship between social 
exchange, CSA derived safety climate dimensions and workers active and proactive 
safety behaviours.  
All scales represented with a GROUP subscript are derived using CSA aggregation methods including   
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange.  Work Group Safety Behaviours- Active and Proactive are derived by direct 
aggregation of  Individual Safety Behaviours of Workers using the ILSA approach.    
 
 
Hypothesis 15: The strength of associations observed between social 
exchange, safety climate and safety behaviours will be stronger when 
analysed using CSA aggregation methodology than when assessed using 
individual-level or ILSA data. 
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6. Research Methodology 
6.1. Research Design 
My study involved the distribution of self-report questionnaires to employees in 
participant organisations.  As such the design is cross-sectional and quantitative in 
nature.  The sampling strategy undertaken resulted in a stratified convenience 
sample.   
 
6.2. Organisation recruitment 
A review of current literature indicated that organisational samples have previously 
been largely homogenous and limited in organisational scope both internally (across 
organisational levels and job categories) and externally (across organisational 
contexts).  In Australia, figures from the Performance Monitoring Reports 
(Workplace Relations Ministers Council, 2005) indicate that the mining, transport, 
manufacturing, agriculture and construction sectors have the highest rates of injury 
and fatalities, supporting the need for continued research in these areas.  
Furthermore, the majority of research to date has focused on safety in high risk 
sectors such as the nuclear (Harvey et al., 2002) and oil industries (Crichton, 2005; 
Rundmo et al., 1998), manufacturing (Zohar & Luria, 2005), steel industry(Brown et 
al., 2000), agriculture (Seo, 2005; Seo et al., 2004) and the military (Zohar & Luria, 
2004). However, since researchers in the sixties and seventies investigated safety in 
the coal mining industry (Goodman, 1979; Trist, Higgin, Murray, & Pollock, 1963; 
Trist, Susman, & Brown, 1977), there has been a noted lack of studies examining 
safety within the mining sector.  As such, preference was given to recruiting 
organisations from the resource and industrial sectors, with a priority to access 
workers operating in the mining industry. 
 
Recruitment of participant organisations was conducted over a two-year period 
through a process of targeted networking.  The inclusion criteria for participant 
organisations took into consideration the size of the organisation, structure and initial 
willingness to provide group-level safety outcome data from organisational records.  
Initial organisation recruitment secured the participation of nine private sector 
organisations (and their aligned external contractors) representing the resource 
sector, manufacturing, construction, and transport industries. These included the 
Australian divisions of several multinational organisations in the mining, oil and gas, 
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and manufacturing sectors.  Of these organisations, five elected to distribute the 
safety survey across a more than one of their work sites.   
 
The additional six contracting companies provided external services to participant 
companies including; mine operations, milling, electrical, engineering, road 
construction, transport, catering, laboratory and mechanical contractors.  The 
utilisation of contract workers is considered typical within the resource, transport and 
construction sectors in Australia.  All contracting companies approached agreed to 
take part in the research project with the understanding that all questions should 
relate to personnel and systems in the overarching participant organisation. 
 
6.3. Participants  
In total 1973 surveys were distributed to all employees in 9 organisations (including 
contractor affiliates) at 21 worksites.  Overall, 514 managers, supervisors and front-
line employees returned questionnaires, resulting in a response rate of 26%.  While 
conservative response rates are generally expected in organisational settings (Rea & 
Parker, 1992), this relatively poor outcome can be partially explained by extremely 
low returns in several contracting companies in the mining and resource sectors and 
one of the manufacturing sites.  Organisation response rates ranged from zero to 
39%, with the lowest rates being observed for contracting companies in the mining 
sector.  Organisation designators including industrial sector, contracting status, group 
structures, employee numbers and response rates for each organisation are provided 
in Table 6.1. 
 
As both individual and multilevel analytical approaches are adopted in this research, 
organisations were asked to provide detailed departmental structures for all 
functional work-groups.  While organisational structures differed across sectors, for 
the purposes of the study a functional work-group was defined as a group of 
operationally dependent workers who all report directly to a designated 
supervisor/team leader.  One hundred and eighty six work-groups within 80 
departments were identified in the consultation process.  Groups ranged in size from 
2 to 36 employees with an average group size of 10.10 (SD = 7.19).  Nine percent of 
teams were small work-groups of 2 or 3 employees; 53% of teams consisted of 
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between 4 and 10 members; 29% of teams with 11 to 19 members and a further 8% 
with over twenty workers.  The process used to link individual responses to work-
groups is outlined in the Procedure section. 
 
Table 6.1 Industry and Contracting Status, Employee Numbers and Response 
Rates for Participant Organisations 
 
Organisation Sites Status Departments Teams Employees Return Rates% 
1   Mining 2  8 19 227 73 32.15 
     Mining 1 Contract 3 7   56    4 7.14 
     Mining 1 Contract 4 11  196  25 12.75 
     Mining 1 Contract 1 5    12   3 25.00 
     Mining 1 Contract 1 2    43   4 9.30 
     Mining 1 Contract 1 2    68   0 0.00 
     Mining 1 Contract 1 3    54   4 7.41 
2 Oil & Gas 2  11 22  182  37 20.33 
3 Construction 1  1 1    41   9 21.95 
4 Transport 3  8 27  201  76 37.81 
5 Construction 1  6 10    60  16 26.67 
6 Construction 1  1 3   47  18  38.30 
7 Engineering 6  6 6  110  32 29.09 
8 Manufacturing 1  5 13  238  38 15.97 
9 Manufacturing 6  23 55  432 170 39.35 
  Total 80 186 1973 514 26.05 
Note. Status=Contracting status; Departments= Number of Departments; Teams= Number of Work 
Teams; Employees=Total number of Employees; Return=Total number of responses returned; 
Rates%= Percentage Response Rates. 
 
Valid survey responses were received from employees in 73% (N = 136) of 
identified functional work teams.  The average team size in the sample was 10.52 
(SD = 6.91).  Teams represented in the sample largely replicated the population  
distribution described above, with 9% of teams being small work-groups of 2 or 3 
employees, 48% of teams with between 4 and 10 members, 34% of teams with 11 to 
19 members and a further 8% with over twenty workers.  While overall team 
response rates provided a fair representation of the organisational structures, 
response rates within each group varied considerable across and within organisations.  
As stated previously employees from fifty teams provided no valid data, being 
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largely teams from the mining/resource contracting companies.  Forty percent of 
groups had a response rate of greater than 50% of workers within the team with an 
average group response rate of 42%. As part of the survey, workers were asked how 
many people were in their team/workgroup.  When this information was compared 
against the actual team compositions provided by the organization, significant 
differences were observed (Mworker  = 9.63, Morg  = 12.17:  t(311)=4.63, p<.001) with 
workers generally underestimating the group size.  In addition, no statistically 
significant correlation between actual and perceived team size was found.  
The total sample included personnel from all organisational work-levels, however 
individual and group-level analysis reported in this thesis was conducted on the 
front-line employee data only. Based on the organisation employment records 
provided, front-line employees represented 73% of the original workforce.  The low 
overall response rate of 23% resulted in a final sample of 342 front-line workers 
(66.5% of total sample responses).   
 
The front-line workforce sample was predominantly male (83.7%). Given the 
correspondence with gender distributions originally provided by the organisations, 
this proportion is considered representative of the gender composition in the 
organisations participating in the study.  The age of front-line employees ranged 
from 19 to 69 with a mean of 41.9 (SD= 12.4).  The age distribution of the workforce 
indicates a relatively mature employee pool with only 23% of front-line workers 
being under the age of 30.  
 
In relation to educational status 14.6% of employees completed 10 years schooling; a 
further 22.4% twelve years of schooling; 47.8% reported having completed 
additional trade certificates or apprenticeships; 13% of front-line employees had 
completed a university degree; and only 1.2% a postgraduate degree. With regard to 
job type, thirty job classifications were identified.  The major categories were trade- 
related jobs including fitters, turners, mechanics, carpenters, boilers makers, caterers, 
cleaners, storemen and electricians; technical positions such as machine operators, 
plant operators, mill operators, laboratory technicians and process technicians; 
transport workers including forklift drivers, ground transport officers and truck 
drivers; administration positions including clerks, payroll officers, Occupational 
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Health and Safety  representatives, Human Resouses personnel, project and 
environmental officers; and professional positions such as civil, electrical and mining 
engineers, geologists, surveyors and metallurgists. The majority of participants were 
employed on a full-time basis (84.2%), a further 4.5% were casual workers and only 
2% indicated being part-time employees.  Nine percent of respondents did not 
specify their employment category. 
 
In relation to employment characteristics several questions were asked including 
employment status, company tenure and job tenure. Additional measures of industry 
experience and trade/professional experience were also collected. These inclusions 
were relevant to the participant organisations due to the labour market context 
associated with the economic boom conditions in Western Australia existing at the 
time of survey distribution (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006).  This context 
involved acute skilled and unskilled labour shortages which resulted in an 
unprecedented influx of new workers into the high paying resource and mining 
sectors and a high incidence of job migration of experienced personnel within and 
between organisations and industries.  Indications of the labour force volatility in my 
sample organisations are reflected in the tenure and experience statistics provided 
below. 
 
For the participants the average time of employment with their current organisation 
was 6.39 years (SD = 7.74) with 23.6% of participants indicating that they had been 
with their organisation for less than one year and a further 20% for less than two 
years.  Job tenure statistics showed that 36% had been in their current jobs for 1 year 
or less and 73% for less than five years (M = 4.66, SD = 6.13).  While these figures 
seem to indicate a relatively inexperienced workforce across these industry groups, 
professional and industry experience statistics provided an alternative picture that 
supports the inflated turnover rates and job migration pattern identified by company 
representatives and labour force trends (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006). 
Industry experience was higher on average (M = 10.78, SD = 10.02) than either 
company or job tenure.  Likewise trade or professional experience (M = 12.49, SD = 
10.49) indicated a more experienced labour force than that inferred from job tenure 
statistics.  Eleven percent of the sample reported that they were relatively new to 
their current industry (i.e., less than one year in the industry) or had limited 
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professional experience (22% under three years). In line with the relatively high 
average age of the sample, half the sample reported having over ten years of 
experience in their current trade or profession.  Based on organisation records 
provided, industry statistics, and labour trends in the employment sectors included in 
the study, the sample is considered representative of the target population rather than 
the general population.   
 
6.4. Instruments 
Several new measures were developed for use in this study including a group-level 
measure of safety climate targeting the impact of coworker commitment to safety; a 
complimentary individual safety performance measure incorporating active and 
proactive safety behaviours; a measure of management-employee social exchange; 
and a measure of group member social exchange. The development of these 
instruments drew largely from current measures of safety climate (Zohar & Luria, 
2005), leader-member exchange (Graen & Scandura, 1987; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; 
Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Hofmann et al., 2003)  and safety citizenship 
behaviours (Hofmann et al., 2003). Collection of all quantitative data was via a self-
report survey of front-line workers (See Appendix A).   
 
The following description of scales provides a brief definition of each instrument, 
item examples, response formats used and for established measures an indication of 
their psychometric properties. Furthermore, as the incorrect usage of referent levels 
in aggregated data has been seen as problematic (Chan, 1998), particular care was 
taken to ensure focal and collective referents were explicit and consistent in and 
between function domains represented in each climate scale. 
 
In line with Flin’s (2003) recommendations, to reduce the potential for ambiguity in 
the climate scales, I chose to differentiate between top level site/ departmental 
management  and lower level, group leader/supervisors  using terms appropriate for 
each participant organisation but congruent according to hierarchical structures. 
Figure 6.1 provides examples of the referent used and shows the potential for scale 
items to be customised to assess the perceptions of employees at different work 
levels.   As participant organisations varied in size and function, minor modification 
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to referents (such as the use of supervisor or team leader; work-group or team: 
department or site) were applied to ensure contextual relevance.  A major component 
of my thesis is the validation of factor structures for all scales using individual and 
group-level data, therefore further psychometric information is provided in relevant 
results chapters.  Of importance to note however is the use of only front-line worker 
data in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Work-level conceptualisation of safety climate subscales and item 
referents. 
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers (front-line worker perspective); LOSC-M= 
Organisation Safety Climate-Managers (supervisor perspective); ISB-M= Individual Safety 
Behaviours -Mangers;  GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors (front-line worker perspective); 
LGSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors (managers perspective); ISB-S= Individual Safety 
Behaviours - Supervisors; GSC-C= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers (front-line worker perspective); 
LGSC-C= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers (manger & supervisor perspective);ISB-W= Individual 
Safety Behaviours- Workers 
 
 
 
100 
Work-level Safety Model 
 
6.4.1. Safety Climate Scales      
Zohar and Luria (2005) provide two of the three safety climate measures tested in the 
proposed safety climate model.  These are the organisational-level safety climate 
measure, tapping employees’ perceptions of top management commitment to safety, 
and the group-level safety climate scale, assessing direct supervisors’ commitment to 
safety.  In Zohar and Luria’s study, exploratory factor analysis identified three 
correlated factors for each scale, covering the content themes of active, proactive and 
declarative practices. Item redundancy and cross-loadings in their original, 27-item 
questionnaires for each climate level, led Zohar and Luria to reduce the number of 
items to 16 for each dimension. 
 
Although the psychometric properties of both the management and supervisor scales 
have not been subject to extensive cross-validation, Zohar and Luria’s (2005) initial 
results showed strong correlations between the long and short versions of their scales 
(r =.94 and .95, p < .001)and high internal reliability (alpha .92 and .95).  The 
predictive validity of each scale was also established by testing against safety 
engineering audits (correlation with organisational level climate, r = .46, p < .01) and 
behavioural observations (i.e., percentage of safe behaviours correlated with group-
level safety climate, r = .38, p < .01).  Discussions with participant organisations 
resulted in the inclusion of one additional item to both the climate scales assessing 
management and supervisors’ stance on the importance of reporting all safety 
accidents and near misses.    
  
6.4.1.1. Organisation Safety Climate- Managers (OSC-M) 
The 16 items making up the organisation-level safety climate - management 
commitment to safety scale (to be referred to as OSC-M) are listed as items 1-17 in 
Appendix A.  The OSC-M includes statements such as: top management in my 
department / at this site react quickly to solve the problem when told about safety 
hazards, insist on thorough and regular safety audits and inspections, and consider 
safety when setting production speed and work schedules. The additional item reads: 
top management at this site emphasise the importance of reporting all safety 
accidents and near misses.  In line with Zohar and Luria’s protocols, a 5- point rating 
scale, ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), was used to 
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gauge employees’ level of agreement with each statement for all safety climate and 
social exchange scales.  Additionally, all climate scales were derived by averaging 
the scores on each item, resulting in scales ranging from 1-5. Low scores indicated a 
poor climate rating.  
 
6.4.1.2. Group Safety Climate- Supervisors (GSC-S) 
The 16 items of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) original group-level safety climate scale 
were combined with one additional incident reporting statement to form the group 
safety climate – supervisor commitment to safety scale (to be referred to as GSC-S).  
The GSC-S scale includes items 26- 42 of Appendix A.  Example statements are: my 
direct supervisor makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the job 
safely, emphasises safety procedures when we are working under pressure, and 
spends time helping us learn to see problems before they arise. The additional item 
for the GSC-S reads as follows: my direct supervisor encourages workers to report 
all safety accidents and near misses.  
 
6.4.1.3. Group Safety Climate- Coworkers (GSC-C) 
As no group-level safety climate scale that specifically targets coworker commitment 
to safety was available, a priority of my study was to create and validate a scale 
measuring both active coworker practices (monitoring, complying) and proactive 
coworker practices (co-operating, initiating, participating, informing).  To create the 
17-item group-level safety climate scale (GSC-C) I integrated core items from both 
Hofmann et al. (2003) individual safety performance scales and Zohar and Luria’s 
(2005) safety climate scale items.  Items for the GSC-C can be seen in Appendix A 
(Items 51-67) and include statements such as: coworkers in my team always wear 
protective equipment even if it is uncomfortable, use their initiative to help solve 
safety-related problems, share information about safety hazards with supervisors and 
each other; and report all safety-related accidents and near misses as soon as they 
occur.  
 
6.4.2. Social Exchange Scales 
As with the measures used to assess safety climate, the choice to select and adapt 
existing scales to examine the quality of social exchanges operating at different 
levels of the organisational hierarchy was based on a number of theoretical and 
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pragmatic criteria as discussed in the following sections.  Three scales were used to 
assess climate for social exchange at the organisation and group level.  This approach 
allowed the alignment of social exchange indicators with the stratified dimensions of 
safety climate.  As described in Section 5.2.2, social exchange is conceptualised as a 
foundation climate, therefore the focus of each scale was directed at interdependent, 
within group social exchanges rather than direct, dyadic exchanges (Molm, 1994). 
To clarify, in the LMX scale front-line workers were asked to provide their 
perceptions of the general quality of the social exchanges occurring between their 
supervisor and members of their work-group rather than specifically with 
themselves. 
 
6.4.2.1. Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) 
Liden et al. (1993) used both a member and leader version of the 7-item LMX scale 
in their longitudinal study of the early development of leader-member exchanges in 
dyads.  Having additionally modified the response scale to an agree/disagree format, 
they found that internal consistency for both member and leader versions were above 
acceptable limits at all three testing stages, with Cronbach’s alphas ranging between 
.75 to .90 over the six month lag.  However, when examining the item content of 
different versions of the LMX (e.g., Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Liden et al., 1993; 
Scandura & Graen, 1984), an important inconsistency was identified.  In Liden’s 
(1993) version, respondents (either subordinates or leaders) rate whether the 
supervisor has confidence in subordinates’ decision making, while the original 
version asks respondents if subordinates have confidence in their supervisor’s 
decision making (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Scandura & Graen, 1984).  While a 
minor point, the two are not interchangeable.  The inconsistency of this item with the 
rest of the scale was evidenced by poor factor loadings in Liden et al.’s factor 
analysis. 
 
As the focus in this study is on leaders’ behaviours the original statement tapping 
perceptions of supervisor’s decision making was used in my study.  An additional 
issue, raised during initial negotiations with organisation representatives, related to 
some of the wording of the LMX being unsuitable for the sample population. As 
such, when adapting the items to an agree/disagree response format, the wording of 
 103 
 Research Method 
 
 
some items was modified slightly, as show in Table B1.  The most important 
modification, however, involved the shift of referent from a dyadic interaction 
(leader-member) to a collective domain (leader-group members).  This change 
supported the measurement of LMX as a group-level climate construct, reflecting 
workers’ general perceptions of the quality of social exchanges exhibited between 
their supervisor and fellow coworkers, rather than specifically with themselves.   
 
Finally, the decision was also made to include one additional item traditionally 
associated with the transformational leadership style.  This item taps the genuine 
nature of the leaders concern for employees’ welfare and was considered a pertinent 
indicator of leader - member social exchange given the safety context of this 
research.    LMX statements correspond to item numbers 43 to 50 in Appendix A. 
The additional item reads: my direct supervisor has a genuine concern for the welfare 
of employees in our work group. To retain continuity throughout the survey a 5-point 
rating scale, ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), was again 
used to gauge employees’ level of agreement with each statement. Average scale 
scores were derived for all three social exchange scales with high scores indicating 
higher quality social exchange relations. 
 
6.4.2.2. Manager-Member Exchange (MMX) 
In seeking to find existing instruments to measure the two additional social 
exchanges variables, several problems were identified. The POS scale used by 
Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) was a modified 9-item version of the original POS 
scale (Eisenberger et al., 1986).  Hofmann and Morgeson’s scale statements showed 
considerable item overlap with the LMX, but with a more ambiguous referent: the 
organisation.  In developing the Management-Member exchange scale (MMX) scale 
I adopted the basic structure of the LMX scale, retaining four items common with the 
POS scale providing a degree of construct overlap.  In addition I modified the 
general organisation referent specifically to top level site or department management 
in a manner consistent with the referent used in the OSC-M scale.  
 
The seven MMX statements listed in Table B2 correspond to item numbers 18 to 24 
in Appendix A.  Statements include: top management at this site are honest and “up 
front” in their dealings with employees, understand employees’ job problems and 
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needs, make decisions that employees feel confident to defend to other workers; and 
show genuine concern for the welfare of employees. 
 
6.4.2.3. Group-Member Exchange 
In sourcing a scale to measure group member social exchanges, scales on team 
effectiveness (Taylor & Bowers, 1972) and Team-Member exchange quality (Seers 
et al., 1995) were considered. However, as discussed in Section 5.2.2.3 issues with 
repetition, double barrelled items and the overlap of items with the LMX led me to 
again modify the LMX scale described in section 6.4.3.1 to a group referent. The 
seven GMX items are included in Table B3 and Appendix A (Items 68 to 75).  
Statements include: coworkers in my team respect each other’s capabilities, help 
each other solve work related problems, and let each other know where they stand.  
Again an additional statement tapping coworkers’ concern for each other’s welfare 
was included in the scale. 
 
6.4.3. Safety Outcomes 
Safety outcome measures included self-reported safety behaviours, self-reported lost 
time injuries, minor injuries and near miss data, and aggregated group-level safety 
behaviours and injury rates.   
 
6.4.3.1. Individual Safety Performance  (ISB-W) 
The operationalisation of individual safety behaviours (ISB-W) was discussed in the 
development of the coworker safety climate scale (see Section 6.4.1.3).  As described 
in Section 3.3 the importance of distinguishing between active, role specified safety 
behaviours (compliance) and proactive, safety citizenship behaviours (participative) 
has been well established.  In developing the GSC-C scale consideration was given 
to the instrument’s potential utility as a measure of both individual safety behaviours 
for front line workers (as originally intended by Hofmann, et al. 2003) and as an 
aggregated group climate construct.  The seventeen statements forming the ISB-W 
scale are provided in Appendix A (Items 76-92). The items replicate the GSC-C 
scale but have a direct self- referent (i.e., I follow correct safety procedures when 
using equipment).  A 5-point rating scale, ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 5 
(completely agree), was again used to gauge employees’ level of agreement with 
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each statement and the scale score obtained by averaging item scores. The scale 
range was from 1-5 with a high score indicating a positive rating of personal safety 
behaviours.  
 
6.4.3.2. Injury and near miss statistics 
All participants were also asked to report injuries they had sustained and near miss 
events they experienced within the last 6 months.  This time frame was selected as it 
has been recommended as the maximum time period that accurate recall can be 
sustained (Veazie et al., 1994).  Three levels of injuries were assessed: lost-time 
injuries (LTI= inability to work for one full day/shift or more), minor injuries (i.e., 
micro accidents requiring company first aid as used by Zohar, 2000), and near miss 
incidents (i.e., an event in which workers could have or almost sustained an injury) 
as used by Zacharatos et al. (2005).   Targeting the different levels of accident and 
injury severity allowed greater flexibility for profiling incident occurrence and 
greater statistical sensitivity in line with Christian et al.’s (2009) recommendations. 
 
To assist participants’ recollections of incidents and injuries, employees were asked 
to recall the number of times they experienced injuries and near misses, in eight 
separate categories. These included: fractures and dislocations; sprains and strains 
(including back injury); bruising and crushing; superficial wounds (scratches and 
abrasions); open wounds (cuts, lacerations and punctures); burns and scalds; eye 
injuries; and concussions and other head injuries.  In contrast to the 5-point Likert 
scale used by Zacharatos and colleagues (2005) to assess frequency of occurrence,   
respondents were asked to record as accurately as possible the number of times they 
experienced injuries or incidents in each category over the past 6 months.  This 
strategy resulted in a 3 x 8 injury/incident table as shown Part E of Appendix A . 
 
To derive individual-level safety outcome scores the number of injuries across the 
eight categories were summed to form a total for each of the LTI, minor injury and 
near miss incident categories.  To derive the group-level safety outcome scores, the 
average number of injuries in each of the three injury/incident categories for each 
work-group was calculated (Zohar, 2000).  Group averages were based on the 
number of survey respondents from each group rather than the actual number of 
workers per group as identified in organisation distribution charts.  Table 6.2 
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provides a summary of the number of individual reports (cases) and total number of 
injuries (frequency) experienced for each injury classifications in the front-line 
worker sample.  The frequency ratio of LTIs to minor injuries and near miss 
incidents is 1:34:49. 
 
Table 6.2 Classification and Frequency of Injury and Near Miss Incidents  
 
Types of Injuries Minor LTI NMI 
 
Unique 
Cases 
Freq Unique 
Cases 
Freq Unique 
Cases 
Freq 
Fractures & Dislocations 11 14 2 3 15 27 
Sprains & Strains  
(including Back injuries) 
41 58 4 5 33 101 
Bruises & Crushing 31 65 3 4 37 107 
Superficial wounds  
(Scratches and abrasions) 
71 199 1 1 43 166 
Open wounds  
(Cuts, lacerations & punctures) 
40 84 1 1 32 113 
Burns & Scalds 16 29 0 0 24 57 
Eye Injuries 14 24 0 0 26 72 
Concussions 
 (Head injuries) 
9 13 0 0 22 44 
Total 233 486 11 14 232 687 
Note. N=319; Minor= Injury requiring company first aid; LTI=Lost-time Injury, Inability to work one 
full shift / day or more after injury; NMI=Near Miss Incident in which worker could have or almost 
sustained this type of injury; Unique Cases= Number of individual reports; Freq= Frequency derived 
from Cases x Occurence rate.  
 
In total 140 front-line employees (41.1%) reported experiencing either an injury or a 
near miss incident in the preceding 6-month period.  Only six respondents (1.8%) 
failed to provide injury data.  Data from one front-line employee was identified as 
invalid due to over-reporting of lost-time injury experiences and was excluded from 
the analysis.  A further 13 cases reported potentially inflated injury or near miss data 
(i.e., frequency rates greater than ten in any one injury classification).  To retain this 
outcome data in the analysis, the extreme responses identified were recoded down to 
10.  Eight front-line employees (2%) reported experiencing one or more lost-time  
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injuries over the reporting period, equating to 14 LTIs across the injury 
classifications.  The majority of LTIs were associated with sprains and strains 
(including back injuries) and bruising or crush injuries.  Nearly one third (n=109) of 
front-line workers reported experiencing minor injuries that required company first 
aid.  Seventy three front-line workers reported multiple injury occurrences.  The 
most frequently reported minor injuries were superficial wounds such as scratches 
and abrasions (199 instances reported by 71 workers), however all injury types were 
represented in the sample.  
 
Responses for the near miss incident classification indicated that 72 front-line 
workers (22%) experienced a near miss incident in the reporting period with the 
majority of these workers (n=58) reporting multiple incidents across classifications. 
A total of 687 near miss incidents were recorded by workers for the 6-month period. 
Workers indicated that superficial wounds were likely to be the most common 
outcome of workplace safety incidents with 43 workers recording a total of 166 near 
miss occurrences in this classification.  Given the small proportion of front-line 
workers reporting lost time injuries (8 cases, 2%); information from this 
classification was combined with the minor injury data to form an overall Injury 
variable.  Table 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the safety outcome variables.  
Due to the extreme positive skew of the injury and near miss incident data, 
logarithmic transformations were performed on these variables.  The resultant 
variables remained positively skewed.   
 
Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics for Injury and Near Miss Incidents  
Variable Mean SD Range Skew Kurtosis 
1 Injury 1.45 3.71 0-31 4.40 24.22 
2 Near Miss Incident 2.06 6.25 0-48 4.16  19.57 
Note. (N=319)  
 
6.5.  Procedure 
Ethics approval for the project was granted by Curtin University HREC (approval 
number HR 158/2006).  Engagement of key organisational members and employee 
support for the study were considered crucial to the success of the research.  Due to 
the diversity of organisations in the study, meetings with company representatives 
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(generally senior occupational health and safety personnel) and management teams 
were conducted to negotiate appropriate distribution approaches for the 
questionnaires and processes for feedback to the company. Provision was made 
during the development of the questionnaire and company negotiations to conduct 
follow-up longitudinal data collection and to examine work-level differences in 
climate perceptions.  Whereas only data collected from frontline workers is reported 
in this thesis, information was also obtained from managers and supervisors.  
 
Human resource databases in each organisation were used to create classification 
codes for each functional work team based on company, division/department and 
work-group unit designators (e.g., Organisation 1/Division 3/Team 2 = 0103002).  
The accuracy of team classification codes and final staffing numbers were verified 
by company representatives prior to survey distribution.  Team codes were recorded 
on questionnaires which were then sealed in survey distribution packs.  For 
distribution purposes individual survey packs were labelled with conventional work-
level, team designators and in some instances employee names.  
 
While distribution strategies differed slightly due to organisation size and structural 
differences, a standard procedure of information dissemination followed by the 
distribution of surveys at regular or specially convened team safety meetings was 
achieved.  Preliminary circulation of information explaining the nature of the survey 
to staff was achieved via internal newsletters, bulletin boards and the electronic 
distribution of a notification sheet (refer Appendix C).  Questionnaires were 
distributed to employees largely by the researcher at onsite information sessions 
arranged by the organisations.  However, given the range of remote sites represented, 
access restrictions and number of shift rotations involved, this was not always 
possible.  When it was not feasible to personally engage in the distribution of survey 
packs, additional information sessions were arranged with operational safety 
personnel to brief them on the distribution process.  To aid standardisation of 
procedures, a customised PowerPoint presentation covering the purpose of the study 
and key ethical issues was provided to organisations for use by their personnel in 
distribution sessions.  
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Distribution procedures were designed to provide employees adequate time and 
detail to make an informed decision to participate.  To further ensure that participants 
felt no undue pressure to complete the survey, organisations agreed that  participants 
be allowed the freedom to complete the survey in a time set aside within their normal 
work hours, or if they preferred in their own time. Each survey pack included a reply 
paid envelop to ensure confidentiality. To protect employee privacy and ensure the 
anonymity of responses, the questionnaires included no direct form of personal 
identification, however a personal code was used to support longitudinal data 
matching and a group coding system was applied to allow team identification.   
 
Employees were encouraged to return their sealed responses either to a central 
collection point at their organisation for forwarding, or directly to the researcher. 
Participants were encouraged to respond within a two-week period.  Contact details 
of the researcher, supervisors and an independent university contact were provided at 
the information sessions, included on the prior notification sheets, and on survey 
documents to enable participants to forward any queries.  Only one employee query 
regarding the research was received and three blank survey forms were returned.  On 
completion of the study, all participant organisations were provided with a detailed 
report on the safety climate of their organisation, including work-level, team and 
divisional data.  As outlined in the feedback agreement provide in Appendix D 
information in feedback reports was aggregated to ensure the protection and 
confidentiality of individual employees. 
 
6.6. Analysis 
According to Chan’s (1998) typology of composition models for multilevel analysis 
a combination of models can be used to develop and test multilevel hypotheses.  In 
my study, a simple additive composition model was implemented when aggregating 
safety outcomes such as incidents and injuries to the group level, while a direct 
consensus model was considered more appropriate for the formation of the group-
level safety performance indicators.  Finally referent-shift consensus models were 
applied to derive all group-level climate measures.  
 
Data analysis involved the validation of existing and new measures at both the 
individual and group-level of analysis.  Scale validation was first conducted at the 
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individual-level of analysis using exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA).  Principal axis factoring (PAF) with varimax rotation was 
used for the exploratory analysis.  The additional examination of the measurement 
models using CFA was undertaken as it provides a more rigorous test of construct 
validity (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996). Unlike EFA loadings of the 
predictor and criterion variables can be specified a priori in CFA.  CFA therefore 
allows the examination of both convergent validity (i.e., the degree to which items 
load on their hypothesised factor) and discriminant validity (i.e., show minimal 
cross-loadings on other factors) (Bollen, 1989). On the basis of scale validation 
results, refinements of the instruments were made and testing of individual- level 
explanatory models using structural equation modelling (SEM) was undertaken.  
 
To determine if potential differences in findings arise when using individual and 
group-level data two strategies for data aggregation described by Peterson and Castro 
(2006) were undertaken.  The first stage of model replication adopted the ILSA 
approach in which group-level variables were formed by simply aggregating scale 
items assessed for factor structure at the individual-level of analysis. This involved 
testing the suitability of the data for group-level analysis at the scale level via 
examination ICCs (Bliese, 2000).  Assessments of the hypothesised explanatory 
models were then performed on the ILSA aggregated variables.  The second stage of 
model replication adopted the CSA approach in which group-level variables are 
formed by first testing item ICCs, aggregating items to the required level of sub unit 
analysis, conducting exploratory factor analysis on this group-level data and then 
creating group-level scales to be used in subsequent model testing.  
 
Data inspection and EFA was conducted using SPSS 17.  For single and random, 
multiple-item missing data cases, a strategy of data substitution was applied using the 
data imputation procedure in EQS 6.1 program (Bentler, 1995).  All path analyses, 
structural and measurement models were estimated using LISREL 8.0.  Analysis was 
based on the maximum-likelihood (ML) method, the input for the analysis being the 
covariance matrix for the items. When testing the hypothesized models only random 
error was considered. 
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In this thesis, I intend to conduct a series of analyses for the same purpose but using 
different statistical approaches.   Given the resultant number of analyses undertaken 
consideration was given to the inflation of Type I errors. However as the testing of 
explanatory models was aimed at making direct comparisons across methodologies 
Bonferroni family-wise corrections were not applied.  Instead I adopted a stringent 
.01 alpha convention and a more conservative interpretative approach to recognise 
the possibility of Type I errors.  In addition to this general approach, when testing 
organisational differences in section 7.7 a Bonferroni correction was applied. 
   
6.7. Power & Sample Size 
To facilitate the use of both exploratory and confirmatory factor techniques to 
examine the factor structures of constructs prior to modelling construct relationships, 
the data set was split using SPSS random sample generation facility into two sub 
samples (EFA: n=159 and CFA: n= 181).  To retain power in the separate factor 
analyses undertaken, cases with full item responses within a specific climate 
dimension (but not a full data set across domains) were included.  Specific sample 
sizes for each analysis undertaken are reported in the results sections where 
appropriate.  
 
In general, recommended variable-to-cases ratios to support EFA range from 10 to 
20 (Thompson, 2008) with an absolute minimum of five cases per item and at least 
100 cases per analysis (Gorsuch, 1983). As items numbers ranged from 8 to a 
maximum of 17 in the EFA procedures performed, the case to item ratios of 
approximately 10:1 for these analyses are considered adequate.  For CFA, Anderson 
and Gerbing (1988) recommend a minimum sample size of 150 or more.  The two 
randomly generated subsamples therefore provided an adequate sample for all 
individual-level exploratory and confirmatory analysis.   
 
For testing of single-level structural models using SEM the total sample was used.  
For SEM a minimum ratio of sample size to number of free parameters of 5:1 is 
recommended (Bentler & Chou, 1987), necessitating an estimated minimum sample 
of 200. In terms of conventional SEM, MacCallum et al. (1996) provide guidelines 
for the calculation of power and determination of sample size.  Given an expected 
medium effect size, and the degrees of freedom in the model, to achieve adequate 
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power of 0.80 using an alpha level of 0.05 the total front-line sample of 319 is 
considered adequate.  However when group-level modelling was applied the sample 
size and corresponding power in the analysis was significantly reduced.  
 
In multilevel research the target units for grouping participant data reflect the 
conceptual models being tested (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). While the highest 
grouping unit directly targeted in my model was management at the 
organisation/department level the sample size obtained and ICC1 results did not 
support aggregation to this level (see Table 6.4 for organisational level ICC1). 
Aggregation was therefore restricted to the work-group level (N=79).  Despite the 
apparent inadequacy of the group-level sample, evidence has been presented that 
neither the accuracy of parameter estimates (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) or fit 
indices (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980; Bentler & Chou, 1987) are adversely affected in 
samples as small as 50. 
    
Table 6.4 Organisation level ICC1 and ANOVA results for Safety Climate, 
Individual Safety Behaviour and Social Exchange Scales.  
 
Item 
 
ICC ANOVA 
1 OSC-M 0.09 F(5,314)=3.48, p=.004 
2 GSC-S 0.01 F(5,310)=1.95, p=.086 
3 GSC-CA 0.05 F(5,303)=2.83, p=.016 
4 GSC-CP 0.02 F(5,303)=2.18, p=.056 
5 ISB-WA 0.04 F(5,309)=2.62, p=.024 
6 ISB-WP 0.01 F(5,309)=1.63, p=.151 
7 MMX 0.15 F(5,314)=5.07, p<.001 
8 LMX 0.02 F(5,310)=2.09, p=.066 
9 GMX 0.01 F(5,303)=1.88, p=.097 
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; ISB-WA= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-WP= Individual Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member 
Exchange; GMX=Group Member Exchange. 
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7. Construct Validation 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the results of analyses which test the construct validity of the 
social exchange, safety climate and individual safety behaviour scales (Objective 1 
of my thesis). 
 
7.2. Assumption Testing and Missing Data treatment 
An assessment of missing data trends across scale items for the full sample using 
EQS 6.1 indicated that missing data fell into three categories: cases with single item 
omissions (9.5%), cases with random multiple item omissions (3%) and cases with 
missing sections (5%). As each data section constituted over 5% of survey items, 21 
cases with sectional missing data were excluded from the main analysis.   
 
Examination of response trends within this group showed that 17 respondents failed 
to provide coworker data; eight did not complete the section relating to supervisor 
behaviours, three failed to provide management data and seven workers did not 
provide information on their own safety-related behaviours.  When sectional and 
random omissions were combined, no single item was missing in 5% of the total 
sample.  A missing values analysis was also conducted using Little’s MCAR test in 
SPSS 20.  The chi-squared test was not statistically significant,   χ2 (3964, N = 337) = 
3741.51, p=.994, indicating that the patterns of data were missing completely at 
random. 
 
When assessing the psychometric properties of the measurement scales used in the 
study, assumption and outlier tests were conducted on the scale items for each 
construct.  Examination of normality plots, bivariate-scatter plots and Mahalanobis’ 
distance estimates were undertaken to assess potential outliers, and to ascertain 
whether the assumptions of both univariate and multivariate normality, and linearity 
necessary to perform PAF and CFA had been violated.  Given the large number of 
scale items, a random selection of bivariate scatter plots were inspected for violations 
of linearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  A small number of univariate outliers were 
identified (z >3.29) on fourteen of the 100 scale items, however the decision was 
made to retain the items without modification as maintenance of response variability 
was considered a priority, and neither removal nor modification substantially 
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improved skew in the distributions.  A visual inspection of normality plots and 
examination of both skew and kurtosis statistics indicated that the majority of items 
were negatively skewed and showed slight positive kurtosis.  Given the nature of the 
survey items a degree of negative skew in the data was anticipated.  The Maximum 
likelihood method applied in the CFA and SEM procedures is considered relatively 
robust to moderate violations of normality due to skewness, but not kurtosis (Hu, 
Bentler, & Kano, 1992).   
 
Multivariate item-based outliers in the EFA procedures and scales-based outliers for 
CFA and SEM were identified using Mahalanobis’ distance as recommended by 
Tabachnick & Fidell (2007).  Inspection of the suspect cases indicated that these 
respondents were more prepared to use the extremes of the scales when making their 
ratings but no cases were found to be fixed response sets.  To assess the impact of 
multivariate outliers on both exploratory and confirmatory procedures, analyses were 
conducted on both the full and reduced data sets. As outliers identified were 
consistent with those previously inspected and no marked differences in model fit 
were identified between results derived using the full and reduced sets, results for the 
full data sets are reported to retain power in the analysis.  Additional data screening 
and assumptions related information is included were relevant within each results 
section.   
 
7.3. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Safety Behaviour and Climate 
Indicators 
Principal axis factor analysis using varimax rotation was conducted on the first 
subsample  (n=159) to examine the factor structure of the individual safety 
behaviour, safety climate and social exchange scales.  For all scales, factor structures 
were investigated using both original and modified scale items to examine whether 
potential structure differences were sample specific.  For the interpretation of factors, 
the criterion to determine the salience of items was set at factor loadings of .55.  
While Thompson (2008) cites the common practice of setting coefficient values of .3 
or .4, Comrey and Lee (1992) argue that factor loadings in excess of .55 provide a 
more stringent cut off, representing approximately 30% of overlapping variance.  
Items considered poor indicators of their target constructs (i.e., loadings of less than 
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.55) were eliminated to improve psychometric properties of the scales as per Hair et 
al.’s (2006) recommendations. 
 
In both the 17-item individual safety behaviour scale (ISB-W) and coworkers safety 
climate scale (GSC-C) one item relating to workers covering up for coworkers when 
safety rules were not followed required reverse coding to align with the positive 
safety orientation of other statements.  Discussion with company representatives 
indicated that this item had confused some workers.  Subsequent examination of 
univariate descriptive statistics, communalities and factor loadings in an initial run of 
the PAF supported the removal of this item from both GSC-C and ISB-W scales.  
The item showed the lowest average (M= 3.22), highest variability (SD= 1.29), an 
exceedingly low communality after extraction (h
2 
= .093) and poor factor loadings 
(F1= .153; F2= .263) in the initial run of the GSC-C.  The decision was made to rerun 
the PAF analysis in both scales on the reduced 16-item scale. 
 
7.3.1. Individual Safety Behaviours (ISB-W) 
In support of Hypothesis 1, a two-factor solution was obtained for the ISB-W scale 
when factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained (Thompson, 2004).  Item 
means, standard deviations, communalities, eigenvalues and factor loadings for the 
ISB-W scale are presented in Table 7.1.  In total 54.87% of total variability was 
explained by the two-factor model for the Individual Safety Behaviours Scale.  After 
varimax rotation Factor 1 explained 28.46% of total variance and Factor 2, 26.41%.  
As a strong correlation was observed between the two factors (R= .691), an oblique 
rotation was also conducted. The correlated factor rotation resulted in a comparable 
factor solution.  The following results are reported for the orthogonal solution.   
 
Communality values for the ISB-W were high for all items except Item 1 (h
2
= .17).  
The reproduced factor matrix showed that 29% of nonredundant residuals had a 
value greater than .05 indicating a relatively good fit for the two-factor model.  Three 
items failed to reach the loading cut off criteria for either factor and showed 
substantial cross loadings.  Item 1 (F1= .168 & F2= .379), Item 14 (F1= .513 & F2= 
.503), and Item 16 (F1= .489 & F2= .494) were therefore not included in further 
analyses. 
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Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
Two-Factor Model of Individual Safety Behaviours  
                          Loadings  
Item I... M SD F1
b
 F2
a
 h
2
 
1 Refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind 
schedule 
3.82 1.30 .168 .379 .17 
2 Always wear protective equipment even if it is 
uncomfortable 
4.22 0.99 .265 .652 .50 
3 Am prepared to question coworkers who are not following 
safety rules 
4.12 1.04 .412 .690 .65 
4 Monitor myself and others when we are tired or stressed to 
ensure no-one is working unsafely 
3.93 0.99 .320 .703 .60 
5 Look out for coworkers personal safety 4.37 0.84 .264 .748 .63 
6 Follow correct safety procedures when using equipment 4.33 0.80 .419 .563 .49 
7 Co-operate with  supervisors to develop better safety 
practices 
4.15 0.96 .634 .388 .55 
8 Use my initiative to help solve safety-related problems 4.30 0.76 .573 .387 .48 
9 Get involved in the safety training programs provide by 
management 
4.00 1.05 .656 .150 .45 
10 Make suggestions on how to improve job safety  4.09 0.89 .708 .427 .68 
11 Share information about safety hazards with supervisors and 
coworkers 
4.37 0.86 .647 .446 .62 
12 Keep myself informed about safety-related issues 3.95 0.93 .740 .319 .65 
13 Discuss ideas about how to continually improve safety 3.87 1.05 .740 .426 .73 
14 Speak highly of those workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
3.91 1.09 .513 .503 .52 
15 Report all safety-related accidents and near misses as soon as 
they occur 
4.18 1.02 .510 .571 .59 
16 Express my opinions on safety matters even if others 
disagree 
4.25 .91 .489 .494 .48 
 Percentage of Variance:  28.46% 26.41% 
Note . (n= 156). 
a
 = Active Safety Behaviours; 
b
 = Proactive Safety Behaviours 
 
Item 15 also showed complex loadings (in excess of .5) on both factors (F1= .510 & 
F2= .571), but exceeded the cut off criteria for Factor 2.  Item 15 was retained as part 
of the active safety subscale of the ISB.  It was also noted that while Item 7 loaded 
cleanly on the proactive factor (F1= .634 & F2 = .388) for the ISB-W, it showed high 
cross loadings on the GSC-C (refer to section 7.3.2), meeting the cut off for inclusion 
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in the active safety factor.  This was the only item to load inconsistently across scales 
and was therefore excluded.  
 
Items loading strongly on Factor 1 in this instance reflect proactive safety practices 
(ISB-WP).  Cronbach’s alpha for the 6-item ISB-WP Scale was .891.  The six items 
aligning with Factor 2 represented active safety practices (ISB-WA).  Internal 
consistency for the 6-item ISB-WA scale was also considered good (Cronbach’s 
alpha = .882).  As a function of increased item numbers, when combined as a 12-
item ISB-W scale, Cronbach’s alpha increased to .927, indicating good internal 
consistency for both full and subscale versions.  
 
7.3.2. Group Safety Climate- Coworkers (GSC-C) 
As previously identified in the ISB-W analysis, communality values for the GSC-C 
scale items were high for all but one variable: coworkers refuse to ignore safety rules 
when work falls behind schedule (h
2
= .36).  In total 61.68% of variability was 
explained by the two-factor model. After varimax rotation, Factor 1, representing 
active safety behaviours, explained 32.28% of total variance and Factor 2, tapping 
proactive safety behaviours 29.4%.  The reproduced factor matrix indicated that 20% 
of nonredundant residuals had a value greater than 0.05.  The factor transformation 
matrix indicated a strong correlation (R= .688) between factors. 
 
Of the sixteen items in the GSC-C scale, four failed to reach the loading cut off or 
showed substantial cross loadings.  Relatively weaker factor loadings for Item 1, 
examining coworkers’ refusal to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule 
(F1= .52 & F2 = .29), were expected given the lower communality value for this 
item.  Of the three complex variables Item 14 (F1= .538 & F2= .518) and Item 16, 
(F1= .543 & F2= .524) failed to meet the cut off criteria.  While Item 7, (F1= .607 & 
F2 = .509) reached the cut off for Factor 1, as described in section 7.3.1, it was the 
only item with inconsistent loading on the ISB-W & GSC-C scales. High cross 
loadings on these items indicate that respondents find it more difficult to distinguish 
these coworker actions as specifically within role compliance behaviours or beyond 
role expectation, participative activities.  Therefore, to improve scale validity these 
four items were removed from the GSC-C subscales used in all subsequent analyses. 
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Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
Two-Factor Model of Group Safety Climate-Coworker 
               Loadings 
Item Coworkers in my work team.... M SD F1
a
 F2
b
 h
2
 
1 Refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind 
schedule 
3.62 1.20 .522 .294 .36 
2 Always wear protective equipment even if it is 
uncomfortable 
3.82 1.17 .671 .288 .53 
3 Are prepared to question coworkers who are not following 
safety rules 
3.77 1.09 .676 .407 .62 
4 Monitor each other when tired or stressed to ensure no-one is 
working unsafely 
3.55 1.15 .707 .404 .66 
5 Look out for each other’s personal safety 3.98 1.09 .761 .435 .77 
6 Follow correct safety procedures when using equipment 3.92 1.06 .731 .430 .72 
7 Co-operate with  supervisors to develop better safety 
practices 
4.00 .99 .607 .509 .63 
8 Use their initiative to help solve safety-related problems 3.95 .94 .450 .687 .67 
9 Get involved in the safety training programs provide by 
management 
3.66 1.16 .368 .647 .55 
10 Make suggestions on how to improve job safety  3.95 .97 .353 .709 .63 
11 Share information about safety hazards with supervisors and 
each other 
4.03 .97 .457 .657 .64 
12 Keep themselves informed about safety-related issue 3.63 .98 .391 .634 .56 
13 Discuss ideas about how to continually improve safety 3.62 1.05 .314 .839 .80 
14 Speak highly of those workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
3.45 1.14 .538 .518 .56 
15 Report all safety-related accidents and near misses as soon as 
they occur 
3.77 1.15 .704 .313 .59 
16 Express opinions on safety matters even if others disagree 3.83 1.06 .543 .524 .57 
 
 
Percentage of Variance: 
 
 
32.28% 
 
29.40% 
Note. n= 152  
a
 = Active Safety Behaviours; 
b
 = Proactive Safety Behaviours 
 
Items loading on Factor 1 represented compliance, reporting and monitoring safety 
behaviours and are subsequently labelled as active safety practices (GSC-CA).  
Internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .915) for the 6-item GSC-CA scale was 
also considered good. The six items loading strongly on Factor 2 reflect more 
proactive or participative safety practices (GSC-CP) such as co-operating with other 
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workers and supervisors, using personal initiative and keeping informed.  Cronbach’s 
alpha for the 6-item GSC-CP scale was .910. When combined as a 12-item scale 
alpha for the GSC-C increases to .943 again indicating good internal consistency for 
both full and subscale versions.  In sum the factor loading patterns for GSC-C items 
closely mirror those found for the ISB-W. 
  
7.3.3. Group Safety Climate- Supervisors (GSC-S)  
As illustrated in Table 7.3 results of the EFA of the seventeen GSC-S items 
supported a one-factor solution when the Kaiser criterion was applied.   
 
Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
One-Factor Model of Group Safety Climate-Supervisor  
  Loadings      
Item My direct supervisor... M SD F1 h
2
 
1 Makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the job 
safely 
4.01 .99 .732 .54 
2 Checks to see if we are all obeying safety rules 3.81 1.08 .848 .72 
3 Discusses how to improve safety  3.81 1.06 .815 .67 
4 Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely 3.74 1.11 .831 .69 
5 Emphasises safety procedures when we are working under 
pressure 
3.72 1.08 .864 .75 
6 Frequently tells us about the hazards  3.60 1.13 .805 .65 
7 Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule 3.69 1.18 .599 .36 
8 Is strict about working safely when we are tired or stressed 3.78 1.12 .752 .57 
9 Reminds workers who need it to work safely 3.90 .97 .748 .56 
10 Makes sure we follow all the safety rules  3.79 1.10 .862 .74 
11 Insists that we obey safety rules when fixing equipment or 
machines 
3.93 1.03 .785 .62 
12 Says a "good word" to workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
3.53 1.25 .798 .64 
13 Is strict about safety at the end of the shift 3.55 1.09 .811 .66 
14 Spends time helping us learn to see problems before they arise 3.46 1.24 .790 .62 
15 Frequently talks about safety issues 3.57 1.19 .817 .67 
16 Insists we wear our protective equipment  4.19 .93 .663 .44 
17 Encourages workers to report all safety accidents and near 
misses 
4.28 .83 .618 .38 
 Percentage of Variance: 60.34%  
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To ensure that the addition of one item to the original GSC scale had not inhibited 
the replication of a three-factor structure identified by both Zohar and Luria (2005) 
and Johnson (2007), an additional PAF analysis was conducted on the sixteen 
original GSC items.  This analysis also resulted in a one-factor solution. 
Communality values for the seventeen GSC-S scale items were high for all but two 
variables: my supervisor refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind 
schedule(h
2
= .36), and encourages workers to report all safety accidents and near 
misses (h
2
= .38).   All items exhibited factor loadings in excess of .55 (Comrey & 
Lee, 1992).  In total 60.34% of total variability was explained by the one-factor 
model.  The reproduced factor matrix indicated that 27% of nonredundant residuals 
had a value greater than 0.05. Cronbach’s alpha for the 17-item7-item GSC-S scale 
was .962 indicating a high degree of internal consistency. 
 
7.3.4. Organisation  Safety Climate- Managers (OSC-M)  
A one-factor solution was also found for both the 17-item and original 16-item OSC-
M scales.  As shown in Table 7.4, communality values for the OSC-M items were 
high for all but two variables.  In total 56.01% of total variability was explained by 
the one-factor model.  The reproduced factor matrix indicated that 29% of 
nonredundant residuals had a value greater than .05. While the one-factor solutions 
for both GSC-S and OSC-M scales were not optimal, enforced two and three-factor 
solutions for both scales resulted in a relatively high number of complex variables in 
the rotated solutions. A high level of internal consistency was again observed for the 
17-item OSC-M scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .955). 
 
7.3.5. Summary 
The preliminary EFAs indicated that both the coworker safety climate and worker 
safety behaviour scales were best explained by two-factor structures representing 
active and proactive safety practices of workers as hypothesised.  The removal of 
several items to form two 6-item subscales for both the ISB-W and GSC-C improved 
the construct validity and internal consistency of the scales.  The one-factor solutions 
obtained for both supervisor and management level safety climate scales were as 
hypothesised. The inclusion of an item relating to the reporting of accidents and 
incidents in both the GSC-S and OSC-M scales did not impact on the one-factor  
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solutions obtained for either scale and the internal consistency of the two 
management level safety scales is considered excellent.  Further discussion of the 
implications of these results is provided in Section 7.8. 
 
Table 7.4 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
One-Factor Model of Organisational Safety Climate-Managers  
                  Loadings      
Item Top management in this department/site... M SD F1 h
2
 
1 React quickly to solve the problem  3.80 1.14 .770 .59 
2 Insist on thorough and regular safety audits  3.84 1.12 .764 .58 
3 Continually improves safety levels  3.97 .99 .828 .69 
4 Provide all the equipment needed  3.91 1.03 .624 .39 
5 
Are strict about working safely when work falls behind 
schedule 
3.69 1.18 .763 .58 
6 Quickly correct any safety hazards (even if it's costly) 3.49 1.15 .811 .66 
7 Provide detailed safety reports to workers  4.05 1.03 .708 .50 
8 Consider a person's safety behaviour when promoting  3.45 1.08 .633 .40 
9 Require each manager to help improve safety in their 
department 
4.02 .86 .672 .45 
10 Invest a lot of time and money in safety training 3.70 1.13 .753 .57 
11 Use any available information to improve existing safety rules 3.89 1.04 .816 .67 
12 Listen carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety 3.61 1.26 .846 .72 
13 Consider safety when setting production speed and schedules 3.59 1.16 .807 .65 
14 Provide workers with a lot of information on safety issues 3.95 1.05 .804 .65 
15 Regularly hold safety-awareness events  3.52 1.27 .689 .47 
16 Give safety personnel the power they need to do their job  3.74 1.12 .752 .57 
17 
Emphasize the importance of reporting all safety accidents and 
near misses 
4.31 .80 .626 .39 
 Percentage of Variance: 56.01%  
 
 
7.4. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Social Exchange Indicators 
The examination of scale properties for the social exchange variables begins with the 
new Group-Member Exchange scale.  For the Leader-Member Exchange scale the 
factor structures were investigated using both original and modified scale items to 
examine whether any potential differences in psychometric properties were sample 
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specific. The final exploratory analysis examines the Manager-Member Exchange 
scale which is followed by a brief summary of the social exchange results. 
 
7.4.1. Group–Member Exchange (GMX) 
Exploratory Factor Analysis of the 8-item GMX resulted in a one-factor solution 
shown in Table 7.5.  In total 57.88% of total variability was explained by the one-
factor model.  Communality values for GMX items were high for all but one item: 
Item 5, coworkers in my work team “bail each other out” at their own expense when 
someone really needs it (h
2
= .34).  Item 5 also showed the relatively lowest factor 
loading of .580.  As the item exceeded the recommended cut off, the decision was 
made to retain the item in the scale. The reproduced factor matrix indicated a 
relatively good model fit with 32% of nonredundant residuals having a value greater 
than .05.  Cronbach’s alpha for the 8 item GMX scale was .911 indicating the scale 
has good internal consistency. 
 
Table 7.5 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
One-Factor Model of Group-Member Exchange  
  Loadings       
Item Coworkers in my work team....     M SD F1 h
2 
1 Let each other know where they stand  3.60 1.01 .661 .44 
2 Understand each other’s job problems and 
needs 
3.88 .96 .783 .61 
3 Respect each other’s capabilities 3.88 1.10 .852 .73 
4 Help each other solve work related problems   4.11 .89 .863 .75 
5  “Bail each other out” at their own expense 
when someone really needs it 
3.49 1.07 .580 .34 
6 Have confidence in each other’s decisions such 
that they defend them to others 
3.72 .99 .714 .51 
7 Have effective working relationships with each 
other 
4.02 .87 .774 .60 
8 Show a genuine concern for each other’s 
welfare  
4.10 .96 .814 .66 
 Percentage of Variance:  57.88%   
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7.4.2. Leader–Member Exchange (LMX) 
Examination of the eight LMX items also resulted in a one-factor solution.  For 
replication purposes an additional EFA analysis was conducted on the seven original 
GSC items (Graen & Scandura, 1987; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) also using the 
modified group referent.  This analysis also resulted in a one-factor solution.  Table 
7.6 shows that communality values for the 7 and 8-item versions were all adequate. 
In total 63.13% of total variability in the 8-item scale was explained by the one-
factor model.  The reproduced factor matrices indicated a relatively good model fit 
with 32% nonredundant residuals having a value greater than .05 in the 8-item 
version and 28% in the original 7-item version. 
 
Table 7.6 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
One-Factor Model of Leader-Member Exchange  
                  Loadings   
Item My direct supervisor...      M SD F8item h
2 Foriginal h
2 
1 Lets all members of the team know 
where they stand  
3.90 1.14 .756 .57 .758 .57 
2 Understands our teams job problems and 
needs 
3.90 .99 .790 .63 .792 .63 
3 Recognises the potential of all 
employees in our work group 
3.74 1.09 .814 .66 .823 .68 
4 Use their available power to solve our 
work related problems 
3.94 .99 .765 .59 .780 .61 
5 Would "bail out" team members at 
his/her own expense if they really need it 
3.40 1.18 .704 .50 .695 .48 
6 Makes decisions that team members 
would defend and justify to other 
workers 
3.72 1.03 .824 .68 .819 .67 
7 Has effective working relationships with 
employees in our work group 
3.93 1.06 .861 .74 .849 .72 
8 Has a genuine concern for the welfare of 
employees in our work-group  
4.02 1.09 .830 .69   
 Percentage of Variance:  63.13% 62.31% 
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A high degree of internal consistency was observed for both the modified 8-item 
LMX scale (α=.93) and the original 7-item scale (α=.92).  Results indicate that the 
inclusion of Item 8, dealing with workers’ perceptions of the genuine concern held 
for them by their immediate supervisors, fitted well within the existing factor 
structure of the LMX scale and did not compromise the psychometric properties of 
the instrument.  For all subsequent analyses the LMX 8-item version will be utilised. 
 
7.4.3. Manager–Member Exchange (MMX) 
As with results for the two previous social exchange measures, analysis of the 8-item 
MMX resulted in a one-factor solution (see Table 7.7). In total 71.88% of total 
variability was explained by the one-factor model with all items exhibiting strong 
factor loadings and high communality values.  The reproduced factor matrix 
indicated a relative good model fit with 17% of nonredundant residuals having a 
value greater than 0.05.  Cronbach’s alpha for the 8-item MMX scale was .953. 
 
Table 7.7 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
One-Factor Model of Manager-Member Exchange  
   Loadings  
Item Top management in this department/site... M SD F1 h
2 
1 
Are honest and "up front" in their dealings with 
employees  
3.46 1.28 .853 .73 
2 Understand employees' job problems and needs 3.26 1.26 .869 .76 
3 Recognise the contributions of employees 3.42 1.23 .837 .70 
4 Can be trusted to do what is best for employees   3.31 1.24 .874 .76 
5 
Are understanding when employees make honest 
mistakes 
3.69 1.11 .778 .61 
6 
Make decisions that employees feel confident to 
defend to other workers 
3.40 1.12 .880 .77 
7 Have effective working relationships with employees  3.44 1.25 .834 .69 
8 Show genuine concern for the welfare of employees 3.68 1.24 .853 .73 
 Percentage of Variance:      71.88%   
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7.4.4. Summary 
Factor validation results for the social exchange variables indicate that all three 
scales conform to one-factor structures with sound psychometric properties.   
 
7.5. Confirmation of Factor Structures 
Having completed the initial examination of factor structures using individual-level 
data from the first randomly selected subsample, the next phase of my research seeks 
to further establish the construct distinction between scales and subscales to be used 
in the explanatory models.  Two forms of CFA were utilised: item and scale level 
analyses.  All item level CFAs were conducted using the second random split sample 
(n=180).  Scale based CFAs were conducted on the full front-line worker sample 
(N=319).  Maximum likelihood estimation was applied in all models.  A summary of 
scale treatment is provided in Table 7.8.   
 
Table 7.8 Summary of Item and Scale-level Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
Unit of 
Analysis 
Target  
Agent 
 Instrument   
Item 
n=180 
 
Worker 
 
Coworker 
 
 
Supervisor 
 
Manager 
ISB-WA 
ISB-WP 
 
 
 
GSC-CA 
GSC-CP 
GMX 
 
 
 
 
 
GSC-S 
LMX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OSC-M 
MMX 
Scale 
N=319 
 
 
Worker-   
Coworker 
 
ISB-WA 
ISB-WP 
 
GSC-CA 
GSC-CP 
  
 
 
 
Coworker- 
Supervisor-
Manager 
  
GSC-CA 
GSC-CP 
GMX 
 
 
GSC-S 
LMX 
 
 
 
OSC-M 
MMX 
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; ISB-WA= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-WP= Individual Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member 
Exchange; GMX=Group Member Exchange. 
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First, item-level CFAs were undertaken to examine the discriminant validity of the 
active and proactive factor structures previously identified for the ISB-W and GSC-C 
scales.  Second, a scale level CFA was conducted to determine the discriminant 
validity of the ISB-W and GSC-C.  Item-level CFAs were also used to examine 
workers’ capacity to discriminate between safety climate and social exchange items 
within each of the organisational hierarchical work domains.  The final section 
presents the results of scale-based CFAs conducted to investigate the nature of higher 
order structures in the scales across hierarchical levels of the organisation. 
 
In all CFA testing the hypothesised models were compared for fit against the 
theoretical models for the null hypothesis (Independence) and the single-factor 
model (Sobel & Bohrnstedt, 1985). To comply with recommendations regarding the 
evaluation of nested models (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980; Hair et al., 2006; Kline, 
2005), multiple fit indices used in my study include: chi-square (χ2), the comparative 
fit index (CFI), normed fit index (NFI), the standardised root mean square residual 
(SRMR), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). 
 
While Bentler and Bonnett (1980) recognize that the chi-square statistic is sensitive 
to sample size and therefore should not be relied upon as a sole indicator of fit, its 
utility in evaluating comparative fit of nested models is supported (Thompson, 2008).  
Cut-off criteria for fit statistics can vary, however CFI and NFI values greater than 
.95 are generally considered to represent acceptable fit (Bentler & Bonnett).  Hu and 
Bentler (1999) recommend SRMR values be less than or equal to 0.08, while Kline 
(2005) indicates that SRMR values less than .10 are acceptable.  For the RMSEA 
index, values less than 0.05 (Steiger, 1989) or 0.06 (Hu & Bentler) have been 
associated with good fitting models, with RMSEA values greater than 0.10 indicating 
relatively poor fit (Kline, 2005). Ninety percent confidence intervals for RMSEA are 
also reported in all subsequent analyses. 
 
7.5.1. Subscale Distinction ISB-W Active and Proactive - Item CFA  
To further test hypothesis one, a CFA was performed on the 12 items retained for the 
ISB-W scale to examine if the factor structure of individual safety behaviours would 
be best represented by a correlated two-factor structure representing active and 
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proactive safety behaviours when tested against single and uncorrelated two factor 
models. Inspection of multivariate outliers within the subsample indicated no 
problematic cases.  Four cases with random missing data in the ISB-W items were 
removed from the analysis (n=176).  Assumptions tests for multivariate normality 
and linearity were undertaken showing only minor deviations in the data.   
 
As shown in Table 7.9, the independence model of uncorrelated items for the ISB-W 
scale was easily rejected.   Assessment of fit indices for both the one-factor and 
uncorrelated two-factor model also indicated inadequate fit to the data.  In contrast, 
the hypothesised correlated two-factor model was found to fit reasonably well.  A 
series of chi-square difference tests added further support for the utility of the 
correlated two-factor model above the one-factor or uncorrelated two-factor 
solutions. 
 
Table 7.9 Fit and Model Differences tests for Models of ISB-W 
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 > .95 < .08 < .10 
1. Independence  
 
 1721.7*** 66 -- -- -- -- 
2. One-factor   
 
 190.14*** 54 .93 .90 .08 .12 
(.10, .14) 
3.  Two Factor Uncorr   199.73*** 54 .91 .89 .23 .11 
(.09, .13) 
4.  Two Factor Correlated   120.75*** 53 .96 .93 .06 .08 
(.06, .10) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #4 -#1  1600.95*** 13     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4 -#2  69.39*** 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4 -#3  78.98*** 1     
Note. n=176;  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index,SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA).*p<.05,**p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
While post hoc Lagrange multiplier tests indicated further model modification could 
be made linking Item 77 to the Proactive factor and Item 85 to the Active factor, 
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improvements to overall model fit statistics were not substantial and therefore the 
modification was not made.  The final correlated two-factor model, including 
significant standardised coefficients, is presented in Figure 7.1.  These results 
replicate the loadings observed on the EFA and add further support to Hypothesis 1.   
 
88 Discuss ideas about how to continually 
improve safety  
 
77  Always wear protective equipment even if it 
is uncomfortable  
86 Share information about safety hazards with 
supervisors and co-workers  
 
78 Am prepared to question co-workers who 
are not following safety rules  
79 Monitor myself and others when we are 
tired/ stressed to ensure no-one is working 
unsafely  
 80 Look out for co-workers personal safety   
 
85 Make suggestions on how to improve job 
safety  
 
84 Get involved in the safety training programs 
provide by management  
 
83 Use my initiative to help solve safety related 
problems  
 
81 Follow correct safety procedures when using 
equipment  
 90 Report all safety related accidents and near 
misses as soon as they occur   
 
87 Keep myself informed about safety related 
issues  
 
ISB – W 
Active    
ISB – W  
Proactive    
.78 
.40 
.66 
.50 
.66 
.59 
.60 
.63 
.58 
.75 
.74 
.69 
.78 
.59 
.71 
.65 
.60 
.64 
.64 
.58 
.47 
.44 
.45 
.52 
.75 
FIGURE??   Final Correlated Two Factor CFA model for Active and Proactive Individual Safety 
Behaviours with significant coefficients presented in standardised form. 
 
Figure 7.1. Final cor el t d two-factor CFA model of active and proactive 
individual safety behaviours with significant coefficients in standardised form. 
Note ISB-WA= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-WP= Individual Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Proactive 
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7.5.2. Subscale Distinction GSC-C Active and Proactive - Item CFA 
The next CFA was performed on the 12 items retained for the GSC-W scale to 
validate the correlated two-factor structure proposed in Hypothesis 2.  No 
multivariate outliers within the subsample were indicated however six cases with 
missing data were removed from the analysis (n=174). The independence model of 
uncorrelated items for the GSC-C scale was easily rejected while assessment of fit 
indices for both the one-factor  model and uncorrelated two-factor model indicated 
that these models did not provided an adequate fit to the data (see Table 7.10).  The 
hypothesised correlated two-factor model provided a good fit and is presented in 
Figure 7.2. These results add support to Hypothesis 2. 
 
Table 7.10 Fit and Model Differences Tests for Models of GSC-C  
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 > .95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence  
 
 2352.09***      66 -- -- -- -- 
2.One-factor   
 
 212.31*** 54 .93 .91 .08 .14 
(.12, .16) 
3.Two Factor Uncorr   222.99*** 54 .93 .91 .27 .12 
(.10, .14) 
4.Two  Factor Correlated   125.03*** 53 .97 .95 .05 .08  
(.06, .10) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #4-#1  2227.06*** 13     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4-#2  87.28*** 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4-#3  97.96*** 1     
Note. n=174;  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation  
   p<.05, **   p<.01, ***   p<.001 
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63 Discuss ideas about how to continually 
improve safety  
 
52 Always wear protective equipment even 
if it is uncomfortable  
61 Share information about safety hazards 
with supervisors and each other 
 
53 Are prepared to question co-workers 
who are not following safety rules  
54 Monitor each other when stressed  or 
tired to ensure no-one is working unsafely  
 
55 Look out for each others personal safety   
 
60 Make suggestions on how to improve 
job safety  
 
59 Get involved in the safety training 
programs provide by management  
 
58 Use their initiative to help solve safety 
related  problems  
 
56 Follow correct safety procedures when 
using equipment  
 
65 Report all safety related accidents and 
near misses as soon as they occur   
 
62 Keep themselves informed about safety 
related issues  
 
GSC-C 
Active    
GSC-C  
Proactive    
.76 
.42 
.49 
.45 
.47 
.43 
.43 
.48 
.64 
.60 
.72 
.82 
.76 
.71 
.74 
.60 
.72 
.76 
.75 
.73 
.49 
.64 
.49 
.32 
.76 
FIGURE??   Model 8: Correlated Two Factor CFA Model for Group Safety Climate- Coworker 
Active and Proactive Safety with significant coefficients presented in standardised form. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Final correlated two-factor CFA model of active and proactive GSC - 
Coworkers with significant coefficients in standardised form. 
Note: GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- 
Coworkers Proactive 
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7.5.3. Construct Distinction: ISB-W and GSC-C Scale CFA 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that workers will differentiate between measures of coworker 
commitment to safety, (as indexed by GSC-C) and their personal commitment to 
safety (ISB-W).  To clarify the construct distinction between group-level safety 
climate and individual safety behaviours, a scale- based CFA was conducted. Having 
created average scale scores for the Active and Proactive safety subscales of both the 
ISB-W and GSC-C, inspection of distributions and both univariate and multivariate 
outliers were undertaken on the CFA random split subsample.   
 
Ten cases with missing data in either the ISB-W or GSC-C subscales were removed 
from the analysis (n=171).  A small number of potential univariate outliers (9 cases) 
representing respondents with low scores on the subscales were identified.  These 
cases were retained as they were considered meaningful to the interpretation and 
context of the analysis.  Univariate distribution patterns for three of the four 
subscales showed slight negative skew and kurtosis. As indicated in Table 7.11 only 
ISB-WP deviated from this trend, being negatively skewed but with a positive 
kurtosis value. Graphs of individual-level scale distributions are provided in 
Appendix E.   
 
Table 7.11 Means, Standard Deviations, Alpha and Zero-Order Correlations for 
ISB-W and GSC-C Scales in the CFA Sub-Sample  
Variable Mean SD Skew Kurtosis α 1 2 3 
1 ISB-WA 4.19 0.59 -.58 -.27 .75    
2 ISB-WP 4.04 0.70 -.83  .69 .85 .60**   
3 GSC-CA 3.85 0.71 -.33 -.35 .82 .52** .40**  
4 GSC-CP 3.89 0.70 -.38 -.26 .88 .41** .50** .62** 
Note. n=171;*p< .01, ** p< .001; α= Cronbach’s Alpha reliability: GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- 
Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; ISB-WA= Individual 
Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-WP= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive. 
 
Only one multivariate outlier cases was identified (Mahalanobis >18.46).  
Investigation of this case indicated that the worker in question was generally very 
negative in his responses about coworkers active and proactive safety actions.  While 
workers were also negative towards their own performance of proactive safety 
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behaviours they responded more positively in regard to active (compliance) 
behaviours.  Analysis was conducted both with and without this outlier case and as 
no substantial difference in results was observed the outlier was retained.  
Assumption tests for multivariate normality and linearity were undertaken showing 
only minor deviations. 
 
The hypothesised correlated two-factor model was compared against the 
independence model, a single model, and uncorrelated two-factor model.  During 
initial processing of the models a problem was encountered when running the 
uncorrelated two-factor model.  The problem concerned the Theta-Delta matrix not 
being positive definite and resulted in the generation of large negative error terms.  
As the advised course of action (removing iteration restrictions) was not successful 
in fixing the problem, an alternative approach was taken. This involved calculating 
reliabilities of the subscales (see Table F1) and including the appropriate derived 
term (1-α) in the analysis as error variances.  For consistency this inclusion of error 
terms was made for all models. Comparisons of the parameters generated when 
models were initially run with the error terms freed to vary and then subsequently 
imposed, indicated that parameter estimates were generally consistent across 
procedures and fit statistics slightly more conservative in the solutions with modelled 
error.  
 
Model fit statistics and chi-square difference tests are displayed in Table 7.12.  The 
independence model, one-factor model and uncorrelated two-factor model all 
provided a poor fit. While the hypothesised correlated two-factor model (Model 4) 
provided a better fit to the data, several key fit indices fell just outside recommended 
limits. Inspection of the Lagrange multiplier test indicated that the inclusion of an 
error covariance between ISB-WA and GSC-CA would further improve model fit.  A 
post hoc modification was performed and the resultant model (Model 5) proved to be 
a good fit to the data.  A series of chi-square difference tests supported the correlated 
two-factor model with error covariance, above alternate solutions. While improving 
model fit, the addition of the error covariance between the two Active safety 
subscales resulted in little change to the parameter estimates generated for both the 
hypothesised and final models. The final model is presented in Figure 7.3. 
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Table 7.12 Fit and Model Difference Tests for ISB-W and GSC-C Models  
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 > .95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence  
 
 270.29***      6 -- -- -- -- 
2.One-factor   
 
 84.82*** 6 .70 .69 .12 .34 
(.29, .39) 
3.Two Factor Uncorr   88.75*** 6 .69 .67 .29 .26 
(.21, .31) 
4.Two Factor Correlated   27.99*** 5 .91 .90 .07 .15 
(.09, .21) 
5.Mod Two Factor Corr   13.44 ** 4 .96 .95 .06 .11 
(.05, .19) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #5 -2  71.38*** 2     
 Difference (Δχ2) #5-4  14.55*** 1     
Note. n=174;  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation: 
Mod =Modified;  .*p<.05,**p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
ISB-W
GSC-C
ISB-WA
.25
ISB-WP
.12
.18
.15
GSC-CA
GSC-CP
Figure X. Correlated Two Factor Model of  Active and 
Proactive Individual Safety Behaviours and Group Safety 
Climate
.39
.59
.60
.54
.67
.59
 
 
Figure 7.3. Final correlated two-factor model of active and proactive ISB-W and 
GSC-C with significant coefficients in standardised form. 
Note: GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- 
Coworkers Proactive; ISB-WA= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-WP= Individual 
Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive 
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While a strong correlation exists between individual safety behaviours and coworker 
behaviours the improved fit of the two-factor model with correlated error terms 
compared to the single-factor model supports the discriminant validity of the ISB-W 
and GSC-C scales.  In combination these results support Hypotheses 3.  
 
7.5.4. Climate Construct Distinction: Item Level CFA 
To establish the construct distinction between safety climate and social exchange 
measures proposed in Hypothesis 6, item-based confirmatory factor analysis was first 
performed on the safety climate and social exchange scales within each work-level of 
the organisational.  Scale-level CFA was then conducted to assess the higher order 
nature of the constructs across hierarchical levels.  The first analysis undertaken 
determined the capacity for respondents to distinguish between coworkers’ 
commitment to safety (as indexed by GSC-CA and GSC-CP), and the quality of 
social exchanges occurring amongst team members (GMX).  The second analysis 
assessed respondents’ capacity to make distinctions between supervisor commitment 
to safety (as indexed by GSC-S) and the quality of their supervisors’ social 
exchanges with team members (LMX). The third analysis, focused on the 
organisational level, examining the distinction between workers’ perceptions of their 
managers’ commitment to safety (OSC-M) and the perceived quality of 
managements’ social exchanges (MMX) with workers.   
 
To optimise power in the analysis the decision was made to select the eight strongest 
loading items identified in earlier exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to 
represent each safety climate scale.  For group-level coworker safety climate the four 
strongest loading items from each of the active and proactive scales were used.  For 
the social exchange scales the seven strongest items were selected.  This involved 
dropping the item relating to coworkers or supervisors “bailing out” team members 
at their own expense.  
  
This series of separate CFAs was again conducted on the second random split 
subsample. Cases with missing data for all items in the relevant scales were removed 
for each analysis resulting in final samples for coworker, supervisor and management 
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scales of 174, 177 and 180 respectively.  Inspection of outliers within the subsample 
indicated no problematic cases. Assumptions tests for multivariate normality and 
linearity were undertaken showing only minor deviations in each of the data sets.   
 
7.5.4.1. GSC-C and GMX 
As indicated in Table 7.13 the theoretical models were compared against the 
correlated two-factor model uncorrelated three-factor model and the hypothesised 
correlated three-factor model.  The final correlated three-factor model for GSC-CA, 
GSC-CP and GMX with significant standardised coefficients is presented in Figure 
7.4.  The independence model of uncorrelated items was easily rejected, as was the 
one-factor  model. Assessment of fit indices for the alternative models also indicated 
that these did not provide the best possible fit to the data.   
   
Table 7.13 Fit and Model Differences Tests for CFA of Group-level Safety 
Climate-Coworker and Group Member Social Exchange  
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence  
 
 3185.40*** 105 - - - - 
2.One-factor   
 
 443.46*** 90 .89 .86 .10 .18 
(.16,.19) 
3.Two Factor Correlated  
 
 264.23*** 89 .94 .92 .07 .11 
(.10,.13) 
4.Three Factor Uncorrelated  
 
 358.16*** 90 .91 .89 .27 .13 
(.12,.15) 
5.Three Factor Correlated 
 
 201.46*** 87 .96 .94 .06 .09 
(.07,.10) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #5 -#2  242*** 3     
 Difference (Δχ2) #5 -#3  62.77*** 2     
 Difference (Δχ2) #5-#4  156.7*** 3     
Note.  n=174; χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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68 Let each other know where they stand  
 
61 Share information about safety hazards 
with supervisors and each other 
 
53 Are prepared to question co-workers 
who are not following safety rules  
54 Monitor each other when stressed  or 
tired to ensure no-one is working unsafely  
 55 Look out for each others personal safety   
 
60 Make suggestions on how to improve 
job safety  
 
58 Use their  initiative to help solve safety 
related  problems  
 
56 Follow correct safety procedures when 
using equipment  
 
62 Keep themselves informed about safety 
related issues  
 
GSC-C 
Active    
GSC-C  
Proactive    
.56 
.46 
.46 
.46 
.36 
.57 
.51 
.40 
.31 
.82 
.80 
.74 
.74 
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.45 
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.83 
.70 
.66 
.76 
.67 
.33 
.36 
.39 
.63 
FIGURE??   Model 18: Correlated Three Factor CFA Model for Group Level Co-Worker Safety 
Climate and Social Exchange with significant coefficients presented in unstandardised form. 
             
GMX    
69 Understand each other’s job problems 
and needs 
 70 Respect each other’s capabilities  
 
71 Help each other solve work related 
problems  
 73 Have confidence in each other’s 
decisions 
 74 Have effective working relationships 
with each other  
 75 Show a genuine concern for each 
other’s welfare  
 
.78 
.77 
.80 
.43 
.80 
.58 
.62 
.73 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Final correlated three-factor model of GMX, active GSC-C and 
proactive GSC-C with significant coefficients in standardised form. 
Note: GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- 
Coworkers Proactive; GMX=Group Member Exchange 
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The hypothesised correlated three-factor model provided a good fit to the data, with 
the all fit indices except the NFI falling within recommended limits.  The chi-square 
difference tests again supported the correlated three-factor model above alternate 
factor solutions.  The superior fit of the three-factor correlated model and pattern of 
factor correlations support Hypothesis 7 that employees discriminate between safety-
specific behaviours of coworkers and the quality of informal workplace social 
exchanges occurring within their teams.  
 
7.5.4.2. GSC-S and LMX  
To further establish the discriminant validity of the LMX and GSC-S scales the 
theoretical independence model was tested against a single factor, uncorrelated two-
factor model and the hypothesised correlated two-factor model.  Full fit statistics are 
provided in Table 7.14 and the final model for GSC-S and LMX is presented in 
Figure 7.4. 
 
Table 7.14 Fit and Model Differences Tests for CFA of Group-level Safety 
Climate-Supervisor and Leader- Member Social Exchange 
 
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence  
 
 6525.63*** 105 - - - - 
2.One-factor   
 
 431.52*** 90 .95 .93 .07 .19 
(.17,.20) 
3.Two Factor Uncorr  
 
 345.44*** 90 .96 .95 .37 .11 
(.09,.12) 
4.Two Factor Correlated  
 
 201.53*** 89 .98 .97 .04 .08 
(.07,.10) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #4 -#2  229.99*** 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4 -#3  143.91*** 1     
Note. N=177;  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation . 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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43 Let’s all members of the team know 
where they stand with him/her  
 
38 Is strict about safety at the end of the 
shift, when we want to go home 
 
27 Frequently checks to see if we are all 
obeying safety rules 
28  Discusses how to improve safety with us 
 
29  Uses explanations (not just compliance) 
to get us to act safely 
 
35 Makes sure we follow all the safety 
rules (not just the most important ones) 
 
31  Frequently tells us about the hazards in 
our work 
 
30  Emphasises safety procedures when we 
are working under pressure 
 
40 Frequently talks about safety issues 
throughout the work week 
 
              
GSC-S 
 
.52 
.30 
.26 
.27 
.30 
.41 
.39 
.45 
.58 
.86 
.92 
.93 
.1.05 
.93 
.87 
.90 
.86 
.91 
.89 
.89 
.83 
.38 
.39 
.49 
.80 
FIGURE??   Model 22: Correlated Two Factor CFA Model for Group Level Supervisor Safety 
Climate and Social Exchange with significant coefficients presented in unstandardised form. 
               
LMX    
44 Understands our teams’s job problems 
and needs 
 45 Recognises the potential of all 
employees in our work group 
 46 Uses his/her available power to solve 
our work related problems 
48 Makes decisions that team members 
would defend and justify to others 
49 Has effective working relationships with 
employees in our work group 
 50 Has a genuine concern for the welfare 
of employees in our work group 
 
.82 
.79 
.89 
.40 
.55 
.54 
 
  
Figure 7.4. Final correlated two-factor model of LMX and GSC-C with 
significant coefficients in standardised form. 
Note: GSC-S= Group Safety Climate- Supervisor; LMX=Leader Member Exchange 
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The independence model of uncorrelated items was easily rejected.  While the one-
factor and uncorrelated two-factor solutions were acceptable, results of the chi-
square difference tests supported the hypothesised model above alternate factor 
solutions.  The correlated two-factor model provided the best fit to the data, with the 
fit indices within recommended limits for all bar the RMSEA. 
 
7.5.4.3. OSC-M and MMX 
To establish whether workers could discriminate between the MMX and OSC-M 
scale items the hypothesised correlated two-factor model was tested against the 
theoretical models and uncorrelated two-factor model.  The final, highly correlated 
two-factor model for OSC-M and MMX including significant standardised 
coefficients is presented in Figure 7.5 and assessment of fit provided in Table 7.15. 
  
Table 7.15 Fit and Model Differences Tests for Organisation-level Safety 
Climate-Managers and Manager- Member Social Exchange   
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence  
 
 6038.91*** 105 - - - - 
2.One-factor   
 
 312.29*** 90 .96 .95 .06 .13 
(.12,.15) 
3.Two Factor Uncorr 
 
 403.55*** 90 .95 .93 .36 .12 
(.11,.14) 
4.Two Factor Correlated  
 
 222.11*** 89 .98 .96 .05 .10 
(.08,.11) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #4 -#2  90.18*** 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4-#3  181.44*** 1     
Note. n=180;  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation . 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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18 Are honest and “up front” in their 
dealings with employees 
 
13 Considers safety when setting 
production speed and schedules 
 
1 Reacts quickly to solve the problem 
when told about safety hazards 
2 Insists on thorough and regular safety 
audits and inspections 
 3 Tries to continually improve safety 
levels in each department 
 
12 Listens carefully to worker’s ideas about 
improving safety 
 
11 Uses any available information to 
improve existing safety rules 
 
6 Quickly corrects any safety hazards 
(even if it’s costly) 
14 Provides workers with a lot of 
information on safety issues 
              
OSC-M 
 
.49 
.35 
.44 
.30 
.47 
.48 
.42 
.43 
.57 
.94 
.89 
.93 
1.02 
1.00 
.90 
.69 
.76 
.70 
.81 
.66 
.76 
.39 
.37 
.41 
.87 
FIGURE??   Model 23: Correlated Two Factor CFA Model for Organisation Level Management 
Safety Climate and Social Exchange with significant coefficients presented in unstandardised 
form. 
               
MMX    
19 Understand employees’ job problems 
and needs 
20 Recognise the contributions of 
employees 
 21 Can be trusted to do what is best for 
employees   
 23 Make decisions that employees feel 
confident to defend to other workers 
24 Have effective working relationships 
with employees in this organisation 
 25 Show genuine concern for the welfare 
of employees 
.76 
.87 
.78 
.55 
.52 
.46 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Final correlated two-factor model of MMX and OSC-M with 
significant coefficients in standardised form. 
Note: OSC-M= Organisational Safety Climate- Manager; MMX=Manager  Member Exchange 
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The independence model of uncorrelated items was again easily rejected.  
Assessment of the fit indices showed that the single factor model provided a 
relatively good fit to the data. However, the hypothesised correlated two-factor 
model was found to be the best fitting solution with all estimates of fit falling within 
recommended limits. 
   
The above results support the construct distinctions between safety climate and social 
exchange measures within each organisational level proposed in Hypothesis 8.  The 
initial item-level CFA for coworker scales indicated the covariation between the two 
safety climate subscales was stronger than that found for either scale with GMX.  For 
the supervisor and management analysis, strong covariations between the safety 
climate and social exchange scales were noted.  To further assess the nature of 
construct convergence across the organisational hierarchy, confirmatory factor 
analysis was also conducted on the first-order safety climate and social exchange 
scales.   
 
7.5.5. Climate Construct Distinction: Higher Order Scale CFA 
In this section a series of theoretical models were developed to test Hypothesis 7 that 
front-line workers will discriminate between safety climate factors and social 
exchange constructs within corresponding hierarchical levels.  As a precursor to 
structural modelling to be undertaken in Chapters 8 and 9, this scale-level model 
testing was conducted on the combined workers’ sample.  Social exchange and safety 
climate scales were constructed by averaging the items identified in the exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis.   
 
The first hypothesised model, illustrated in Figure 7.6, examines the alignment of 
workers’ perceptions within construct domains by proposing a two-factor model of 
global safety climate and social exchange.  This model offers support for the use of 
global safety climate and social exchange measures across organisational levels in 
predictive models.  In contrast, the alternative models (see Figures 7.7 & 7.8) depict 
a stronger alignment of workers’ perceptions within organisational levels than within 
construct domains.   
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Figure 7.6. Two-factor model of global safety climate and social exchange. 
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactice; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange. 
 
In line with Zohar and Luria’s (2005) recognition of the importance of supervisor 
behaviours in the development of group-level climate, the alternative model 
represents a two-factor model of organisation and group-level actions in which 
supervisor and coworker safety commitment and social exchange are closely aligned.   
 
OSC-Me
Figure X. Model 30 Two Factor Model of Organisation Level 
Safety Climate and Social Exchange
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Figure 7.7. Two-factor model of organisation-level safety climate and social 
exchange. 
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactice; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange. 
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The third model further stratifies the hierarchy of workers’ perceptions to clearly 
distinguish between workers’ perceptions of management, supervisor and coworker 
actions.  A stronger correspondence of workers’ perceptions within hierarchical 
levels of the organisation than within construct domains would provide support for 
the use of first-order work-level models of safety climate and social exchange 
variables in predictive models. 
 
OSC-Me
Figure X. Model 31 Three Factor Model of Organisation Level 
Safety Climate and Social Exchange
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Figure 7.8. Three-factor model of organisation-level safety climate and social 
exchange. 
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactice; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange. 
 
In the full sample, 21 cases (6%) had missing data for one or more scales.  Only 
cases with valid data on all safety climate and social exchange scales were included 
in the analysis (N=319).  Data inspection indicated that all scales were slightly 
negatively skewed (see Appendix E). The few univariate outliers identified 
represented respondents with more extreme negative views of the safety climate and 
social exchanges operating within the work environment, their data was retained in 
the analysis.  Table 7.16 shows the descriptive statistics, scale reliabilities and 
correlations for the safety climate and social exchange scales. Model fit statistics and 
chi-square difference tests are displayed in Table 7.17.   
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Table 7.16 Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-Order Correlations for Safety 
Climate and Social Exchange Scales. 
Variable Mean SD Items α 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 OSC-M 3.79 0.78 17 .95       
2 MMX 3.46 0.98 8 .94 .83**      
3 GSC-S 3.78 0.82 17 .96 .65** .64**     
4 LMX 3.80 0.90 8 .93 .48** .56** .78**    
5 GSC-CA 3.82 0.82 6 .88 .49** .50** .52** .36**   
6 GSC-CP 3.84 0.77 6 .90 .53** .54** .57** .41** .70**  
7 GMX 3.80 0.73 8 .90 .31** .37** .30** .33** .59** .56** 
Note. N=319;  α = Cronbach’s Alpha; *p<.05, **p<.01, Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-
Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; 
LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group Member Exchange. 
 
Table 7.17 Assessment of Fit and Model Differences for CFA of Safety Climate 
and Social Exchange Scales  
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence  
 
 1968.40*** 21 - - - - 
2.One-factor   
 
 394.40*** 14 .80 .80 .10 .29 
(.27,.32) 
3.Two Factor Global Corr  
 
 390.91*** 13 .81 .80 .10 .29 
(.27,.32) 
4.Two Factor Level Corr  
 
 281.28*** 13 .86 .86 .09 .27 
(.24,.29) 
5.Three Factor Level Corr  
 
 65.67*** 11 .97 .97 .03 .12 
(.09,.15) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #5-#3  325.73*** 2     
 Difference (Δχ2) #5-#4  215.61*** 2     
 Difference (Δχ2) #3-#2  3.49 1     
Note. N=319;  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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The independence model, one-factor model and correlated two-factor global model 
provided poor fit.  The two models proposing stronger links within organisational 
levels than within construct domains showed an improvement in fit.  When 
organisational levels were fully stratified, the fit statistics for the three-factor 
correlated model were substantially improved.  The superior fit of the three-factor 
model compared to both the two-factor models is also shown by the significant chi 
square difference tests undertaken. The final correlated three-factor model for OSC-
M, MMX, GSC-S, LMX, GSC-CA, GSC-CP and GMX, including significant 
standardised coefficients, is presented in Figure 7.9.   
 
OSC-M.17
Figure X. Model 31 Standardised Coefficients for the Three Factor 
Model of Organisation Level Safety Climate and Social Exchange
GMX.57
LMX.39
GSC-S.01
GSC-CP.26
GSC-CA.30
MMX.18
Manager
Level 
Actions
Supervisor 
Level 
Actions
Co-Worker 
Level 
Actions
.91
.91
.99
.78
.84
.86
.65
.72
.62
.65
 
Figure 7.9. Standardised coefficients for the three-factor model of organisation-
level safety climate and social xchange.
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactice; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange. 
 
The high zero-order correlations and pattern of loadings indicate that a greater degree 
of construct convergence between social exchange and safety climate is found for the 
more distal management-level actions than for group-level supervisor or coworker 
behaviours.  That is, in support of Hypothesis 7, front-line workers find it more 
difficult to distinguish between management commitment to safety and social 
exchanges with employees in their work area than they do when rating either their 
supervisor or fellow coworkers.  Contrary to expectation, the association between the 
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two group-level climate dimensions (supervisors and coworkers) was shown to be 
weaker than the relationship between management and supervisor-level higher order 
factors. 
 
7.5.6. Summary 
When considered in combination with the results of the item-based CFA reported in 
Section 7.3 and both the zero-order correlations and the pattern of factor correlations 
between scales described above, overall my results indicate that there is a stronger 
correspondence of workers’ perceptions of organisational agent’s actions within 
workplace hierarchical levels than within construct domains.  Whereas front-line 
workers can distinguish between safety climate and social exchange variables for 
specific organisational referents, it appears that the degree of construct distinction 
diminishes as organisational distance between the respondent and target agents 
increases.  The fully stratified work-level model provided a superior fit compared to 
the global construct domain model, offering support for the use of first-order safety 
climate and social exchange variables in predictive models. Support was found for 
Hypothesis 7 in that front-line workers were found to discriminate between first-
order safety climate factors representing management, supervisor and coworker 
commitment to safety and social exchange constructs within corresponding 
hierarchical work-level domains.  Constructs representing supervisor and coworker 
safety climate and social exchanges did not converge at the group-level, but rather 
retained a further level of distinction.    
 
7.6. Safety Climate Level and Strength 
In this section of the individual-level scale validation results my intention is to 
present the reader with a brief description of the safety climate profiles found in the 
participant organisations.  These organisational profiles index both safety climate 
level and strength and are used to assess Hypothesis 8.  Previously, Zohar and Luria 
(2005) have used mean scores to represent climate level and standard deviation 
scores as an index of climate strength.  Climate variability is gauged by determining 
group or organisation-level differences in climate level (as was discussed in section 
2.7.1).  While climate levels form the basic unit of analysis in the majority of extant 
safety climate research (and in this thesis), recognising and assessing the shared 
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nature of perceptions implicit in the definition of climate scales is also considered an 
important issue (Luria, 2008). 
 
In this section therefore, analyses are conducted to test the hypothesis that front-line 
workers will discriminate between safety climate factors and individual safety 
behaviours by comparing climate level and variability of scales across the 
organisational sample.  As proposed in Hypothesis 3, individual workers are 
expected to rate their own levels of safety performance in a more positive light 
compared to their perceptions of normative safety behaviours exhibited by workers 
in their teams.  Furthermore, it is hypothesised that the level of agreement between 
workers found when assessing their coworkers’ safety behaviours (GSC-C) should 
be weaker than the level of agreement observed for workers assessing their own 
behaviours.  Hypothesis 9 proposed that workers will differentiate between measures 
of management, supervisor and coworker safety climate such that average scores 
(climate level) will be highest for ratings at the respondents’ work-level and diminish 
with increased organisational distance.  It is also proposed that less response 
variability will be found when workers’ complete rating scales within their own 
work-level than when they rate the safety behaviours of more distal organisational 
agents. 
 
In line with Zohar and Luria’s (2005) conventions for deriving climate level and 
strength, mean and standard deviation scores were calculated for the active and 
proactive subscales of both the ISB-W and GSC-C.  Climate level and strength were 
also derived for OSC-M and GSC-S scales. The total sample (N=319) was used for 
this set of analyses. Aggregated results are reported for organisations with more than 
10 valid responses from front-line employees (n=6). 
  
7.6.1. ISB-W and GSC-C Scales 
Summary statistics and contrasts for the Active and Proactive subscales of individual 
and coworkers safety behaviours are included in Tables 7.18 and 7.19 respectively.  
To further investigate the nature and consistency of observed trends, results for each 
of the participant organisations on both Active and Proactive subscales are also 
described.  
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When assessed across the overall front-line sample, workers rated their own safety 
behaviours in a more positive light than that of their coworkers.  Paired samples t-
tests indicated that this trend held for both Active safety practices, (MISB-WA = 4.19; 
MGSC-CA = 3.82) and Proactive safety subscales, (MISB-WA = 4.06; MGSC-CA = 3.85).  In 
support of Hypothesis 3 the level of agreement amongst workers was also shown to 
be stronger for both the ISB-W subscales (SDActive = 0.67; SDProactive = 0.72) than for 
the GSC-C subscales (SDActive = 0.82; SDProactive = 0.77). 
 
Active Subscales 
On average, workers rated their own active safety behaviours 0.36 scale points 
higher than their coworkers, representing a medium effect (Cohen, 1988).  When 
aggregated to the organisational level the scores for safety climate levels as indexed 
by the GSC-CAORG scale were marginally lower than for the ISB-WAORG. A series of 
paired t-tests were conducted to test if the trend was consistent across organisations.  
To reduce type I errors a strict Bonferroni correction was made (alpha=.008). The 
results are presented in Table 7.18.  For the Active safety subscales differences 
between individual and coworker behaviours were statistically significant in four 
organisations.  The small sample sizes (resulting in a lack of power in the analysis) 
may have contributed to the nonsignificant results for Organisations 2 and 4. 
 
Table 7.18. Means, Standard Deviations and Contrast Statistics for ISB-W and 
GSC-C Active Subscales 
  ISB-WA GSC-CA    
Variable N Mean SD Mean SD t Mdiff 95% CI d 
Org 1 72 4.27 0.68 3.84 0.97 5.43* 0.43 0.27 0.59 0.52 
Org 2  30 4.07 0.64 3.84 0.61 2.04 0.23 -0.01 0.47 0.37 
Org 3 39 4.08 0.75 3.74 0.84 3.48* 0.34 0.14 0.54 0.43 
Org 4 16 4.57 0.43 4.48 0.48 1.50 0.09 -0.39 0.22 0.20 
Org 5 29 4.29 0.53 3.82 0.60 4.83* 0.47 0.27 0.67 0.83 
Org 6 116 4.13 0.69 3.74 0.83 6.32* .039 0.27 0.51 0.51 
Total  319 4.19 0.68 3.82 0.82 10.27* 0.37 0.29 0.43 0.50 
Note.  Total = Includes all valid individual cases from the total sample;*p<.008; CI=confidence 
interval -lower limit & upper limit: d=Cohen’s d GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; 
ISB-WA= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active;Org=Organisation 
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Level of agreement at an organisational level for the ISB-WA and  GSC-CA scales 
was generally stronger for the self-report version of the scales compared to the rating 
of coworkers, with only one organisation (Org 2) showing a reversal of this trend.  
Standard deviation scores for the ISB-WA ranged from 0.43 to 0.75 while climate 
strength for the GSC-CA scale showed greater variability across organisations, 
ranging from 0.48 to 0.97.  
 
Proactive Subscales 
As illustrated in Table 7.19, for Proactive safety behaviours, individual self- ratings 
were 0.21 scale points higher than ratings made of coworkers within their teams.   
 
Table 7.19 Means, Standard Deviations and Contrast Statistics for ISB-W and 
GSC-C Proactive Subscales. 
  ISB-WP GSC-CP    
Variable N Mean SD Mean SD t M diff 95% CI d 
Org 1 72 4.09 0.80 3.81 0.82 3.61* 0.28 0.13 0.45 0.35 
Org 2  30 3.97 0.71 3.83 0.60 1.27 0.14 -0.08 0.35 0.21 
Org 3 39 3.89 0.82 3.78 0.86 1.09 0.11 -0.10 0.33 0.13 
Org 4 16 4.34 0.59 4.39 0.54 -0.38 -0.05 -0.28 0.19 0.09 
Org 5 29 4.19 0.63 3.90 0.67 2.33 0.29 0.04 0.56 0.45 
Org 6 116 4.07 0.66 3.81 0.76 3.91* 0.26 0.13 0.39 0.37 
Total  319 4.06 0.72 3.85 0.77 5.67* 0.21 0.14 0.29 0.29 
Note.  Total = Includes all valid individual cases from the front-line sample.*p<..008; CI=confidence 
interval -lower limit & upper limit: d=Cohen’s d: GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; ISB-WP= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; Org=Organisation 
 
 
Whereas this difference was also statistically significant the effect size is considered 
small.  Mean difference scores between ISB-WPORG and GSC-CPORG ranged from 
0.04 scale to 0.30.  Results for Organisation 4 went against the general trend of 
individual safety behaviours being rated more positively than coworker behaviours.  
Only two organisations showed statistically significant differences between ISB-
WPORG and GSC-CPORG scores, however these effects were small.  Level of 
agreement was generally stronger for the self-report ISB-WP scale compared to the 
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rating of coworkers GSC-CP scale (Organisations 2 and 4 showed a reversal of this 
trend.  
7.6.2. GSC-S and OSC-M Scales 
As show in Table 7.20, results for the OSC-M and GSC-S scales indicated that front-
line employees generally view their managers’ and supervisors’ commitment to 
safety in a positive light. The indicators of climate strength for the management and 
supervisor climate scales were generally consistent with the degree of variability 
observed for the group-level coworker climate scales and again showed slightly 
greater variance than that observed for either of the individual safety behaviour 
scales.  
 
For the combined sample, repeated measures comparisons showed that individual 
workers’ consistently rated their own safety behaviours higher than ratings for all 
safety climate subscales with slightly larger differences emerging for the Active 
subscale.  The above results offer some support to the proposal that systematic biases 
may be observed in the pattern of workers’ responses to safety climate measures 
based on organisational distance of the focal referent from the respondent.   
 
Table 7.20 Means and Standard Deviations for Climate scales. 
  OSC-M GSC-S GSC-CA GSC-CP  
Variable N Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD  
Org 1 72 3.86 0.73 3.86 0.80 3.84 0.97 3.81 0.82  
Org 2  30 3.50 0.70 3.75 0.63 3.84 0.61 3.83 0.60  
Org 3 39 3.73 0.68 3.65 0.79 3.74 0.84 3.78 0.86  
Org 4 16 4.45 0.49 4.23 0.88 4.48 0.48 4.39 0.54  
Org 5 29 3.75 0.69 3.75 0.81 3.82 0.60 3.90 0.67  
Org 6 116 3.78 0.86 3.73 0.86 3.74 0.83 3.81 0.76  
Total Sample  319 3.79 0.78 3.78 0.82 3.82 0.82 3.85 0.77  
Note. Total Sample= Includes valid cases from organisations not reported; OSC-M= Organisation 
Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-CA= Group Safety 
Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; Org = 
Organsiation 
 
However when comparisons between all safety climate scales were undertaken 
(rather than comparing against individual self-ratings), no statistical support was 
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found for Hypothesis 8.  That is, ratings of safety climate scales were not found to be 
significantly higher at the respondent’s work-level or diminish with increased 
organisational distance.  This overall result was not consistent across organisations 
with three of the participant companies showing significant differences between 
management safety climate and the active dimension of coworker safety climate (Org 
2, 5 & 6).  When analysed at the organisation-level only Organisation 2 produced 
significant results in the pattern proposed in Hypothesis 9.  
 
7.7. Organisation Climate Profiles and Variability 
When aggregated to the organisational level, a clearer understanding of the different 
climate profiles of each organisation may be obtained by plotting climate levels 
against climate strength. A composite profile of the four safety climate scales for 
each organisation is provided in Figure 7.10. 
 
 
Figure 7.10. Organisation profiles representing climate level and strength of safety 
climate subscales. 
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers  
 
Organisation 
Weak
er 
Stronger 
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As standard deviation scores are used to index climate strength, smaller deviation 
scores represent stronger organisational climates and relatively larger scores weaker 
climates.  Of particular interest is the unique pattern of relative climate level and 
strength observed within and between each organisation.  When considered in 
combination with CFA findings reported previously, these profiles show that 
employees distinguish between safety climate dimensions targeting specific 
organisational referents in their distinct organisational context.  The diversity of 
response patterns observed offers support for the utility of the safety climate scales as 
both a diagnostic tool. 
  
7.7.1. Group Safety Climate-Coworkers  
Results indicated that homogeneity of variance was adequate within the six 
organisations for both the active (ICC=.048) and proactive subscales (ICC=.019) of 
the GSC-C, however there was a slightly less within-group variability in the 
proactive subscale.  As shown in Figure 7.11, when the data was aggregated, 
Organisation 4 had the highest GSC-CA climate level.  Climate strength for the 
GSC-CAORG was also strongest in Organisation 4 and relatively weakest in 
Organisation 1.  The combination of level and strength for Organisation 4 represents 
a very strong, positive group safety climate in the coworker active safety practices 
dimension. Workers in Organisations 2 and 5 were also relatively consistent in their 
ratings of their coworkers’ active safety practices; however they were less positive in 
their assessments (a strong, moderately positive safety climate).   
 
The test for homogeneity of variance across organisations was significant 
F(5,296)=2.40, p=.037.  Calculation of the F max ratio (Fmax= 4.06) also indicated 
that the inequality of variances was a potential issue.  As such the one-way ANOVA 
and subsequent post hoc analyses were tested against robust Welch statistics. The 
ANOVA was statistically significant Welch  F (5, 85.48) = 5.75, p<.001, Cohen’s f = 
.20, indicating that front-line workers’ perceptions of coworkers proactive safety 
practices varied across organisations.  Post hoc analysis using Tamhane t statistic, 
showed that no significant differences in climate level were found between 
organisations 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6.  However, Organisation 4 was found to have a 
significantly higher GSC-CA climate level (M= 4.48) than the other organisations.  
 153 
 Validation 
 
 
Cohen’s d for the post hoc comparisons ranged from 0.29 to 0.39, amounting to 
small effects (Cohen 1988). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.11. Climate level and strength for active GSC-Coworkers. 
 
 
The safety climate levels for the GSC-CPORG scale ranged from 3.78 in Organisation 
3 to 4.39 for Organisation 4 (see Figure 7.12).  Climate strength for the GSC-CPORG 
was again strongest in Organisation 4 (SD=0.54) and relatively weakest in 
Organisation 3 (SD=0.86).  Testing conducted to assess the homogeneity of variance 
across groups was not significant F(5,296)=1.32, p=.255 indicating that there was no 
violation of this assumption (Fmax= 2.52). The omnibus F for the overall analysis 
was not statistically significant F(5,296)=1.80, p=.112, Cohen’s f = .17 indicating 
that front-line workers’ perceptions of coworkers’ proactive safety behaviours varied 
little across organisations.  Post hoc analyses were not conducted. 
 
Weaker Stronger 
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Figure 7.12. Climate level and strength for proactive GSC-Coworkers.  
 
7.7.2. Group Safety Climate-Supervisor 
Results indicated that homogeneity of variance for the GSC-S scale (ICC=.007) was 
relatively high within the six organisations. The safety climate levels for the GSC-
SORG scale ranged from 3.65 in Organisation 3 to 4.23 for Organisation 4 (see Figure 
7.13).  Climate strength for the GSC-SORG was strongest in Organisation 2 (SD=0.63) 
and relatively weakest in Organisation 4 (SD=0.88).  This combination of measures 
of level and strength for Organisation 4 represents a relatively weaker, positive 
organisational safety climate in the supervisor dimension, indicating greater disparity 
between the supervisor safety practices observed by employees.  In contrast, while 
front-line employees in Organisation 2 are more consistent in rating their perceptions 
of supervisory commitment, they tend to rate their immediate supervisor’s 
commitment to safety in a less positive light.     
 
The one-way between-groups ANOVA conducted to assess the differences between 
climate levels for the GSC-S across organisations was not statistically significant F 
(5,296) =1.39, p=.227, Cohen’s f = .15.  The test for homogeneity of variance across 
groups was not significant F(5,296) =1.16, p=.330; Fmax= 1.99; indicating no 
Weaker Stronger 
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violation of this assumption.  This result indicates that front-line workers’ 
perceptions of supervisor commitment to safety varied little across organisations. 
 
 
Figure 7.13. Climate level and strength for GSC-Supervisors. 
 
7.7.3. Organisational Safety Climate-Management 
Results for the OSC-M scale indicated that homogeneity of variance was also low 
within the six organisations (ICC=0.08).   Figure 7.14 illustrates that climate level for 
the OSC-MORG ranged from a low of 3.50 scale points in Organisation 2 to a high of 
4.45 in Organisation 4.  Climate strength for the OSC-MORG was also strongest in 
Organisation 4 and relatively weakest in Organisation 6. This combination of level 
and strength for Organisation 4 again represents a strong, positive organisational 
safety climate in the management dimension compared to relatively weaker, positive 
climates in the remaining organisations.   
 
The test for homogeneity of variance across organisations for the OSC-M ORG was 
not significant F (5,296) =1.69, p=.137, however calculation of the F max ratio 
indicated that a moderate problem with inequalities of variance existed (Fmax= 
3.10).  The ANOVA was statistically significant Welch F (5, 83.66) =6.51, p<.001, 
Weaker Stronger 
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Cohen’s f = .24, indicating that front-line workers’ perceptions of management 
commitment varied across organisations.   
 
 
 
Figure 7.14. Climate level and strength for OSC-Managers. 
 
Post hoc analysis using Tamhane t statistic, showed that Organisation 4 had a 
significantly higher OSC-M climate level (M= 4.45) than all other organisations.  No 
significant differences in climate level were found between organisations 1, 2, 3, 5 
and 6.  Cohen’s d for the post hoc comparisons ranged from 0.32 to 0.46, amounting 
to small to medium effects (Cohen 1988). 
 
7.7.4. Summary 
In support of Hypothesis 3, the above results show that workers rated their own 
safety behaviours in a more positive light than they rated their coworkers.  This trend 
held for both active safety practices and proactive safety subscales in the sample, 
however more robust effects (medium) were observed for active safety behaviours.  
When results for individual organisations were considered different patterns 
emerged.  For active safety practices higher and more homogenous ISB-W scores 
Weaker Stronger 
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were found consistently across organisations (only two organisations showed no 
significant difference between ratings).  In contrast, when proactive safety practices 
were examined at the organisational level, mean difference scores in only two 
organisations were significant.  Also in support of Hypothesis 3, the level of 
agreement amongst workers was shown to be stronger for both the ISB-W subscales 
than for the GSC-C subscales.   
 
With regard to Hypothesis 9, while my results did not show strong evidence of 
systematic work-level related biases in workers’ ratings of safety climate levels, 
differences in response patterns emerged when examined at the organisational level.  
In particular workers perceived coworker active safety practices to be higher in 
relation to management safety climate.  The series of tests conducted to assess 
climate variability across organisations also indicated that only workers’ ratings of 
the active dimension of coworker safety climate and management safety climate 
varied significantly across organisations supporting the collapsing of data across 
organisations in the structural modelling.    
 
7.8. Factor Structures for Aggregated Group Safety Climate  
Results for the exploratory factor analyses conducted on the group-level data are 
described in the following sections.  A total of 112 function work-groups were 
represented in the total sample, however 32 of these groups consisted of only one 
respondent.  At the expense of power in the analysis, only work-groups with more 
than one respondent per group were retained in the group-level EFA (N=80).  While 
Hofmann et.al  (2003) have recommended the retention of work units with three or 
more members for climate research 9% of teams in my sample were small work-
groups of two or three employees and 53% had less than ten members.  As previous 
studies (see Oliver et al., 2006) have used a three member criteria to conduct 
organisational level analysis the inclusion of functional work-groups with valid data 
from two group members is considered representative and methodologically sound 
given the size of identified work-groups in the sample.  
 
The average group size in the reduced data set was 3.85 (SD= 2.19) with a range 
from 2 to 11 workers per group.  To assess if the exclusion of groups with only one 
respondent would bias the results a series of independent t-test were performed on a 
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random selection of items comparing responses for the retained groups with excluded 
groups.  Results indicated no significant differences across the range of items. 
Exploratory factor analysis conducted on the aggregated items of the three social 
exchange variables reproduced the one-factor structures previously identified in the 
individual- level analysis and are therefore not reported below. 
   
To justify the aggregation of social exchange and safety climate items to the group-
level as recommended in the CSA approach, within-group homogeneity and 
between-group variance was assessed.  Intraclass correlations (ICC) and results of 
one-way analyses of variance using work-group as the independent variable and 
individual scale scores as the dependent variable are presented in Appendix F.    
Results indicated sufficiently high ICCs and between-group variability to support 
aggregation at the item level for the coworker items (M=.10, Range .02 -.27), 
supervisor items (M=.14, Range .08 -.21) and management items (M=.16, Range .07  
- .23).  ANOVA results indicated that only six items (five from the coworker item 
list) did not show statistically significant differences in aggregated responses 
between work groups.  On the basis of both ICC1 and ANOVA results all items were 
retained for the group level EFA.  
 
Exploratory factor analysis conducted on the aggregated items of the three social 
exchange variables reproduced the one-factor structures previously identified in the 
individual-level analysis and are therefore not repeated below. 
 
7.8.1. Coworker Safety Climate (AGSC-C) 
As illustrated in Table 7.21 the factor structure for the AGSC-C scale items when 
applying the CSA approach resulted in a marginally improved factor solution.  While 
fundamentally replicating the two-factor structure of the individual-level EFA, both 
the number of items failing to reach the cut off criteria and the number of complex 
variables identified were reduced using the CSA approach.  Also after initial 
aggregation of items, Communality values were high (h
2
>.50) for all items.  In total 
63.89% of variability was explained by the two-factor model.  After varimax 
rotation, Factor 1 explained 34.55% of total variance and Factor 2, 29.34%.  The 
reproduced factor matrix indicated that 31% of nonredundant residuals had a value 
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greater than 0.05. The factor transformation matrix also indicated a strong correlation 
(r= .671) between factors.   
 
Table 7.21 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
CSA Aggregated Two-Factor Model of Group Safety Climate – Coworker  
               Loadings 
Item Coworkers in my work team.... M SD F1
a
 F2
b
 h
2
 
1 Refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule 3.59 .79 .687 .256 .54 
2 Always wear protective equipment even if it is uncomfortable 3.83 .89 .818 .228 .72 
3 
Are prepared to question coworkers who are not following 
safety rules 
3.81 .71 .717 .323 .62 
4 
Monitor each other when tired or stressed to ensure no-one is 
working unsafely 
3.51 .73 .666 .449 .65 
5 Look out for each other’s personal safety 3.99 .79 .768 .399 .75 
6 Follow correct safety procedures when using equipment 3.99 .73 .723 .459 .73 
7 Co-operate with  supervisors to develop better safety practices 3.91 .68 .627 .458 .60 
8 Use their initiative to help solve safety-related problems 3.91 .71 .625 .467 .61 
9 
Get involved in the safety training programs provide by 
management 
3.95 .61 .243 .786 .68 
10 Make suggestions on how to improve job safety  3.69 .74 .439 .676 .65 
11 
Share information about safety hazards with supervisors and 
each other 
3.91 .65 .460 .774 .81 
12 Keep themselves informed about safety-related issue 4.05 .57 .284 .572 .41 
13 Discuss ideas about how to continually improve safety 3.63 .65 .321 .817 .77 
14 
Speak highly of those workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
3.33 .69 .532 .465 .50 
15 
Report all safety-related accidents and near misses as soon as 
they occur 
3.74 .73 .619 .430 .57 
16 Express opinions on safety matters even if others disagree 3.83 .69 .468 .635 .62 
 Percentage of Variance:  34.55% 29.34% 
Note . N=80 a = Active Safety Behaviours; b = Proactive Safety Behaviours 
 
The nine items loading on Factor 1 represented active safety practices associated 
with following procedures and monitoring safety compliance (AGSC-CA).  The six 
items loading strongly on Factor 2 (AGSC-CP) reflected proactive safety practices.  
Item 8, coworkers use their initiative to help solve safety-related problems (.625) 
was the only statement to shift from loading on the proactive safety factor on the 
individual EFA to the Active safety factor in the CSA factor solution.  Internal 
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consistency of the group-based subscales was again considered good (Cronbach’s 
alpha: Active =0.93, Proactive=0.91). 
 
7.8.2. Supervisors Safety Climate (AGSC-S)  
Unlike results for the individual-level factor solution, EFA of the CSA aggregated 
GSC-S items resulted in a two-factor solution.  As illustrated in Table 7.22 
communality values for the seventeen AGSC-S scale items were high for all but two 
variables.   
Table 7.22 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
CSA Aggregated Two-Factor Model of Group Safety Climate – Supervisor 
               Loadings 
Item My direct supervisor... M SD F1
b
 F2
a
 h
2
 
1 Makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the job 
safely 
4.05 .66 .562 .421 .49 
2 Checks to see if we are all obeying safety rules 3.73 .72 .668 .499 .69 
3 Discusses how to improve safety  3.69 .74 .806 .279 .73 
4 Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely 3.68 .71 .713 .563 .83 
5 Emphasises safety procedures when we are working under 
pressure 
3.67 .67 .768 .428 .77 
6 Frequently tells us about the hazards  3.63 .67 .791 .322 .73 
7 Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind 
schedule 
3.65 .79 .315 .672 .55 
8 Is strict about working safely when we are tired or stressed 3.70 .69 .275 .797 .71 
9 Reminds workers who need it to work safely 3.82 .60 .529 .519 .55 
10 Makes sure we follow all the safety rules  3.75 .73 .537 .722 .81 
11 Insists that we obey safety rules when fixing equipment or 
machines 
3.88 .60 .602 .510 .62 
12 Says a "good word" to workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
3.44 .79 .582 .564 .66 
13 Is strict about safety at the end of the shift 3.51 .72 .480 .690 .71 
14 Spends time helping us learn to see problems before they arise 3.38 .80 .400 .766 .75 
15 Frequently talks about safety issues 3.49 .78 .706 .392 .65 
16 Insists we wear our protective equipment  4.04 .59 .517 .376 .41 
17 Encourages workers to report all safety accidents and near 
misses 
4.20 .57 .583 .303 .43 
                                                     Percentage of Variance:  34.55% 29.34% 
Note .N=80 a = Active Safety Behaviours; b = Proactive Safety Behaviours 
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In total the two-factor model explained 65.24% of total variability.  After varimax 
rotation Factor 1, explained 35.75% of the total variance and Factor 2, 29.49%.  The 
reproduced factor matrix indicated that 23% of nonredundant residuals had a value 
greater than 0.05. The factor transformation matrix also indicated a strong correlation 
(r = .667) between factors.  
 
The two-factor solution resulted in eight items loading on the first factor and five 
items on the second.  Of the four remaining items, two exhibited factor loadings less 
than the .55 cut off recommended by Comrey and Lee (1992) and a further two 
complex variables loaded highly on both factors.  Factor 1(AGSC-SP) represents 
proactive supervisory practices associated with informing, guiding and providing 
workers with operational support.  Factor 2 (AGSC-SA) represents active 
supervisory practices with a focus on monitoring and controlling workers to ensure 
compliance with safety procedures.  Cronbach’s alpha values for both group-based 
subscales were again high (Active =0.92, Proactive=0.93). 
 
7.8.3. Managers Safety Climate (AOSC-M)  
In contrast to the single-factor solution found for OSC-M in the individual- level 
EFA, when principal axis factoring was conducted on the seventeen aggregated scale 
items 63.90% of total variability was explained by a two-factor model.  
Communalities were high for all variables.  Total variance explained after orthogonal 
rotation was 32.62% for Factor 1 and 31.28% for Factor 2.  The two-factor solution 
resulted in seven items loading on the first factor and nine items on the second.  As 
shown in Table 7.23, only Item 1, referring to top management’s capacity to react 
quickly to solve problems, loaded on both factors.  However several other items (6, 
10, 11, and 16) had cross loadings close to the cut off criteria.   
 
The reproduced factor matrix indicated a good fit for the model (26% of 
nonredundant residuals had a value greater than 0.05) and the factor transformation 
matrix indicated a strong correlation (R= .699) between factors.  Factor 1(AOSC-
MA) represents active management safety practices relating to controlling and 
monitoring safety standards, while Factor 2 (AOSC-MP) reflects proactive 
managerial practices associated with promoting the ongoing exchange of safety-
related information, improvement of standards and investment in employees. 
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Cronbach’s alpha for both group based management subscales were good (Active 
=0.92, Proactive=0.94). 
 
Table 7.23 Descriptive Statistics, Communalities and Factor Loadings for the 
CSA Aggregated Two-Factor Model of Organisational Safety Climate-Managers  
               Loadings 
Item Top management in this department/site... M SD F1
a
 F2
b
 h
2
 
1 React quickly to solve the problem  3.80 .71 .574 .558 .64 
2 Insist on thorough and regular safety audits  3.84 .70 .487 .623 .63 
3 Continually improves safety levels  3.96 .67 .428 .711 .69 
4 Provide all the equipment needed  3.89 .76 .651 .333 .53 
5 
Are strict about working safely when work falls behind 
schedule 
3.56 .79 .841 .347 .83 
6 Quickly correct any safety hazards (even if it's costly) 3.483 .72 .680 .549 .77 
7 Provide detailed safety reports to workers  4.10 .59 .196 .763 .62 
8 Consider a person's safety behaviour when promoting  3.25 .76 .619 .293 .47 
9 
Require each manager to help improve safety in their 
department 
3.82 .66 .608 .336 .48 
10 Invest a lot of time and money in safety training 3.57 .84 .543 .575 .63 
11 
Use any available information to improve existing safety 
rules 
3.81 .66 .525 .686 .75 
12 Listen carefully to workers’ ideas about improving safety 3.52 .76 .714 .401 .67 
13 Consider safety when setting production speed and schedules 3.51 .75 .747 .365 .69 
14 Provide workers with a lot of information on safety issues 3.94 .70 .434 .768 .78 
15 Regularly hold safety-awareness events  3.52 .81 .366 .631 .53 
16 Give safety personnel the power they need to do their job  3.73 .66 .525 .571 .60 
17 
Emphasize the importance of reporting all safety accidents 
and near misses 
4.24 .60 .417 .624 .56 
                                                         Percentage of Variance:  32.62% 31.28% 
Note . N=80; a = Active Safety Behaviours; b = Proactive Safety Behaviours 
 
7.8.4. Summary 
Results of exploratory factor analysis of the CSA derived group-level data failed to 
support a three-factor structure for either the management or supervisor level safety 
climate scales as had been found in previous studies using individual- level data (see 
Johnson, 2007; Zohar & Luria, 2005).  As the two-factor solutions representing 
active and proactive safety practices for all three aggregated safety climate scales 
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exhibited some complex loadings, enforced three-factor solutions were conducted; 
however this specification resulted in a substantially higher number of complex 
variables in the rotated solutions and was therefore rejected.   
 
The two-factor solution for management safety climate also corresponds to the factor 
solution obtained in the leader sample.  Consequently, whereas the treatment of the 
Supervisor and Management safety climate scales as one-dimensional constructs is 
defensible when conducting individual-level analysis, the CSA approach appears 
more appropriate for the factor analysis and modelling of climate related constructs 
at the group-level.  
 
7.9. Discussion 
The overall aim of my thesis is to investigate how the relationship between climate 
for social exchange and employee perceptions of management, supervisor and work-
group safety climate, influences individual employees’ compliance and proactive 
safety behaviours and incident/injury rates.  The first step in the achievement of this 
goal was the validation of measures to be used in individual-level predictive models.  
The focus of this discussion section is therefore to highlight key points of interest 
that emerged in the validation process. As a starting point, I will first discuss results 
pertaining to individual workers’ safety performance and coworker safety climate.  
Attention will then shift to the interpretation of results for the validation of the two 
established supervisor and management safety climate scales and the derived social 
exchange scales.  The discriminant validity of safety climate and social exchange 
scales will be evaluated.  My results for the scale validations will be discussed in 
relation to the extant literature and implications for the research domain provided.   
 
7.9.1. Individual Safety Performance and Coworker Safety Climate 
An important objective in my thesis was the operationalisation of a multilevel safety 
climate construct that expanded upon Zohar’s Organisational Safety Climate Scale 
(Zohar, 2003) using a level-of -analysis approach to incorporate the active and 
proactive safety practices of coworkers’ at the group-level.  The decision to base the 
coworker safety climate items on Hofmann et al.’s (2003) measure of compliance 
and participative workers’ safety behaviours and Zohar and Luria’s (2005) safety 
climate scales appears justified, with results of the individual-level exploratory and 
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confirmatory factor analyses supporting the proposed two-factor structure of active 
and proactive safety practices for both the individual and coworker referent scales.  
This conceptualisation of coworker group safety climate is consistent with Jiang et 
al.’s  (2010) operationalisation of perceived colleagues’ safety knowledge and 
behaviour,  however the expanded two dimensions of the GSC-C scale provides a 
broader item representation of the safety-specific construct domain. 
 
In the process of scale development particular care was taken to ensure that items 
represented safety-specific behaviours rather than supportive or internal group 
process indicators.  My review of recent meta-analyses (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; 
Christian et al., 2009; Nahrgang et al., 2011) highlighted potential problems with 
how coworker generic and safety behaviours are often clumped together or used 
interchangeably with little regard for the specificity of item content.  This concern 
reflects back to the previously described lack of distinctions drawn between 
foundation and facet-specific climates. As such, I argue that this operationalisation of 
coworker dimension of safety climate improves upon protocols and measures 
previously utilised in the literature. 
 
Items in both the individual and coworker scales generally loaded cleanly on the two 
factors (active compliance safety factors and proactive safety practices) and 
similarities in complex loading patterns and poor communalities for some items in 
the exploratory factor analysis were apparent across both scales.  The decision to 
drop items to improve construct discriminant validity resulted in both full scales 
being reduced to12 items.  Both revised scales exhibit strong psychometric 
properties, having excellent internal consistency and both face and discriminant 
validity. 
 
The active dimension of the two worker level scales incorporates typically “within 
job role” safety expectancies while the proactive dimension incorporates “beyond job 
role” or safety citizenship expectancies (Hofmann et al., 2003).  However, as the 
focus of safety within an organisation shifts from an emphasis on basic compliance 
towards prioritising personal ownership of safety as a generic value across all levels 
of the organisation, proactive behaviours previously considered discretionary are 
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more likely to be deemed nondiscretionary.  This organisation transition may in part 
account for some of the cross-loading variables encountered in my study.  
 
Furthermore, in differentiating between the psychometric properties of the active and 
proactive subscales, it appears that the potential for item and scale-level ceiling 
effects are more likely to impact on individual ratings of active safety behaviours.  
Support for this is seen in higher mean scores and reduced variability for the 
individual self-report active items and subscale than for the proactive items and 
subscale. As ratings for specific indicators, tapping nondiscretionary role 
expectations, approach the maximum scale limits, reduced response variability may 
compromise item utility in factor analysis and as individual predictors in explanatory 
models (Little et al., 1999). 
 
While not considered problematic in my study due to the combining of data from a 
range of organisations, several of the active items in the individual safety 
performance scale were very high in several participant organisations.  While 
dropping such items may be justifiable on statistical grounds, their exclusion could 
potentially compromise the face validity of the scale in practical applications.  For 
example when providing organisations with diagnostic feedback based on safety 
climate profiles, such items generally represent expected minimal safety standards.  
As a baseline for safety behavioural audits and feedback the inclusion of such 
measures therefore enhances the credibility of the individual active safety 
performance scale.   
 
Confirmatory factor analyses also supported the correlated two-factor solutions 
proposed in Hypothesis 1 and 2 for both the individual safety behaviours scale and 
coworker safety climate.  While the importance of distinguishing between role 
specified safety compliance behaviours (active) and participative safety citizenship 
behaviours (proactive) in measures of individual safety performance has been well 
established (S. Clarke, 2006),  my results add to the extant literature in transferring 
this practical distinction to coworker practices.   By modifying the referent applied, I 
have shown that scale items can be used to meaningfully assess both the focal 
individuals’ rating of coworker commitment to safety (GSC-C) and self-report 
ratings of the focal individuals’ safety behaviour (ISB-W).   
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In support of Hypothesis 3 a scale-based confirmatory factor analysis indicated that 
while a strong positive correlation between the two scales was evident, front-line 
workers clearly differentiate between the coworker safety climate and their own 
safety  behaviour.  In particular, the clear trend for individual workers to rate their 
own safety behaviours in a more positive light than their fellow coworkers is 
consistent with self-serving biases typically observed in attribution theory research 
(Bradley, 1978; DeJoy et al., 2004).  As stated in my rationale, the consistency of 
this trend may be largely due to workers attributing their own good safety 
performance to controllable, stable, internal causal factors; while at the same time 
attributing any safety deviance or violations to less stable, uncontrollable, external 
factors, thereby creating a positively biased personal safety schema.  In contrast, 
when rating their colleagues, workers would be more likely to attribute observations 
of both compliant and aberrant safety practices of their various coworkers to 
dispositional characteristics (Ross, 1977), resulting in a more diffused assessment of 
overall safety performance and subsequently greater response variability in 
coworkers ratings. 
 
As shown in my results the level of agreement observed between workers when 
assessing their own behaviours exceeded the level of agreement between workers in 
assessing coworkers’ behaviours.  That is, the strength of coworker safety climate for 
the overall sample and at the organisational level was weaker than the variability 
observed for individual safety performance.  Furthermore this trend towards lower 
ratings with greater response variability was also observed across the remaining 
management and supervisor safety climate dimensions.   
 
Previously, Pousette et al. (2008) observed higher levels of consensus for safety 
climate constructs than personal attitude variables. They compared ICCs for 
individual attitude scales with supervisor and manager safety climate measured at the 
departmental level in 12 natural social units across four companies. In contrast, my 
results compared standard deviation scores for individual safety performance and for 
coworker, supervisor and management-level safety climate aggregated to the 
organisational level and in the overall sample.  Whereas the use of different climate 
strength indices may have contributed to the differences in results, I believe that 
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interpreting the apparent differences between individual and climate-based constructs 
is enhanced by using an attribution theory perspective. 
   
Again the greater degree of variability in the coworker scale compared to individual 
worker items and scales may be explained by the reduced influence of socially 
desirable responses when rating coworkers.  That is, individual workers are likely to 
rate their own safety performance in a more positive light and in a more consistent 
manner across the range of items than their coworkers’ behaviour.  As safety is 
generally considered a socially desirable attribute in organisations it is not surprising 
that the majority of workers would likely believe and report that they personally do 
the right thing but are willing to admit that their coworkers are not as vigilant 
towards safety.  Given the greater potential for positive bias in individual 
performance scores, I would argue that a more accurate picture of workers’ group-
level safety performance may be gauged from the ratings of coworker actions than 
aggregated personal performance scores.    
 
An additional reason for the difference in response patterns between the individual 
behaviour scale and coworker safety climate may be associated with the use of a 
group referent.  The issue of what constitutes an accurate referent in group-level 
analysis is a complex issue.  Whereas a referent shift from I to coworkers in my team 
appears relatively straight forward, it is difficult to determine exactly who and what 
behaviours workers are including in their assessment of the team.  In this instance the 
three information cues in Kelley’s (1973) covariation model of causal attributions 
(consensus, consistency and distinctiveness) provide a guide for comparative 
purposes.  For example, compared to when respondents are asked to rate themselves, 
there is a far greater diversity of focal targets when using a group referent (i.e., which 
workers are included in the subjective assessment or how many workers perform this 
particular way) which broadly aligns with Kelley’s consensus cue.  Second, with the 
group referent there are larger margins for response inconsistency across time (i.e., 
have identified coworkers acted safely all the time, most of the time or only 
occasionally). And third, in terms of distinctiveness the group referent gives greater 
scope for divergence of safety activity across the task domain (i.e., do selected 
coworkers perform safely on some tasks but not others).  
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The potential reasons for who or why team members are included or excluded are far 
ranging and may include in-group/ out- group distinctions, group size, and work area 
or functional proximity.  As the size of work-groups increases the likelihood of 
workers perceiving greater diversity in their coworkers’ safety behaviours would 
influence the heuristic used to judge group-based responses, which would 
subsequently result in increased response variability.  As such, while obtaining 
measures of coworker safety practices may benefit from reduced incidence of 
responses bias due to social desirability, the measure may be subject to reduced 
reliability linked to greater subjective selection of who is included in the group 
referent.  However, the use of consensus informational cues are also likely to result 
in the diffusion of small numbers of extremely positive or deviant cases in the work-
group (eliminating perceptual outliers), potentially providing a more balanced 
perspective of the group safety norm.   
 
Therefore, in addition to its primary role in expanding existing safety climate 
inventories to include the group safety practices of front-line workers, the 
development of the coworker safety climate scale may provide an alternative and 
more effective measure of worker safety performance.  My results indicate that both 
the active and proactive coworker subscales are likely to provide valid assessments 
of workplace safety practices that are less susceptible to self-report bias than 
individual safety performance scales.  This trend has implications for researchers in 
that the use of coworker information may reduce the potential for ceiling effects in 
survey data and show increased response variability for predictive models.  In 
practical terms the use of a team member referent in the coworker safety climate 
scale offers practitioners the scope to obtain group-based safety performance norms 
from the workers’ perspective which can be meaningfully compared against the 
perceptions of team leaders and managers as illustrated in Figure 6.1.  Such 
triangulation would provide a more accurate representation of group safety norms 
and offers the scope to investigate perceptual difference in climate perceptions as a 
focal construct in its own right.   
 
When the coworker scale was reassessed using the CSA approach to aggregation an 
equivalent two-factor structure was achieved. However the shift to group-level data 
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resulted in less complex variables in the solution, which in turn led to more items 
being retained in the scales.  In sum, the development of this scale constitutes one of 
the major contributions of this study to the existing field of knowledge, as it provides 
an instrument that comprehensively covers an expanded content domain with scope 
for multiple applications. 
 
7.9.2. Supervisor and Management Safety Climate 
The use of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) measures of supervisor and management 
commitment to safety as part of my operationalisation of a work-level safety climate 
construct, offered the opportunity to ground my thesis within some of the most well 
established safety climate research.  Hypothesis 4 and 5 proposed that the factor 
structures of the organisation- level management safety climate scale and group-level 
supervisor safety climate scale would both be best represented by one factor 
structures when tested against imposed two & three factor models. In support of 
Hypothesis four and five, when factor structures were examined using individual- 
level data a one-factor solution was found for both the OSC-M and GSC-S scales.  
While my validation results failed to support the three-factor structure solutions for 
both safety climate scales previously found by Zohar and Luria (2005) or for 
supervisor-level safety climate identified by Johnson (2007), the incongruence of 
findings may be in some degree linked to sample composition and in the case of 
Johnson’s findings to methodological differences.  However, as both of these 
previous studies identified strong correlations between factors it is plausible to 
conclude that a one-factor solution may offer a more accurate representation of the 
two leadership-level safety climate constructs. 
 
The identification of one-factor solutions for both the OSC-M and GSC-S scales in 
my sample indicates that workers do not clearly distinguish between the various 
types of management and supervisor safety practices, but may use a general heuristic 
for gauging their leaders’ overall commitment to safety.  This finding offers some 
support for the idea that greater organisational distance between focal targets 
(leaders) and workers would influence the respondents’ capacity to differentiate 
between active and proactive safety practices represented at that work-level. Given 
the more proximal relationship between supervisors and workers, if organisational 
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distance was playing a strong role in perceptual differentiation of content domains, it 
would be more likely that a two-factor solution would have emerged in the 
supervisor safety climate scale than in the management scale.  However, in terms of 
both factor structure and climate level there is no evidence to support my hypothesis 
that workers will show greater capacity to distinguish between active and proactive 
safety practices in the more proximal group-level supervisor safety climate index or 
rate supervisors in a more positive light than managers. 
 
An alternate argument that may be forwarded to support workers use of a general 
heuristics when they are asked to rate organisational level constructs such as 
management commitment to safety or the quality of social exchanges with 
management, is the typical application of generic referents such as management or 
the organisation in these types of scale.  Such nonspecific referents would potentially 
increase both the range of agents available to respondents when using consensus cues 
and the range of relevant safety practices considered when using distinctiveness cues 
during informational processing.   
 
To reduce the potential for focal target ambiguity, Flin (2003) recommended that the 
pertinent levels of management being investigated are clarified when undertaking 
safety climate studies.  Zohar (2010) has also recognised the need to ensure item 
content in safety climate scales is work-level specific and not bundled together ad 
hoc.  It could therefore be argued that in reducing the potential for target agent 
ambiguity and increasing item specificity, the need for respondents to apply broader 
ranging generic heuristics in their perceptual decision making would also be 
minimised.  Therefore, in line with Flin and Zohar’s recommendations, during the 
development of my questionnaire, I ensured that the management and supervisor 
referents were clearly specified, that terms to describe supervisors and managers 
were consistent with use in each sampled organisation, and that item content was 
relevant to the work-level of interest.  
 
For example, the inclusion of extra items relating to the reporting of safety incidents 
in both the OSC-M and GSC-S were intended to be work-level specific.  That is, in 
the coworker safety climate scale this item focused on procedural compliance or 
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performance of the task (Coworkers report all safety-related accidents and near 
misses as soon as they occur); for supervisors the focus was placed on supporting 
procedures and task performance  (My direct supervisor encourages workers to 
report all safety accidents and near misses): and at the Management level the focus 
was on raising awareness of the importance of procedure  (Top management at this 
site emphasize the importance of reporting all safety accidents and near misses). 
 
In particular, attention was paid to ensuring the specific leadership referents applied 
were relevant in terms of the common usage of leadership positions in each 
participant organisation (e.g., supervisor = team leader, shift boss, process line 
manager); consistent across organisations in terms of the internal hierarchical 
structures; and finally, specific in terms the leader’s relationship to the respondent 
rather than generic. For example, workers were asked about their direct supervisor or 
top managers rather than supervisors or managers in general across the organisation.  
Also top level managers in a facility/department/site were the highest level of 
management in large or multinational participant companies, thereby excluding 
executive and board level management from this study.  Although verbal feedback 
from participant organisations indicated that workers clearly understood who they 
were meant to be rating, it is difficult to determine if the use of specific referents in 
the questionnaire led to any improvement in response outcomes and I cannot 
discount that their use may have in some way contributed to the different factor 
structures found in my results. 
 
When the scales were reanalysed using the CSA approach for group-level data, two-
factor solutions representing active and proactive safety practices were found for 
both the manager and supervisor safety climate. This result indicates that when the 
nonindependence of data within organisations is recognised, and within-group 
variability is reduced by collapsing data prior to the evaluation of factor structures, 
different structural pattern may emerge.  The identification of group-defined safety 
climate subscales provides the opportunity to track the differential relationship 
between active and proactive managerial and supervisory practices with safety 
outcomes including compliance and participatory safety behaviours in multilevel 
analysis.  This opportunity was not afforded in ILSA approach using scales structures 
derived using individual-level data.  
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To summarise, my overall results indicate that while the treatment of the supervisor 
and management safety climate measures as one-dimensional constructs may be 
appropriate when conducting individual-level analysis with workers, scales derived 
using this simple structure may not be applicable when conducting group-level 
analysis.  Furthermore, as the CSA approach to data aggregation has been proposed 
as the correct methodology to use when dealing with climate-based composite 
models, the two-factor solutions identified for all three safety climate scales arguably 
provide the most accurate representation of the construct structures. 
 
7.9.3. Climate for Social Exchange and Safety Construct Distinction 
A further objective of my study was to investigate how the quality social exchanges 
within organisations influence employees’ perceptions of safety climate and their 
safety behaviours. Hypothesis 6 and 7 tested the first step in this process by setting 
out to determine if front-line workers could discriminate between safety climate and 
social exchange constructs when tested as both first-order and higher order 
structures. 
 
In line with the approach taken by Wallace, et al., (2006) and recommendations 
provided by Zohar (2010) my intention was to operationalise a work-level foundation 
climate for social exchange by aligning three social exchange indicators with the 
stratified dimensions of safety climate.  To appropriately reflect the emergent 
properties of collective climate constructs (Chan, 1998; Glick, 1985),  a referent shift 
composition model was applied for the social exchange scales requiring a shift of 
focus in each of the social exchange scales to the group-level referent rather than on 
individual-level direct, dyadic exchanges (Molm, 1994) as is more typically used.  
Overall my results support the construct distinction between safety climate and 
climate for social exchange measures within each organisational level proposed in 
Hypothesis 7 a, b and c.  It appears that a worker’s ability to discriminate between 
safety-related practices and more general social exchange practices is stronger when 
rating the activities of proximal organisational agents and reduces as the 
organisational distance between agents increases. 
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7.9.3.1. Group-Member Social Exchange 
The development of a work-group focused social exchange scale constitutes one of 
the key contributions of this thesis.  As the scale is broadly based on Seer, et.al’s 
(1995) Team-member exchange, Hypothesis 6 proposed that exploratory factor 
analysis of the scale would produce a one-factor  structure. My results supported this 
hypothesis and the new scale was found to have good internal consistency.  Results 
for the item level CFA determined that workers could clearly distinguish between 
coworkers’ active and proactive safety practices and the quality of social exchanges 
occurring amongst team members supporting Hypothesis 7c. Correlations between 
the active and proactive co-worker safety climate subscales were found to be 
stronger than correlations found between either active and proactive co-workers 
safety climate and group member social exchange, supporting Hypothesis 7d .  As a 
potential antecedent of safety climate, my results identified strong correlations 
between the social exchange and coworker safety climate indicators.  However the 
magnitude of correlations did not indicate that multicollinearity would emerge as a 
problem in predictive models. 
 
While no safety-related studies have included these constructs as separate entities 
within their predictive models, the recognition of the discriminant validity of 
coworker safety climate and social exchange draws attention to the importance of 
treating team process and safety climate variables as separate entities given the 
integrated nature of the constructs. This issue reflects the same concerns expressed 
by Zohar and Luria (2005) regarding the distinction between leadership and safety 
climate.  While past studies and meta-analyses have tended to merge internal group 
process and coworker safety practices within an overarching domain of coworker 
social support for safety (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009; Nahrgang 
et al., 2011) this practice overlooks the potential value to be gained from separating 
the various elements of workplace safety context.    
 
7.9.3.2. Leader-Member Exchange 
In support of Hypothesis 6  my scale validation produced results consistent with past 
studies in finding that LMX was best represented as a one-factor structure with good 
psychometric properties (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Hofmann et al., 2003). The 
inclusion of an extra item assessing a leader’s consideration for the welfare of team 
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members did not compromise the factor structure or internal consistency of the scale.  
Again, in accordance with Zohar and Luria (2005) recognition of the need to 
establish the discriminant validity of safety climate and leadership style inventories, 
results from both item and scale-level confirmatory factor analyses established that 
workers distinguished  between the two supervisor work-level constructs, by basing 
leadership perceptions on relationship referents and climate perceptions on 
commitment referents, supporting Hypothesis 7c.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
correlation between supervisor social exchange and safety climate indicates that 
workers find it harder to discriminate between the constructs, potentially using a 
more general heuristic to this more distal organisational agent than for coworkers. 
 
7.9.3.3. Manager-Member Exchange 
The examination of a social exchange construct at a management/ organisational 
level in safety climate research has previously been undertaken using measures or 
derivations of Perceived Organisational Support (POS) (Eisenberger et al., 1986; 
Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999).  However issues with regard to double barrelled items 
and the use of a potentially ambiguous organisation referent led me to derive the 
Manager-Member exchange scale to provide a more content and referent-specific 
measure of social exchange at this higher organisational work-level.   
 
Given the simple dimensionality previously found for the POS and LMX scales used 
as a basis for my operationalisation of the MMX, Hypothesis 6 proposed that the 
MMX would be best represented by a one-factor  structure.  My results supported 
this hypothesis and further indicated that the psychometric properties of the MMX 
were sound and commensurate with existing POS measures. Again results for both 
item and scale confirmatory factor analyses supported the discriminant validity of the 
social exchange and safety climate scales at the management level; supporting 
Hypothesis 7a. 
 
However, as proposed in Hypothesis 7 e, the exceedingly high correlation between 
manager-member exchange and management-level safety climate and the relatively 
good fit of the one-factor model indicate that the distinction between constructs is far 
less definitive.  It appears that when workers appraise the more distal practices of 
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managers the positive or negative heuristic used may be far more generalised, 
leading to less variance across their ratings of items.  
 
In sum the validation of the three social exchange scales showed that all scales had a 
unidimensional structure.  Furthermore, it appears that the use of more specific 
referents in the MMX scale and a referent shift to the group in the LMX did not 
compromise the psychometric properties of these scales.  These changes facilitate the 
treatment of all three social exchange constructs as dimensions of a foundation 
climate for social exchange rather than as individual-level measures of dyadic social 
exchanges.  The inclusion of items relating to target organisational agents’ concern 
for the general welfare of employees showed strong correlations with other social 
exchange items in all three scales and did not compromise the discriminant validity 
of the social exchange and safety climate scales. 
 
Hypothesis 7e proposed that correlations between safety climate and social exchange 
constructs within hierarchical levels (i.e. organisation and group levels) would be 
stronger than those observed within construct domains (i.e. safety climate and 
climate for social exchange). In terms of scale level confirmatory assessment of 
factor structures, the content domain model representing separate global climates for 
safety and social exchange was not supported.  The alternate proposal for a two-
factor, work-level model separating organisation-level, management practices from 
the work-group practices of supervisor and coworkers was not supported.  Instead the 
fully stratified three-factor model, based on the separation of constructs into the three 
hierarchical work-levels represented in the study provided the best fit.  Stronger 
correlations were observed between management and supervisor work-levels in the 
three-level model than between the group-level scales.  One possible reason for this 
result is the greater degree of specificity in the management-level referent used in the 
scale.  By restricting the management referent to the site/department level, rather 
than to more distal, top level management at a head office or executive level in the 
multinational companies involved in this study, the relationship between managers 
and supervisors was likely to be less diffused.  That is, workers appear to be more 
likely to view their direct supervisor as a part of the overall management team rather 
than as a member of their functional work team. 
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Finally, the greater degree of convergence between management and supervisor 
social exchange and safety climate has both theoretical implications for the 
modelling of predictive relationships in this thesis and in future research.  The 
investigation of any explanatory model of safety climate that includes the influence 
of social exchange variables as a foundation climate requires the establishment of 
discriminant validity between safety climate and social exchange constructs 
operating at different work-levels within the organisation and the testing of temporal 
precedence in future studies.  The close associations observed between management-
level social exchange and safety climate may create collinearity problems.  
Furthermore, my results indicate a stronger correspondence of workers’ perceptions 
within hierarchical levels of the organisation rather than within construct domains.  
The finding that employees can distinguish between safety climate and social 
exchange variables for specific organisational referents, offers support for the use of 
first-order safety climate and social exchange variables in predictive models. 
 
7.9.4. Organisation Safety Climate Profiles  
A further aim of my research was to present one format option for reporting 
organisational safety climate profiles based on climate level, strength and variability.  
The heterogeneous nature of my sample population provides scope to investigate the 
capacity of the safety climate measure to discern both work-level and organisational 
differences. As indicated in Nahrgang et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis, patterns of 
associations between safety-related constructs can vary considerably across industry 
settings.  The variability in safety climate constructs amongst organisations 
represented in my results provides evidence for situational specificity (Clarke, 2006).  
However when taking into consideration the aggregation statistics produced at both 
the organisation (i.e., the for organisation profiles) and group-level (i.e., for the CSA 
item EFA) it appears that the group is the most appropriate level of aggregation for 
all climate scales including management-level constructs.        
 
Hypothesis 8 proposed that front-line workers would differentiate between measures 
of management, supervisor and coworker safety climate such that:(a) average scores 
(climate level) would be highest for ratings at the respondents’ work-level and 
diminish with increased organisational distance; and (b) the level of agreement 
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would be strongest for scales targeting the respondents’ own work-level (climate 
strength).  When evaluating the overall climate levels based on front-line worker 
responses and the separate organisational safety climate profiles, it was apparent that 
self-other biases were more obvious in workers’ ratings of managers and supervisors 
commitment to safety compared to ratings of coworker commitment.  A process of 
biased attributions potentially contributed to workers providing relatively higher 
ratings of coworker climate measures than for more distal supervisor and managers 
offering partial support for Hypothesis 8. Partial support was also found for the 
proposal that less response variability would be found when workers complete rating 
scales within their own work-level than when they rate the safety behaviours of more 
distal organisational agents. 
 
7.9.5. Summary 
In terms of the theoretical framework of this thesis and broader literature, the 
inclusion of safety-specific content organised around the practices of agents 
traversing the organisational hierarchy, acknowledges both the multidimensional and 
multilevel nature of safety climate.  The utilisation of domain-aligned safety content 
(e.g., communication, rule compliance, monitoring and training), with more clearly 
defined referents, answers Zohar’s (2010) call for the adoption of a level -of -
analysis approach in safety climate research.  Such an approach offers opportunities 
for researchers and safety practitioners to track areas of strength and weakness in the 
chain of safety activity; identify incongruent practices across work-levels; and 
identify core tensions in safety priorities between organisational agents. Finally, by 
adopting a multilevel approach to climate research, I was able to describe the 
organisational-level safety climate of  participant companies not only in  terms of the 
orientation (level) of safety climate, as has been done in the majority of safety 
studies, but also in terms of the within and between-group  patterns of variability 
(Dragoni, 2005) which have attracted far less attention from researchers.
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8. Explanatory Models- Global Safety Climate  
8.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I report the results for Hypothesis 10 and 11 examining the link 
between a global operationalisation of safety climate and individual safety outcomes. 
A series of structural models are tested to investigate the relationship between global 
safety climate (a latent variable with work-level dimensions of safety climate as 
indicators), individual safety performance (a latent variable with both active and 
proactive safety behaviours as indicators) and individual safety outcomes (a latent 
variable with injuries and near miss incidents as indicators). 
 
Section 8.2 reports results for the first stage of group-level model testing using the 
ILSA approach to aggregation.  As the ILSA approach simply requires the 
aggregation of scales based on individual- level factor structures, all variables in the 
hypothesised models will be identical in structure to those used for individual- level 
analysis (reported in Appendix E) but will potentially vary in magnitude and 
variability.  This protocol has been the approach typically taken in organisational 
safety climate studies using group-level methodologies.  Results for this series of 
analysis will be interpreted against the relatively few empirical studies that have 
investigated group-level associations. Section 8.3 reports results for the second stage 
of group-level model replication based on the CSA approach.  This alternative 
aggregation approach is undertaken to investigate if concerns raised regarding the 
lack of rigour in multilevel data treatment are warranted.  For reference and 
comparative purposes Appendix E reports results for individual-level data modelling, 
reproducing the operationalising of psychological safety climate as a global 
construct, as has been most frequently been reported in the literature. 
 
8.2. Model Specification 
Hypothesis 10 proposed that the influence of global safety climate on self-reported 
safety outcomes will operate through the individual safety behaviours of workers.  
Figure 8.1 depicts the hypothesised mediation model.  Two alternative models are 
also tested: the full model, specifying both direct and indirect effects between safety 
climate and safety outcomes (Figure 8.2); and the direct model in which safety 
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climate is hypothesised to directly influence both individual safety behaviours and 
injuries and incidents (Figure 8.3).   
Global Safety 
Climate
Individual 
Safety 
Behaviour
Individual  
Safety 
Outcome
NMI
e
OSC-Me
GSC-Se
GSC-CAe
GSC-CPe
ISB-A
e
ISB-P
e
Injuries
e
 
Figure 8.1. Mediation model of the predictive relationship between global safety 
climate, individual safety behaviours and safety outcomes.   
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; ISB-A= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-P= Individual Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Proactive; NMI= Near Miss Incidents 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Full model of the predictive relationship between global safety 
climate, individual safety behaviours and safety outcomes.   
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; ISB-A= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-P= Individual Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Proactive; NMI= Near Miss Incidents 
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Figure 8.3. Direct model of the predictive relationship between global safety 
climate, individual safety behaviours and safety outcomes.   
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; ISB-A= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-P= Individual Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Proactive; NMI= Near Miss Incidents 
 
In all the SEM analyses, maximum likelihood estimation was applied and the 
hypothesised models were compared for fit against the theoretical model for the null 
hypothesis (Sobel & Bohrnstedt, 1985).  To comply with recommendations regarding 
the evaluation of nested models (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980; Hair et al., 2006; Kline, 
2005) multiple fit indices were used. 
 
8.3. ILSA Group-level Analysis 
Using the individual-level factor structures identified through the original EFA 
analysis reported in Chapter 7, group-level variables where derived by aggregating 
scales across functional work-groups.  To justify the aggregation of climate and 
individual safety behaviour scales to the group-level within-group homogeneity and 
between-group variance was assessed.  Intraclass correlations (ICC) were calculated 
to assess within group homogeneity. A one-way analysis of variance using work-
group as the independent variable and individual scale scores as the dependent 
variable were conducted to test between-group variance. The results are presented in 
Table 8.1.   Results indicated sufficiently high within group homogeneity and 
between-groups’ variability to support group-level aggregation for all scales. 
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Table 8.1 Intra Class Correlations and ANOVA for Safety Climate, Social 
Exchange and Safety Behaviours for ILAS Aggregated Work-groups 
  
Scale ICC Work-group ANOVA 
OSC-M .263 F(79,225)=2.40 ,p=.001 
GSC-S .209 F(79,223)=1.96 ,p=.001 
GSC-CA .183 F(79,218)=1.89 ,p=.001 
GSC-CP .129 F(79,218)=1.55 ,p=.007 
ISB-WA .167 F(79,221)=1.81 ,p=.001 
ISB-WP .122 F(79,221)=1.52 ,p=.010 
MMX .204 F(79,225)=1.95 ,p=.001 
LMX .212 F(79,223)=2.03 ,p=.001 
GMX .089 F(79,218)=1.45 ,p=.019 
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; ISB-WA= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-WP= Individual Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member 
Exchange; GMX=Group Member Exchange. 
 
Inspection of the injury and near miss data identified three groups with unusually 
high combined scores.  These groups were removed from the analysis. A total of 77 
function work-groups with two or more respondents were retained for the SEM 
analyses.  Table 8.2 shows the descriptive statistics and zero order correlations for 
the safety climate scales, safety behaviours and both injury and incident statistics 
aggregated to work-groups.  Bivariate correlations amongst the safety climate 
dimensions ranged from .53 to.76 (compared to a range of .49 to .70 found for the 
individual- level analysis).  As previously observed, the highest correlation was 
between the AGSC- Coworker active and proactive subscales.  Correlations 
exceeding .7 were also observed between AOSC-M and both supervisor and 
coworker-proactive safety climate dimensions.  
 
Statistically significant negative correlations were also found between the safety 
climate and the majority of safety outcome data.  While the correlations between 
individual safety behaviours and both injury and incident outcomes are stronger than 
those observed for the individual-level data set, nonsignificant correlations were 
again found for group injuries.  These weaker bivariate relationships were found 
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between injuries and AGSC-S and both the aggregate group safety behaviour scales 
(the small sample size is likely to have contributed to the nonsignificance of these 
weaker correlations).  A strong positive correlation (.56) was also observed between 
self-reported injury and incident rates.     
 
Table 8.2 Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-Order Correlations for Safety 
Climate and Safety Outcomes for ILAS Aggregated Work-groups  
Variable Mean SD Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 AOSC-M 3.75 0.56 17        
2 AGSC-S 3.76 0.54 17 .71**       
3 AGSC-CA 3.82 0.59 6 .55** .53**      
4 AGSC-CP 3.82 0.52 6 .72** .62** .76**     
5 AGSB-WA 4.14 0.47 12 .47** .55** .75** .63**    
6 AGSB-WP 4.02 0.48 12 .62** .63** .62** .73** .72**   
7 ALogINJ 0.25 0.28  -.35** -.19 -.25* -.33** -.20  -.16  
8 ALogINC 0.29 0.38  -.39** -.31** -.37** -.34** -.42** -.38** .56** 
Note: AOSC-M= Aggregated Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; AGSC-S=Aggregated Group 
Safety Climate-Supervisors; AGSC-CA= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; 
AGSC-CP= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; AISB-WA= Aggregated 
Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; AISB-WP= Aggregated Individual Safety Behaviours- 
Workers Proactive; ALogINJ = Aggregation of Logarithmically transformed Injuries; ALogINC = 
Aggregation of Logarithmically transformed Near Miss Incidents;  N=77; *p<.05, **p<.01  
 
In an initial SEM run inspection of modification indices indicated that the addition of 
error covariances between the safety climate variables and also between AGSCCA 
and GSBWA would substantially improve fit.  All models were therefore rerun with 
the error covariance between AOSC-M and AGSC-S, AGSC-CA and AGSC-CP, and 
AGSC-CA and GSBWA freed.  The independence and full models provided 
inadequate fit to the data.  Fit indices for the full model with freed error covariance 
indicated that this model provided a good fit.  The mediation and equivalent direct 
path models provided an equally good fit, with neither model showing substantial 
improvement over the full model.  Model fit statistics and results of the chi-square 
difference tests undertaken are displayed in Table 8.3.  
 
With fit equivalent across models attention is turned to the structural coefficients for 
the SEM, as reported in Table 8.4 to determine the most parsimonious model.  
Examination of the structural equations showed that the pathway between aggregated 
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global safety climate and group safety behaviours was statistically significant in all 
models indicating that aggregated ratings of safety climate are a strong positive 
predictor of individuals’ self-reported safety behaviours at the group-level.   
  
Table 8.3 Assessment of Fit and Model Differences for ILSA Group-level 
Predictive Models of Global Safety Climate, Safety Behaviours and Safety Outcomes 
  
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence  
 
 591.52*** 28 - - - - 
2.Full  
 
 57.25*** 17 .93 .90 .06 .17 
(.12,.22) 
3.Full with error  
 
 21.99n.s 14 .99 .96 .04 .08 
(.00,.15) 
4.Mediation with error  
 
 22.35n.s 15 .99 .96 .05 .08 
(.00,.14) 
5.Direct with error  
 
 22.07n.s 15 .99 .96 .04 .08 
(.006,.14) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #1-#2  569.53*** 14     
 Difference (Δχ2) #2-#3       32.16*** 3     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4-#3  0.36 n.s 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #5-#3   0.08n.s     1     
Note.  N=77; χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
Testing of the full and direct models allowed the evaluation of the direct 
relationships between global safety climate and safety outcomes.  The direct pathway 
from GSC to GSO was statistically significant in the direct pathway indicating that 
positive perceptions of safety climate are associated with lower rates of self-reported 
injury and incidents.  However this direct pathway was not significant in the full 
model offering support for the mediation hypothesis.  In the full model the direct 
pathway between group safety behaviours and outcomes also failed to reach 
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statistical significance.  When the direct relationship between safety climate and 
outcomes was constrained in the mediation model, the parameter estimate for GSB to 
GSO increased substantially (-0.19, p<.05).  These results indicate that when 
reanalysed at the group-level, support was found for Hypothesis 10 that safety 
behaviours mediate the relationship between safety climate and outcomes such as 
injuries and near miss incidents.  In further support of the mediation hypothesis the 
indirect effects of Global Safety Climate on Safety Outcomes were significant.   
 
Table 8.4 Parameter Estimates for ILSA Group-level Models Predicting Safety 
Outcomes  
 
 
Path 
Full  
Model  
Mediated  
Model  
Direct  
Model  
 
 St Unst SE St Unst SE St Unst SE 
Direct Effect         
GGSCGSB  0.89 0.75*** .12 0.90 .75*** .12 0.89 0.74*** .12 
GSBGSO -0.16 -0.08n.s 
(-0.43,0.28) 
.18 -0.44 -0.19* 
(-0.37,-.01) 
.09    
GGSCGSO -0.34 -0.13n.s 
(-0.44,-0.17) 
.16    -0.51 -0.21** 
(-0.36,-0.06) 
.08 
Indirect Effect          
GGSCGSO  -0.06 .14  -0.14* .07    
Total Effects          
GGSCGSO  -0.19* .08  -0.14* .07    
Note. N=77; GGSC= Group-level Global Safety Climate, GSB= Group Safety behaviour, GSO= 
Group Safety Outcomes; St= Standardised; Unst= Unstandardised; Estimate 95% confidence interval 
in parenthesis, SE=Standard Error,  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
 
The total effects of Global Safety Climate and Safety Behaviours on group injuries 
and incidents are reported in Table 8.5.  Results indicate different patterns of 
associations with far stronger predictive relationships being observed between the 
rate of Near Miss Incident reporting and both Safety Climate and Safety Behaviours.  
Standardised structural coefficients, error terms and modelled error covariance for 
the final mediation model are presented in Figure 8.4.   
  
 
 185 
 Global Model 
 
 
Table 8.5 Total Effects for ILSA Group-level Global Safety Climate, Safety 
Behaviours and Safety Outcomes  
Path GGSC             GSB   
  Unst SE   Unst SE   
Total Effects          
GSBWActive  0.75*** .12       
GSBWProactive  0.88*** .12       
GINJ  -0.14* .07   -0.19*   .09   
GINC  -0.35*** .10   -0.46*** .12   
Note. GGSC= Group-level Global Safety Climate, GSB= Group Safety behaviour, GINJ= Group 
Injuries; GINC= Group Near Miss Incidents; Unst= Unstandardised; SE=Standard Error,  *p<.05, 
**p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
 
Global Work 
Group Safety 
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Work Group 
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Figure 8.4. Significant standardised coefficients for the group-level mediation 
model of global safety climate, group safety behaviours and outcomes.   
Note: AOSC-M= Aggregated Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; AGSC-S=Aggregated Group 
Safety Climate-Supervisors; AGSC-CA= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; 
AGSC-CP= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; GSB-A= Aggregated Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Active; GSB-P= Aggregated Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; GInj = 
Aggregation Injuries; GNMI = Aggregation Near Miss Incidents 
 
 
To determine the practical significance of the findings, disturbance terms for the 
endogenous variables in the mediation model were assessed.  The percentage of 
explained variance for Group Safety Behaviours was 80% and Group Safety 
Outcomes 20%.  The moderate effect size observed for the prediction of Group 
Safety Outcomes using group-level analysis was considerably larger than that 
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observed when data was processed using the individual-level analysis.  Again the 
large effect size achieved for the prediction of group safety behaviours reinforce 
current opinions that the safety performance of workers may be explained by the 
prevailing safety climate operating within an organisations.  Furthermore, while the 
mediation model proposed in Hypothesis 10 was not supported when individual- 
level analysis was utilised, results support the proposed mediation model at the 
group-level using ILSA aggregation. 
 
Hypothesis 11 proposed that the strength of associations observed between global 
safety climate and safety outcomes will be stronger using both ILSA & CSA 
aggregation than using individual-level analysis. Partial support was therefore found 
for Hypothesis 11 as evidence of stronger associations between constructs was 
observed in both the bivariate correlations and parameter estimates.  Despite the 
smaller sample size the strength of the relationships between constructs resulted in 
the emergence of good fitting models.  Furthermore the aggregation of data resulted 
in much larger proportions of variance in the criterion measures being accounted for.  
While a 10% increase in explained variance was noted for the group safety 
behaviours, the increase for group safety outcomes was a noteworthy 18%. 
 
8.4. CSA Group-level Analysis 
The next stage of model replication adopted the CSA approach in which group-level 
variables were formed by first aggregating items to the required level of sub unit 
analysis (functional work-groups) and then conducting EFA to create group-level 
scales for subsequent use in model testing.  Results for the CSA based factor analysis 
performed on the specific climate variables for the group-level data set were reported 
in Section 7.8.  An initial difference between the CSA based model and ILSA model 
is the identification of subscales for both the supervisor and management level safety 
climate construct in the CSA factor analysis.  Table 8.6 shows the descriptive 
statistics and zero-order correlations for the safety climate scales, safety behaviours 
and both injury and incident statistics aggregated to work-groups.  Distributions for 
the group-level variables are provided in Appendix G.   
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Table 8.6 Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-Order Correlations for Safety 
Climate and Group Safety Outcomes in the CSA Aggregated Work-group Sample  
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 AOSC-MA 3.60 0.60 .92         
2 AOSC-MP 3.86 0.56 .82** .94        
3 AGSC-SA 3.64 0.62 .73** .61** .92       
4 AGSC-SP 3.82 0.54 .67** .61** .82** .93      
5 AGSC-CA 3.82 0.56 .62** .50** .53** .50** .93     
6 AGSC-CP 3.79 0.54 .73** .67** .59** .60** .76** .91    
7 AGSB-WA 4.14 0.47 .50** .42** .57** .50** .72** .65**    
8 AGSB-WP 4.02 0.48 .60** .54** .50** .63** .62** .72** .72**   
9 ALogINJ 0.25 0.28 -.36** -.29** -.15 -.16 -.28*  -.32* -.20     -.16  
10 ALogINC 0.29 0.38 -.37** -.39** -.31** -.29*  -.38** -.36* -.42** -.38*** .56** 
Note. N=77; α = Cronbach’s Alpha derived from group-level data on the diagonal; *p<.05, **p<.01; 
AOSC-MA= Aggregated Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Active; AOSC-MP= Aggregated 
Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Proactive; AGSC-SA=Aggregated Group Safety Climate-
Supervisors Active; AGSC-SP=Aggregated Group Safety Climate-Supervisors Proactive ; AGSC-
CA= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; AGSC-CP= Aggregated Group Safety 
Climate- Coworkers Proactive; AGSB-A= Aggregated Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; AGSB-P= 
Aggregated Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; GInj = Aggregation Injuries; GNMI = 
Aggregation Near Miss Incidents 
 
Bivariate correlations amongst the safety climate dimensions ranged from .50 to .82 
(compared to a range of .49 to .70 found for the individual-level analysis and from 
.53 to .76 for the ILSA group data).  The highest intercorrelations between the 
climate scales were observed for the active and proactive subscales of AOSC-
Manager and AGSC-Supervisor.  No change in the strength of the association 
between AGSC-Coworker active and proactive subscales occurred as a result of the 
slight reconfiguration of these scales. 
 
Statistically significant negative correlations were also found between the safety 
climate and safety outcome data.  In particular strong correlations were observed 
between both active and proactive group safety behaviours and the six safety climate 
scales.  As the ILSA derivations of the GSB-W subscales were considered the 
appropriate forms to use in this group-based analysis the correlations between group  
safety behaviours and both injury and incident outcomes are as previously reported.  
No significant correlations were found between supervisor safety action and group 
injuries.  
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Model fit statistics and results of the chi-square difference tests undertaken are 
displayed in Table 8.7.  The independence model and the full model provided a poor 
fit to the data.  Inspection of modification indices indicated that the addition of 
several error covariances would substantially improve fit.  All models were therefore 
rerun with the error covariance between the active and proactive safety climate 
indicators for AOSM, AGSC-S and AGSC-C freed.  In addition the corresponding 
error covariances between active and proactive indictors of AGSC-S and AGSC-C 
with AGSB were freed. 
 
Table 8.7 Assessment of Fit and Model Differences for CSA Group-level 
Predictive Models of Global Safety Climate, Safety Behaviours and Safety Outcomes  
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence   989.82*** 45 - - - - 
2.Full  
 
 132.41*** 32 .89 .87 .07 .19 
(.15,.23) 
3.Full with error  
 
 44.96* 26 .98 .95 .05 .09 
(.02,.13) 
4.Mediation with error   45.60* 27 .98 .95 .05 .08 
(.02,.13) 
5.Direct with error  
 
 45.50* 27 .98 .95 .05 .08 
(.01,.13) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #1-#2  857.41*** 13     
 Difference (Δχ2) #2-#3       87.45*** 6     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4-#3  0.64 n.s 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #5-#3   0.54n.s     1     
Note. N=77;  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
Fit indices for the full model with error covariance showed a significant 
improvement in fit.  The respecified mediation and direct path models provided an 
equally good fit, with neither model showing substantial improvement over the full 
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model.  With fit equivalent across models attention is turned to the structural 
coefficients for the SEM, as reported in Table 8.8 to determine the most 
parsimonious model. 
 
Table 8.8 Parameter Estimates for CSA Group-level Models Predicting Safety 
Outcomes  
 
Path 
Full  
Model  
Mediated  
Model  
Direct  
Model  
 
 St Unst SE St Unst SE St Unst SE 
Direct Effect         
GGSCGSB  0.84 0.61*** 
(0.43,0.80) 
.09 0.85 .62*** 
( .44,0.81) 
.09 0.85 0.61*** 
(0.43,0.80) 
.09 
GSBGSO -0.25 -0.11n.s 
(-0.36,0.14) 
.13 -0.46 -0.19* 
(-0.36,-.01) 
.09    
GGSCGSO -0.27 -0.09n.s 
(-0.28,-0.10) 
.09    -0.52 -0.18** 
(-0.31,-0.06) 
.06 
Indirect Effect          
GGSCGSO  -0.07n.s .08  -0.12* .06    
Total Effects          
GGSCGSO  -0.15* .06  -0.12* .06    
Note. GGSC= Group-level Global Safety Climate, GSB= Group Safety behaviour, GSO= Group 
Safety Outcomes; St= Standardised; Unst= Unstandardised; Estimate 95% confidence interval in 
parenthesis, SE=Standard Error,  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
Examination of the structural equations showed that the pathway between global 
safety climate and group safety behaviours was statistically significant in all models 
indicating that CSA aggregated ratings of safety climate remain strong positive 
predictors of individuals’ self-reported safety behaviours at the group-level.  The 
direct pathway from GGSC to GGSO was statistically significant in the direct model; 
however it was not significant in the full model offering support for the mediation 
hypothesis.  When the direct relationship between safety climate and outcomes was 
constrained in the mediation model, the parameter estimate for GGSB to GSO 
increased substantially (-0.19, p<.05).  In further support of the mediation hypothesis 
the indirect effects of Safety Climate on Safety Outcomes were significant.   
 
For the CSA derived data, the total effects of Global Safety Climate and Safety 
Behaviours on group injuries and incidents, reported in Table 8.9 show that stronger 
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predictive relationships are again observed between the rate of near miss incident 
reporting and both Safety Climate and Safety Behaviours than found for injury data. 
Standardised structural coefficients, error terms and modelled error covariance for 
the final mediation model are presented in Figure 8.5.   
   
Table 8.9 Total Effects for Group-level Safety Climate and Safety Outcomes 
Path GGSC             GSB  
  Unst SE   Unst SE 
Total Effects        
GSB-Active  0.62*** .09     
GSB-Proactive  0.69*** .09     
GINJ  -0.12* .06   -0.19* .09 
GINC  -0.29*** .08   -0.47*** .12 
Note. N=77: GGSC= Group-level Global Safety Climate, GSB= Group Safety behaviour, GINJ= 
Group Injuries; GINC= Group Near Miss Incidents; Unst= Unstandardised; SE=Standard Error,  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
 
Global Work 
Group Safety 
Climate
Work Group 
Safety 
Behaviour
Work Group 
Safety 
Outcome
GNMI
.02
AOSC-
MP.42
AGSC-
SA.44
AGSC-
CA.42
AGSC-
CP.25
GSB-A
.35
GSB-P
.21
GInj
.70
1.01
.55
.17
.09
.76
.75
.71
.86
.81 .89
.85 -.46
AOSC-
MA.26
AGSC-
SP.50
.76
.86
.29
 
 
Figure 8.5 Standardised coefficients for the group-level mediation model of 
global safety climate, group safety behaviours and outcomes. 
Note:AOSC-MA= Aggregated Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Active; AOSC-MP= 
Aggregated Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Proactive; AGSC-SA=Aggregated Group Safety 
Climate-Supervisors Active; AGSC-SP=Aggregated Group Safety Climate-Supervisors Proactive ; 
AGSC-CA= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; AGSC-CP= Aggregated Group 
Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; AGSB-A= Aggregated Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; 
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AGSB-P= Aggregated Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; GInj = Aggregation Injuries; GNMI = 
Aggregation Near Miss Incidents 
 
For the final model the percentage of explained variance for Group Safety 
Behaviours was 72% and Group Safety Outcomes 21%.  The moderate effect size 
observed for the prediction of Group Safety Outcomes using CSA group-level 
aggregation was consistent with the ILSA results in again being considerably larger 
than that observed when data was processed using the individual- level analysis. 
Full support was therefore found for both the mediation model proposed in 
Hypothesis 10 and for the stronger construct associations in group-level models 
proposed in Hypothesis 11. Evidence of stronger associations between constructs 
was again observed in both the bivariate correlations and parameter estimates 
obtained in the CSA model compared to individual- level analysis.  
 
The different method of data aggregation did not substantially change the magnitude 
of effects compared to the results found when using the ILSA method.  For the CSA 
method only a 2% increase in explained variance was noted for the group safety 
behaviours.  Again the relatively large effect size achieved for the prediction of 
group safety behaviours reinforces current opinions that the safety performance of 
workers may be explained by the prevailing safety climate operating within 
organisations.  It appears that while the strength of associations between constructs is 
improved when accounting for the nonindependence of data in organisational 
settings by conducting group-level analyses, the aggregation methodology applied 
does not appear to have a large impact on the results when a global conceptualisation 
of the constructs is being examined.  
    
8.5. Incremental variance supplementary analysis 
 
To further test that co-worker commitment to safety can account for a significant 
proportion of the variance in safety outcomes beyond that already accounted for by 
management and supervisor subscales of safety climate a series of supplementary 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses (MRA) were undertaken. Four separate 
analyses for the individual - level, ILSA and CSA data were conducted using 
injuries, near miss incidents, and both active and proactive safety behaviours of 
individual workers as criterion variables. In summary, when injuries and near miss 
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incidents were used as criterion variables coworker safety climate did not account for 
a significant proportion of variance in outcomes beyond that already accounted for 
by management and supervisor safety climate.  In contrast, when predicting workers’ 
safety behaviours, coworker safety climate provided statistically significant 
incremental variance. The full results for the supplementary MRAs are reported in 
Appendix H. 
 
8.6. Discussion 
Two main objectives of my thesis were to investigate the relationship between 
employees’ perceptions of workplace safety climate, workers’ safety behaviours and 
safety outcomes such as injuries and incidents, and to examine potential differences 
in construct relations when individual and group-level data is assessed.  In Section 
8.2 the safety climate measures were operationalised and tested in a manner 
consistent with those studies categorised under the label Global Safety Climate in 
Christian et al.’s (2009) and Beus, Payne  and Payne et al.’s (2010) meta- analyses. 
However in this instance safety climate items or subscales were not summated or 
averaged to form a global scale score, but rather safety climate subscales were used 
as separate indictors of a higher order global safety climate construct for the SEM 
analyses.   Likewise individual safety behaviours were modelled as a composite of 
active and proactive behaviours, as were the retrospective injuries and incident data. 
My choice to run a global model for the prediction of safety outcomes was intended 
to ground my study in the extant literature.   
 
Meta- analyses conducted by Clarke (2006), Christian et al. (2009) and Nahrgang et 
al. (2011) have identified that the relationship between safety climate and safety 
outcomes such as accidents and injuries operates indirectly through individual and 
group-level safety performance behaviours. As such I proposed that when safety 
climate was treated as a global construct the effects on safety outcomes would be 
fully mediated by individual safety performance.  Whereas,  results for the 
individual-level data set indicated that a direct relationships between global 
psychological safety climate and both individual safety behaviours and individual 
safety outcomes provided the best fit to the data, the full mediation model proposed 
in Hypothesis 10 was supported at the group-level of analysis.  Furthermore in 
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support of Hypothesis 11, stronger overall construct relationships were identified in 
the group-level analyses compared to the individual-level analysis.  
 
Inspection of the three proposed individual-level models indicated that in all cases 
the relationship between individual safety behaviours and safety outcomes was not 
significant.  Furthermore, in the case of the full model, the positive direction of the 
association between ISB and ISO was contrary to prediction, going against general 
findings of negative correlations between behaviour and injuries.  When the direct 
relationship between safety climate and outcomes was constrained, the parameter 
estimate for ISB to ISO reversed direction, indicating that rather than operating as a 
mediator, in this instance, ISB may be acting as a suppressor variable. 
 
This effect was not noted in the group-level analysis, however, two potential reasons 
for such results relate to a possible pattern of high social desirability responses in 
some workers and differences in workers’ willingness to report accidents and near 
misses. In some cases individuals who reported higher near miss and injury 
occurrences may also have been more likely to rate their own safety performance in a 
positive manner, but the safety climate of the work area less positively.  This 
scenario fits with attribution theory premises that would see workers who had 
experienced negative safety events (high injury/incident statistics) diffusing personal 
responsibility from themselves (high safety behaviours ratings) and transferring 
causal responsibility to situational factors (low safety climate ratings).  Such biased 
response patterns would potentially artificially inflate the safety behaviour measures 
and attenuate safety climate measures, thereby confounding the true climate- 
behaviour –injury association.   
 
Alternatively, in organisations with stronger safety climates, the importance of being 
aware of and learning from near miss incidents injuries may have been enhanced.  
Accordingly workers in this environment may be more likely to recall and be willing 
to report near miss incidents and injuries.  In these instances workers may have rated 
psychological safety climate as high, their own behaviours positively, but also report 
relatively higher incident and injury rates.  However, in both scenarios, any disparity 
in individual workers’ responses may have been diffused when data was collapsed to 
the group-level.  
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As stated above, the strength of relationship between constructs was generally 
stronger when assessed at the group-level, in particular in relation to the prediction of 
safety outcomes.  As such my results are consistent with trends identified in the 
safety literature. To expand, the strength of relationship between global 
psychological safety climate and safety outcomes observed in my study are relatively 
consistent with the population estimates generated for both individual and group-
level data in previous  meta-analysis (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; Christian et al., 
2009).  In line with my results, Beus and colleagues found small negative 
correlations between safety climate and retrospective injuries and relatively stronger 
medium negative correlations with organisational safety climate.  
 
Christian et al. (2009) also identified a weak negative relationship between global 
psychological safety climate and workplace accidents when self-report data was used 
for the criterion measure, and slightly stronger negative correlations for aggregated 
organisational safety climate. Christian et al.’s results also indicated that both 
compliance and participative safety behaviours of workers had commensurate weak, 
negative relationships with safety outcomes, of a magnitude equivalent with safety 
climate. In contrast to Christian et al.’s results, an initial examination of bivariate 
correlations in my analysis showed far stronger relationships between the 
psychological safety climate variables and outcomes than between individual safety 
behaviours and outcomes, immediately flagging potential problems for a full 
mediation model.   
 
In particular, proactive safety practices showed no significant correlations with either 
injuries or near miss incidents at the individual-level.  However again this pattern 
was not found when group analysis was conducted.  Indeed when group analysis was 
performed using CSA aggregation the relationship between individual performance 
and injuries, while still slightly weaker, was more aligned with safety climate-
outcome associations.  Bivariate correlations also showed that safety outcomes had 
slightly stronger (small to moderate) associations with active safety behaviours than 
proactive practices.     
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This trend was contrary to Clarke’s (2006) results that showed participative safety 
practices had slightly stronger (though weak overall) associations with injuries than 
compliance behaviours.  As stated above, this finding was not supported in my study 
for either the group or individual-level data.  However, while Clarke’s (2006) results 
were based on a very small sample, more recent meta-analytic results (Nahrgang et 
al., 2011) based on a marginally larger sample of studies identified weaker effects 
between participative safety practices and injuries than found for compliance 
behaviours.  While Nahrgang et al. (2011) did not distinguish between data 
treatments used in the studies included in their meta-analysis, their composite 
measures of engagement/participative safety practices showed smaller initial 
correlations with outcomes than found for compliance behaviours. As such, 
participation was not included in the testing of their proposed JD-R safety model.  In 
this model Nahrgang et al. maintained a direct pathway between safety climate and 
accidents/injuries, finding this direct relationship to be stronger than the link between 
compliance behaviours and safety outcomes, a finding consistent with results from 
my individual-level analysis.  
 
While overall only 4.9% of the variance in safety outcomes was accounted for in the 
individual-level model, this small effect size for predicting individual safety 
outcomes is relatively consistent with past findings based on individual- level 
retrospective, self-report data (Christian et al., 2009).  The increase in effect size in 
the group-level models is also reflected in the extant literature, however the 
magnitude of change observed in studies using self-report data by Christian et al. is 
less substantial than that observed in my results. Furthermore, supplementary MRA 
analyses indicated that although the four safety climate indicators in combination 
accounted for a statistically significant proportion of variance in injuries and near 
misses, the two coworker safety climate indicators did not account for a significant 
proportion of incremental variance in outcomes above that initial  accounted for by 
management commitment to safety.    
 
Nahrgang et al. (2011) also concluded that predictive relationships were stronger 
when adverse events were used as a criterion compared to accident and injury data.  
A stronger effect with near miss incidents was observed in the bivariate correlations 
and modelled effects for all three data treatments in my study.  It is important to note 
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that the significant relationship between safety climate and individual safety 
outcomes in my study was driven largely by the stronger effects found for near miss 
incidents.  My results therefore, add weight to Christian et al.’s recommendation that 
research focus shift to investigating accidents in which no injuries are incurred (i.e., 
near miss incidents) and micro-accidents (Zohar, 2000) (in which only minor injuries 
are incurred) as well as reportable injuries as defined by OSHA regulations.  
Furthermore, given the overall strength of associations observed in my study, the 
utility of both the recall-based minor injury and near miss incident measures is 
supported by my results.  
 
In contrast to the small to moderate effects found for incident and injury outcomes, 
safety climate explained over 70% of the variance in individual safety behaviours in 
all models. Although an increase in variance (80%) in safety behaviours was 
observed in the ILSA model compared to the CSA model (72%), overall the large 
effect sizes observed for the prediction of safety performance reinforce current 
opinions that the safety behaviours of workers may be principally explained by 
safety climate (Nahrgang et al., 2011).  Christian et al. (2009) found the population 
estimate for psychological safety climate and self-reported safety behaviours to be 
.47, representing around 22% of variance.  Christian et al.’s results also indicated that 
larger associations were observed between safety climate and safety performance 
with group data (34%). This trend is commensurate with my results however effect 
sizes are of a small magnitude.  Clarke (2006) also found moderate, positive 
correlations between safety climate and both dimensions of safety performance.  
 
The relatively larger effects explained in my results are most likely linked to the 
expanded operationalisation of the safety climate construct. This is supported by the 
supplementary MRA analyses which found that on in both individual and group level 
data treatments coworker safety climate accounted for addition variance in workers 
safety active and proactive behaviours beyond that provided by existing measures of 
management and supervisor safety climate (i.e Active 30%; Proactive 45%), 
increasing variance accounted for up to a total of 60%.  For example in the CSA data 
variance in workers active safety behaviours accounted for increased 26% with the 
addition coworker safety climate in the model.  For workers proactive safety 
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behaviours incremental variance in the hierarchical MRA analysis rose 13% when 
coworker safety climate was included at step 2 of the model run.     
 
In both the above mentioned meta-analyses (Christian et al., 2009; S. Clarke, 2006) 
global safety climate was generally composed of management practices and safety 
systems content.  Nahrgang et al. (2011) also conceptualised safety climate as a 
largely management-level construct.  When Nahrgang et al. assessed the relative 
importance of the predictors of individual safety performance they found that job 
resources (including both individual resources and supportive environments) 
accounted for 67% of workers’ engagement in participative safety practices and 58% 
of compliance practices.  These variance estimates are more commensurate with my 
study.   
 
Interestingly, within Nahrgang et al.’s (2011) job resource predictor category, safety 
climate only accounted for 34% of the total R
2 
for compliance behaviours and 42% 
for proactive behaviours, bringing the proportion of variance in safety performance 
explained by safety climate back down to around 19% and 28% respectively. 
However, coworker and leader support contributed more than 45% of the remaining 
variance in safety behaviours.  As I discussed in Section 4.3, the overlap between 
general support and safety-related practices in both the coworker and leadership 
dimensions of Nahrgrang et al.’s study loosely equates these variables with the group 
safety climate dimensions of my safety climate construct.  As such the larger 
proportion of explained variance in safety performance in my study is likely to be 
due to the incorporation of coworker, supervisor and management commitment to 
safety in my global psychological safety climate scale. 
 
In sum, differences in model structures and strength of observed associations can 
emerge with the simple aggregation of data.  This process of aggregation could 
therefore explain variations in results reported in meta- analyses investigating 
differences between conceptualisations of psychological and organisational climate  
that have previously been attributed to the data source issues (i.e., the use of 
prospective or retrospective data or archival compared to self-report data).  Although 
meta-analytic evidence would support the use of objective, prospective injury data, if 
this is not plausible the use of minor injury and near miss data combined with group-
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level of analysis will improve the likelihood of researchers’ finding strong predictive 
relationships.  Overall my results show that global safety climate is a strong predictor 
of individual safety behaviour. The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is 
that in work environments where safety is valued, workers are more likely to comply 
with policies and procedures and be more engaged in taking personal responsibility 
and using their initiative in safety-related situations.  Furthermore, having a positive 
safety climate in an organisation is likely to result in a reduction in the number of 
safety-related incidents occurring and minor personal injuries experienced by 
workers. My results also provide some justification for the inclusion of coworker 
practices in an expanded work-level safety climate index, however the results for the 
next series of model testing will allow more concise examination of the relationships 
between safety climate and individual safety behaviours.   
 199 
 Stratified Model 
 
 
9. Work-level Model of Social Exchange and Safety Climate  
9.1. Introduction 
Having previously established the discriminant validity of the safety climate and 
social exchange scales in Chapter 7, a further objective of my thesis is to investigate 
how the quality of social exchanges occurring in the workplace influence safety 
climate and workers’ safety performance. In this chapter I investigate the proximal 
and distal relationship between social exchange and safety climate dimensions 
(operationalised as separate lower-order constructs) and individual safety 
performance (operationalised as active and proactive safety behaviours).  A level- of 
analysis approach is adopted to test Hypotheses 12, 13 and14.  Model testing will 
again be under taken using group-level data using both ILSA and CSA to test 
Hypothesis 15. Individual-level data treatment was undertaken and included as 
Appendix I, for comparison purposes in the discussion chapters. 
 
9.2. Model Specification 
Hypothesis 12 predicts that in a stratified work-level model of safety climate 
coworker’s commitment to safety will mediate the more distal influence of 
mangement and supervisor commitment to safety on workers safety behaviours.  
Hypothesis 13 further proposes the dimensions of climate for social exchange at 
distinct work-levels as antecedents of safety climate at the corresponding work-level 
such that: 
(d) High quality management-member social exchange supports front-line 
workers’ positive perceptions of organisation level management safety 
climate. 
(e)  High quality leaders-member social exchange supports front-line 
workers’ positive perceptions of group level supervisor safety climate. 
(f) High quality management-member social exchange supports front-line 
workers’ positive perceptions of group level co-worker active and 
proactive safety climate. 
Furthermore, in Hypothesis 14 I propose that the positive impact of climate for 
social exchange on individual workers’ safety behaviours will be best represented 
by a fully mediated model operating through the establishment of positive safety 
climate when compared to a direct or partially mediated model.  
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The above hypotheses are represented in the mediation model for the relationship 
between climate for social exchange, safety climate and safety behaviours as 
presented in Figure 9.1.  In this model both exogenous and endogenous variables are 
represented by single observed variables with measurement error estimated.  
Additionally, the correlations between the active and proactive components of both 
GSC-C and ISB-W are recognised by freeing these parameters in model testing.  The 
covariances between error terms for the three social exchange indicators were also 
included in the modelling.  Diagrammatic representations are also provided for two 
alternative models, however for clarity, observed variables and measurement error 
are omitted.  The partial mediation model (Figure 9.2) includes the direct effects of 
OSC-M on GSC-C active and proactive practices.  The direct effects model includes 
the direct pathways between social exchange variables and individual safety 
behaviours (Figure 9.3).  
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Figure 9.1.  Mediation model for social exchange, safety climate dimensions and 
individual safety behaviours.    
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; ISB-WA= Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; ISB-WP= Individual Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member 
Exchange; GMX=Group Member Exchange. 
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Figure 9.2. Partial mediation model for social exchange, safety climate 
dimensions and individual safety behaviours. 
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Figure 9.3. Direct social exchange effects model for safety climate dimensions 
and individual safety behaviours.   
 
9.3. ILSA Group-level Analysis. 
To test Hypotheses 12, 13 and14 the models were tested using ILSA group-level 
data.  An initial run of this series of SEM models included group-based estimates of 
measurement error; however these models failed to generate solutions. When 
measurement error was removed and covariances between the social exchange 
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variables were included, the path models generated solutions.  Descriptive statistics, 
zero-order correlations for the aggregated scales used in the path analysis are 
provided in Table 9.1.  For comparison purposes differences between correlations 
obtained using individual and group-level analysis are also provided.  
 
Table 9.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-Order Correlations for ILSA 
Group Safety Behaviours, Safety Climate and Social Exchange Scales  
 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 AOSC-M 3.75 0.56  .00 .06 .03 .06 .19 .11 .05 .18 
2 AMMX 3.42 0.68 .83**  .04 .04 .01 .08 .03 .00 .09 
3 AGSC-S 3.76 0.54 .71** .68**  .00 .01 .05 .07 .12 .18 
4 ALMX 3.78 0.62 .51** .60** .78**  -.11 .02 .04 .05 .13 
5 AGSC-CA 3.82 0.59 .55** .51** .53** .25*  .06 .05 .09 .09 
6 AGSC-CP 3.82 0.52 .72** .62** .62** .43** .76**  .01 .09 .14 
7 AGMX 3.80 0.50 .42** .40** .37** .37** .64** .57**  .15 .07 
8 GSB-WA 4.14 0.47 .47** .39** .55** .31** .75** .63** .57**  .05 
9 GSB-WP 4.02 0.48 .62** .48** .63** .38** .62** .73** .38** .72** 
Note. N=77; Difference between-group and individual- level correlations are represented above the 
diagonal.  *p<.05, **p<.01: Note: AOSC-M= Aggregate Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; 
AGSC-S=Aggregate Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; AGSC-CA= Aggegate Group Safety 
Climate- Coworkers Active; AGSC-CP= Aggregatre Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; 
GSB-WA= Group Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; GSB-WP= Group Safety Behaviours- 
Workers Proactive; AMMX= Aggregate Manager-Member Exchange; ALMX=Aggregate Leader-
Member Exchange; AGMX=Aggregate Group Member Exchange. 
 
 
Strong correlations between the safety climate variables and group active and 
proactive safety behaviours also provide initial support for Hypothesis 12. 
Significant, positive bivariate correlations between the social exchange and safety 
climate variables also provide initial support for Hypothesis 13: that the quality of 
social exchanges amongst managers, supervisors and workers act as an antecedent 
for the development of positive group-level safety climate.  Significant positive 
correlations between social exchange variables and group safety behaviours also 
offers initial support for the mediation model proposed in Hypothesis 14.   
 
Overall the correlations observed using ILSA protocols are relatively consistent with 
those obtained using individual-level analysis, however in support of Hypothesis 15, 
slightly stronger correlations between variables are observed in the group analysis.  
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The exception to this trend was seen in the weaker correlation found between LMX 
and GSC-CA at the group-level (decrease from .36 to .25).  Again comparatively 
weaker correlations were found between LMX and the active and proactive 
components of both Coworker Safety Climate and Group Safety Behaviours than for 
either MMX or GMX.  The largest correlation increases were found for the 
associations between Management level Safety Climate and the proactive scales of 
both Coworker Safety Climate (.53 to .72) and Group Safety Behaviours (.44 to .62); 
and between Proactive Group Safety Behaviours and Supervisor Safety Climate (.45 
to .63).  
 
As shown in Table 9.2 the independence model was easily rejected but the 
hypothesised mediation model did not prove a good fit to the data. 
 
Table 9.2 Assessment of Fit and Model Differences for the Work-level Model of 
Social Exchange and Safety Climate (ILSA Group-level) 
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence  
 
 910.55*** 36 - - - - 
2.Mediation  
 
 71.08*** 22 .94 .92 .10 .16 
(.11,.20) 
3.Direct SX   62.30*** 16 .95 .93 .09 .18 
(.13,.23) 
4.Partial Mediation  
 
 52.98***   20 .96 .94 .08 .14 
(.09,.19) 
5.Final Modified   26.56n.s 19 .99 .97 .06 .06 
(.00,.13) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #1-#2  839.47*** 14     
 Difference (Δχ2) #2-#3  8.78n.s 6     
 Difference (Δχ2) #2-#4  18.10*** 2     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4-#53  26.42*** 1     
Note.  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR = 
Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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In contrast to the individual-level model solutions achieved with large sample SEM, 
the use of path analysis without modelled measurement error in this instance 
produced less than adequate fit in the initial runs.  Inclusion of the direct effects 
between social exchange and group safety behaviours resulted in no improvement in 
fit statistics.  In addition, no significant direct pathways between social exchange and 
safety behaviours variables were found.  While the inclusion of the direct paths from 
AOSC-M to both active and proactive AGSC-C indicators improved fit, several 
indices remained less than optimal in this partial mediation model. Inspection of 
structural models for the partial mediation model and modification indices 
highlighted minor path changes that would substantially improve model fit.  The 
standardised structural coefficients for the final model are presented in Figure 9.4.  
OSC-M GROUP GSC-S GROUP
GSC-C 
Proactive 
GROUP
Work Group 
SB Proactive
GSC –C
Active GROUP
Work Group  
SB Active
MMX GROUP LMX GROUP
GMX GROUP
.25 .39
.40 .47
.25.31
.83
.73
-.44
.57
.43
.20
.43
.67
.32 .20 .23
-.14
.40
.37
.60
.58
.87
 
Figure 9.4. Significant standardised coefficients for the group-level model of 
social exchange, safety climate and group safety behaviours. 
Note: The Group subscript indicates that all variables are group level aggregates: OSC-M= 
Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-C= Group 
Safety Climate- Coworkers; Work group SB-Active= Aggregate Individual Safety Behaviours- 
Workers Active; Work group SB-Proactive= Aggregate Individual Safety Behaviours- Workers 
Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange. 
 
The modified model including a path between ALMX and the active dimension of 
coworker safety climate and an error covariance between the active components of 
AGSC-C and Group safety behaviour was therefore tested.  As the direct path 
between AOSC-M and AGSC-CA was not significant in the partial mediation model 
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this was also dropped from the final model.  The modified model provided a 
theoretically justifiable solution with excellent fit.  While guided by modification 
indices the changes imposed reflected the change in correlations identified at the 
bivariate level, especially in relation to the weaker correlation between ALMX and 
AGSC-CA and therefore warranted further investigation.  Chi square difference tests 
indicated a significant improvement in model fit for the modified model over the 
partial mediation model.   
 
9.3.1. Direct Effects 
Parameter estimates are presented in Table 9.3.  In support of Hypothesis 13, 
examination of the unstandardised structural equations indicated significant positive 
relationships between climate for social exchange and safety climate indicators.  
Direct effects for the social exchange indicators on aggregate safety climate variables 
were largely consistent with previous results with the exception of the negative path 
between ALMX and the active dimension of AGSC-Coworkers. While the overall 
strength of associations between social exchange and safety climate were weaker 
this, may have been due to the error variance not being modelled. 
 
A one point increase in a work group’s ratings of management safety climate resulted 
in a significant 0.41 point increase in AGSC at the supervisory level. The inclusion 
of the direct pathway from AOSC-M to AGSC-CP was also significant.  A one unit 
increase in AGSC-S resulted in a 0.72 unit increase in AGSC-C Active but only a 
0.19 unit increase for AGSC-C Proactive (p < .05) which can be explained by the 
inclusion of the direct effect of OSCM on the latter.  In combination these results 
indicate that when using functional work-groups as the central level of analysis the 
perceived influences of management and supervisor commitment to safety directly 
impacts on the establishment of strong group-based safety norms represented by 
coworker safety climate.  However in this instance the direct impact of AOSC-M 
manifests in the promotion of proactive group practices but not active safety 
practices. When aggregation of workers’ perceptions of the quality of social 
exchanges is conducted the patterns of association with safety climate at the 
corresponding level of the organisational hierarchy are generally consistent with 
results achieved using individual-level analysis, supporting Hypotheses 13 and 14.  
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  Table 9.3 Parameter Estimates for the Work-level Model of Social Exchange 
and Safety Climate (ILSA Group-level) 
 
Path 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
 
 St Unst SE  Unst SE  Unst SE 
AMMX          
AOSC-M  0.83 0.68*** 
(0.58,0.79) 
.054     0.68*** 
 
.05 
AGSC-S      0.28*** .05  0.28*** .05 
AGSC-CA      0.20*** .05  0.20*** .05 
AGSC-CP     0.32*** .05  0.32*** .05 
GSB-WA     0.14*** .03  0.14*** .03 
GSB-WP     0.22*** .04  0.22*** .04 
ALMX          
AGSC-S  0.57 0.50*** 
(0.38,0.61) 
.059     0.50*** 
 
.06 
AGSC-CA  -0.44 -0.41** 
(-0.58,-0.23) 
.089  0.36*** .07  -0.05n.s .08 
AGSC-CP     0.09* .05  0.09* .05 
GSB-WA     -0.03n.s .05  -0.03n.s .05 
GSB-WP     0.06n.s .03  0.06n.s .03 
AGMX          
AGSC-CA  0.58 0.68*** 
(0.51,0.85) 
.088     0.68*** 
 
.09 
AGSC-CP 0.32 0.33*** 
(0.17,0.49) 
.081     0.33*** 
 
.08 
GSB-WA     0.46*** .07  0.46*** .07 
GSB-WP     0.22*** .06  0.22*** .06 
AOSC-M          
AGSC-S  0.43 0.41*** 
(0.28,0.54) 
.065     0.41*** 
 
.07 
AGSC-CA      0.29*** 
 
.07  0.29*** 
 
.07 
AGSC-CP 0.43 0.39*** 
(0.23,0.55) 
.081  0.08n.s 
 
.04  0.47*** 
 
.07 
GSB-WA     0.20*** .05  0.20*** .05 
GSB-WP     0.32*** .06  0.32*** .06 
AGSC-S          
AGSC-CA  0.67 0.72*** 
(0.50,0.94) 
.11     0.72*** 
 
.11 
AGSC-CP 0.20 0.19* 
(0.01,0.37) 
.094     0.19* 
 
.09 
GSB-WA     0.49*** .08  0.49*** .08 
GSB-WP     0.13* .07  0.13* .07 
AGSC-CA          
GSB-WA 0.87 0.68*** 
(0.54,0.82) 
.073     0.68*** 
 
.07 
AGSC-CP          
GSB-WP 0.73 0.68*** 
(0.54,0.82) 
.072     0.689*** 
 
.07 
Note. N=77; St= Standardised; Unst= Unstandardised; Estimate 95% confidence interval in 
parenthesis, SE=Standard Error,  *p<.05, **p<.01, *** p<.001; AOSC-M= Aggregate Organisation 
Safety Climate-Managers; AGSC-S=Aggregate Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; AGSC-CA= 
Aggregate Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; AGSC-CP= Aggregate Group Safety Climate- 
Coworkers Proactive; GSB-WA= Group Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; GSB-WP= Group 
Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; AMMX= Aggregate Manager-Member Exchange; 
ALMX=Aggregate Leader-Member Exchange; AGMX=Aggregate Group Member Exchange. 
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Results show that high quality social exchanges are linked to high safety climate 
ratings in all but the association between ALMX and AGSC-CA. Contrary to 
expectation, modelling this pathway showed a significant negative relationship 
indicating that work-groups with lower ratings of the quality of supervisor-member 
social exchange also report relatively higher ratings of the compliance-based aspects 
of coworker safety climate. This may be linked to the interpretation that supervisors 
with more authoritarian leadership styles (i.e., lower LMX scores) may focus on 
ensuring workers’ compliance. 
  
9.3.2. Indirect and Total Effects 
In relation to the indirect impact of social exchange variables on group-level safety 
climate the indirect pathways from AMMX and ALMX to the two Coworker climate 
dimensions were statistically significant, ranging from 0.09 to 0.36.  However, while 
the total effects of AMMX on Coworker Safety Climate may be interpreted as small 
to medium, the total effects of ALMX on Coworker Safety Climate are trivial.  Small 
to medium indirect effects were also observed for the influence of AMMX and 
AGMX on both Active and Proactive Group safety behaviours.  Again the total 
effects of ALMX on Active and Proactive GSB scales were not significant.   
 
Unstandardised coefficients also indicated that the indirect pathways from AOSC-M 
to GSB-W were statistically significant for both active and proactive dimensions.  
The indirect relationship between AOSC-M and the active subscale of AGSC-C was 
also significant.  While the indirect relationship between AOSC-M and AGSC-CP 
was not significant the total effects for this pathway were significant.  Furthermore, 
the positive associations between GSC-S and group safety behaviours were fully 
mediated by the corresponding coworker safety climate dimensions.    
 
To determine the practical significance of the ILSA findings, disturbance terms were 
assessed.  In the final model the percentage of explained variance for all variables are 
considered large effects.  Results indicated that 51% of variance in Active Work-
group Safety Behaviours and 53% of Proactive safety practices may be explained by 
our understanding of the facet-specific safety climate and foundation social exchange 
climates operating within the organisation.  Reduced form equations provided 
alternate estimates of 23% and 27%. 
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When examining the hierarchical relationships, the most distal dimension of AMMX 
has a major impact on management’s commitment to safety, explaining 69% of the 
variance in AOSC-M.  The influence of both AOSC-M and LMX in combination 
accounted for 75% of the variance in GSC-Supervisors.  When accounting for the 
variance in both the active and proactive GSC-C scales slightly different predictive 
equations are derived, however in both cases nearly two thirds of variance can be 
accounted for (Active= 61%; Proactive 60%). 
 
These results indicate that while the patterns of association found using individual- 
level and ILSA derived group-level analysis are generally consistent, the previously 
obtained individual- level findings that the benefits of high quality social exchanges 
manifest most strongly in the formation and maintenance of compliance-based group 
norms is less evident in the group-level results. This result may be partially due to 
the modelling of upper level management direct influences on proactive group safety 
practices and proximal impact of supervisor-member exchanges on active group 
safety practices.  In this instance it appears that management safety practices and 
social exchange relations with workers has a relatively stronger positive influence on 
workers’ engagement in proactive safety behaviours than compliance. Furthermore 
work-groups that rate their supervisors more highly on the LMX scale also report 
relatively fewer active safety practices amongst their coworkers.  However, when a 
stronger safety priority of supervisors is factored in this effect is mitigated.  
 
Overall the results support the proposal that establishing high quality social 
interactions amongst workers as a foundation climate operating across levels of the 
organisation will assist in the promotion of positive organisation and group-level 
safety climates and group safety performance.  Given the strength of the bivariate 
correlations and parameter estimates, partial support is found for Hypothesis 15. 
 
9.4. CSA Group-level Analysis 
On the basis of results for group-level EFA reported in Section 7.8 the management 
and supervisor safety climate scales were split into active and proactive dimensions 
for this series of group-level model testing.  Figure 9.5 shows the hypothesised 
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construct relationships. Two additional models specifying the direct influence of 
social exchange on safety behaviours, and the cross effects of active and proactive 
safety climate dimensions were also tested.  As depicted, the covariances between 
active and proactive dimensions of safety climate and work-group safety behaviours 
are specified in the modelling.  Error terms were calculated and included in the 
model specification. 
 
OSC-MP GROUP
GSC-SA GROUP
GSC-C 
Proactive 
GROUP
Work Group 
SB Proactive
GSC –C
Active 
GROUP
Work Group  
SB Active
MMX GROUP LMX GROUP
GMX GROUP
GSC-SP GROUP
OSC-MA GROUP
 
Figure 9.5. Hypothesised CSA group-level model of the predictive relationship 
between social exchange, safety climate and group safety behaviours.  
All scales represented with a GROUP subscript are derived using CSA aggregation methods including   
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange.  Work Group Safety Behaviours- Active and Proactive are derived by direct 
aggregation of  Individual Safety Behaviours of Workers using the ILSA approach.    
 
Descriptive statistics, zero-order correlations and group-based alpha coefficients for 
the aggregated scales, are provided in Table 9.4.  In support of Hypothesis 13 large 
positive correlations I found for all hierarchically aligned social exchange and safety 
climate variables.  Additionally, significant moderate to large positive correlations 
between social exchange and safety climate variables and group safety behaviours 
offers initial support for the mediation model proposed in Hypotheses 12 and 14.  
Overall the pattern of correlations observed using both CSA and ILSA protocols are 
consistent.  In support of Hypothesis 15 stronger correlations between variables were 
observed in both forms of group analysis than in the individual-level analysis.  
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However, the splitting of management and supervisor levels of safety climate into 
their active and proactive dimensions allows further investigation of the subtle 
differences in construct relations.   
 
Table 9.4 Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-Order Correlations for CSA 
Group Safety Behaviours, Safety Climate and Social Exchange Scales  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 AOSC-MA .92           
2 AOSC-MP .82** .94          
3 AMMX .84** .74** .96         
4 AGSC-SA .73** .61** .69** .92        
5 AGSC-SP .67** .61** .59** .82** .93       
6 ALMX .56** .39** .57** .73** .72** .96      
7 AGSC-CA .62** .50** .55** .53** .50** .28* .93     
8 AGSC-CP .73** .67** .63** .59** .60** .43** .76** .91    
9 AGMX .48** .35** .41** .41** .26* .36** .64** .56** .91   
10 GSB-WA .50** .42** .41** .57** .50** .32** .72** .65** .57**   
11 GSB-WP .60** .54** .46** .50** .63** .36** .62** .72** .38** .72**  
Mean 3.60 3.86 3.43 3.64 3.82 3.78 3.82 3.80 3.80 4.14 4.02 
SD 0.60 0.56 0.66 0.63 0.54 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.50 0.47 0.48 
Note. N=77 CSA group alpha coefficients are represented in bold on the diagonal.  *p<.05, **p<.01: 
AOSC-MA= Aggregate Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Active; AOSC-MP= Aggregate 
Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Proactive; AGSC-SA=Aggregate Group Safety Climate-
Supervisors Active; AGSC-SP=Aggregate Group Safety Climate-Supervisors Proactive; AGSC-CA= 
Aggregate Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; AGSC-CP= Aggregate Group Safety Climate- 
Coworkers Proactive; GSB-WA= Group Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; GSB-WP= Group 
Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; AMMX= Aggregate Manager-Member Exchange; 
ALMX=Aggregate Leader-Member Exchange; AGMX=Aggregate Group Member Exchange. 
 
Of note is the trend for the perceived active and proactive safety practices of agents 
at higher levels of the organisation (i.e., manager and supervisor safety climate) to 
align more strongly with the corresponding active or proactive behaviours of 
workers.  At the bivariate level, the strong correlations observed between AGSC-SA 
and AGSC-CP, and AOSC-MA with the proactive scales of both AGSC-C and group 
safety behaviours are notable exceptions to this trend.  Again comparatively weaker 
correlations were found between ALMX and the active and proactive components of 
both GSC-C and G than for either AMMX or AGMX.  A relatively weaker 
correlation was again observed between LMX and GSC-CA at the group-level. 
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The group-level SEM with modelled error produced less than adequate fit in the 
initial runs with two of the three theoretical models failing to produce solutions.  The 
first of these models also specified the direct paths between social exchange and 
safety behaviours.  The second alternative model included the additional active-
proactive safety climate cross effects. The failure of these models may be linked to 
the addition of too many pathways given the small sample size. However, running 
the full mediation model did not prove problematic.  Examination of the modification 
indices in the mediation model recommended the inclusion of a direct path from 
AOSC-MP to AGSC-CP and several error covariances.  As shown in Table 9.5 the 
independence model was easily rejected and the hypothesised mediation model 
proved only a fair fit to the data. 
 
Table 9.5 Assessment of Fit and Model Differences for the Work-level Model of 
Social Exchange and Safety Climate (CSA Group-level) 
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
1.Independence   1424.84*** 55 - - - - 
2.Mediation  
 
 101.64*** 36 .95 .93 .06 .12 
(.09,.16) 
3.Part Mediation   90.75*** 35 .96 .94 .05 .12 
(.08,.16) 
4.Part Mediation& Error    72.03***   34 .97 .95 .05 .10 
(.05,.14) 
5.Final Model    51.87* 32 .99 .96 .05 .07 
(.00,.11) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #1-#2  1323.2*** 19     
 Difference (Δχ2) #2-#3  10.89*** 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #3-#4  18.72*** 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #4-#5  20.16*** 1     
Note.  χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR = 
Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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The standardised structural coefficients for the final model are represented in Figure 
9.6 and the full measurement model is included in Appendix J.  Chi square difference 
tests indicated a significant improvement in model fit for the final model which was 
found to provide a theoretically justifiable solution with excellent fit.  As found for 
the ILAS derived model partial support of Hypothesis 12 was again found using the 
CSA derived indicators.  However, the splitting of AOSC-M and AGSC-S into active 
and proactive dimensions served to clarify how the chain of psycho-social influence 
on safety operates down the organisational hierarchy.   
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Work Group 
SB Proactive
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Figure 9.6.  Significant standardised coefficients for the CSA derived group-level 
model of social exchange, safety climate and group safety behaviours. 
All scales represented with a GROUP subscript are derived using CSA aggregation methods including   
OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; GSC-
CA= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; GSC-CP= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Proactive; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-Member Exchange; GMX=Group 
Member Exchange.  Work Group Safety Behaviours- Active and Proactive are derived by direct 
aggregation of  Individual Safety Behaviours of Workers using the ILSA approach.    
 
 
 
9.4.1. Direct and Indirect Effects for Social Exchange 
Parameter estimates for the group-level direct and indirect pathways between Social 
Exchange constructs, the dimensions of Safety Climate and aggregated Group Safety 
Behaviours for the final model are presented in Tables 9.6 and 9.7.   
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Table 9.6 Parameter Estimates for Social Exchange effects in the Work-level 
Model of Social Exchange and Safety Climate (CSA Group-level)  
 
Path 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
 
 St Unst SE  Unst SE  Unst SE 
AMMX          
AOSC-MA  0.99 0.88*** 
(0.75,1.01) 
.067     0.88*** 
 
.07 
AOSC-MP  0.83 0.68*** 
(0.53,0.83) 
.076     0.68*** 
 
.08 
AGSC-SA      0.51*** .09  0.51*** .09 
AGSC-SP      0.30*** .07  0.30*** .07 
AGSC-CA      0.18** .06  0.18** .06 
AGSC-CP     0.40*** .08  0.40*** .08 
GSB-WA     0.13** .04  0.13** .04 
GSB-WP     0.29*** .06  0.29*** .06 
ALMX          
AGSC-SA  0.45 0.46*** 
(0.26,0.66) 
.10  
 
  0.46*** 
 
.10 
AGSC-SP  0.63 0.55*** 
(0.38,0.71) 
.085  
 
  0.55*** 
 
.08 
AGSC-CA      0.17** .05  0.17** .05 
AGSC-CP     0.13n.s .07  0.13n.s .07 
GSB-WA     0.12** .04  0.12** .04 
GSB-WP     0.09n.s .05  0.09n.s .05 
AGMX          
AGSC-CA  0.72 0.85*** 
(0.56,1.13) 
.15  
 
  0.85*** 
 
.15 
AGSC-CP 0.35 0.38** 
(0.14,0.63) 
.12  
 
  0.38** 
 
.12 
GSB-WA     0.59*** .11  0.59*** .11 
GSB-WP     0.28** .09  0.28** .09 
Note. St= Standardised; Unst= Unstandardised; Estimate 95% confidence interval in parenthesis, 
SE=Standard Error,  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001;AOSC-MA= Aggregate Organisation Safety 
Climate-Managers Active; AOSC-MP= Aggregate Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Proactive; 
AGSC-SA=Aggregate Group Safety Climate-Supervisors Active; AGSC-SP=Aggregate Group Safety 
Climate-Supervisors Proactive; AGSC-CA= Aggregate Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; 
AGSC-CP= Aggregate Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; GSB-WA= Group Safety 
Behaviours- Workers Active; GSB-WP= Group Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; AMMX= 
Aggregate Manager-Member Exchange; ALMX=Aggregate Leader-Member Exchange; 
AGMX=Aggregate Group Member Exchange. 
 
Examination of the unstandardised structural equations for the final model indicated 
significant positive relationships between AMMX and both Active and Proactive 
AOSC-M.  The direct paths between ALMX and both AGSC-SA and AGSC-SP 
were also significant.  Positive relationships were also observed between AGMX and 
both AGSC-CA and AGSC-CP when ALMX and AMMX were controlled.  The 
modelling of direct effects for the social exchange indicators across work-levels 
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showed that the quality of social exchanges experienced within work-groups has a 
different pattern of association with workers’ perceptions of active and proactive 
safety climate.  The effects overall were medium to large, with the strongest 
associations being observed between both AMMX and the active dimension AOSC-
M; and AGMX with the active dimension of coworker safety climate.  In contrast, 
the relatively weakest associations were observed for group- member social 
exchange and proactive group safety climate-coworker and leader-member exchange 
with the proactive dimension of supervisor safety climate.   
 
In relation to the indirect impact of social exchange variables on group-level safety 
climate the indirect pathways from AMMX to the four Supervisor and Coworker 
climate dimensions were statistically significant.  The indirect effects of AMMX on 
Group Safety Behaviour were slightly weaker for the active dimension than for the 
proactive subscale.  While the indirect effects of ALMX on Coworker Safety Climate 
may be considered small, the path to GSC-CA was significant. This pattern of 
association was replicated with the small indirect effects found between ALMX and 
both group safety behaviour subscales.  Medium to large indirect effects were also 
observed for the influence of AGMX on both Active and Proactive Group safety 
behaviours. 
 
Overall these results show a relatively consistent pattern of association between 
constructs when CSA aggregation is applied compared to ILAS or individual-level 
analysis.  However, the separation of management and supervisor safety climate into 
active and proactive components allows more concise examination of how the 
quality of social exchanges occurring within work-groups are differentially 
associated with the perceived level of specific compliance or participative safety 
practices taking place.  
 
9.4.2. Direct and Indirect Effects for Safety Climate 
In relation to the safety climate measures a one point increase in work-group ratings 
of active management safety practices resulted in a significant 0.58 point increase in 
their ratings of active safety climate at the supervisory level. The respective increase 
in the proactive domain was marginally less at 0.44 scale points.  Moving down the 
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organisational hierarchy, a one unit increase in AGSC-SA resulted in a 0.36 unit 
increase in Coworker Active Climate.  While the direct path between AGSC-SP and 
AGSC-CP was significant in the full mediation model, when the path between 
AOSCMP and AGSC-CP was included, this mediation pathway was no longer 
significant. However, the nonsignificant AGSC-SP to AGSC-CP pathway was 
retained in the final model as fit indices were reduced when it was dropped from the 
model.  In line with previous results strong, positive associations were found 
between coworker climate and group safety behaviours.  
 
Table 9.7 Parameter Estimates for Safety Climate effects in the Work-level 
Model of Social Exchange and Safety Climate (CSA Group-level) 
 
Path 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
 
 St Unst SE  Unst SE  Unst SE 
AOSC-MA          
AGSC-SA  0.56 0.58*** 
(0.37,0.78) 
.10     0.58*** 
 
.10 
AGSC-CA      0.21** .07  0.21** .07 
GSB-WA     0.15** .05  0.15** .05 
AOSC-MP          
AGSC-SP  0.47 0.44*** 
(0.25,0.62) 
.09  
 
  0.44*** 
 
.09 
AGSC-CP 0.51 0.48*** 
(0.21,0.75) 
.14  0.10n.s 
 
.06  0.58*** 
 
.11 
GSB-WP     0.42*** .08  0.42*** .08 
AGSC-SA          
AGSC-CA  0.41 0.36*** 
(0.19,0.53) 
.09  
 
  0.36*** 
 
.09 
GSB-WA     0.25*** .06  0.25*** .06 
AGSC-SP          
AGSC-CP 0.23 0.23n.s 
(-0.02,0.49) 
.13  
 
  0.23n.s 
 
.13 
GSB-WP     0.17n.s .10  0.17n.s .10 
AGSC-CA          
GSB-WA 0.78 0.70*** 
(0.54,0.86) 
.08  
 
  0.70*** 
 
.09 
AGSC-CP          
GSB-WP 0.76 0.73*** 
(0.55,0.91) 
.09  
 
  0.73*** 
 
.09 
Note. N=77; St= Standardised; Unst= Unstandardised; Estimate 95% confidence interval in 
parenthesis, SE=Standard Error,  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 AOSC-MA= Aggregate Organisation 
Safety Climate-Managers Active; AOSC-MP= Aggregate Organisation Safety Climate-Managers 
Proactive; AGSC-SA=Aggregate Group Safety Climate-Supervisors Active; AGSC-SP=Aggregate 
Group Safety Climate-Supervisors Proactive; AGSC-CA= Aggregate Group Safety Climate- 
Coworkers Active; AGSC-CP= Aggregate Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; GSB-WA= 
Group Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; GSB-WP= Group Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive. 
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The unstandardised coefficients for the final model indicated that the indirect 
relationships between the active dimensions of AOSC-M and AGSC-C represented a 
small but significant effect.  Due to the specification of the direct effects between the 
proactive subscales of AOSC-M and AGSC-C the indirect relationships was not 
significant, however the total effects for this pathway were significant.  The indirect 
pathways from the active and proactive AOSC-M dimensions to the corresponding 
GSB-W scales were both statistically significant.  The positive associations between 
AGSC-SA and Active Group Safety Behaviours were fully mediated by the 
corresponding coworker safety climate dimensions however the indirect effects of 
AGSC-SP on Proactive GSB was not significant.  
 
To determine the practical significance of the CSA findings, disturbance terms from 
the structural equations for the endogenous variables in the model were assessed.  In 
the final model the percentage of explained variance for all variables are considered 
large effects.  Results indicated that 61% of variance in Active Work-group Safety 
Behaviours and 58% of Proactive safety practices (51% and 40% respectively based 
on reduced form equations) may be explained by our understanding of the facet-
specific safety climate and foundation social exchange climates operating within the 
organisation.  The effect size for the active safety behaviour dimension is less than 
that observed in the individual- level model, however in all other instances the 
proportion of variance in safety climate that is explained by the model is greater 
using the CSA method than the ILAS or individual- level approach, supporting 
Hypothesis 15. 
 
Furthermore, our understanding of how the processes of social exchange and safety 
climate impact on individuals’ safety behaviours is enhanced by splitting the more 
distal safety climate constructs into active and proactive dimensions.  Working down 
the organisational hierarchy, workers’ ratings of the quality of social exchanges 
managers engage in with their subordinates was found to be strongly aligned with 
workers’ perceptions of management’s commitment to safety.  This effect was most 
pronounced for the active dimension of management safety climate where AMMX 
explained 97% of the variance.  In comparison, 69% of variance in the Proactive 
subscale was explained.   
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The influence of ALMX and both active and proactive aspects of AOSC-M in 
combination accounted for 83% and 93% of the variance in AGSC-SA and AGSC-
SP respectively.  When accounting for the variance in both the active and proactive 
AGSC-C subscales slightly different predictive equations were derived, however in 
both cases over 80%of variance can be accounted for (Active= 87%; Proactive 82%).  
These effects are substantially stronger than observed with the alternate 
methodologies applying the single construct operationalisation of management and 
supervisor safety climate.  The separation of management and supervisor safety 
climate scales into active and proactive dimensions allowed a clearer picture of the 
chain of psycho-social influence to emerge.   
 
9.5. Discussion 
My overall objective of this chapter was to investigate how the climate for social 
exchange influences safety climate and workers’ active and proactive safety 
performance.  By using a level-of-analysis approach rather than global treatment of 
constructs in this set of analyses, it was possible to see the differential impact that 
social exchange and safety climate dimensions have on workers’ safety behaviours.  
The use of the multilevel approach to construct operationalisation and data treatment 
constitutes one of the major theoretical contributions of this thesis. 
 
9.5.1. Climate for Social Exchange 
Hypotheses 13 and 14 proposed that high quality social exchanges would support 
positive perceptions of safety climate at the corresponding work-level and that the 
impact of social exchange climate on safety behaviours would be fully mediated by 
positive safety climates within the organisational hierarchy. Research to date has 
found evidence of the safety benefits to be gained from organisations providing 
supportive environments (Nahrgang et al., 2011), however the main theoretical and 
empirical focus has been on leadership style and generic organisational support. The 
importance of worker inter-relationships in predictive safety models has also been 
implied in a recent meta-analysis by the strong associations found between individual 
safety behaviours and both internal group processes (Christian et al., 2009) and 
coworker support (Nahrgang et al.). However, the issue of poor construct distinction 
between safety climate, leadership and coworker support scales has been raised as a 
concern.  To minimise this potential confound, I adopted a levels-of-analysis 
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approach, as recommended by Zohar (2010), in which social exchange and safety 
climate constructs were separated into well-defined work-level dimensions. 
 
Results for all three analyses of the full social exchange model indicate that workers’ 
perceptions of the quality of social exchanges occurring at each level of the 
organisational hierarchy are closely and positively associated with their perception of 
safety climate at the corresponding level.  Furthermore, the distal influences of 
management and supervisor workplace social exchanges and their perceived 
commitment to safety were found to indirectly impact individual safety behaviours 
through the establishment of strong group safety norms represented by coworker 
safety climate.  As such both Hypotheses 12 and 14 were supported. 
 
The initial examination of the zero-order correlations for individual and both group 
level analytic treatments showed a pattern of strong to moderate positive correlations 
between safety climate, social exchange and individual safety behaviours offering 
initial support for the full mediation model between social exchange and safety 
behaviours.  In particular, strong associations were observed between social 
exchange and safety climate variables at the same work-level; the largest of these 
associations being at the management level.  This strong correlation may be due to 
workers adopting an overall heuristic to gauge the positive or negative performance 
of their managers across the range of social exchange and safety climate items.  
Indeed the trend for the magnitude of effects for the social exchange -safety climate 
relationship to diminish down the organisational hierarchy indicates that workers are 
more capable of differentiating between social interaction referents and safety 
commitment referents when rating more physically and functionally proximal 
organisational agents such as coworkers and their immediate supervisors than 
managers who have a more distal relationship. 
 
Of note were the relatively weaker associations observed between group- member 
exchange and both active and proactive coworker safety behaviours.  When 
comparing across methodologies the relationship trends between social exchange and 
safety climate were largely replicated when utilising the individual- level analysis 
and ILSA approach, with slightly weaker correlations being observed in the ILSA 
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model.  In particular, aggregating the data to the group-level resulted in a substantial 
attenuation of the pathway between-group  member social exchange and coworker 
proactive practices.  In contrast, no reduction was observed with the active subscale.  
For the CSA model the relatively weaker association between-group  social exchange 
and the proactive coworker safety climate dimension was replicated, however the 
relationship with the active subscale was substantially increased compared to the 
parameter estimate obtained for this pathway in either the individual or ILSA 
models.   
 
Of particular interest in the CSA model was the pattern of social exchange -safety 
climate associations across the organisational work-levels.  The separation of the 
management and supervisor safety climate scales into active and proactive 
dimensions in the CSA model showed a degree of differentiation in the relationships 
observed with the social exchange antecedents.  For example, at the management 
level, MMX was most closely associated with active management practices (97% of 
variance explained) compared to proactive climate (69%).  In contrast, at the group-
level LMX was more strongly associated with the proactive dimension of 
supervisory safety climate than with supervisor active safety practices.  When 
considered in combination with the validation results reported in Chapter 7 these 
differential associations indicated that front-line workers clearly distinguished 
between safety and relationship-related climate referents as proposed by Zohar and 
Luria (2005).  
 
As no previous research has examined climate for social exchange in a safety context 
applying the collective group referent used here, replication of my results is required 
to ascertain the generalisability of the relationships observed.  Furthermore, in 
making comparison with the extant literature below it is important to note that 
general organisational climate and the foundation climate for social exchange 
described in this thesis are not theoretically the same.  Instead the climate for social 
exchange may be considered as only one facet within the broader conceptualisation 
of organisational climate as defined by James and colleagues (L. A. James & James, 
1989; Jones & James, 1979).  As described in Chapter 2, general organisational 
climate includes components such as leader support and facilitation, autonomy and 
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workgroup cooperation; therefore it is plausible to argue that constructs represented 
in the climate for social exchange fit within the scope of general organisational 
climate.  
 
That being established, my results are consistent with Neal et al.’s (2000) proposal 
that general organisational climates not only predict facet-specific climates but that 
the facet-specific climate mediates the influence of more general climates on 
outcomes relevant to the domain of enquiry.  The strength of the associations 
observed in my research are generally stronger than past findings investigating 
general organisation climate as a context for safety climate development (DeJoy et 
al., 2004; see Larsson et al., 2008; Neal et al., 2000; Silva et al., 2004; Wallace et al., 
2006).  In a hospital setting, Neal and colleagues showed that the relationship 
between general organisational climate and individual safety behaviours was fully 
mediated by safety climate (Neal et al., 2000).  However, as Neal et al. 
operationalised general and safety climate as individual- level constructs the 
magnitude of the strong, positive relationship (r= 0.52) they found between 
organisational climate and safety climate should be compared against the range of 
social exchange - safety climate correlations reported for my individual-level model 
(r values ranged from 0.56 - 0.83), all of which were stronger than Neal et al.’s 
result.   
 
Silva and colleagues (2004) also found that general climate explained 52% of the 
variance in safety climate. When compared against the effect sizes found for 
organisation-level management safety climate and group-level supervisor safety 
climate using the ILSA and CSA models, the results of my study again show stronger 
effects.  In this instance the magnitude of effects observed in my research indicates 
that climate for social exchange provides a viable measure of a foundation climate 
influential in the safety domain.  
 
Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) have described how social exchange theory provides 
a conceptual framework to explore key aspects of organisational behaviour in a 
safety context. They showed that both perceived organisational support and LMX 
had significant associations with safety communication and that LMX also showed 
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significant associations with commitment.  Hofmann and Morgeson concluded that 
the more proximal exchange relationship with direct supervisors was more critical in 
fostering better safety communication, commitment to safety and fewer injuries in 
group leaders than more distal organisational support.  Even though they collected 
data from supervisor and group leader dyads, rather than front-line workers, the 
replication of stronger bivariate correlations between more proximal social exchange 
relations and safety climates in my study indicates that the social exchange 
relationship with safety variables appear consistent across samples. 
 
A comparison of effect sizes for social exchange can be made with Wallace et al.’s 
(2006) study examining the mediated relationship between foundation climates, 
safety climate and accidents.  As part of their model, Wallace et al. examined the 
association between organisational support (using a generic organisation referent) 
and supervisor safety climate at the group-level of analysis.  While I did not model 
this cross level association, a comparison of Wallace et al.’s group-level correlations 
against my ILSA results showed that the bivariate associations between MMX and 
group-level supervisor safety climate were considerably stronger in my study (ILSA 
r=.68 compared to r=.48).  This difference may simply be an artefact of the sample 
populations; however an alternative explanation for these results may be that the 
alignment of climate constructs within work-levels optimises the magnitude of 
associations observed.  Additionally, in my study the use of a specific management 
referent and collective focus on the group rather than the individual in all climate 
scales may have contributed to the stronger associations. 
 
In my initial review of the social exchange and safety literature, I identified that two 
key issues required greater attention. These were the need to ensure construct 
distinction between safety-specific climates and foundation climates associated with 
leadership or social support and the importance of distinguishing between 
organisational referents in climate inventories.  I have argued that without an explicit 
focal referent, that allows the clear differentiation of item content tapping social 
support and the safety practices of the different agents across the organisational 
hierarchy, the precision of safety climate survey instruments is likely to be 
compromised and the interplay between constructs potentially confounded.  The 
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strength of associations found in my study offer some support to the validity of this 
argument, however further replication of study protocols is required to assess if the 
results are an artifact of the sample.   
 
Furthermore, by comparing results obtained using individual and group-level data, I 
have been able to show that while the pattern and strength of relationships are 
relatively robust across statistical treatments, subtle differences emerge when the 
nonindependence of organisational data is recognised and group-level analysis 
undertaken.  For example, for the individual-level model, management safety climate 
was shown to have both a direct and indirect influence on the active and proactive 
aspects of group-level coworker safety climate.  Using the ILSA approach the direct 
influence of management safety climate was shown to impact proactive group 
practices but not active safety practices.  When the CSA approach was applied 
management’s engagement in proactive safety practices was shown to directly 
influence proactive normative safety practices (overriding the direct influence of 
supervisors).   
 
Additionally, when workers’ perceptions of the quality of social exchanges were 
modelled using the CSA methodology, the patterns of association with safety climate 
at the corresponding level of the organisational hierarchy were shown to be stronger 
than those observed in the two alternate data treatments.  Also, the unexpected 
negative association between LMX and active coworker safety climate observed in 
the ILSA analysis was not replicated when the CSA approach was used.  In the CSA 
model the indirect effects of group based leader-member exchange showed a small 
but significant positive relationship with coworkers’ active safety practices and a 
nonsignificant positive relationship with the proactive subscale.  These disparities 
indicate that the nature of the safety climate – social exchange relationship at the 
supervisor level may be more complex than previously considered.  For example, it 
may be that some supervisors who are rated by workers as having relatively lower 
LMX scores (perhaps having a more authoritarian style of leadership) are still 
successful in establishing a positive workgroup safety climate, in particular in terms 
of worker compliance.   
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Overall my results support the proposal that establishing high quality social 
interactions amongst workers as a foundation climate operating across levels of the 
organisation will assist in the promotion of positive organisation and group-level 
safety climates.   
 
9.5.2. Safety Climate and Safety Behaviours 
Within the broader scope of the multilevel social exchange safety model, it was also 
possible to test the hypothesis that the differential influence of safety climate on 
individual safety behaviours would be best represented by a fully mediated model 
operating through the active and proactive safety commitment of coworkers 
(Hypothesis 12). My results indicated that a partial mediation model, including the 
direct influences of more distal organisation-level management safety climate on 
coworker safety climate dimensions, provided the best fit to the data, with only 
minor variations across the three analysis methodologies.  While the hypothesised 
full mediation model proposed in Hypothesis 12 was not supported, the partial 
mediation model including the direct influences of management safety commitment 
on proactive coworker safety climate in the ILSA and CSA models, and both active 
and proactive coworker climate in the individual-level modelling, is theoretically 
justifiable.  
 
To summarise the pattern of within construct safety climate associations found in my 
study, the most distal dimension of safety climate, associated with management 
commitment to safety, was found to have a major impact on supervisory safety 
practices.  The influence of both management and supervisor climate dimensions had 
strong associations with both the active and proactive subscale of coworker climate.  
While all three analytic treatments produced generally consistent results, overall the 
CSA model, distinguishing between active and proactive dimensions of management 
and supervisor safety climate, provided the clearest picture of the chain of influence 
impacting on workers’ safety behaviours. 
 
When individual-level modelling was undertaken, safety climate and social exchange 
accounted for a greater percentage of variance in active safety behaviours (82%) than 
proactive behaviours (53%).  Furthermore, my individual-level results conflict with 
past meta-analytic results (Christian et al., 2009; S. Clarke, 2006; Nahrgang et al.) 
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that have found safety climate to have a stronger relationship with workers’ 
participative safety behaviours than compliance.  The magnitude of these 
associations and the increased relationship between safety climate and active safety 
practices of workers is most likely associated with the expansion of the safety 
climate construct to include coworker commitment to safety, but may also be linked 
to response biases in the data.   
 
To expand, in the two group-level analyses, the explained variance in the active 
safety performance dimension was substantially reduced (Individual- level =82%, 
ILSA=51%: CSA= 61%), however the same degree of attenuation was not found for 
the proactive subscale (Individual- level =53%, ILSA=61%: CSA= 58%).  As argued 
previously, employee ratings on the active safety behaviour scale are likely to be the 
most susceptible to social desirability responses.  The subsequent aggregation of data 
to the group-level may reduce the impact of such cases either intentionally through 
the averaging of responses across the group or inadvertently through the omission of 
anomalous data from the analysis (i.e., workers who were the only respondents for 
their work group).   
 
Despite this statistical aberration the magnitude of effects between the group safety 
climate and both active and proactive safety performance were still substantially 
higher than organisational safety climate correlations previously reported in meta-
analyses (Christian et al., 2009) or observed more recently in Jiang et al.’s study 
(2010).  In addition, the explained variance in workers’ active and proactive safety 
practices was more modest when using the individual-level modelling and ILSA 
approach compared to the CSA analysis.  I argue that this was due to the separation 
of management and supervisor safety climate into active and proactive dimensions 
allowing the linkages between aligned safety practices at the different organisational 
work-levels to be modelled more effectively.  For example, a worker’s willingness to 
follow rules such as wearing protective safety equipment (workers’ active safety 
practices) is likely to be strongly associated with the provision of correct equipment 
and monitoring of rule compliance (management and supervisory active safety 
climate) when their coworkers are also complying with the procedure (coworker 
active safety climate).  Likewise the uptake and engagement in safety training by 
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workers (proactive safety practice) is likely to be strongly associated with workers’ 
perceptions of the provision of quality training programs by management (proactive 
management safety climate).  
 
In terms of the different patterns of association anticipated to occur between safety 
climate and the two safety behaviour scales, when comparing results for the 
individual- level and ILSA models it appears that the active safety behaviours of 
workers are more closely linked to the normative practices of coworkers than 
workers’ proactive practices.  However the extent of this differentiation is reduced in 
the CSA model where the link between the group norm and safety performance of 
individuals is equally strong for both active and proactive practices.   
 
My results are therefore generally consistent with Jiang et al.’s (2010) findings as 
they also reported correlations of similar magnitude between workers’ perceptions of 
their colleagues’ safety knowledge and behaviour, and self-reported compliance and 
participative safety practices.  In addition, Jiang et al. also identified stronger 
correlations between workers’ safety performance and safety norms compared to 
management safety climate; however the overall effects were far weaker than those 
found in my study.  Jiang et al. found that unit-level safety climate moderated the 
influence of group norms on safety behaviours such that both compliance and 
participative worker practices were strongest in work-groups with both high 
management commitment to safety and positive safety norms.  As the main focus of 
Jiang et al.’s study was on the role coworkers’ normative safety behaviour plays in 
workplace safety, the similarities observed between their and my results reinforce the 
importance of establishing positive group safety norms in both Chinese and 
Australian workplaces.    
 
While the impact of coworkers’ normative behaviours on an individual’s intentions 
and performance has been well established in the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
literature (Ajzen, 1991), only recently has a TPB model been applied in the safety 
domain (Fogarty & Shaw, 2010). Fogarty and Shaw found that group safety norms 
mediated the link between management safety attitudes, workers’ intentions to 
violate procedures and self-reported violations.  These outcome measures can be 
conceptualised as the opposite of safety compliance practices used in my research.  
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The similar pattern of associations found in my study and Fogarty and Shaw’s results 
provides evidence that the relationships investigated are robust whether measuring 
outcomes negatively as violations or positively as safety compliance. 
 
A key finding of my study is therefore the important role coworker commitment to 
safety plays in the workplace.  My results indicate that the distal influences of 
management and supervisor commitment to safety exert their influence on individual 
workers’ safety behaviours indirectly through the establishment of strong group 
safety norms represented by coworker safety climate.  This effect was sustained 
across data treatments and was supported by supplemental analysis which showed 
that coworker commitment to safety accounted for additional variance in worker’s 
safety behaviours when the influence of management and supervisor commitment to 
safety was controlled for. Indeed a main objective of this research was to investigate 
the relationships between the work-level based safety climate dimensions, with the 
intention of advancing our understanding of how the separate dimensions of safety 
climate impact on each other and individual workers’ safety behaviours.   
 
While little research to date has examined the interrelations between safety climate 
dimensions, Tomás et al. (1999) found significant relationships between safety 
climate (representing mainly management actions and safety goals ), supervisors’ 
safety responses and coworkers’ safety responses.  Their modelling did not support 
the direct impact of safety climate on coworkers’ safety response.  Instead they 
identified significant direct paths between supervisor safety responses and workers’ 
safety compliance behaviours.  In contrast to Tomás et al.’s findings, the inclusion of 
the direct pathways between supervisor safety climate and workers’ safety 
performance were not supported in my modelling.  However, my results do indicate 
the importance of both the direct and indirect influence of management and 
supervisor safety climate on coworker safety norms and show how both distal 
climate dimensions indirectly impact on active and proactive safety performance.  To 
clarify further, I found stronger total effects for the relationship between 
management safety climate and proactive worker behaviours than for active 
behaviours.  In contrast, my results also indicate that the relationship between 
supervisor climate and workers’ active safety performance is stronger than for 
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proactive practices.  Again, the nature of these relationships was most clearly defined 
using the CSA methodology in which supervisor and management safety climate was 
separated into active and proactive subscales, supporting the greater utility of this 
approach to group-level analysis. 
 
In sum, these results have both theoretical and practical implications in that they 
reinforce the long established notion in the extant literature and with safety 
practitioners that managers and supervisors play a key role in workplace safety, 
while expanding our understanding to show that this influence manifests through the 
establishment of positive coworker safety norms in the workplace.  When reviewing 
the safety literature, it was apparent that research to date has focused on investigating 
the more formal influences of management and supervisors on safety, to the neglect 
of the influences exerted by coworkers.  My results add weight to the argument that 
establishing a positive safety climate across all the levels of the organisation is 
instrumental in both reinforcing  the importance of rule compliance and encouraging 
workers to engage in more proactive safety activities.  While supervisors play a 
particularly vital role in encouraging, and ensuring workers comply with, safety 
procedures, it appears that higher-level management commitment to safety has a 
more telling role in fostering worker engagement in proactive safety practices.  
Importantly, establishing high quality social exchange interactions amongst 
employees at all levels of the organisation will assist in the promotion of positive 
organisation and group-level safety climates. 
 
The process undertaken in my thesis highlights the efficacy of using CSA 
aggregation when functional work-groups are the central level of analysis.  The 
variation in factor structures and subsequent SEM results found using the various 
methodologies justify Shannon and Norman’s (2009) concerns regarding the need for 
researchers to account for the nonindependence of data in their samples when 
deriving factor structures as well as when modelling predictive relationships.  While 
the issue of using correct measurement metrics for scale development at aggregate 
levels of analysis is far from simple, one theoretical implication of my thesis is that 
not applying the appropriate ILSA or CSA techniques for each construct as 
recommended by Peterson and Castro (2006) may be detrimental to the results 
achieved. 
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In sum my results add weight to Zohar’s (2008, 2010) recent recommendations that 
researchers should seek to understand the patterns of relationships between general 
and facet-specific climates across the organisational hierarchy.  As no studies 
examining with the relationships between foundation climates, facet-specific safety 
climate and safety outcomes have investigated the three dimensions of social 
exchange, as undertaken in my thesis, my results contribute to the extant literature by 
advancing our understanding of how supportive environments promote safety in the 
workplace.
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10. Overall Discussion 
10.1. Introduction 
Accidents and injuries in organisations continue to be a major concern to all vested 
parties, as researchers and safety practitioners strive to identify ways to minimise 
their occurrence.  One avenue of investigation has identified safety climate as a lead 
indicator of an organisation’s safety standing. The general aim of my research was to 
examine the relationships between key organisational predictors of employee safety 
outcomes by developing and testing a multilevel model of safety climate and social 
exchange using both individual and group-levels of analysis.  Specifically the 
objectives of my research were:  
 
 To develop a measure of safety climate, using a level-of -analysis approach 
that incorporates the active and proactive safety practices of organisational 
agents. 
 To examine organisational differences in safety climate profiles representing 
climate level, strength and variability.  
 To investigate how the relationship between employee perceptions of 
management, supervisor and work-group commitment to safety (i.e., levels of 
safety climate) influence individual employees’ safety performance and 
safety outcomes (e.g., injuries, near misses and micro-accidents). 
 To investigate how the climate for social exchange, including the 
management, supervisory and coworker social exchanges, influences 
perceived safety climate level and workers’ safety performance.  
 To examine potential differences in the hypothesised construct structures and 
relationships for the multilevel model of safety climate when analysed at the 
individual and group-level. 
 
In this chapter I discuss the key findings of my study.  I also identify methodological 
strengths and limitations of the research in terms of the conceptual framework for 
organisational safety research described in Chapter 1, which guided my research.  
Theoretical and practical implications are described and three ideas presented for 
future research to lead on from my findings that address the themes identified in the 
safety research framework.   
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10.2. Key Findings 
 
10.2.1. Validation of scales 
The first phase of my research focused on validating scales incorporated in the 
proposed multilevel operationalisation of safety climate.  While determining the 
content range and dimensionality of safety climate has long been acknowledged as a 
problematic issue in the safety literature (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010; Guldenmund, 
2000), in line with Zohar’s (2010) recommendations I adopted a stratified approach 
to construct development using clearly defined organisational referents to improve 
the alignment of item content within and across organisation-levels.  By adding 
coworker safety practices to Zohar and Luria’s existing organisational and group-
level operationalisation of safety climate many of the dimensions previously 
identified as components of safety climate (e.g., reporting, monitoring, procedures, 
safety awareness, training, communication, role of safety reps, coworker support) 
were incorporated at the appropriate level of analysis ensuring functional relevance 
to the work-level concerned .   
 
The pattern and strength of associations observed in both exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analyses supported the validity of a three-level model of safety 
climate, distinguishing between management, supervisor and coworker commitment 
to safety.  A two-factor structure representing the active and proactive safety 
practices of coworkers was supported when tested using both individual and group-
level factor analyses. Different factor solutions emerged for the more distal 
management and supervisor safety climate dimensions, with a two-factor solution 
representing active and proactive safety practices for each scale only emerging when 
tested at the group-level.  My results support the utility of adopting a level-of-
analysis approach in the operationalisation of the safety climate construct.   
 
Furthermore, expanding the level-of-analysis approach facilitated the 
operationalisation of climate for social exchange as a potential antecedent of safety 
climate.  As Zohar and Luria (2005) have argued that constructs that fuse leadership 
style and safety priorities are problematic, by using clearly defined referents it was 
possible to ensure the discriminant validity between relation-based and safety 
focused constructs in a rigorous and theoretically meaningful manner.  The factor 
 231 
 Discussion 
 
 
validation of the three proposed social exchange scales, tapping workers’ social 
exchanges with management, supervisors and coworkers, showed that all scales had 
a one-dimensional structure.  Importantly the use of a collective referent shift to the 
group, rather than on individual dyadic social exchanges and more specific 
management referents in the leader scales, did not compromise the psychometric 
properties of these scales.  These changes facilitated the treatment of all three social 
exchange constructs as dimensions of a foundation climate for social exchange. A 
further key finding was that the fully stratified work-level model of social exchange 
and safety climate provided a superior fit compared to the global construct domain 
model, offering support for the use of first order safety climate and social exchange 
variables in predictive models. 
 
In addition the splitting of safety performance into active and proactive dimensions 
and establishing the discriminant validity between coworker safety climate and 
workers’ self-reported safety behaviours offered the opportunity to examine safety 
performance (one of the core constructs used in safety research) in a more critical 
manner. In particular my results showed how attribution and social desirability 
response biases differentially impact on the two dimensions of self-report safety 
behaviours.  In particular the active dimension of workers’ safety performance 
incorporating typically “within job role” safety expectancies, is more likely to be 
subject to response biases than the proactive dimension incorporating “beyond job 
role” or safety citizenship expectancies (Hofmann et al., 2003). 
   
10.2.2. Global Safety Climate and Outcomes 
 While establishing the validity of scales used in research is paramount, Zohar (2010) 
recently called for safety research to shift its focus away from definitional issues to 
functional processes and explanatory models using a level-of-analysis approach.  
Consistent with this, the second phase of my research modelled the association 
between safety climate, individual safety behaviours and safety outcomes within the 
broader social context of the organisation using both individual-level and group-level 
analysis.  To replicate the general trend within safety research, I first modelled the 
safety climate -safety outcomes relationship using a global conceptualisation of 
safety climate.  This analysis allowed direct comparisons with existing studies, which 
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subsequently allowed me to conclude that the addition of coworker safety climate 
added to the predictive utility of the construct.     
 
My results for the individual-level data analysis indicated that a direct relationship 
between global psychological safety climate and both safety behaviours and 
outcomes provided the best fit to the data.  In contrast the proposed full mediation 
model was supported at the group-level of analysis.  A strong relationship between 
global safety climate and safety behaviours was observed across all models. The 
substantial increases in effect sizes compared to results reported in meta-analyses 
(Christian et al., 2009; S. Clarke, 2006) supported the predictive utility of the global 
safety climate construct when active and proactive coworker safety practices were 
added. Overall stronger construct relationships were identified in the group-level 
analyses compared to the individual- level analyses.    
 
The small effect size observed when predicting individual safety outcomes was 
relatively consistent with past findings based on individual- level retrospective, self-
report data (Christian et al., 2009).  However the increased effect size in my group-
level results was greater than those observed for group-level studies using self-report 
injury data.  These relatively larger effects may be attributed to the inclusion of 
coworker safety climate in the global construct and also the use of minor injuries and 
near miss incidents as safety outcomes.  Indeed the use of these two safety outcome 
indices proved to be very effective with the greater range and variability in the 
measures adding support to the utility of the data collection method and retrospective 
time span for incident recall adopted in my research.  
 
In combination the key findings from this chapter led me to conclude that group-
level analysis offers the best opportunity to track the relationship between safety 
climate and safety outcomes.  While strong direct associations exist between safety 
climate, workers’ safety behaviours and workers’ self-reported injuries and incidents 
when the influence of reporting biases in workers’ safety behaviours are controlled in 
group-level analysis it is clear that a mediation model provides the best description of 
the nature of the safety climate- outcomes relationship. 
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10.2.3. Climates for Social Exchange and Safety 
Having established the predictive validity of the global model of safety climate my 
next objective was to investigate the patterns of interaction between the dimensions 
of safety climate and their potential antecedents.  To date, empirical findings have 
indicated that the general organisational climate provides the context in which more 
specific facet climates, such as safety climate, emerge (Nahrgang et al., 2011; Neal et 
al., 2000).  Whereas the foundation climates so far examined in the safety literature 
have represented a variety of contextual workplace dimensions, my results showed 
strong direct links between dimensions of climate for social exchange and safety 
climate operationalised at the same hierarchical level of the organisation, and indirect 
links with workers’ safety behaviours.  The relationships between constructs were 
relatively robust across the different analytic treatments, with the exception that the 
strength of effects were generally attenuated when using individual- level data. 
 
When group-level analysis, using the CSA approach to data aggregation, was 
conducted the modelling of direct effects for the social exchange indicators across 
work-levels showed that the quality of social exchanges experienced within work-
groups has a differential pattern of association with workers’ perceptions of active 
and proactive safety climate.  The splitting of management and supervisor safety 
climate measures into active and proactive dimensions served to clarify how the 
chain of psycho-social influence on safety operates down the organisational 
hierarchy. As such my results indicated that in addition to differences in results 
occurring due to the level of analysis selected, applying different aggregation 
methodologies can also significantly influence findings. In particular, potentially 
important construct relationships may have been overlooked if the nested nature of 
organisational data was not taken into consideration.  
 
A key finding of my study is that establishing high quality social interactions 
amongst workers as a foundation climate operating across levels of the organisation 
will assist in the promotion of positive organisation and group-level safety climates. 
This finding is complimented by the evidence provided that while managers and 
supervisors’ commitment to safety play a key role in workplace safety, their 
influence on individual workers’ safety performance can be reinforced or diluted by 
the prevailing safety practices of coworkers.   Again while these relationships are 
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robust across the methodologies applied when group-level analysis using CSA 
derived construct are used the clearest and most theoretically justifiable 
representation of construct structures and relationships is produced. 
 
In combination my findings add empirical support to Zohar’s (2010) integrated 
model of safety climate and outcomes in which the process of sense-making is shown 
to provide a foundation for a modified version of the safety pyramid. In Zohar’s 
multilevel model the social and cognitive exchanges between leaders and workers 
play a crucial role in the formation of climate perceptions.  Safety climate in turn 
guides workers’ behaviours which underlie the occurrence of safety incidents and 
injuries.  In linking foundation climates, safety climate, individual workers’ 
behaviours, safety incidents and injuries as illustrated in Figure 10.1 my research 
provides empirical evidence to support Zohar’s safety pyramid.   
 
  
 
 
Figure 10.1. Work-level model of foundation and safety climate  
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; 
GSC-C= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers; MMX= Manager-Member Exchange; LMX=Leader-
Member Exchange; GMX=Group Member Exchange. 
 
However I would argue that if a metaphor for safety is to be applied, a safety iceberg 
is a more accurate representation of the nature of organisation safety; with injuries 
and accidents comprising the highly visible tip of the iceberg and prevailing safety 
environment forming the larger, yet unseen underlying structure that ultimately has 
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the potential to cause the most damage. The broader organisational climate, and in 
particular supportive social environment, then forms the ocean in which the safety 
iceberg is sustained.  My results indicate that to reduce the size of the tip of the 
iceberg, modifying the environment in which it exists may provide the greatest 
opportunity to achieve pervasive change. 
 
The following sections examine the methodological limitations and strengths of my 
research and directions for future research.  When discussing strengths and 
limitations the theoretical and practical implications are incorporated where 
applicable. 
 
10.3. Research Methodology Limitations 
The findings of my study should be interpreted with an awareness of the following 
limitations. 
 
10.3.1. Common method variance 
A general concern in psychological research is the use of self-report measures which 
may introduce systematic bias to the data (Campbell, 1982).  Spector (1986) also 
suggested that common method variance associated with a reliance on one form of 
response format can artificially inflate correlations between constructs.  
Consequently a possible limitation in this study was the use of a self-report 
questionnaire with a standard response scale for all climate scales.   However, 
support for the validity of self-report instruments has also been offered (Conway & 
Lance, 2010; Howard, 1994; Reio, 2010; Spector, 1994).  Spector argued that when 
employed within an appropriate design, surveys provide important and relatively 
effective measurement tools.  Conway and Lance (2010) also indicated that while 
misconceptions about the nature and the impact of common method bias abound, use 
of self-report data can be justified if researchers provide: 
 
(a) an argument for why self-reports are appropriate;  
(b) construct validity evidence;  
(c) [evidence of a ] lack of overlap in items for different constructs, and  
(d) evidence that authors took proactive design steps to mitigate threats of 
method effects (p.325). 
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In light of Conway and Lance’s (2010) statements, I would argue that the self-report 
instruments used in my thesis are clearly appropriate as the focus of study is 
obtaining individual workers’ perceptions of the state of safety in their organisation. 
Furthermore construct validity evidence has been provided and efforts to minimise 
item overlap and improve construct discriminant validity in all instruments have been 
described at length in the methodology section.   
 
10.3.2. Cross-sectional data 
A further common limitation of research within the broader field of psychology is the 
use of cross-sectional data.  Cross-sectional designs do not permit conclusions to be 
made regarding causal relations between constructs.  While structural equation 
modelling techniques allow a more stringent investigation of the direction of the 
relationships between constructs (Bollen, 1989), longitudinal designs need to be 
employed to infer causal relationships.  As such, while the mediation models 
proposed were successfully tested in this study, for any causal conclusions to be 
drawn regarding the temporal sequencing of the constructs, longitudinal studies 
would need to be undertaken.    
 
The issue of temporal sequencing is especially pertinent with regard to clarifying the 
causal relationships between safety climate and workplace injuries.  The issue of 
reverse causation continues to be an area of debate in the safety literature (Beus, 
Payne, et al., 2010; S. Clarke, 2006).  On the basis of their meta-analysis Beus, 
Payne, et al. argued that “injuries were more predictive of organisational safety 
climate than safety climate was predictive of injuries...and that the injury safety 
climate relationship is stronger for organisational climate than psychological 
climate”(Beus, Payne, et al., p. 713), however they acknowledged that the magnitude 
of the temporal ordering effect was weak.  Beus, Payne et al.’s conclusions are based 
on the results of cross-sectional studies using retrospective injury data rather than on 
truly longitudinal data as would have to be the case for the prospective injury data.  
As such, scope remains for future studies to undertake longitudinal research to 
explore these important causal relationships.  
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However longitudinal designs are not without their own methodological issues in 
organisational research. In particular employee attrition, and both theoretical and 
logistical difficulties associated with the timing of collecting prospective injury data 
(whether subjective or objective) from participant companies, is often problematic. 
Too short a time interval between data collect points may compromise effect sizes by 
restricting the range of injury and incident responses, whereas too long an interval 
may result in greater employee attrition and contextual changes due to organisational 
growth or regression. For example, in my study the consistent, and in some instances 
rapid, turnover of both front-line and management employees meant that in two of 
the largest companies key management personnel who had negotiated the contracts 
for prospective data collection, had been head-hunted to different organisation prior 
to the follow-up collection date. The new management team recognised that many of 
the employees who had potentially participated in the research where no longer 
employed; placing the viability of conducting the second data collection and validity 
of objective team injury data provided in question. A further complication was 
experienced when a major and protracted power supply issue was experience across 
industry sectors, resulting in several participant companies standing down or 
retrenching workers, which had the potential to massively inflate attrition and 
fundamentally affect employees’ responses across data collection periods.  In sum, 
both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs have limitations; and while every 
attempt to obtain longitudinal data was made in the data collection phase of my 
research the use of a cross-sectional data is ultimately justifiable.       
 
10.3.3. Analysis 
The choice to conduct my analyses on both individual and group-level data is a 
strength of my thesis, however the use of traditional structural equation modeling 
using the aggregated group data as the base unit rather than more sophisticated 
Multilevel Structural Equations Modelling (ML-SEM: Mehta & Neale, 2005) or 
Multilevel Modeling (MLM) may be considered a methodological limitation. The 
direct aggregation of individual-level data to the group-level and subsequent analysis 
at this level can result in interpretation and statistical errors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007).  However, the decision to use SEM for both individual and group data was 
based largely on my intention to make direct comparisons of models obtained across 
levels of analysis.  
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Additionally, large samples are typically required for both MLM and ML-SEM 
procedures, however when using MLM techniques the sampling criteria are more 
flexible (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). For example in MLM a trade-off exists between 
the number of groups and number of members in each group.  To have adequate 
power of .90, to detect cross-level interactions, a sample of 150 groups with five 
people per group is required; or 30 groups with 30 people per group.  For the 
detection of main effects models the sample size is argued to be slightly less 
(Hofmann, 1997; Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998).  As a form of restricted CFA, ML-SEM 
has equivalent sample size requirements.  However, as the data is nested, the sample 
size is again linked to the number of clusters (n) rather than the total number of 
participants (N).  As such, the minimum number of work-groups required for either 
analysis was approximately 150.  
 
While my sample was not adequate to support these methodological options the 
utilisation of ML-SEM and MLM in future research will extend the rigour of existing 
safety literature in line with current methodological  recommendations (Chan, 1998; 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Mehta & Neale, 2005).  However, in practical terms, the 
likelihood of studies continuing to report individual-level results is high given that 
the data collection procedure and data analysis required for multilevel analysis are 
more complex and challenging.  
    
10.3.4.  Sample Size 
In terms of the individual-level SEM analyses undertaken the employee sample was 
adequate in terms of size and representativeness of the participant organisations on 
characteristics such as gender, age, job types and tenure.  A limitation in my study 
was the relatively small sample size for the group-level analysis.  Athough data loss 
due to the inclusion criteria set for the group analysis (i.e., having at least two valid 
responses from group members) did not appear to affect the representativeness of the 
sample, it did result in a less than adequate sample size for the group-level analysis. 
 
In multilevel research the target units for grouping participant data should reflect the 
conceptual models being tested and subsequently the sampling strategy undertaken 
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should be directed by this hierarchical structure (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998).  In the 
case of my research, sampling strategies were undertaken to ensure adequate 
numbers of functional work-groups (coworker and supervisor group-level constructs) 
and departments/worksites (higher level management constructs) in the total sample.   
 
As the focus of the highest grouping unit directly targeted in my model was 
management at the department level, to truly apply the multilevel approach, the 
sample size and data decomposition should have been based on the number of 
organsiations/departments/ worksites represented rather than on the number of work-
groups in the sample.  While every effort was exerted to obtain a sample that would 
provide adequate numbers of groups within departments, this goal was not ultimately 
achieved.  However when tests for aggregation were conducted at both the 
organisation and work-group levels results indicated that even for the organisation-
level construct (OSC-M) the work-group provided a more appropriate level of 
aggregation. As the referent used in the management scales directed workers’ to 
consider management practices at the departmental/site level further testing at this 
level may show strong within-group  homogeneity and between department 
variability.  
 
Hofmann and Morgeson (1999) discussed two potential analytical issues relating to 
the use of small samples for SEM.  These were the potential bias in, and significance 
of, the maximum likelihood parameter estimates derived, and also the potential 
attenuation of overall assessment of fit.  They provided evidence that in samples as 
small as 50 neither the accuracy of parameter estimates (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) 
or fit indices (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980; Bentler & Chou, 1987) would be adversely 
affected. As my group sample was larger than both this theoretical cut off and the 
group-level sample used by Hofmann and Morgeson, my sample can be considered 
adequate, if not optimal. Given the lack of statistical power available in the group-
level analysis, the significance of results and magnitude of the fit statistics testify to 
the strength of associations observed. 
 
While it appears that the use of group methodologies enhances the relationships 
between constructs, one alternative explanation must be considered.  That is, when 
creating the group data set the decision was made to exclude groups with only one 
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valid response.  This decision had a direct impact on further reducing the sample size 
and may have introduced a systematic bias to the sample.  For example, excluded 
groups potentially had poorer response rates than the retained groups, or had 
adequate response rates but where of smaller size.  Included work-groups, with 
multiple respondents may therefore have a greater degree of group cohesion or a 
more positive interest in workplace safety than is generally found in the 
organisations. 
 
The issue of potential biases due to inclusion criteria is also a concern in relation to 
the use of ICCs or Rwg statistics to exclude groups from analyses. Groups with poor 
ICCs and low Rwg are usually removed from analysis due to the definitional 
inference that respondents within these group do not exhibit an adequate degree of 
shared perceptions.   However a potential issue with this approach is that while 
groups with large within-group variability may have weaker safety climates this does 
not equate to no climate.  If groups with weak climates are subsequently removed 
from the analysis you immediately reduce power in the analysis and potentially lose 
variance and contextual variability amongst the data. This is particularly relevant if 
the analysis undertaken is seeking to investigate the antecedents of climate strength.   
I therefore would argue to retain all functional work-groups but report aggreement 
statistics to appreciate the nature and continuity of group coherence in the sample. 
 
10.3.5. Response Rates 
The smaller than expected sample was largely due to two issues concerning the 
economic and employment conditions in the region over the data collection period.  
The first involves the dropout of several committed organisations and work sites 
from the project due to unforseen economic circumstances (e.g., A corporate take-
over at the proposed time of data collection in one instance and the extended shut 
down of production sites and long-term stand down of workers in the midst of data 
collection due to a major loss of power supply to industries in the region, as 
discussed in section 10.3.2).  
 
Poor response rates in several participant organisations also contributed to the sample 
shortfall.  In particular, the lowest response rates were found for contracting 
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companies operating in the resource and mining industries.  At the time of data 
collection, labour supply issues and high levels of job transience associated with an 
economic boom were affecting industries across the region and in particular those 
operating in the resource sector.  This trend was reflected in the high representation 
of newer and younger workers in the sample and also shows in the discrepancy 
between company tenure and industry experience as highly prized experienced 
workers were able to freely migrate to higher paying jobs.  
 
Low response rates in these organisations were also potentially linked to their remote 
location and the fly-in-fly-out nature of work in these sectors.  Whilst concerted 
efforts were made to inform employees of the project, distribution of questionnaires 
to workers in these two sectors was generally undertaken by company personnel 
rather than the researcher which may have resulted in concerns regarding the 
confidentiality of information.   
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the present study demonstrated several strengths 
which helped it contribute to the literature.   
 
10.4. Research Methodology Strengths 
With regard to the framework of my thesis, a high degree of consideration was given 
to exploring the multidimensional nature of safety in a way that reflects conceptually 
the multilevel structure of organisations. 
 
10.4.1. Sample Heterogeneity 
A strength of this study relates to the sampling strategy applied to facilitate data 
aggregation.  Theme five of the research framework outlined in Chapter 1 focused on 
safety in terms of two aspects of organisational fit: the congruence of the 
organisation with its external environment (how the safety performance of an 
organisation compares to others) and the congruence within the organisation (how 
individuals and groups differ within the organisation).  Conducting inter and intra 
organisational research provides an opportunity to identify similarities and 
differences in safety-related antecedents and outcome variables across and within 
industries.   
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To facilitate external fit analysis, consideration was given to recruiting a variety of 
organisations from different industry groups including the resource, transport, 
construction and manufacturing sectors.  To facilitate examination of internal fit 
functional work-teams and departments were clearly identified in the data collection 
process.  This process resulted in greater heterogeneity in the sample population than 
is usually observed in safety climate research.  Previous studies have utilised 
restricted samples from a limited number of organisational settings.  In contrast, 
participants in this study included employees representing multiple job types from 
organisations of differing size, purpose and structure.  
 
The diverse nature of this sample allowed greater scope for making context specific 
interpretations of results as shown in the presentation of organisation safety climate 
profiles.  Additionally, Cook, Cambell and Paracchoi (1990) have emphasised that 
the external validity of a concept cannot be derived from a single study but from a 
body of research in diverse settings.  Therefore, the contribution of these findings to 
the extant literature pertaining to climates for social exchange and safety, serve to 
enhance the external validity of the constructs.  
 
10.4.2. Group Identification 
During the data collection process care was taken to identify and access group 
structures that aligned with the work-level model proposed. To ensure respondents 
directed their perceptional evaluations to organisational agents associated with their 
specific work group, explicit focal referents were applied in the questionnaire. This 
process was applied to reduce the degree of ambiguity often found in organisational 
surveys and is considered a strength of my study.  However, a supplementary 
analysis undertaken indicated that workers’ perceptions of the size of their functional 
work-group showed no correlation with the actual group size as prescribed in 
organisational records.  That is, from a subjective, individual perspective and an 
objective, organizational perspective team composition was shown to differ, with 
workers generally underestimating their group size.   
 
While it is expected that individuals are likely to base their perceptual evaluations of 
the work-group on a limited number of significant coworkers, the differences 
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observed indicate that what and who constitutes a functional work-group is more 
complex than expected.  For example, who respondents are including and excluding 
may depend on physical or functional proximity.  Alternatively larger group sizes 
could lead to more ingroup-outgroup distinction which may have implications for the 
climate strength of the group.  Consequently the potential impact on research 
findings requires further investigation. 
 
The inference that workers are potentially basing their group climate perceptions on 
smaller groupings than are structurally defined has practical implications for group 
based research.  For example, when developing climate surveys consideration should 
be given to identifying what constitutes each workers’ functional work-group.  
Asking respondents questions about their work-group size and structure prior to 
completing the climate items may prime workers to consider their work-group in a 
more objective manner.   
 
10.4.3. Psychological and Organisational Safety Climate 
In accordance with the multilevel theme of my thesis framework, my intention in this 
study was to analyse explanatory models linking social exchange, safety climate and 
safety outcomes using both individual and group-level data.  This methodological 
approach was intended to facilitate more rigorous examination of the potential 
difference in construct associations obtained when different methodologies are used.  
 
Although the majority of safety research continues to utilise individual-level data to 
examine the relationships between global psychological safety climate (PSC) and 
outcomes, far fewer studies have used aggregated group or organisational-level data 
to investigate organisation safety climate (OSC) either as a global or 
multidimensional construct using appropriate collective referents. Despite meta-
analyses consistently reporting different effect sizes in studies examining 
psychological and organisational safety climate, it remains unclear whether this 
effect has been due to design, data source or level-of-analysis issues. Acknowledging 
the limitation that my study uses retrospective, subjective injury data collected at one 
time period; one of the strengths of my study lies in the opportunity provided to 
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make a direct comparison across data treatment methodologies without the potential 
confounding issues associated with data sources or design.  
 
As an integral part of my thesis, my results draw attention to the theoretical 
importance of understanding organisations in terms of the multilevel nature of their 
internal contexts. I have also attempted to show the utility of climate indices derived 
when using group-level approaches including climate level, strength and variability 
as potential diagnostic tools for safety practitioners and managers. While recognising 
the scope of my study is limited, my results contribute to our understanding of 
construct structures and relationships in models of safety climate by investigating 
both Psychological and Organisational Safety Climate analysed at both the individual 
and group-level. 
 
10.4.4. Minor Injuries and Near Miss Incidents 
As longitudinal, objective injury statistics were not ultimately made available due to 
major changes and disruptions in employment circumstances in the participant 
companies following the main data collection, the use of self-reported injuries and 
near miss occurrences were the only viable source of safety outcome data.  Clarke 
(2006) found that studies using retrospective injury data produced weaker 
associations than studies using prospective data. To optimise construct relations they 
therefore recommended the use of prospective safety outcome measures.  As such the 
use of retrospective data in my study was a potential limitation.  
 
However the studies in Clarke’s (2006) meta-analysis that used prospective data 
generally obtained this data from more objective sources, such as company OHS 
medical records.  All-bar-one of the prospective studies also used group-level 
analysis. In Chapter 3 I argued that the overlap between data source, level of  
analysis and design make generalisations relating to the utility of retrospective and 
prospective data and inferences regarding the temporal ordering of injuries as an 
antecedent of safety climate rather than as an outcome (Beus, Payne, et al., 2010) 
less justifiable.   
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My results for both individual-level and group-level analysis indicate that the 
relationship between safety climate and retrospective injury and near miss data is 
stronger when group-level data is used.  In light of this finding it is likely that 
Clarke’s (2006) results are partially an artefact of the level of analysis applied rather 
than the type of injury data obtained.  Given the results of my study, while the use of 
self-report, retrospective data may not allow researchers to make causal inferences, 
this form of data is both expedient and valid.  
 
Additionally, the strength of the safety outcome effects observed indicates that the 
use of a more comprehensive protocol to obtain LTI, minor injuries and near miss 
frequency data was justified.  In particular, my results showed that far stronger 
effects were found for the relationship observed with near miss incidents compared 
to those with minor injuries.  This finding fits with the established understanding that 
injuries are less common than accidents (Christian et al., 2009) and as such the latter 
potentially offers greater response range.  Overall my results support Christian et 
al.’s call for future research to look more closely at higher frequency safety outcomes 
such as micro accidents (Zohar, 2000) and shows that near miss incidents may yet 
prove an even more useful indicator of safety outcomes.       
 
In terms of the practical implications for researchers, my results showed that the 
simple aggregation of data to the group-level enhances the magnitude of the 
relationship between the constructs improving the likelihood of achieving significant 
results in the analysis.  As such, despite potential drawbacks in reduced effects sizes 
that could realistically be expected when using retrospective, self-report injury data, 
the utility of this information source, especially when including near miss data, 
should not be dismissed but rather considered as an underestimate of effects when 
analysed at the individual- level. 
   
10.4.5. Active and Proactive Dimensions of Safety Behaviour 
In relation to workers’ safety behaviours, adopting a dimensional approach involved 
operationalising and analysing both active and proactive safety behaviours as 
separate aspects of safety performance. As the majority of empirical safety studies 
have gauged safety performance in terms of safety compliance, with few studies 
having examined both active and  proactive behaviours concurrently (Christian et al., 
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2009; S. Clarke, 2006) the use of both measures is a strength of my study and 
contributes to the broader understanding of workers’ safety practices.    
 
Furthermore, a simple shift of referent from self to coworkers expedites the change 
from an individual-level construct to an emergent group climate indicator.  My 
results also showed that while active and proactive dimensions of workers’ safety 
behaviours scale are strongly correlated, different patterns of associations are found 
between each dimension of safety performance and both antecedents such as safety 
climate and injury outcome.   
 
One additional point of theoretical interest was the weak association between safety 
behaviours and safety outcomes observed in the individual-level analysis.  This 
finding was interpreted in terms of the workers’ self-report ratings of safety 
behaviours being susceptible to social desirability response.  However, the impact of 
this effect was shown to be mitigated when the scale was aggregated to the group-
level.  Importantly when active and proactive safety was modelled separately it 
appeared that the response biases were more apparent in the active safety behaviours 
subscale than proactive subscale.   
 
While a close association was observed between the individual safety behaviour 
scales and coworker safety climate scales the influence of self-report biases appeared 
to be reduced in the climate scales.  As such, for both practical purposes (i.e, when 
reporting safety benchmark or diagnostic information to organisations), and research 
purposes, the coworker safety climate scale may ultimately provide a more accurate 
reflection of the normative safety performance of front-line employees.     
 
 
10.4.6. Work-level Model of Safety Climate 
In line with Zohar’s (2010) recommendations, I have argued that the differentiation 
of organisation and group-level dimensions of safety climate should provide greater 
theoretical clarity and analytic utility.  Furthermore, I proposed the inclusion of 
coworker commitment to safety as a group-level dimension of safety climate.  My 
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results have supported the key role coworkers play in the establishment of normative 
safety practices.  
 
The modification of Zohar and Luria’s (2005) model of safety climate to include 
coworker safety practices constitutes one of the major strengths of my thesis.  It 
contributes to the safety literature by expanding the content domain of the construct 
in line with established definitions  (Zohar, 2003, 2008, 2010; Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
In Beus, Payne et al.’s (2010) terms, the inclusion of group-level coworker safety 
practices rectifies the content deficiency prevalent in many scales without increasing 
construct contamination that occurs when including workers’ personal attitudes to 
safety in climate scales.  
 
Importantly, as my results show, the work-level model of safety climate allows 
researchers the opportunity to analyse and report results for either a global or 
dimensional operationalisation of safety climate.  Indeed the organisation of item 
content according to work-level functionality facilitates the inclusion of global safety 
climate in more complex structural models.  In line with recommendations that three 
indicators constitute the optimal number of manifest variables per construct in 
confirmatory analysis (Little et al., 1999), the parcelling of the safety climate scales 
into their theoretically derived domains reduces item diversity to a level at which the 
construct representation will most likely be accurate at the higher order of analysis, 
while improving the power of the overall structural analysis and retaining broader 
domain relevance at the item level. 
 
In addition, the treatment of safety climate as a lower-order multidimensional 
construct representing key macro and micro dimensions adopts the approach 
recommended by Guldenmund (2007) and Zohar (2010). The separation of safety 
climate dimensions at hierarchical levels importantly allows researchers  to tease out 
variations in the chain of psycho-social influence (Oliver et al., 2002).   Furthermore 
my results showed that using the CSA approach to data aggregation provided a 
different factor solution for the management and supervisor safety climate scales.  
These structures provided a more theoretically sound and interpretatively useful tool 
and ultimately resulted in stronger effects and clarified construct relations.  While not 
widely adopted in the safety literature, on the basis of my findings I would argue that 
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respecting the nonindependence of data at the factor examination phase appears to be 
a well-conceived recommendation (Peterson & Castro, 2006; Shannon & Norman, 
2009). The identification of both active and proactive safety climate subscales at the 
three work-levels using the CSA approach to scale formation therefore constitutes 
one of the major strengths of my research. 
 
By modelling active and proactive safety behaviours as separate facets across work-
levels, my intention was to move beyond the typical compliance driven approaches 
to safety to a participative, core value approach.  In a core value approach, personnel 
at all levels of the organisation are encouraged to take ownership of safety issues and 
be proactive in “doing the right thing”(O'Toole, 2002, p.233).  However in terms of 
the practical implications for safety practitioners, managers and workers, it is 
important to establish that endorsing a proactive safety focus does not overshadow 
the significance of understanding and/or promoting compliance behaviours in 
organisations, but rather builds upon this solid base. The separation of active and 
proactive practices across work-levels in the CSA model showed a clearer picture of 
how supervisors and managers influence coworkers’ active and proactive practices in 
different ways. This finding has strong practical implications for management in 
terms of both understanding the processes in operation and also in helping guide 
strategies for change.   
 
In sum, the inclusion of safety-specific content in scales organised around the safety 
practices of agents traversing the organisational hierarchy acknowledges both the 
multidimensional and multilevel nature of safety climate.  Furthermore, the inclusion 
of domain-aligned safety content, with more clearly defined referents, offers 
opportunities for researchers and safety practitioners to track areas of strength and 
weakness in the chain of safety activity, identify incongruent practices across work-
levels and identify tensions in safety priorities between organisational agents.  
Of particular importance was the inclusion of the coworker safety climate scale as an 
indicator of group safety norms. Given the greater potential for positive bias in 
individual performance scores I would argue that a more accurate picture of group-
level worker safety performance may be gauged from the ratings of coworker actions 
than aggregated personal performance scores.   
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10.4.7. Climate for Social Exchange  
My research investigated the utility of social-exchange theory as a common 
theoretical basis for understanding the lateral and vertical workplace interactions 
operating within organisations.  Importantly I operationalised social exchange as a 
foundation climate supporting the development of the more facet-specific safety 
climate.  The incorrect use of referent levels in aggregated data has been identified as 
a problem in multilevel studies (Chan, 1998). Furthermore, imprecise specification of 
management levels (Flin, 2003) and generic organisation referents can create an 
unnecessary degree of ambiguity in questionnaires.  In my study attention was paid 
to the use of specific target referents (coworker, direct supervisor and sectional 
management) in the generation of survey items.  Also, a focus on the collective 
referent (i.e., the group) was used for the climate indicators.  As such the social 
exchange variables had a collective rather than dyadic focus.   
 
As social exchange was conceptualised as an emergent collective construct it was 
important to establish if workers would differentiate between their own dyadic social 
exchanges and group-based exchanges.  Although a direct comparison between 
existing social exchange scales and my modified scales was not conducted, my 
results support the use of the group referent in the social exchange scales.  The 
stronger correlations observed between the social exchange and safety climate 
variables than with individual worker performance support the appropriate 
application of the group-based referents for the social exchange variables.  However, 
without also obtaining direct referent data for the social exchange variables to 
ascertain if workers were making intuitive social comparisons in shifting to a 
collective referent, it was not possible to determine if this is indeed the case.  
 
Research has identified that the social comparisons workers make with other workers 
can also have an influence on workplace outcomes (Vidyarthi, Liden, Anand, 
Erdogan, & Ghosh, 2010).  For example, when workers compared the quality of their 
own relationships with leaders (LMX) and those they perceive their leaders to be 
having with other workers (LMX social comparison) job performance and 
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citizenship behaviours where impacted (Vidyarthi et al., 2010) above the impact of 
the LMX relationship itself.  Vidyarthi et al. concluded that when employees 
interpret their LMX relations with their supervisor as more constructive relative to 
other workers in their group then their performance maybe optimised.  
Correspondingly, negative comparison may result in reduced performance even if the 
LMX relationship is itself perceived as positive.  
  
Likewise, negative effects on both team performance and positive affect have been 
observed when managers and team members disagree about the level of 
organisational support provided to workers (Bashshur, Hernandez, & Gonzalez-
Roma, 2011); with negative consequences being most evident when managers 
perceive support to be greater than team members.  Research on social comparison 
(or perceptual distance) relating to either social exchange or safety climate 
perceptions has yet to be conducted in the safety domain, offering scope for future 
research in this area to provide greater insights into safety practices.   
 
In line with past research my results highlight the important role having quality 
social exchanges amongst employees plays in the formation of workers’ perceptions 
and the establishment of normative safety performance standards (Chiaburu & 
Harrison, 2008). While replication of results is required, the use of appropriate 
collective referents is a further strength of my thesis as it extends the methodological 
rigour of existing climate literature in line with Chan’s (1998) recommendations.  
Overall my results supported the utility of a work-level model of safety that 
incorporates the climate for social exchange as a foundation for the emergence of 
facet-specific safety climate and therefore goes some way towards filling the 
theoretical gaps in the existing safety literature, exposed by Zohar.  While Nahrgang 
et al. (2011) have argued that a supportive environment is critical to workplace 
safety, our understanding of what constitutes such an environment is still developing.   
 
10.5. Practical Implications 
My findings indicate that if organisations are interested in encouraging workers to be 
more proactive in their approach to safety (i.e., by using their initiative in safety-
related situations, forwarding ideas and concerns about safety and generally engaging 
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in constructive safety-related discussion with fellow workers and supervisor) higher 
level management has a direct role to play in this process.  In sum, managers need to 
be more proactive in ensuring they use all the information available to improve 
existing policies, invest time and money in quality training, provide detailed and 
relevant safety information to workers, make every effort to raise the profile of safety 
and be seen to be continually trying to improve safety levels in the organisation. In 
contrast top managers have a less direct role to play in maintaining safety compliance 
norms as responsibility for workers’ active safety practices is better handled at the 
supervisory level where monitoring behaviours and reinforcing procedures has a 
more direct impact on workers’ active safety practices. 
 
In addition, it is important for managers and supervisors to understand that the safety 
norms of the group, represented by established coworker practices, are likely to 
strongly influence individual safety behaviour.  Therefore, to improve safety in the 
workplace, efforts should be exerted by managers and supervisors towards 
understanding the informal pressures exerted by key stakeholders within work-
groups with the intention of directing all workers towards positive safety standards.  
When specific safety training needs are established, work-group based safety training 
and inclusive briefing sessions where consistent messages can be delivered to all 
group members may offer the best opportunities for improving the safety 
environment.       
 
At a practical level, creating level-adjusted safety climate subscales when providing  
organisational diagnostic feedback provides safety researchers, practitioners and 
managers the opportunity to make linkages between the provision and uptake of 
safety services and track breakdowns in safety practices and communications.  For 
example, workers may perceive that managers provide adequate safety training 
options but that coworkers are unwilling to engage in the training opportunities.  This 
tells a very different story from a situation in which workers’ perceive the safety 
training opportunities to be limited but in general are willing to get involved in the 
programs offered. The same form of interpretive utility applies to other processes 
such as communication, incident reporting, risk, manpower planning, monitoring and 
procedures (Guldenmund, 2007). 
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Furthermore, separating workers’ safety behaviours and safety climate into two 
distinct dimensions representing active and proactive safety practices is likely to 
produce a clearer picture of the current focus of safety within an organisation.  This  
should allow safety practitioners to better monitor changes that occur as 
organisations build upon establishing basic compliance practices to focus more on  
prioritising personal ownership of safety as a generic value across all levels of the 
organisation.  As this shift occurs proactive behaviours, previously considered 
discretionary, are more likely to be deemed nondiscretionary by both workers and 
their managers. 
 
Finally, the most potentially important practical implication of my results is that 
establishing high quality social interactions amongst employees at all levels of the 
organisation will assist in the promotion of positive organisation and group-level 
safety climates.  In particular, improving the quality of internal group social 
exchanges between workers, coworkers and supervisors is likely to manifest most 
strongly in the formation and maintenance of compliance based group norms.  In 
contrast, improved social exchanges with higher level management are more likely to 
facilitate greater worker engagement in proactive safety practices.  Furthermore, it is 
important for managers and supervisors to understand that the proximal influence of 
group interactions and coworker commitment to safety are likely to reinforce or 
mitigate the influence of their own safety priorities.  That is to say, the impact of 
more distal supervisory and management safety and leadership practices on 
individual workers’ safety activities is largely dependent on the group priority for 
safety and strength of group consensus to this goal.  
 It is vitally important for managers to understand that workers’ perceptions of the 
quality of workplace social support and the relationships they have with their 
managers and supervisor are closely aligned with their perceptions of those same 
leaders’ commitment to safety.  Consequently, as Nahrgang et al. (2011) have 
inferred, the social support environment is likely to be just as important in promoting 
safety in the workplace as the safety priorities and procedures forwarded by 
management.    
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In practical terms this means that if managers wish to encourage workers to become 
more engaged in workplace safety it is imperative they are honest and transparent in 
their dealings with workers.  Likewise, if managers want workers to use their 
initiative in safety-related situations it is important for managers to show that they 
have a sound understanding of workers’ job needs and problems and can appreciate 
and take into consideration the specific circumstances impacting on workers when 
inevitably mistakes are made.  Finally, when workers see that managers are making 
effective decisions and can trust that management actions are in the best interest of 
both workers and the organisation, they are more likely to reciprocate by taking 
greater personal responsibility for safety in their immediate environment.  In sum 
when workers perceive that managers have a genuine concern for their welfare they 
are likely to respond by not only personally doing the right thing but encouraging 
others to so as well.   
 
10.6. Future Directions 
Having discussed the strengths and limitations of my thesis and offered practical and 
theoretical implications based on the interpretation of my findings the following 
ideas focus on future directions for research based on gaps in the research framework 
present in Chapter 1.  In terms of my overarching research framework Bennett et 
al.’s (2003) sixth theme relates to researchers having an awareness of the core 
tensions involved in maintaining optimal safety within an organisation.  This relates 
to the degree of organisational alignment of adaptive tensions in terms of three main 
dimensions: stability versus chaos; coherence versus diversity and a slack versus 
tight fit.  Safety climate indicators, such as climate strength and variability, go some 
way towards assessing the level of deviance and consensus amongst individuals and 
work-groups. While I have briefly touched on these indices in my description of 
organisational profiles, a major gap in my thesis was not investigating climate 
strength as a focal construct in the explanatory models, either in terms of its impact 
on outcomes or to examine social exchange relations as an antecedent of climate 
strength.   
 
Furthermore, as my research focused solely on front-line workers perceptions of 
social exchange and safety climate dimensions a gap in my research is the neglect of 
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managers’ and supervisors’ viewpoints.  Indeed the alignment across work-levels of 
climate measures, tapping into the core tensions or perceptual distance between 
employees and their managers, may provide an additional index of organisational 
safety climate. These ideas for future research are developed in the following section. 
 
10.6.1. Climate Strength as a Focal Index  
While my research focused on the relationship between social exchange and level of 
safety climate, as has typically been done in the leadership-safety literature (e.g. S. 
Clarke & Ward, 2006; Crichton, 2005; Kelloway et al., 2006; Martinez-Córcoles et 
al., 2011; Wu et al., 2008; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008) an important alternate 
avenue of investigation is to examine how climate for social exchange relates to 
climate strength.  According to Chan’s typology of compositional models when 
using consensus composition model approaches, as applied in this thesis, within-
group variance is treated as error variance.  In such models, if the criteria for 
aggregation are not met in a particular work unit, there is assumed to be a lack of 
agreement within the group and any information from that unit is not consider 
uniform enough to represent a climate per se. These data may then be excluded from 
further analysis or alternatively overall aggregation not supported.  While consensus 
models are the most commonly applied in safety climate research, potentially the 
exclusion of data representing weaker climate perceptions within groups may in fact 
lead to biased findings, as only those units with relatively strong climates are 
retained for examination. 
 
However when dispersion composition models are applied, climate strength becomes 
a highly useful focal index.  For example it may be used as a group or organisation-
level descriptive statistic in combination with climate level as used in this study: as a 
predictor variable, a control variable, or as an outcome in its own right. 
In the dispersion approach, a unit with poor internal consensus remains a valid 
source of information; being viewed as having a weak climate (a potentially 
meaningful point of differentiation from other units), rather than having no climate.  
For example, using the within-group homogeneity statistic as their index of climate 
strength, Luria (2008) identified that both transformational leadership style and 
positive group interactions predict safety climate strength in military units.  Pousette, 
 255 
 Discussion 
 
 
Larsson and Törner (2008) tested the theory that as safety climate represents “a 
property of a social unit” (p.403), the level of agreement in responses (climate 
strength) would be higher for safety climate factors, than for measures of individual 
safety attitudes; such as safety knowledge and motivation.  They found support for 
their hypothesis using ICCs as an index of climate strength.   
 
In contrast, Zohar and Luria  (2005) used standard deviations to measure 
organisational and group climate strength and found that increases in organisational 
safety climate strength were associated with reduced lower level, between-group  
variability and increased group-level safety climate strength.  Following Zohar and 
Luria’s lead Beus, Payne, et al. (2010) also used standard deviation scores to index 
climate strength and identified a curvilinear relationship between organisational 
tenure and safety climate strength, with longer tenure being related to stronger 
climate.   
 
As these few studies testify, further research is required to uncover the antecedents 
and outcomes of climate strength.  Having operationalised the work-level model of 
safety climate one obvious antecedent candidate is the quality of social exchange.  
Following Luria (2008) and Zohar and Luria’s (2005) lead, it would further our 
understanding of the social exchange -safety climate relationship to investigate if the 
climate for social exchange at different work-levels predicts not only climate level as 
found in my study but also climate strength.  
 
In sum, while indices of climate perceptions have expanded to include the 
examination of group consensus amongst workers and dispersion of their responses 
across organisations, scope remains for future research examine climate strength as 
focal construct in safety climate studies.  Furthermore, while a growing interest in 
issues concerning group consensus in safety climate research has been shown, the 
examination of potential differences in perceptions of safety climate between 
workers, supervisors and managers has attracted less attention.  Several approaches 
may be taken to explore potential work-level differences including: examining 
differences in how managers, supervisors and workers conceptualise the construct; 
assessing organisation-wide hierarchical differences on aggregated safety climate 
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ratings; and investigating within-group manager and worker alignment as described 
in the following sections.  
 
10.6.2. Work-level Differences in Safety Climate 
 
10.6.2.1. Factor structure stability  
As safety climate research has typically focused on workers’ perceptions of safety 
climate at an individual- level of analysis, research investigating potential differences 
in how workers and managers conceptualise the construct has been relatively sparse.  
However, in line with generic climate research trends within the broader 
organisational literature (Glick, 1985: Hackman, 2003), the need to understand factor 
structure and consistency across respondent groups and identify differences in 
climate levels across work units is gaining more research attention.   
 
When comparing constructs across work-levels an important first step is to check the 
continuity of factor structures.  To date few studies (Harvey, Bolman, & Gregory, 
1999; Harvey et al., 2002; McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000) have 
examined whether employees across work-levels conceptualise safety climate in a 
similar way.  Harvey, Bolan and Gregory concluded “that the basic 
conceptualisations of safety differ between management and employees, and 
potentially from plant to plant” (1998, p.11).  In particular they identified differences 
in both factor solutions obtained for safety culture items for managers and workers 
and relative mean scores across the identified factors.  
 
Of the few studies that have assessed work-level differences in the safety domain , 
the practice of not examining factor structures for different work-levels has been 
commonplace, with researchers generally collapsing information across work-levels 
for factor examination before assessing mean differences in work-level categories as 
supplementary analyses.  However, in defence of this practice, few studies have had 
the sample sizes required at each work-level (especially managers and supervisors) to 
support factor analysis as best practice would prescribe.  Therefore, further research 
is recommended to ascertain if safety climate factor structures are stable across 
work-levels. 
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10.6.2.2. Safety Climate Alignment  
Furthermore, the few studies that have reported work-level differences using a mean 
difference approach (S Clarke, 1999; S. Clarke, 2004; Mearns, Flin, Gordon, & 
Fleming, 1998; Prussia, Brown, & Willis, 2003) have all used individual-level data.  
To date no safety climate research has taken into consideration group-level effects 
(i.e., differences between workers, their supervisors and managers in each work 
team) such has been applied when deriving  team-leader perceptual distance 
(Gibson, Cooper, & Conger, 2009) in organisational research.   
 
Scope therefore exists for the investigation of work-level similarities and differences 
in line with Zohar’s (2010) recommendation for using group-level data as the base 
unit of analysis.  That is, by looking more closely at what managers, supervisors and 
workers in any work unit report that they do, compared to what others in their work 
unit perceive them doing, we may enhance our understanding of  the overall and 
unit-level alignment of safety climate.  The triangulation of employee perceptions 
within the work-group would also help resolve any issues of common method 
variance as the group-level data would be obtained from different sources.   
 
Team-leader perceptual distance (Gibson et al., 2009), represents the difference 
between team member ratings and their managers’ ratings of key organisational 
climate measures.  Recent studies have identified that differences in climate for 
organisational support (Bashshur et al., 2011), goal accomplishment and constructive 
conflict (Gibson et al., 2009) can impact on team performance, such that greater 
differences between stakeholders is associated with reduced performance.  However, 
no studies have examined the issue of differences in climate conceptualisation or 
perceptions across work-levels in the safety domain in this manner. 
 
One pattern-level characteristic, proposed by Zohar (2010), which may influence 
employees’ perceptions of safety climate, is the alignment between espoused and 
enacted safety priorities, which can be interpreted as the congruence between an 
organisational agent’s words and actions.  If a lack of alignment between the 
formally stated policies and procedures and the explicit actions of company agents is 
observed by workers it would be expected that the level of safety climate would be 
compromised.  For example, a high degree of alignment between espoused policy 
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and enacted safety practices would demand that managers and/or supervisors not 
only talk the safety talk, but walk the safety walk.  
 
As safety climate is considered as a social construct (Rochlin, 1999), attention is 
focused on the employees’ consensual interpretation of the enforced policies and 
enacted practices, rather than on the espoused set of formal policies or procedures in 
and of themselves (Zohar, 2003).  However, while obtaining subjective measures of 
the enforced safety policies and enacted practices of organisational agents is the 
purpose of safety climate questionnaires, options to capture espoused policies and 
practices other than objective evaluations of policy documents and procedural 
manuals are limited.  One option I wish to propose for future research is based on the 
correspondence between workers’ perception of organisational agents’ safety 
practices (for managers and supervisors) and those same agents’ self-ratings.   
 
As illustrated in Figure 10.2, at the work-unit level, safety climate alignment would 
represent the difference between what a supervisor or manager acknowledges doing 
and what workers in their unit perceive them as doing.  While a highly subjective 
measure, in view of self-protection biases, we would expect leaders to report a 
relatively high level of compliance with company policy, and therefore the disparity 
between ratings to represent a meaningful incongruence between policy and practice.  
Such a measure would extend the utility of work-level differences in safety climate 
in a manner consistent with team-member perceptual distance (Gibson et al., 2009) 
currently being used in climate research.  Furthermore it would potentially provide a 
new focal safety climate construct for descriptive and predictive purposes.    
 
To determine if, and to what degree, systematic biases are operating across work-
levels of the organisation, a 360 degree reporting structure would be required in 
questionnaire development. When utilised in the research design, small response 
differences would indicate greater alignment of opinions across work-levels (i.e., less 
team-leader perceptual distance), stronger cohesion and overall a stronger safety 
climate.  Alternatively large differences in opinions would be indicative of a weaker 
overall safety climate. 
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Figure 10.2. Alignment for group and organisational level espoused and enacted 
safety climate measures. 
Note: OSC-M= Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; ISB-M= Individual Safety Behaviours -
Mangers;  GSC-S=Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; ISB-S= Individual Safety Behaviours - 
Supervisors; GSC-C= Group Safety Climate- Coworkers;ISB-W= Individual Safety Behaviours- 
Workers 
 
A recommendation for future research is therefore to examine similarities and 
differences in safety climate dimensions across organisational work-levels by using 
both individual-level data and group-level data collected from front-line workers, 
their supervisors and managers.  I propose that the measurement of climate strength 
and variability at the group, department or organisational level as described by Zohar 
and Luria (2005) could be further enhanced by the measurement of an additional 
climate indicator, tapping the alignment of management’, supervisors’ and workers’ 
perceptions of safety climate. The triangulation of data from different organisational 
sources would provide opportunities to compare and expand the safety literature in a 
manner not previously undertaken. 
 
 
 
260 
Work-level Safety Model 
 
10.7. Conclusion 
My investigation of how workers’ perceptions of the safety commitment of 
managers, supervisors and coworkers combine to influence individual workers’ 
active and proactive safety behaviours and outcomes such as minor injuries and near 
miss incidents within the broader workplace environment of social relations  goes 
some way towards answering Zohar’s (2010) recent call for safety research to shift 
its focus away from definitional issues to functional processes and explanatory 
models using a level-of-analysis approach.  My research adopted a multilevel 
analytical approach that acknowledged the nested nature of individuals within 
organisational settings and allowed the examination of the differing levels and the 
relative strengths of foundation and safety-specific climate indicators within and 
between employee groups.  Importantly, my results indicate that the use of near miss 
incident information provides a valid safety outcome measure with greater response 
range and variability than generally observed in accident and injury data. 
 
By undertaking two separate series of analyses utilising a global and a dimensional 
conceptualisation of safety climate I have established the predictive utility of the 
proposed work-level model of safety climate in a variety of statistical and theoretical 
applications.  In line with past research in the field my results indicate that as a 
global construct safety climate is a strong predictor of both individual safety 
behaviours and safety outcomes.  However, when separating out the safety climate 
dimensions a clearer picture of the nature and strength of associations between 
constructs emerges.     
 
In particular my findings indicate that differences in construct factor structures and 
the strength of observed associations in structural models can emerge with the simple 
aggregation of data.  While the results of my individual-level analysis generally 
supported the hypothesised construct relationships for both the global and 
dimensional models of safety climate tested, in all instances the group-level analysis 
provided stronger and more interpretable findings.   
 
In sum, my findings add weight to the argument that establishing a supportive 
working environment in which employees engage in quality social exchanges and 
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safety is prioritised across all the levels of the organisation is instrumental in 
reinforcing both the importance of rule compliance and encouraging workers to 
engage in more proactive safety activities.  My findings support the important role 
that managers and supervisors play in promoting a positive safety environment, 
however they also indicated that coworker interactions and safety practices also play 
a crucial role in consolidating both compliance and proactive safety norms. 
 
My results showed that when undertaking safety climate research the choice of 
methodology used is likely to influence findings and must be taken into 
consideration at the earliest stages of project development.  While the pattern of 
modelled associations between climate for social exchange, safety climate, worker 
behaviours and safety outcomes were found to be relatively robust whether 
individual or group-level analysis are undertaken, the aggregation of data is likely to 
facilitate stronger effects.  However these results require further replication.  My 
concluding recommendation is that while using the group as the unit of analysis can 
be both logistically and statistically more demanding the benefits to safety 
researchers warrants the effort required to collect the larger samples needed.  Such 
efforts and application will ultimately improve the theoretical rigour of findings 
within the safety literature. 
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Appendix A: Sample Questionnaire 
Safety Climate Survey 
Information about this survey. 
 
 The survey you are asked to complete provides you the opportunity to share your views on a 
range of work-related safety issues. Your participation in this survey will allow researchers the 
opportunity to investigate how employees’ perceptions of the safety climate in their company 
influence workers’ safety behaviour and injury rates.  Management at [this organisation] support the 
project and agree that all information provided will be anonymous and confidential.   
 The survey takes approximately 20 minutes to complete.  Questions in the survey ask about 
different aspects of safety in your job, including your own approach to safety and your opinions about 
the safety behaviours of management, supervisors and other workers in your organisation.  There are 
no trick questions.  If some of the questions appear repetitive, this is to ensure that we have adequately 
obtained your viewpoint.   
 All responses will be treated in the strictest confidence. Your name is not required on the 
survey. Other possible identifying details such as age, gender, tenure and job type are asked to allow 
statistical analysis of specific research questions. However, only averaged and general feedback will 
be provided to management, ensuring no individual can be directly or indirectly identified.   
Management at [this organisation] agree to have no access to completed questionnaires or individual 
responses.  
 The questionnaire has two identifying codes on it. One is to allow your information to be 
matched with your work team, including your direct supervisor.  This code has been applied by the 
researcher and is not known to the company.  The second is your personal code, which will be used to 
match your information when safety surveys are conducted in the future. 
 Your participation in the study is voluntary and your decision to participate or withdraw 
from this research may be done freely at any time.  By completing the survey you indicate that you 
have understood what the research involves and have consented to take part.  Once you have 
completed the survey please seal it in the reply paid envelope provided and mail it directly to Curtin 
University.   
 The survey has been designed as part of a Doctoral project, supervised through the School of 
Psychology at Curtin University of Technology.  Approval for the study has been given by the Curtin 
University Human Research Ethics Committee and only the researcher and her immediate supervisors 
will have access to the completed questionnaires.   
 
 If at any time you have any queries or concerns regarding the survey, please contact the 
researcher, Fiona Geddes on (08) 93817098 or email fionageddes@westnet.com.au. Professor Clare 
Pollock may also be contact at Curtin University on (08) 9266 7279. If needed, verification of ethics 
approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research Ethics 
Committee, c/- Office of Research and Development, Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box 
U1987, Perth 6845 or by telephoning (08) 92662784. 
 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
 
Please Remember 
 
All responses are strictly CONFIDENTIAL  
DO NOT print your name on the survey 
 
PLEASE TURN OVER TO BEGIN 
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Part A 
 
The following section asks you to consider a series of statements about 
“Top level management” in your [department/site/organisation]. 
Please rate your level of agreement with each statement by circling your 
answers on the scales provided. 
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 Top Management in this [department/site/company]… Agreement 
1 Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about safety hazards  1 2 3 4 5 
2 Insists on thorough and regular safety audits and inspections 1 2 3 4 5 
3 Tries to continually improve safety levels in each department 1 2 3 4 5 
4 Provides all the equipment needed to do the job safely 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Is strict about working safely when work falls behind schedule 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Quickly corrects any safety hazards (even if it’s costly) 1 2 3 4 5 
7 
Provides detailed safety reports to workers (e.g. injuries, near 
accidents) 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 
Considers a person’s safety behaviour when promoting people-
rewards safe working 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 Requires each manager to help improve safety in their department 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Invests a lot of time and money in safety training for workers 1 2 3 4 5 
11 Uses any available information to improve existing safety rules 1 2 3 4 5 
12 Listens carefully to worker’s ideas about improving safety 1 2 3 4 5 
13 Considers safety when setting production speed and schedules 1 2 3 4 5 
14 Provides workers with a lot of information on safety issues 1 2 3 4 5 
15 
Regularly holds safety-awareness events (e.g. presentation 
ceremonies) 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 Gives safety personnel the power they need to do their job  1 2 3 4 5 
17 
Emphasize the importance of reporting all safety accidents and near 
misses 
1 2 3 4 5 
18 Are honest and “up front” in their dealings with employees  1 2 3 4 5 
19 Understand employees’ job problems and needs 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Recognise the contributions of employees 1 2 3 4 5 
21 Can be trusted to do what is best for employees   1 2 3 4 5 
22 Take personal responsibility for their mistakes 1 2 3 4 5 
23 
Make decisions that employees feel confident to defend to other 
workers 
1 2 3 4 5 
24 
Have effective working relationships with employees in this 
organisation 
1 2 3 4 5 
25 Show genuine concern for the welfare of employees 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please indicate which of the behaviours by management listed above do you consider to be; 
1) the most important to ensuring a high level of safety in your organisation 
2) the areas that require most improvement 
You may list more than one item for each heading 
 
 Item Numbers 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Importance       
Improvement       
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Part B 
The following section asks you to consider a series of statements about 
the behaviours of your direct supervisor.  Please rate your level of 
agreement with each statement by circling your answers on the scales 
provided. 
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 My direct Supervisor… Agreement 
26 
Makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the job 
safely 
1 2 3 4 5 
27 Frequently checks to see if we are all obeying safety rules 1 2 3 4 5 
28 Discusses how to improve safety with us 1 2 3 4 5 
29 Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely 1 2 3 4 5 
30 Emphasises safety procedures when we are working under pressure 1 2 3 4 5 
31 Frequently tells us about the hazards in our work 1 2 3 4 5 
32 Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule 1 2 3 4 5 
33 Is strict about working safely when we are tired or stressed 1 2 3 4 5 
34 Reminds workers who need reminders to work safely 1 2 3 4 5 
35 
Makes sure we follow all the safety rules (not just the most 
important ones) 
1 2 3 4 5 
36 
Insists that we obey safety rules when fixing equipment or 
machines 
1 2 3 4 5 
37 Says a “good word” to workers who pay special attention to safety 1 2 3 4 5 
38 
Is strict about safety at the end of the shift, when we want to go 
home 
1 2 3 4 5 
39 Spends time helping us learn to see problems before they arise 1 2 3 4 5 
40 Frequently talks about safety issues throughout the work week 1 2 3 4 5 
41 
Insists we wear our protective equipment even if it is 
uncomfortable 
1 2 3 4 5 
42 Encourages workers to report all safety accidents and near misses 1 2 3 4 5 
43 Lets all members of the team know where they stand with him/her 1 2 3 4 5 
44 Understands our teams job problems and needs 1 2 3 4 5 
45 Recognises the potential of all employees in our work group 1 2 3 4 5 
46 Uses his/her available power to solve our work related problems  1 2 3 4 5 
47 
Would “bail out” team members at his/her own expense if they 
really need it? 
1 2 3 4 5 
48 
Makes decisions that team members would defend and justify to 
other workers 
1 2 3 4 5 
49 
Has effective working relationships with employees in our work 
group 
1 2 3 4 5 
50 
Has a genuine concern for the welfare of employees in our work 
group  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please indicate which of the behaviours by your supervisor listed above do you consider to be; 
1) the most important to ensuring a high level of safety in your organisation 
2) the areas that require most improvement 
You may list more than one item for each heading 
 
 Item Numbers 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Importance       
Improvement       
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Part C 
 
The following section asks you to consider a series of 
statements about the behaviours of your fellow workers.  
Please rate your level of agreement with each statement by 
circling your answers on the scales provided. 
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 Co-workers in my team… Agreement 
51 Refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule 1 2 3 4 5 
52 Always wear protective equipment even if it is uncomfortable 1 2 3 4 5 
53 
Are prepared to question co-workers who are not following 
safety rules 
1 2 3 4 5 
54 
Monitor each other when tired or stressed to ensure no-one is 
working unsafely 
1 2 3 4 5 
55 Look out for each other’s personal safety 1 2 3 4 5 
56 Follow correct safety procedures when using equipment 1 2 3 4 5 
57 Co-operate with  supervisors to develop better safety practices 1 2 3 4 5 
58 Use their initiative to help solve safety related problems 1 2 3 4 5 
59 
Get involved in the safety training programs provide by 
management 
1 2 3 4 5 
60 Make suggestions on how to improve job safety  1 2 3 4 5 
61 
Share information about safety hazards with supervisors and 
each other 
1 2 3 4 5 
62 Keep themselves informed about safety related issue 1 2 3 4 5 
63 Discuss ideas about how to continually improve safety 1 2 3 4 5 
64 
Speak highly of those workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
1 2 3 4 5 
65 
Report all safety related accidents and near misses as soon as 
they occur 
1 2 3 4 5 
66 Express opinions on safety matters even if others disagree 1 2 3 4 5 
67 “Cover up” for one another when safety rules are not followed 1 2 3 4 5 
68 Let each other know where they stand  1 2 3 4 5 
69 Understand each other’s job problems and needs 1 2 3 4 5 
70 Respect each other’s capabilities 1 2 3 4 5 
71 Help each other solve work related problems   1 2 3 4 5 
72 
 “Bail each other out” at their own expense when someone 
really needs it 
1 2 3 4 5 
73 
Have confidence in each other’s decisions such that they defend 
them to others 
1 2 3 4 5 
74 Have effective working relationships with each other 1 2 3 4 5 
75 Show a genuine concern for each other’s welfare  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Please indicate which of the behaviours by your co-workers listed above do you consider to be; 
1) the most important to ensuring a high level of safety in your organisation 
2) the areas that require most improvement 
You may list more than one item for each heading 
 
 Item Numbers 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Importance       
Improvement       
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Part D 
The following section asks you to consider a series of 
statements about your own behaviours.   
Please rate your level of agreement with each statement by 
circling your answers on the scales provided. C
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 I… Agreement 
76 Refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind schedule 1 2 3 4 5 
77 Always wear protective equipment even if it is uncomfortable 1 2 3 4 5 
78 
Am prepared to question co-workers who are not following 
safety rules 
1 2 3 4 5 
79 
Monitor myself when I am tired or stressed to ensure I am 
working unsafely 
1 2 3 4 5 
80 Look out for my co-workers personal safety 1 2 3 4 5 
81 Follow correct safety procedures when using equipment 1 2 3 4 5 
82 
Co-operate with  my supervisor to develop better safety 
practices 
1 2 3 4 5 
83 Use my initiative to help solve safety related problems 1 2 3 4 5 
84 
Get involved in the safety training programs provide by 
management 
1 2 3 4 5 
85 Make suggestions on how to improve job safety  1 2 3 4 5 
86 
Share information about safety hazards with supervisors and co-
workers 
1 2 3 4 5 
87 Keep informed about safety related issue 1 2 3 4 5 
88 Discuss ideas about how to continually improve safety 1 2 3 4 5 
89 Speak highly of co-workers who pay special attention to safety 1 2 3 4 5 
90 
Report all safety related accidents and near misses as soon as 
they occur 
1 2 3 4 5 
91 Express my opinion on safety matters even if others disagree 1 2 3 4 5 
92 “Cover up” for co-workers when safety rules are not followed 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Part E       In this section you are asked to record as accurately as possible the number of times 
you have experienced the following types of injuries in the last 6 months. Please record the number 
of injuries experienced for all three levels of severity:   
Types of Injuries 
Minor 
(Requiring company first 
aid) 
Lost-time Injury 
(Inability to work one full 
shift / day or more after 
injury ) 
Near Miss 
(Almost sustained an injury) 
e.g.Bruises & Crushing 5 0 2 
Fractures & Dislocations    
Sprains & Strains  
(including Back injuries) 
   
Bruises & Crushing    
Superficial wounds 
(Scratches and abrasions) 
   
Open wounds (Cuts, 
lacerations & punctures) 
   
Burns & Scalds    
Eye Injuries    
Concussions & other head 
injuries 
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Part F     Background Questions 
 
The following questions are very important for properly analysing and understanding the information 
once it has been combined together.  Please be assured that all responses will be kept strictly 
confidential by the principal researcher at Curtin University.  
 
Please complete the following details by entering or circling the appropriate response: 
 
93 Your year of birth (year) 19__ __ 
94 Your gender 
1 
2 
Male 
Female 
95 
What year did you first start with this 
Company? 
(year) __ __ __ __ 
96 What year did you start your current job? (year) __ __ __ __ 
97 
 What is the highest educational level you 
attained? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
Primary 
Secondary Yrs 8-10 
Secondary Yrs 11-12 
Certificate 
TAFE/College 
5 
6 
7 
 8 
Apprentice/Trade  
University degree  
Masters/PHD 
Other  
98 
What type of job do you currently 
perform? 
Job 
Title 
__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ 
99 
How would you rate the likelihood of 
you being injured in your job? 
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8        9       10 
Very low                                                               Very high  
100 
How would you rate the relative hazard 
level in your job?  
1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8        9       10 
     Very low                                                           Very high  
101 What is your job category? 
 
1 
2 
 
Full-time 
Part-tine 
    3 
    4 
Casual  
Contractor 
102 
What location do you currently work 
from?  
Site __ __ __ __  __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __  
103 
How many years of experience do you 
have in this industry? 
Years __ __  
104 
How many people are in your work 
team? 
Team  __ __ __ 
 
 
105 
 
To retain your anonymity we would ask 
you to create a personal code which will 
allow us to match your information in 
future surveys.  
  
The code is made by combining the first 
3 letters of your mother’s maiden name 
and the day of the month on which you 
were born.   
 
 
 
 
 
Your 
Code 
Eg       Smith    7th Oct 1956   =   S M I 0 7  
 
 
___   ___   ___   ___   ___ 
  
Now that you have finished, please go back and check to see that you have answered all the questions. 
Then seal your questionnaire in the reply–paid envelope and post it directly to Curtin University. 
 
Remember all information is confidential 
Please return your completed survey as soon as possible.  Thank you 
for your participation - your opinion is important to us. 
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Appendix B: Climate for Social Exchange Scale Modifications  
 
The following three tables show the comparative wording and item inclusion for 
original and modified social exchange scales. 
 
Table A1 Leader-Member Exchange Scale Adaptation 
Original LMX 7* Modified LMX 
To what extent; My direct supervisor; 
Do you know where you stand with your 
supervisor or (know how satisfied/ 
dissatisfied your supervisor is with you  
Lets all members of the team know 
where they stand with him/her 
Does your supervisor understand your 
job problems and needs 
Understands our teams job problems and 
needs 
Do you feel your supervisor recognises 
your potential 
Recognises the potential of all employees 
in our work group 
Would your supervisor be personally 
inclined to use their available power to 
solve problems in your work 
Uses his/her available power to solve our 
work related problems  
Can you count on him/her to “bail you 
out” at his/her expense when you really 
need it? 
Would “bail out” team members at 
his/her own expense if they really need 
it? 
Do you have confidence in your 
supervisors decisions such that you 
would defend and justify them even if 
they were not present to do so 
Makes decisions that team members 
would defend and justify to other 
workers 
How effective would you characterise 
your working relationship with your 
supervisor.  
Has effective working relationships with 
employees in our work group 
 Has a genuine concern for the welfare of 
employees in our work group  
Note * Graen & Uhl-Bien (1995) as used by Hofmann & Morgeson (1999) 
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Table B2. Manager-Member Exchange Scale Adaptation  
Short version POS* Modified MMX 
To what extent does /is; 
 
Top Management in this department/site; 
The organisation strongly considers my 
goals and values 
Are honest and “up front” in their 
dealings with employees  
Help available from the organisation 
when I have a problem 
Understand employees’ job problems 
and needs 
The organisation is willing to help me 
when I need a special favours 
Recognise the contributions of 
employees 
The organisation takes pride in my 
accomplishments at work 
Can be trusted to do what is best for 
employees   
The organisation value my contribution 
to its wellbeing 
Take personal responsibility for their 
mistakes 
The organisation tries to make my job as 
interesting as possible 
Make decisions that employees feel 
confident to defend to other workers 
The organisation cares about my 
opinions 
Have effective working relationships 
with employees in this organisation/work 
team 
The organisation really cares about my 
well-being 
Show genuine concern for the welfare of 
employees 
The organisation cares about my general 
satisfaction at work 
 
Note * 9 items from short version POS (Eisenberger et al., 1986) used by Hofmann & Morgenson (1999). 
Negative worded items are omitted.   
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Table B3. Group-Member Exchange Scale Adaptation  
TMX* Modified GMX 
 Coworkers in my team: 
 
Do other members of your team usually 
let you know when you do something 
that makes their jobs easier (or harder)? 
(Reciprocal) 
Let each other know where they stand  
How well do other members of your 
team understand your problems and 
needs? 
Understand each other’s job problems 
and needs 
How well do other members of your 
team recognise your potential? 
Respect each other’s capabilities 
In busy situations, how often do other 
team members ask you to help out? 
(Reciprocal) 
Help each other solve work related 
problems   
How flexible are you about switching job 
responsibilities to make things easier for 
other team members? 
 “Bail each other out” at their own 
expense when someone really needs it 
How willing are you to help finish work 
that has been assigned to others? 
(Reciprocal) 
Have confidence in each other’s 
decisions such that they defend them to 
others 
How often do you make suggestions 
about better work methods to other team 
members? 
Have effective working relationships 
with each other 
 Show a genuine concern for each other’s 
welfare  
Note * 7 items from TMX (Seers et al., 1995) Reciprocally worded items indicated but not included.   
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Appendix C: Sample Prior-Notification Sheet  
Employee Survey 
A doctoral research student from Curtin University of Technology has approached Organisation to 
conduct a study investigating how the commitment of management, supervisors and workers to safety 
influences safety outcomes such as accident and injury rates in our organisation.   
 
Organisation recognises our community responsibility to contribute to ongoing research and believes 
the study is worthy of our support.  
 
Participation simply involves you filling in a short questionnaire, which should take around 20 
minutes.  As participation is voluntary, you are under no obligation to complete the survey.  
 
It is important for you to understand that while Organisation is committed to ensuring the needs and 
concerns of its staff are identified, and where appropriate, acted on, your responses in this study will 
be completely confidential. You are not required to provide your name on the survey, ensuring all 
responses are anonymous.  
 
A reply paid envelop, to return completed surveys directly to Curtin University, will be provided to 
ensure that no one at Organisation will know who has or has not completed a questionnaire. All 
information will be independently analysed by the researcher at Curtin University of Technology.  
 
It has also been agreed that feedback from the survey will be provided in a final summary of average 
or grouped responses and Organisation will not have access to ANY responses you make as an 
individual.  
 
The survey is intended to provide valuable information to help us understand the safety climate in our 
organisation. It also offers you the opportunity to share your views on a range of safety-related issues. 
The more responses received the more valid the findings will be.  
 
Your contribution to this research is important and will be greatly appreciated.   
 
The survey will be distributed on Date next week .  Please return your completed survey by Date next 
two weeks. 
 
If you have any queries about the survey please feel welcome to contact Organisation Representative 
or the researchers directly on the numbers listed below. 
 
Thank you for your consideration of this request. 
 
 
 
Organisational Rep Details 
Position 
Contact 
 
 
Fiona Geddes    Associate Professor Clare Pollock 
B Science (Psychology)   School of Psychology 
(08)9381 7098    Curtin University of Technology 
fionageddes@westnet.com.au  (08) 92667279 
 
Approval for this study has been given by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee. If needed, verification of 
ethics approval can be obtained either by writing to the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, c/- Office of 
Research and Development, Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U1987, Perth 6845 or by telephoning (XX) 
XXXXXXXX. You may also contact Professor Jan Piek (XX) XXXXXXX, as an independent representative of Curtin 
University of Technology. 
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Appendix D: Sample Feedback Agreement 
 
 
Research Data Feedback Agreement 
 
 
 
This agreement is between the researcher, a Doctoral student from the School of 
Psychology at Curtin University of Technology, and the management of 
Organisation. 
 
 It is agreed that the following may be provided to management and 
employees at Organisation: 
 
1. An executive summary of the study’s findings and conclusions. 
 
2. A report detailing data averages, frequencies and distribution statistics 
for each of the variables in the study. To safeguard against possible 
indirect identification of employees these will be provided in 
collapsed demographic categories. 
 
 
 It is agreed that the above be provided on or before Date. 
 
 It is agreed that the student facilitates a survey feedback session to 
management, supervisors and selected staff representatives on or before Date. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________   ____________________________ 
Fiona Geddes      Organisational Rep  
PHD Candidate     Position 
Curtin University     Company 
 
 
Date        Date 
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Appendix E: Individual-Level Analysis and Scale Distributions 
Hypothesis 10 proposed that the influence of global safety climate on self-reported 
safety outcomes will operate through the individual safety behaviours of workers.  
Figure E.1 depicts the hypothesised mediation model.  Two alternative models are 
also tested: the full model, specifying both direct and indirect effects between safety 
climate and safety outcomes; and the direct model in which safety climate is 
hypothesised to directly influence both individual safety behaviours and injuries and 
incidents. In all the SEM analyses, maximum likelihood estimation was applied and 
the hypothesised models were compared for fit against the theoretical model for the 
null hypothesis (Sobel & Bohrnstedt, 1985).  To comply with recommendations 
regarding the evaluation of nested models (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980; Hair et al., 
2006; Kline, 2005) multiple fit indices were used.   
 
 
Global Safety 
Climate
Individual 
Safety 
Behaviour
Individual  
Safety 
Outcome
NMI
e
OSC-Me
GSC-Se
GSC-CAe
GSC-CPe
ISB-A
e
ISB-P
e
Injuries
e
 
 
Figure E.1. Mediation model of the predictive relationship between global safety 
climate, individual safety behaviours and safety outcomes.   
 
 
The individual-level models were tested on the total sample.  Only cases with valid 
data on all safety climate, individual safety behaviours and both injury and incident 
data were included in the analysis (N=318).  Twenty two cases (6%) had missing 
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data for one or more variables and one case with extreme injury data was removed.  
Table E.1 shows the descriptive statistics, scale reliabilities and zero order 
correlations for the safety climate, individual safety behaviours and injury and 
incident variables. Bivariate correlations amongst the safety climate dimensions 
ranged from .49 to .70. The highest correlation was observed between the two GSC-
C active and proactive subscales.  Of note is the pattern of bivariate correlations 
observed for both the injury and near miss incident data.  While significant negative 
correlations are found between the safety climate and safety outcome data, the 
bivariate correlations between individual safety behaviours and both outcomes are 
weaker than anticipated. 
 
Table E.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-Order Correlations for 
Individual-level Safety Climate, Safety Behaviour and Safety Outcomes.  
Variable Mean SD Items α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 OSC-M 3.79 0.78 17 .95        
2 GSC-S 3.78 0.82 17 .96 .67**       
3GSC-CA 3.82 0.82 6 .88 .49** .52**      
4 GSC-CP 3.85 0.77 6 .90 .53** .57** .70**     
5 ISB-WA 4.19 0.67 12 .83 .43** .43** .66** .54**    
6 ISB-WP 4.06 0.72 12 .87 .44** .46** .51** .59* .67**   
7LogINJ 0.197 0.33   -.20** -.13* -.12* -.12* -.08 .02  
8 LogINC 0.184 0.40   -.18** -.12* -.13* -.10 -.14* -.08 .45** 
Note. N=318; α = Cronbach’s Alpha; *p<.05, **p<.01,  
 
Model fit statistics and results of the chi-square difference tests undertaken are 
displayed in Table E.2.  The independence model was easily rejected.  Assessment of 
fit indices for the full model indicated that this model provided a reasonable fit to the 
data. However, inspection of modification indices indicated that the addition of an 
error covariance between OSC-M and GSC-S would substantially improve fit.  All 
models were therefore rerun with the error covariance between OSC-M and GSC-S 
freed.  Fit indices for the full model with freed error covariance indicated that this 
model provided a good fit. The mediation model and equivalent direct path model 
(proposing no direct effects between individual behaviours and safety outcomes) 
provided an equally good fit, with neither model showing substantial improvement 
over the full model.   
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With fit equivalence across models, attention is turned to the structural coefficients 
for the SEM, as reported in Table E.3.  Examination of the structural equations 
showed the standardised parameter estimate between GSC and ISB was statistically 
significant in all models indicating that ratings of safety climate are a strong positive 
predictor of individuals’ self-reported safety behaviours.  The direct pathway from 
safety climate to safety outcomes was statistically significant in both the full model 
and direct pathway model indicating that positive perceptions of safety climate are 
associated with lower rates of self-reported injury and incidents.   
 
Table E.2 Assessment of Fit and Model Differences for Predictive Models of 
Global Safety Climate, Safety Behaviour and Safety Outcomes 
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
Independence (#1)  
 
 1587.04*** 28 - - - - 
Full (#2) 
 
 115.05*** 17 .94 .93 .05 .13 
(.11,.16) 
Fullwith error (#3)  
 
 59.75*** 16 .97 .96 .04 .09 
(.07,.12) 
Mediation with error (#4) 
 
 63.00*** 17 .97 .96 .05 .09 
(.07,.11) 
Direct with error (#5) 
 
 60.94*** 17 .97 .96 .04 .09 
(.06,.11) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #1-#5  1526.1*** 11     
 Difference (Δχ2) #2-#3  55.3*** 1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #3-#4  3.25     1     
 Difference (Δχ2) #3-#4  1.19     1     
Note.  N=318; χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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In both the full and mediation models the direct pathway betweenindividual safety 
behaviours and outcomes failed to reach statistical significance, curtailing the 
possibility of ISB acting as a mediator.  Furthermore the positive direction of the 
association between ISB and ISO found in the full model is contrary to prediction 
(0.28, Z=1.47, p>.05).  When the direct relationship between safety climate and 
outcomes was constrained in the mediation model the parameter estimate for ISB to 
ISO reversed direction (-0.17, Z= -1.40) indicating that rather than operating as a 
mediator, in this instance, ISB may be acting as a suppressor variable.  Finally the 
indirect effects of safety climate on safety outcomes were not significant.  
 
Table E.3 Parameter Estimates for Models Predicting Safety Outcomes  
 
Path 
Full Model  Mediated Model  Direct Model  
 St Unst SE St Unst SE St Unst SE 
Direct Effect         
GSCISB  0.84 0.98*** 
(0.79,1.17) 
.097 0.84 1.00*** 
(0.80,1.19) 
.099 0.84 0.99*** 
(0.80,1.18) 
.098 
ISBISO 0.28 0.13ns 
(-0.04,0.31) 
.089 -0.17 -0.05ns 
(-0.12,0.02) 
.036    
GSCISO -0.45 -0.25* 
(-0.45,-0.04) 
0.11    -0.22 -0.10* 
(-0.18,-0.02) 
.042 
Indirect Effect          
GSCISO 0.24 0.13ns 0.09 -0.14 -0.05ns .040    
Total Effects          
GSCISO -0.21 -0.12** .042       
Note. N=318; GSC= Global Safety Climate, ISB= Individual Safety behaviour, ISO= Individual safety 
Outcome; St= Standardised; Unst = Unstandardised; Estimate 95% confidence interval in parenthesis, 
SE=Standard Error, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
The different total effects of global safety climate on individual injuries and incidents 
provided in the Ksi matrix are reported in Table E.4.  Results indicate a marginally 
stronger predictive relationship between the rate of near miss incident reporting and 
safety climate than between climate and injuries.  To determine the practical 
significance of the findings, disturbance terms for the endogenous variables in the 
model were assessed.  The percentage of explained variance for ISB was 70% and 
for safety outcomes 4.9% in the direct model.  While the effect size for predicting 
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safety outcomes is small, the large effect size for ISB reinforces current opinions that 
the safety behaviours of individual workers may be explained by safety climate. 
 
Table E.4 Total Effects for Global Safety Climate Predicting Safety Outcomes  
 
Total Effects                ISB ISO 
  Active Proactive Injuries Incidents 
GSC      
Unst  1.00*** 1.00*** -0.05 -0.11* 
SE  .10 .11 .04 .04 
Note. GSC= Global Safety Climate, ISB= Individual Safety behaviour, Incidents= Near Miss 
Incidents; Unst= Unstandardised; SE=Standard Error,  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
When considered in combination, the results for the individual-level analyses support 
the notion that a direct relationship exists between safety climate and safety 
outcomes such as injuries and near miss incidents, rather than a mediated relationship 
through individual safety behaviours.  The full mediation model proposed in 
Hypothesis 10 was therefore not supported.  Standardised structural coefficients for 
the final direct effects model are presented in Figure 8.2. Also reported are the error 
terms and modelled error covariance between GSC-S and OSC-M. 
 
Global Safety 
Climate
Individual 
Safety 
Behaviour
Individual  
Safety 
Outcome
.51
OSC-M
.62
GSC-S
.58
GSC-CA.30
GSC-CP.30
ISB-A
.28
ISB-P
.37
Injuries
.59
NMI
.84
-.22
.26
.85.65
.84
.84
.62
.79
.64
.70
 
Figure E.2. Direct model with significant standardised coefficients for global 
safety climate, individual safety behaviours and safety outcomes.   
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Appendix F: ICC Calculations for CSA Aggregation 
 
Table F.1. CSA aggregation ICC and ANOVA results for Coworker Safety 
Climate and Social Exchange Scales Items.  
 
Item 
 
ICC ANOVA 
1 Refuse to ignore safety rules when work falls behind 
schedule 
0.04 F(79,297)=1.23, p=.128 
2 Always wear protective equipment even if it is 
uncomfortable 
0.27 F(79,297)=2.38, p<.001 
3 Are prepared to question co-workers who are not following 
safety rules 
0.11 F(79,297)=1.48, p=.014 
4 Monitor each other when tired or stressed 0.11 F(79,297)=1.45, p=.020 
5 Look out for each other’s personal safety 0.15 F(79,297)=1.71, p=.001 
6 Follow correct safety procedures when using equipment 0.13 F(79,297)=1.52, p=.009 
7 Co-operate with supervisors to develop better safety 
practices 
0.11 F(79,297)=1.63, p=.003 
8 Use their initiative to help solve safety related problems 0.07 F(79,297)=1.44, p=.020 
9 Get involved in the safety training programs provide 0.20 F(79,297)=1.92, p<.001 
10 Make suggestions on how to improve job safety 0.06 F(96,297)=1.33, p=.056 
11 Share information about safety hazards with supervisors 
and each other 
0.05 F(79,297)=1.18, p=.179 
12 Keep themselves informed about safety related issue 0.09 F(79,297)=1.29, p=.079 
13 Discuss ideas about how to continually improve safety 0.11 F(79,297)=1.46, p=.017 
14 Speak highly of those workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
0.08 F(79,297)=1.28, p=.083 
15 Report all safety related accidents and near misses as soon 
as they occur 
0.02 F(79,297)=1.13, p=.245 
16 Express opinions on safety matters even if others disagree 0.14 F(79,297)=1.63, p=.003 
17 Cover up for one another when safety rules are not followed  Not included 
18 Let each other know where they stand * F(79,297)=0.91, p=.692 
19 Understand each other’s job problems and needs 0.08 F(79,297)=1.44, p=.020 
20 Respect each other’s capabilities 0.04 F(79,297)=1.20, p=.156 
21 Help each other solve work related problems 0.04 F(79,297)=1.32, p=.060 
22 Bail each other out at their own expense when someone 
really needs it 
0.06 F(79,297)=1.38, p=.035 
23 Have confidence in each other’s decisions such that they 
defend them to others 
0.07 F(79,297)=1.40, p=.031 
24 Have effective working relationships with each other 0.11 F(79,297)=1.62, p=.003 
25 Show a genuine concern for each other’s welfare 0.11 F(79,297)=1.50, p=.011 
Note. * An ICC value could not be computed for this item. The following warning produced-The final Hessian 
matrix is not positive definite although all convergence criteria are satisfied. 
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Table F.2. CSA aggregation ICC and ANOVA results for Supervisor Safety 
Climate and Social Exchange Scales Items.  
 
Item 
 
ICC ANOVA 
1 Makes sure we receive all the equipment needed to do the 
job safely 
0.14 F(79,302)=1.63, p=.003 
2 Checks to see if we are all obeying safety rules 0.15 F(79,302)=1.59, p=.004 
3 Discusses how to improve safety 0.11 F(79,302)=1.43, p=.021 
4 Uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act 
safely 
0.15 F(79,302)=1.59, p=.005 
5 Emphasises safety procedures when we are working under 
pressure 
0.10 F(79,302)=1.33, p=.053 
6 Frequently tells us about the hazards 0.09 F(79,302)=1.31, p=.065 
7 Refuses to ignore safety rules when work falls behind 
schedule 
0.15 F(79,302)=1.64, p=.003 
8 Is strict about working safely when we are tired or stressed 0.17 F(79,302)=1.69, p=.001 
9 Reminds workers who need it to work safely 0.12 F(79,302)=1.45, p=.018 
10 Makes sure we follow all the safety rules 0.21 F(96,302)=1.99, p<.001 
11 Insists that we obey safety rules when fixing equipment or 
machines 
0.10 F(79,302)=1.29, p=.074 
12 Says a "good word" to workers who pay special attention to 
safety 
0.16 F(79,302)=1.69, p=.001 
13 Is strict about safety at the end of the shift 0.18 F(79,302)=1.79, p<.001 
14 Spends time helping us learn to see problems before they 
arise 
0.16 F(79,302)=1.72, p=.001 
15 Frequently talks about safety issues 0.15 F(79,302)=1.61, p=.003 
16 Insists we wear our protective equipment 0.08 F(79,302)=1.36, p=.043 
17 Encourages workers to report all safety accidents and near 
misses 
0.18 F(79,302)=1.85, p<.001 
18 Lets all members of the team know where they stand 0.14 F(79,302)=1.60, p=.004 
19 Understands our teams job problems and needs 0.11 F(79,302)=1.49, p=.012 
20 Recognises the potential of all employees in our work group 0.18 F(79,302)=1.89, p<.001 
21 Use their available power to solve our work related 
problems 
0.09 F(79,302)=1.40, p=.028 
22 Would "bail out" team members at his/her own expense if 
they really need it 
0.12 F(79,302)=1.50, p=.011 
23 Makes decisions that team members would defend and 
justify to other workers 
0.17 F(79,302)=1.74, p=.001 
24 Has effective working relationships with employees in our 
work group 
0.19 F(79,302)=1.95, p<.001 
25 Has a genuine concern for the welfare of employees in our 
work group 
0.14 F(79,302)=1.62, p=.003 
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Table F.3. CSA aggregation ICC and ANOVA results for Management Safety 
Climate and Social Exchange Scales Items.  
 
Item 
 
ICC ANOVA 
1 Reacts quickly to solve the problem 0.19 F(79,304)=1.86, p<.001 
2 Insists on thorough and regular safety audits 0.18 F(79,304)=1.82, p<.001 
3 Continually improves safety levels 0.14 F(79,304)=1.65, p=.002 
4 Provides all the equipment needed 0.20 F(79,304)=1.98, p<.001 
5 Are strict about working safely when work falls behind 
schedule 
0.22 F(79,304)=2.10, p<.001 
6 Quickly corrects any safety hazards (even if it's costly) 0.17 F(79,304)=1.73, p=.001 
7 Provides detailed safety reports to workers 0.07 F(79,304)=1.15, p=.220 
8 Considers a person's safety behaviour when promoting 0.18 F(79,304)=1.80, p<.001 
9 Requires each manager to help improve safety in their 
department 
0.15 F(79,304)=1.75, p<.001 
10 Invests a lot of time and money in safety training 0.23 F(96,304)=2.20, p=.001 
11 Uses any available information to improve existing 
safety rules 
0.18 F(79,304)=1.87, p<.001 
12 Listens carefully to worker's ideas about improving 
safety 
0.15 F(79,304)=1.64, p=.003 
13 Considers safety when setting production speed and 
schedules 
0.17 F(79,304)=1.75, p=.001 
14 Provides workers with a lot of information on safety 
issues 
0.23 F(79,304)=2.15, p<.001 
15 Regularly holds safety-awareness events 0.11 F(79,304)=1.50, p=.011 
16 Gives safety personnel the power they need to do their 
job 
0.14 F(79,304)=1.62, p=.003 
17 Emphasize the importance of reporting all safety 
accidents and near misses 
0.13 F(79,304)=1.69, p=.001 
18 Are honest and "up front" in their dealings with 
employees 
0.20 F(79,304)=1.92, p<.001 
19 Understand employees' job problems and needs 0.16 F(79,304)=1.66, p=.002 
20 Recognise the contributions of employees 0.16 F(79,304)=1.73, p=.001 
21 Can be trusted to do what is best for employees 0.20 F(79,304)=1.91, p<.001 
22 Are understanding when employees make honest 
mistakes 
0.12 F(79,304)=1.42, p=.024 
23 Make decisions that employees feel confident to defend 
to other workers 
0.17 F(79,304)=1.72, p=.001 
24 Have effective working relationships with employees 0.10 F(79,304)=1.38, p=.035 
25 Show genuine concern for the welfare of employees 0.13 F(79,304)=1.60, p=.004 
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Appendix G: Group-Level Scale Distributions 
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Appendix H: Incremental validity test of Co-worker Scales 
To test if the inclusion of coworker commitment to safety in a global 
conceptualisation of safety climate representing management and supervisor safety 
climate a series of supplemental hierarchical MRAs were conducted on the 
individual level data, and both ILSA  and CSA data for injury, near miss, worker’s 
active safety behaviours and worker’s proactive safety behaviours.   In all analysis at 
step one of the hierarchical regression management (AOSC-M) and supervisor 
commitment to safety (AGSC-S) entered and coworker subscales (AGSC-CA or 
AGSC-CP) at Step 2.  Results including changes in incremental variance, 
unstandardised (B) and standardised (β) regression coefficients, and squared semi-
partial correlations in the hierarchical MRAs are reported in Table form.  
 
For the individual level data results for the injury outcomes indicated that while the 
predictive power of the model at step one was significant R
2
=
 
.05, F (2, 316) = 9.06, 
p < .001, 
 
that when the two safety climate - coworker subscales where entered into 
the analysis the incremental variance was not statistically significant Δ R2= .001, Δ F 
(2,314) = 0.23, p = .793.  Results for the near miss incident outcome also indicated 
that the predictive power of the management and supervisor safety climate subscales 
in the model when entered in step 1 was significant R
2
=
 
.04, F (2,316) = 5.82, p = 
.003. However again, when the two safety climate - coworker subscales where 
entered into the analysis at step two, the incremental variance was not statistically 
significant Δ R2= .004, Δ F (2,314) = 0.57, p = .565.   
 
In contrast when the active and proactive safety behaviours of workers were used as 
criterion variables, coworker safety climate showed significant incremental variance 
at Step 2 in both hierarchical MRA procedures (Active: Δ R2= .23, Δ F (2, 314) = 
66.58, p < .001; Proactive Δ R2= .14, Δ F (2,314) = 36.64, p < .001). In combination 
safety climate variables accounted for 46% of variance in worker’s active safety 
behaviours and 39% of variance in proactive safety behaviours. 
 
For the ILSA data results for the injury outcomes indicated that while the predictive 
power of the model at step one was significant R
2
=
 
.13, F (2, 74) = 5.72, p = .005, 
 
that when the two safety climate - coworker subscales where entered into the analysis 
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the incremental variance was not statistically significant Δ R2= .02, Δ F (2,72) = 0.75, 
p = .475.  Results for the near miss incident outcome also indicated that the 
predictive power of the management and supervisor safety climate subscales in the 
model when entered in step 1 was significant R
2
=
 
.15, F (2,74) = 6.64, p = .002. 
However again, when the two safety climate - coworker subscales where entered into 
the analysis at step two, the incremental variance was not statistically significant Δ 
R
2
= .04,
 Δ F (2,72) = 1.60, p = .209.   
 
In contrast when the active and proactive safety behaviours of workers were used as 
criterion variables, coworker safety climate showed significant incremental variance 
at Step 2 in both hierarchical MRA procedures (Active: Δ R2= .29, Δ F (2, 72) = 
25.84, p < .001; Proactive Δ R2= .14, Δ F (2,72) = 12.06, p < .001). 
   
Table H.1. Incremental Variance, Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) 
Regression Coefficients, and Squared Semi-partial Correlations (sr
2
) for Predictor in 
the Hierarchical Multiple Regression for ILSA Group-level Models Predicting Safety 
Outcomes  
 
 
Variable 
GSB 
Active 
  GSB 
Proactive  
 
 B [95% CI] β sr2           B [95% CI] β sr2 
Step 1 Δ R2= .32***                                          Δ R2= .45***  
AOSC-M .13 [-.09, .36] .16 .010  .30 [.09, .51]** .36 .062 
AGSC-S .38 [ .14, .62]** .44 .090  .33 [.11, .54]** .37 .068 
          
Step 2  Δ R2= .29***                                           Δ R2= .14***  
AOSC-M -.08 [-.29, .12]  -.10 .004  .52 [-.16, .26] .06 .001 
AGSC-S .21 [ .02, .40]*  .24 .027  .21 [.02, .41]* .24 .027 
AGSC-CA .49 [ .31, .67]***  .61 .157  .09 [-.10, .28] .11 .005 
AGSC-CP .08 [-.17, .33]  .08 .002  .42 [.16, .67]** .46 .061 
   R
2
= .60***                                                 R
2
= .59***  
Note. N=77; AOSC-M= Aggregated Organisation Safety Climate-Managers; AGSC-S=Aggregated 
Group Safety Climate-Supervisors; AGSC-CA= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers 
Active; AGSC-CP= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; GSB-A= Aggregated 
Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; GSB-P= Aggregated Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; β = 
Standardised regression coefficients; B = Unstandardised  regression coefficients ; Estimate 95% 
confidence interval in parenthesis, sr
2
= squared semi-partial correlations,  *p<.05, **p<.01, 
***p<.001  
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For the CSA aggregated data, management and supervisor safety climate scales were 
both separated into their active and proactive dimensions.  Results for the injury and 
near miss outcomes replicated those found in the ILSA analysis indicated that while 
the predictive power of the overall models were statistically significant the 
incremental variance of coworker safety climate was not statistically significant for 
either the injury (Δ R2= .01, Δ F (2,70) = 0.58, p = .561) or near miss incident 
outcomes (Δ R2= .04, Δ F (2,70) = 1.69, p = .193).  However, when the active and 
proactive safety behaviours of workers were used as criterion variables, coworker 
safety climate again showed significant incremental variance at Step 2 in both 
hierarchical MRA procedures (Active: Δ R2= .26, Δ F (2, 70) = 22.19, p < .001; 
Proactive Δ R2= .13, Δ F (2,70) = 11.73, p < .001). Results are reported in Table H.2 
  
Table H.2. Incremental Variance, Unstandardised (B) and Standardised (β) 
Regression Coefficients, and Squared Semi-partial Correlations (sr
2
) for Predictor in 
the Hierarchical Multiple Regression for CSA Models Predicting Safety Outcomes  
 
Variable  GSB  Active   GSB  Proactive   
 B [95% CI] β sr2           B [95% CI] β sr2 
Step 1 Δ R2= .34***                                          Δ R2= .47***  
AOSC-MA .11 [-.19, .41] .14 .005  .30 [.02, .57]* .38 .034 
AOSC-MP .02 [-.26, .30] .02 .001  .05 [-.21, .30] .05 .001 
AGSC-SA .31 [ .04, .59]* .42 .047  -.19 [-.44, .06] -.25 .017 
AGSC-SP .04 [-.26, .34] .05 .001  .48 [.21, .75]*** .54 .092 
Step 2  Δ R2= .26***                                           Δ R2= .13***  
AOSC-MA -.18 [-.44, .07]  -.23 .011  .08 [-.18, .34] .10 .002 
AOSC-MP -.01 [-.22, .24]   .01 .001  -.02 [-.25, .21] -.02 .014 
AGSC-SA .27 [ .06, .49]*  .37 .037  -.20 [-.42, .02] -.26 .019 
AGSC-SP -.04 [-.28, .20]  -.04 .001  .40 [.16, .64]*** .45 .063 
AGSC-CA .44 [ .23, .64]***  .52 .108  .14 [-.07, .34] .16 .010 
AGSC-CP .19 [-.05, .45]  .23 .015  .37 [.13, .62]** .42 .052 
   R
2
= .60***                                                 R
2
= .60***  
Note. N=77; AOSC-MA= Aggregated Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Active; AOSC-MP= 
Aggregated Organisation Safety Climate-Managers Proactive; AGSC-SA=Aggregated Group Safety 
Climate-Supervisors Active; AGSC-SP=Aggregated Group Safety Climate-Supervisors Proactive; 
AGSC-CA= Aggregated Group Safety Climate- Coworkers Active; AGSC-CP= Aggregated Group 
Safety Climate- Coworkers Proactive; GSB-A= Aggregated Safety Behaviours- Workers Active; 
GSB-P= Aggregated Safety Behaviours- Workers Proactive; β = Standardised regression coefficients; 
B = Unstandardised  regression coefficients ; Estimate 95% confidence interval in parenthesis, sr
2
= 
squared semi-partial correlations,  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
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Appendix I: Individual Level Stratified Social Exchange Model 
This series of model testing was conducted with valid data on all individual safety 
behaviours, safety climate and social exchange scales.  Table I.1 shows the 
descriptive statistics, scale reliabilities and zero-order correlations for the scales.   
 
Table I.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Zero-Order Correlations for 
Individual Safety Behaviours, Safety Climate and Social Exchange Scales 
Variable Mean SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 OSC-M 3.79 0.78 .95         
2 MMX 3.46 0.98 .94 .83**        
3 GSC-S 3.78 0.82 .96 .65** .64**       
4 LMX 3.80 0.90 .93 .48** .56** .78**      
5 GSC-CA 3.82 0.82 .88 .49** .50** .52** .36**     
6 GSC-CP 3.84 0.77 .90 .53** .54** .57** .41** .70**    
7 GMX 3.80 0.73 .90 .31** .37** .30** .33** .59** .56**   
8 ISB-WA 4.19 0.67 .83 .42** .39** .43** .26** .66** .54** .42**  
9 ISB-WP 4.06 0.72 .87 .44** .39** .45** .25** .51** .59** .31** .67** 
Note. N=318; α = Cronbach’s Alpha; *p<.05, **p<.01,  
 
Statistically significant positive bivariate correlations between the social exchange, 
safety climate and individual safety behaviours provide initial support for 
Hypotheses 12, 13 and 14.  Overall stronger correlations are observed between social 
exchange variables and active and proactive GSC-C than between social exchange 
scales and ISB-W subscales.  This trend potentially reflects the use of group-based 
referents for the social exchange variables rather than individual-based referents.   Of 
particular note are the relatively weaker correlations between LMX and both the 
active and proactive components of individual safety behaviours.   
 
As shown in Table I.2 the independence model was easily rejected.  While all three 
models fit the data well chi square difference tests indicated a significant 
improvement in model fit when the pathways between OSC-M and both active and 
proactive GSC-C were included.  This result does not support the full mediation 
model proposed in Hypothesis 12.  Instead the alternate partial mediation model was 
found to provide the most parsimonious solution. 
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Table I.2 Assessment of Fit and Model Differences for the Work-level Model of 
Social Exchange and Safety Climate (Individual-level SEM) 
Model  χ2 
 
df CFI NFI 
 
SRMR RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Fit criteria    >.95 >.95 < .08 < .10 
Independence (#1)  
 
 3020.83*** 36 - - - - 
Mediation (#2) 
 
 33.90* 19 1.0 .99 .03 .05 
(.02,.07) 
Partial Mediation (#3) 
 
 26.40 n.s   17 1.0 .99 .03 .04 
(.00,.07) 
Direct SX (#4)  24.39* 13 1.0 .99 .03 .05 
(.02,.08) 
 Difference (Δχ2) #1-#2  2986*** 17     
 Difference (Δχ2) #2-#3  7.50* 2     
 Difference (Δχ2) #3-#4  2.01 n.s 4     
Note.  N=318; χ2= Chi-square statistic, CFI = Comparative Fit Index, CFI = Normed Fit Index, SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square residual, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 
 
Direct Effects 
Parameter estimates for the direct and indirect pathways between Social Exchange 
constructs, the dimensions of Safety Climate and Individual Safety Behaviours for 
the final model are presented in Table I.3.  In support of Hypothesis 13, examination 
of the unstandardised structural equations for the partial mediation model indicated 
significant positive relationships between MMX and OSC-M; and LMX and GSC-S. 
Significant positive relationships were also observed between GMX and both GSC-
CA and when LMX and MMX were controlled.  Direct effects for the safety climate 
variables were consistent with previous modelling.   
 
With the inclusion of the direct pathways between OSC-M and GSC-CA and GSC-
CP the significant path between OSC-M and GSC-S indicates that on average, a one 
point increase in workers’ ratings management safety climate is associated with a 
0.39 point increase in their ratings of Group Safety Climate at the supervisory level 
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and 0.15 (p < .05) and 0.17 (p < .01) increases respectively for the Active and 
Proactive dimensions of Group Safety Climate- Coworker.  A one unit increase in 
GSC-S resulted in a 0.30 unit increase in GSC-C Active and 0.34 unit increase for 
GSC-C Proactive (p < .001).   
 
In combination these findings indicate that the distal influences of management and 
supervisor commitment to safety indirectly impacts individual safety behaviours 
through the establishment of strong group safety norms represented by coworker 
safety climate, offering partial support for Hypothesis 12.  Furthermore, workers’ 
perceptions of the quality of social exchanges occurring at each level of the 
organisational hierarchy are closely associated with the perception of safety climate 
at the corresponding level such that high quality social exchanges are linked to high 
safety climate ratings supporting Hypotheses 13 and 14. 
 
Indirect and Total Effects 
 
Unstandardised coefficients for the partial mediation model indicated that the 
indirect pathways from OSC-M to ISB-W were statistically significant for both 
Active and Proactive dimensions (0.21, p < .001).  The relationship between OSC-M 
and Coworker Climate was mediated by Supervisor Safety Climate.  Furthermore the 
positive associations between GSC-S and individual workers’ safety behaviours were 
mediated by the corresponding coworker safety climate dimensions.    
 
In relation to the indirect impact of social exchange variables on safety climate and  
individual safety behaviours, the indirect pathways from both MMX  and LMX to 
the two ISB-W dimensions were all statistically significant, small effects, ranging 
from (0.11 to 0.15, p < .001).  Significant indirect effects were also observed for the 
influence of MMX and LMX on Coworker Climate.  The positive indirect 
associations between GMX and individual workers safety behaviours were mediated 
by the corresponding coworker safety climate dimensions. 
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Table I.3 Parameter Estimates for the Work-level Model of Social Exchange 
and Safety Climate (Individual-level SEM) 
 
Path 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
 
 St Unst SE  Unst SE  Unst SE 
MMX          
OSC-M  0.89 0.70*** 
(0.65,0.76) 
.027     0.70*** 
 
.03 
GSC-S      0.28*** .03  0.28*** .03 
GSC-CA      0.19*** .04  0.19*** .04 
GSC-CP     0.22*** .04  0.22*** .04 
ISB-WA     0.13*** .03  0.13*** .03 
ISB-WP     0.15*** .03  0.15*** .03 
LMX          
GSC-S  0.64 0.58*** 
(0.51,0.65) 
.037     0.58*** 
 
.04 
GSC-CA      0.17*** .04  0.17*** .04 
GSC-CP     0.19*** .04  0.19*** .04 
ISB-WA     0.11*** .03  0.11*** .03 
ISB-WP     0.13*** .03  0.13*** .03 
GMX          
GSC-CA  0.59 0.66*** 
(0.54,0.78) 
.059     0.66*** 
 
.06 
GSC-CP 0.50 0.52*** 
(0.41,0.62) 
.053     0.52*** 
 
.05 
ISB-WA     0.44*** .05  0.44*** .05 
ISB-WP     0.36*** .05  0.36*** .04 
OSC-M          
GSC-S  0.38 0.39*** 
(0.31,0.47) 
.042     0.39*** 
 
.04 
GSC-CA  0.15 0.15* 
(0.01,0.29) 
.072  0.12*** 
 
.03  0.27*** 
 
.06 
GSC-CP 0.18 0.17** 
(0.05,0.30) 
.066  0.13*** 
 
.03  0.31*** 
 
.05 
ISB-WA     0.18*** .04  0.18*** .04 
ISB-WP     0.21*** .04  0.21*** .04 
GSC-S          
GSC-CA  0.30 0.30*** 
(0.17,0.43) 
.066     0.30*** 
 
.07 
GSC-CP 0.37 0.34*** 
(0.22,0.45) 
.061     0.34*** 
 
.06 
ISB-WA     0.20*** .05  0.20*** .05 
ISB-WP     0.23*** .04  0.23*** .04 
GSC-CA          
ISB-WA 0.91 0.67*** 
(0.59,0.75) 
.043     0.67*** 
 
.04 
GSC-CP          
ISB-WP 0.75 0.69*** 
(0.59,0.79) 
.051     0.69*** 
 
.05 
Note. St= Standardised; Unst= Unstandardised; Estimate 95% confidence interval in parenthesis, 
SE=Standard Error,  *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
To determine the practical significance of the findings, disturbance terms from the 
structural equations for the endogenous variables in the model were assessed.  In the 
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partial mediation model the percentage of explained variance for all variables are 
considered large effects.  Results indicated that 82% of variance in the Active and 
57% of Proactive safety behaviours of individual workers may be explained by the 
dimensions of safety climate and social exchange.  As a more conservative estimate 
the reduced form equations indicate that total effects of the three social exchange 
variables on individual safety behaviours account for 53% of the variance in Active 
safety behaviours and 36% of Proactive Behaviours.   
 
To understand how both the processes of social exchange and safety climate impact 
on individuals’ safety behaviours it is important to consider the hierarchical 
relationship between the various constructs.  First, the most distal dimension of 
Manager-member exchange has a major impact on management’s commitment to 
safety, explaining 79% of the variance in OSC-M.  The influence of both OSC-M 
and LMX in combination then account for 80% of the variance in GSC-Supervisors.  
When the quality of group member social exchanges is considered in combination 
with the influence of OSC-M and GSC-S over two thirds of the variance in 
coworkers’ safety climate can be accounted for (Active= 67%; Proactive 68%). 
 
Overall the strongest effects were found for the prediction of active over proactive 
safety practices.  These results indicate that while establishing high quality social 
interactions amongst workers at all levels of the organisation will assist in the 
promotion of positive organisation and group-level safety climates, the benefits 
manifest most strongly in the formation and maintenance of compliance related 
group norms.  When considered in combination, the above results indicate that the 
partial mediation model hypothesising the direct influences of more distal 
management safety climate on both active and proactive group-level coworker safety 
climate dimensions is supported, while the full mediation model proposed in 
Hypothesis 12 was not supported.  Furthermore, the proximal influence of coworker 
safety climate fully mediates the influence of more distal supervisory and 
management safety and leadership practices on individual workers’ safety activities. 
The standardised structural coefficients for the final model are represented in Figure 
I.1. 
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Figure I.1.  Significant standardised coefficients for the final partial mediation 
model of social exchange, safety climate and individual safety behaviours.   
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Appendix J: Group-Level Scale Distributions 
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